BOOK SYMPOSIUM

You Me and the World

NAOMI EILAN

1. Introduction

Serious treatments of the topic of self-consciousness often begin, as does
Christopher Peacocke's, with expressions of some humility relative to
others' efforts in this area, and the sheer difficulty of the topic (something
similar is doubly due, and hereby expressed, when embarking on a brief
discussion of such treatments). One of the many virtues of Peacocke's *tour
de force* of a book is that he shows just how difficult (in his words 'treach-
erous') the terrain is, not least because of the multitude of fundamental issues,
in numerous branches of philosophy, and some in psychology, that one needs
to negotiate when tackling it. A great number of these are woven together by
Peacocke in new ways in the service of the substantive theses he argues for.
Because of connections he makes vivid among different claims in this area,
one cannot but gain much illumination from following him through on the
paths he clears in this minefield, even when doing so helps one become
clearer about particular theses one might question.

To set the scene for the particular issues I will be focusing on in my dis-
cussion of *The Mirror of the World*, consider the following scenario. You are
walking with a friend along a river, in a park neither of you has been in
before. As you walk you each build up a little local map of this new area (the
'world' of the title). Suddenly you spot a kingfisher on a tree on your left and
draw your friend's attention to it. A brief intake of breath, or an exchange of
looks can suffice to establish that your companion has spotted it too, and you
stand admiring it together, mutually aware of each other's attention to the
bird. You, your friend and the kingfisher constitute a joint attention triangle.

One claim Peacocke would make about this scenario concerns the spatial
contents of each of your spatial perceptions before and after the joint atten-
tion sets in. He would say that they include an element of non-conceptual
self-representation. They have contents that are the non-conceptual counter-
part of the contents of judgements such as 'I'm to the right of the kingfisher'.
This non-conceptual counterpart grounds and rationally justifies the
judgement.

A second claim he would make concerns the way each of you is aware of
the other once joint attention has set in. There is no need to invoke any kind
of analogous non-conceptual 'you-awareness' to explain how, on the basis of

our jointly attending to the bird, you are each in a position to use the second person in addressing each other. This is partly because there is no such thing as a *sui generis*, irreducible 'you' thought that you are expressing in using the second person, so nothing to provide a basis for. The account of interpersonal self-awareness provided in Chapter 10 is intended to explain such awareness invoking only third and first person ways of thinking.

In singling out these topics, I am topping and tailing, focusing on the second and penultimate chapters of the book, though in my discussion of the former I will be drawing on some of the claims Peacocke makes in the chapters in between. The two topics are quite different but there is a unifying theme to my discussion of them. In both cases, I will be gesturing at, and inviting Peacocke to respond to, the potential for a simpler, non-iterative account of some aspects self-consciousness, on the one hand, and of the way we are aware of each other in cases such as joint attention, on the other (the 'you and me' of the title). It may help to note in advance, by way of framing the discussion, that the alternatives I will gesture at are meant to be consistent with, and indeed draw on, a large number of the substantive theses Peacocke argues for, in my view compellingly.

My discussion will be structured as follows. In the next section I look at Peacocke's arguments for the need to introduce a notion of non-conceptual self-awareness to explain the contents of our spatial perceptions and the use to which he puts this in explaining various kinds of self-consciousness. I then turn to his account of interpersonal awareness and thoughts expressed using the second person.

2. *Spatial perception and non-conceptual self-representation*

To get going, we should have before us some of the basic definitions Peacocke introduces in the second chapter of the book (further elaborated in the fourth). The first person concept is the concept expressed when you make statements using 'I'. It is individuated by its fundamental rule of reference. Very crudely, this rule is the mental analogue of the token reflexive rule for the linguistic first person, which says that every token refers to its producer. The fundamental rule of reference for the first person concept is every token use of the concept refers to the agent thinking the thought content in which it occurs. Non-conceptual self-representations are the non-conceptual equivalents of such concepts; they refer to the subject of the experiences in the contents of which they occur. Both states have *de se* contents that refer *de jure* to the subject and are described by Peacocke as having the property of subject reflexivity. A substantive point worth stressing in advance about Peacocke's notion of non-conceptual self-representation is this. It is autonomous, and in this sense similar to the notion of non-conceptual self-representation José Bermúdez has argued for, but there is a radical difference. For Bermudez, what such self-representations provide for is awareness of the

'material self as the bearer of physical properties' (Bermudez 1999). For Peacocke, in contrast, awareness of the body and its physical properties is extrinsic to the non-conceptual equivalent of the first person concept, as it is to the first person concept itself. The rule of reference for both the conceptual and non-conceptual versions of 'I' is meant to capture, in Wittgenstein's terms, the nature of our 'I-as-subject' self-awareness.

With this in place, consider now a creature about whom it is right to say that it perceives a tree on its left, a house on its right and a path straight ahead. Given these vectors, often called 'egocentric', we can triangulate back to the creature's location at the time of perception. Call the latter location the creature's 'here'. And let us say that the 'here' refers to the creature's (spatial) point of view. Now suppose, we equip it with the capacity to update its egocentric identifications of locations in a systematic way as it moves relative to them. As it moves, the tree perceived as being on the left is perceived as being straight ahead, say, its earlier 'heres' perceived as being 'theres on the left' and so forth. Correlatively, given these vectors, it is possible to triangulate back to the path it follows, to a temporally and spatially extended 'here', or spatial point of view.

