

# EC9D3 Advanced Microeconomics, Part I: Lecture 1

**Francesco Squintani**

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- **Lecture 1:** Individual Preferences, Utility Representation.
- **Lecture 2:** Utility Maximization, Expenditure Minimization, Demand.
- **Lecture 3:** Revealed Preferences, Choice under Uncertainty.
- **Lecture 4:** Intertemporal Choice, Production, Profit Maximization.
- **Lecture 5:** Cost Minimization, General Equilibrium Introduction.

## Course Outline (2)

- **Lecture 6:** Exchange Economies, Existence, Welfare Theorems.
- **Lecture 7:** Production Economies, Externalities, Incomplete Markets.
- **Lecture 8:** Social Choice, May Theorem, Arrow Theorem.
- **Lecture 9:** Interpersonal Comparisons, Manipulability, Liberty.

- Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston and Jerry Green (1995): *Microeconomic Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Peter C. Ordeshook (2008): *Game Theory and Political Economy: An Introduction*, Cambridge University Press.
- Geoffrey A. Jehle and Philip J. Reny (2010): *Advanced Microeconomic Theory*, FT/Prentice-Hall.

It is the analysis of the **behaviour of individual economic agents** and the **aggregation of their actions** in an **institutional framework**.

- *individual agents*: typically a consumer or a firm (producer);
- *behaviour*: traditionally utility maximization or profit maximization;
- *the institutional framework*: traditionally, the price mechanism in an impersonal market place or a game theoretic setting,
- *the mode of analysis*: equilibrium analysis.

# What do we intend to get out?

- In a **positive sense**: a better understanding of individual agent's behaviour in certain situations.
- In **normative sense**: the ability to intervene or not, both at the government level and at the institutional level.
- The models we analyze are **highly simplified** hence, although they have some general predictive power, they are *not directly empirically testable* (lab environment).
- However, these models represent **the building blocks** of more complex and realistic testable models.

- *The agent*: individual (consumer);
- *The activity*: consume a whole set of commodities (goods and services). We focus on  $L$  commodities  $l = 1, \dots, L$ ;
- *The framework*: *consumption feasible set*

$$X \subset \mathbb{R}^L$$

where  $x \in X$  is a *consumption bundle* which specifies the amounts of the different commodities;

- **Time and location** are included in the definition of a commodity.

# Consumption Feasible Set

Let  $X$  be the set of commodity bundles that the individual can conceivably consume given the **physical constraints** imposed by the environment.

*Example of physical constraints:* Impossibility to have negative amounts of bread, water, . . . , indivisibility.

Constraints may be **physical** but also **institutional** (legal requirements).

*Example: non-negative orthant.*

$$X = \left\{ x \in \mathbb{R}^L \mid x_l \geq 0, \forall l = 1, \dots, L \right\} = \mathbb{R}_+^L$$



# Properties of the Consumption Feasible Set

- 1 **Non-negativity:**  $X \subset \mathbb{R}_+^L$
- 2 **Closed set:** it includes its own boundary;
- 3 **Convexity:** if  $x \in X$  and  $y \in X$  then for every  $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ :

$$x'' = \alpha x + (1 - \alpha)y \in X$$

# Preference Relation

- Each consumer is endowed with *a preference relation  $\succeq$  defined on the consumption feasible set  $X$ .*
- These preferences represent the *primitive* of our analysis.

- The expression:

$$x \succeq y$$

means that *“x is at least as good as y”*.

- From this *weak preference relation* two relevant binary relations may be derived:

# Strong Preference and Indifference Relations

- *The strong preference relation*  $\succ$  defined as follows.

$$x \succ y \quad \text{iff} \quad x \succeq y \quad \text{and not} \quad y \succeq x;$$

- *The indifference relation*  $\sim$  defined as follows.

$$x \sim y \quad \text{iff} \quad x \succeq y \quad \text{and} \quad y \succeq x.$$

① **Completeness:** for every  $x, y \in X$  either  $x \succeq y$  or  $y \succeq x$ , or both.

② **Transitivity:** for every  $x, y, z \in X$  if  $x \succeq y$  and  $y \succeq z$  then

$$x \succeq z.$$

③ **Reflexivity:** for every  $x \in X$

$$x \succeq x.$$

A preference relation satisfying completeness, transitivity and reflexivity is termed *rational*.

## Axioms of Choice (2)

- ④ **Continuity:** the preference relation  $\succeq$  in  $X$  is continuous if it is preserved under the limit operation.

In other words, for every converging sequence of pairs of commodity bundles  $\{(x^n, y^n)\}_{n=0}^{\infty}$  such that

$$x^n \succeq y^n \quad \forall n$$

where

$$x = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} x^n \quad y = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} y^n$$

then

$$x \succeq y.$$

# Alternative Formulations of Continuity

There exist **two alternative formulations** of such axiom.

- ④ **Continuity II:** Given a bundle  $z$  both the **upper contour set**  $\{y \in X \mid y \succeq z\}$  and the **lower contour set**  $\{y \in X \mid z \succeq y\}$  are *closed sets*.
- ④ **Continuity III:** Both the **strict upper contour set**  $\{y \in X \mid y \succ z\}$  and the **strict lower contour set**  $\{y \in X \mid z \succ y\}$  are *open sets*.

## Definition

A **utility function** is a mapping

$$u : X \rightarrow \mathbb{R}.$$

This mapping **summarizes and represents** the preference of a consumer in an *ordinal fashion*.

One of the key results of consumer theory is: **the Representation Theorem**.

## Theorem (Representation Theorem)

If preferences are

- *rational* (complete, reflexive and transitive) and
- *continuous*;

then there exists a *continuous utility function* that *represents such preferences*.

A utility function represents a *preference relation*  $\succeq$  if the following holds:

$$x \succeq y \quad \text{iff} \quad u(x) \geq u(y)$$



# Proof of Representation Theorem

- The proof of such theorem is rather lengthy.
- We prove an **easier theorem** that makes the following extra assumption on the preference relation  $\succeq$ .
- ⑤ **Strong monotonicity:** for every  $x, y \in X$  if  $x \succeq y$  (meaning  $x_l \geq y_l$  for every  $l = 1, \dots, L$ ) but  $x \neq y$  (meaning that there exists an  $l$  such that  $x_l > y_l$ ) then

$$x \succ y.$$

## Theorem (Easier Representation Theorem)

*If preferences are:*

- *rational (complete, reflexive and transitive),*
- *continuous and*
- *strongly monotonic then*

*there exists a continuous utility function that represents them.*

# Proof of Representation Theorem

## Proof:

- Let

$$e = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ \vdots \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

- For given  $x \in X$  let

$$B(x) = \{t \in \mathbb{R} \mid (t e) \succeq x\}$$

be a **restricted upper contour set**, where

$$(t e) = \begin{pmatrix} t \\ \vdots \\ t \end{pmatrix}$$

# Proof of Representation Theorem (2)

- Let

$$W(x) = \{t \in \mathbb{R} \mid x \succeq (t e)\}$$

be the **restricted lower contour set**.

- By **strong monotonicity**:
  - $B(x)$  is **non-empty**;
  - $W(x)$  is **non-empty** since  $0 \in W(x)$ ;

# Proof of Representation Theorem (3)

- By *continuity*:
  - $B(x)$  and  $W(x)$  are *both closed*.
- By *completeness*:
  - the set  $B(x) \cup W(x) = \mathbb{R}$
- By *connectedness* of  $\mathbb{R}$  (divisibility theorem):
  - there *exists* a  $t_x \in \mathbb{R}$  such that  $(t_x e) \sim x$

# Proof of Representation Theorem (4)

## Definition (Utility Function)

$$u(x) = t_x.$$

## Claim

The *utility function*  $u(\cdot)$  represents the preference relation  $\succeq$ . In other words, given  $x \in X$  and  $y \in X$ :

$$u(y) \geq u(x) \quad \text{iff} \quad y \succeq x$$

# Proof of Representation Theorem (5)

**Proof (Sufficiency):** Assume  $u(y) \geq u(x)$

- by definition of  $u(\cdot)$  it implies

$$t_y \geq t_x;$$

- by strong monotonicity

$$(t_y e) \succeq (t_x e);$$

- by definition of  $u(\cdot)$

$$y \sim (t_y e) \quad (t_x e) \sim x;$$

- by transitivity:

$$y \succeq x.$$

# Proof of Representation Theorem (6)

**Proof (Necessity):** Assume  $y \succeq x$ ;

- by definition of  $t_y$  and  $t_x$ :

$$(t_y e) \sim y \quad x \sim (t_x e);$$

- by transitivity:

$$(t_y e) \succeq (t_x e);$$

- by strong monotonicity:

$$t_y \geq t_x;$$

- by definition of  $u(\cdot)$ :

$$u(y) \geq u(x).$$





# Proof of Representation Theorem (7)

- The final step is to prove the *continuity of the utility function*  $u(\cdot)$ .
- *Continuity of  $u(\cdot)$*  means that for any sequence  $\{x^n\}_{n=0}^{\infty}$  with  $x = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} x^n$  we have

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} u(x^n) = u(x).$$

- Notice first that *continuity of the utility function*  $u(\cdot)$  is a more restrictive property of *continuity of preferences*.
- Consider for example

$$v(x) = \begin{cases} u(x) & x_h \leq 3 \\ u(x) + 4 & x_h > 3. \end{cases}$$

# Proof of Representation Theorem (7)

- Therefore we do need to prove continuity of the specific utility function we constructed  $u(x) = t_x$ .
- Consider a sequence  $\{x^n\}_{n=0}^{\infty}$  with  $x = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} x^n$ .
- We prove first that the sequence  $\{u(x^n)\}_{n=0}^{\infty}$  has a **converging subsequence**.
- Monotonicity implies that for all  $\varepsilon > 0$  the utility value  $u(x')$  lies in a compact set  $[\underline{t}, \bar{t}]$  for every  $x'$  such that  $\|x' - x\| \leq \varepsilon$  where  $\|x' - x\|$  denotes the Euclidean distance between  $x'$  and  $x$ .

## Proof of Representation Theorem (8)

- Since  $x = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} x^n$  then there exists  $\bar{n}$  such that  $u(x^n) \in [\underline{t}, \bar{t}]$  for every  $n > \bar{n}$ .
- An infinite sequence that lies in a compact set has a converging subsequence.
- We prove next that all **converging subsequences of  $\{x^m\}_{m=0}^{\infty}$**  are such that  **$\lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} u(x^m) = u(x)$** .
- Assume **by way of contradiction** that there exists a subsequence  $\{x^m\}_{m=0}^{\infty}$  such that  $\lim_{m \rightarrow \infty} u(x^m) = q \neq u(x)$ .

# Proof of Representation Theorem (9)

Consider first the case  $q > u(x)$ .

- Monotonicity implies that  $q e \succ u(x) e$ .
- Consider now  $p = [q + u(x)]/2$  then by monotonicity  $p e \succ u(x) e$ .
- Then there exists  $\hat{m}$  such that for every  $m > \hat{m}$  it is the case that  $u(x^m) > p$  and  $x^m \sim u(x^m) e \succ p e$ .
- Continuity of preferences imply then  $x \succeq p e$  and from  $x \sim u(x) e$  also  $u(x) e \succeq p e$  a contradiction of  $p e \succ u(x) e$ .
- The proof in the case  $q < u(x)$  is symmetric. □

# Preferences without Utility Representation


- Notice that there exists preferences that have *no utility representation*.
- Consider for example the following *lexicographic preferences*:

$$(x_1, x_2) \succ (y_1, y_2)$$

if and only if either  $x_1 > y_1$  or if  $x_1 = y_1$  then  $x_2 > y_2$ .

- Discontinuity follows from the fact that *the upper contour set* and *the lower contour set* are *both neither closed nor open*.

# Lexicographic Preferences



# Local Non-Satiation

Consider a weaker assumption than strong monotonicity, but enough for a Representation Theorem:

- 6 **Local non-satiation:** A preference relation  $\succeq$  is *locally non-satiated* if for every  $x \in X$  and every  $\varepsilon > 0$ , there exists  $y \in X$  such that:

$$\|y - x\| \leq \varepsilon \quad \text{and} \quad y \succ x$$

where  $\|y - x\|$  denotes the Euclidean distance between points  $x$  and  $y$  in an  $L$ -dimensional vector space:

$$\|y - x\| = \left[ \sum_{l=1}^L (x_l - y_l)^2 \right]^{\frac{1}{2}}.$$

# Continuous Utility Function

From now on we shall assume that:


- the consumer's preference relation is **continuous**
- the consumer's preferences **satisfy strong monotonicity (local non-satiation)**,

Hence preferences are representable by a *continuous utility function*.



# Indifference Curves


A relevant feature of a utility function is its *map of indifference curves*:



# Properties of Indifference Curves

- 1 **Downward sloping** (implied by strict monotonicity).
- 2 **Each consumption bundle is part of an indifference curve** (implied by the completeness of preferences).
- 3 **Two indifference curves *cannot cross*** (it violates transitivity):

# Indifference Curves cannot Cross



# Convexity of Indifference Curves

- ④ **Convexity** (to the origin), implied by the *convexity* of the preference relation  $\succeq$ .

## Definition (Convex Preferences)

The preference relation  $\succeq$  is **convex** if for every  $x \in X$  the **upper contour set**  $\{y \in X \mid y \succeq x\}$  is **convex**.

The convexity property of the indifference curves can be restated in the following manner.

# Marginal Rate of Substitution

## Definition (Marginal Rate of Substitution)

The *marginal rate of substitution* is the slope of an indifference curve:

$$\text{MRS} = \left| \frac{dx_2}{dx_1} \right| = \frac{\partial u / \partial x_1}{\partial u / \partial x_2} = \frac{u_1}{u_2}$$

- The convexity to the origin of indifference curves may be interpreted as *diminishing MRS*.
- Alternatively, the indifference curves are convex to the origin if and only if the utility function  $u(\cdot)$  is *quasi-concave*.

# Quasi-Concave Utility Function

## Definition (Quasi-Concavity)

The function  $u(\cdot)$  is *quasi-concave* if and only if the set:

$$\{y \in X \mid u(y) \geq k\}$$

is *convex* for every  $k \in \mathbb{R}$ .

Notice that if you choose  $x$  so that  $k = u(x)$ :

- the set above is the *upper-contour set* of  $x$ ,
- the definition of quasi-concavity of the utility function *coincides with the definition of convexity of preferences*.

# Diminishing MRS


- *Notice* that diminishing MRS is sometimes interpreted as diminishing marginal utility. This is *meaningless*.
- Indeed, given that utility functions are characterized in an ordinal fashion, they are *defined up to a monotonic transformation*: the MRS is independent of monotonic transformation (proof by differentiation).
- Notice that for the same reason *concavity of the utility function  $u(\cdot)$  is meaningless* (subsequent convex transformations of the  $u(\cdot)$ ).

# Homotheticity

- Preferences are **homothetic** if indifference is invariant to scaling up consumption bundles:  $q^0 \sim q^1$  implies  $\lambda q^0 \sim \lambda q^1$  for any  $\lambda > 0$ .
- This imposes no restriction on the shape of any one indifference curve, but all indifference curves have the same shape: those further out from the origin are magnified versions of those further in.
- Marginal rates of substitution are constant along rays through origin.
- Homotheticity holds if the utility function is **homogeneous of degree one**:  $u(\lambda q) = \lambda u(q)$  for  $\lambda > 0$ .
- Up to increasing transformation, this is the only class of utility functions with homothetic preferences.
- Preferences are homothetic if and only if  $u(q) = \phi(v(q))$  where  $v(\lambda q) = \lambda v(q)$  for  $\lambda > 0$ .



# Homothetic Preferences



Income expansion paths are rays through the origin.

- **Quasilinearity** implies that indifference curves all to have the same shape in the sense of being translated versions of each other.
- Indifference is invariant to adding quantities to a particular good.
- Preferences are quasilinear with respect to the  $i$ -th good if  $q^0 \sim q^1$  implies  $q^0 + \lambda e_i \sim q^1 + \lambda e_i$  for any  $\lambda > 0$  and  $e_i$  is the  $n$ -vector with zeroes in all places except the  $i$ -th.
- In terms of the utility function, preferences are quasilinear if and only if  $u(q) = \phi(v(q))$  where  $v(q + \lambda e_i) = v(q) + \lambda$  for  $\lambda > 0$ .

# Quasi-linear Indifference Curves