This creature is very close to the kind of creature Peacocke uses to introduce Level 0 self-representation, where his account of the latter is meant to illustrate the conceivability of creatures with conscious perceptions of their environment who are incapable of any kind of self-awareness. The perceptions of both kinds of creatures provide for self-location only in the minimal sense that they are from a 'here'. They do not include reference to the perceiver in their content. They are, in John Campbell's terms, monadic rather than relational (Campbell 2004). They have contents such as 'tree on the left' rather than 'tree on my left' or 'I am to the right of the tree'. However, there is one crucial difference between my creature's perceptions and those of Peacocke's Level 0 creature. The latter's perceptions only yield 'time-indexed atlases', temporally indexed snapshots of egocentrically specified locations. In order for it to be the case that the creature can be credited with a spatially and temporally extended spatial point of view, we must credit the creature with perceptions with Level 1 self-representation, i.e. with perceptions that include non-conceptual self-representations in their contents, non-conceptual analogues of 'I am to the left of the pond'. This is one example of the increased expressive power, which, Peacocke says, comes with the introduction of such self-representation (32).

Why do we need to introduce non-conceptual self-representation to move beyond temporally indexed spatial contents? One kind of response is not, I think, one that Peacocke can, or would want to avail himself of. You might say any updating of egocentric vectors over time requires distinguishing between bodily movements and changes in the world perceived, which in turn requires a variety of non-conceptual representations of one's body, and body parts, and computations over these. And you might hold that

such representations constitute the creature's non-conceptual self-representa-
tion. But, as noted, for Peacocke, representations of the body are extrinsic to
self-representation, representation of oneself qua subject. Moreover, it is
plausible to claim that what is required for such keeping track happens,
for this creature, on a sub-personal level, and Peacocke's non-conceptual
self-representation is meant to be a subject-level feature of the phenomen-
ology of perception.

In level-speak, let us say my creature has Level 0.5 perceptions. There is,
I think, much that Peacocke should find congenial about giving Level 0.5
perceptions a life of their own. For the case for that simultaneously strength-
ens his case for the conceivability of subjects of experience who are incapable
of any kind of self-representation. A far stronger claim, which he would
definitely reject, though, is: this is how we should describe our own spatial
perceptions, e.g. the perceptions you and your companion enjoy on your
walk. For his main arguments in Chapter 2 for the need for non-conceptual
self-representation lie not so much with the limitations of Level 0 creatures
as with claims about our own conscious perceptions. The first, which I
will call the Phenomenological Claim, says we need to invoke such self-
representations in accounting for the spatial contents of perceptions to ac-
count for what our own, mature human conscious perceptions of objects
located in space are like. The second, which I will label the Explanatory
Claim, says we need to appeal to such contents to explain the way in
which our perceptions rationalize judgements such as 'I am to the left of
the tree'. (In fact, in Chapter 4, Peacocke cites four phenomena for which
he thinks positing a non-conceptual self-representation is the best explan-
ation. But the one I am calling the Explanatory Claim is the most pertinent
to our concerns, and is the one which probably goes deepest in the general
account of self-consciousness that Peacocke develops).

The most succinctly expressed explicit simultaneous denial of both claims I
know of is to be found in the following passage in Gareth Evans's *The
Varieties of Reference*:

> . . . a subject can know he is in front of a house simply by perceiving a
> house. Certainly what he perceives comprises no element corresponding
> to 'I' in the judgments 'I am in front of a house': he is simply aware of a
> house. (Evans 1982: 232)

The negative phenomenological claim is there is no representation of our-
selves in the contents of our perceptual experiences. The positive epistemo-
logical claim is nonetheless that they yield knowledge of our location,
expressible in statements such as 'I am in front of the house'. The first con-
flicts with Peacocke's Phenomenological Claim; the second with Peacocke's
Explanatory Claim. I consider these in turn.

I will call the phenomenological component of Evans's claim 'Evans's
Phenomenal Elusiveness Claim'. The claim is that basic perceptual awareness

of the world does not include a representation of oneself. Related claims
have, of course a long history (Evans himself refers to Hume and
Wittgenstein). Evans is no less keen than is Peacocke to block inferences
from phenomenology to metaphysical claims to the effect that the subject
isn't an object at all. One way of stating Evans's Phenomenal Elusiveness
Claim in a way that has no such metaphysical implications is this. Conscious
spatial perceptions have Level 0.5 contents only. They are from a spatial
point of view, which is a location in physical space, the subject's 'here'.
The 'here' refers to what is in fact the subject's point of view when perceiving;
and that is all there is to say about the way the subject of the experience
figures in the contents of the perception. The experiences are from her point
of view.

Now, in the passage quoted above, Evans moves from the claim that noth-
ing in what the subject *perceives* corresponds to the 'I' to the claim that all the
subject is aware of is the tree. Peacocke would accept the first claim but
would reject the second (his own very interesting response to Hume contains
materials for elaborating the first. See pages 44–49). He would, if I have
understood him correctly, say there is, nonetheless, a sense in which our
perceptual experiences of the environment do, contra Evans, include an
'element corresponding' to 'I', namely a non-conceptual self-representation.

Although I think Peacocke has strong phenomenological intuitions, which
are meant to lend independent support to his non-conceptual representation
claim, he doesn't provide much elaboration, referring us, mainly, to the
'many examples' in Gibson's chapter 'The Optical Information for Self-
Perception' (in Gibson 1986). With respect to the link between spatial per-
ception and self-representation, I think he has in mind examples Gibson and
others have used to illustrate the way in which changes in the structure of the
ambient optic array ('visual flow') suffice, on their own, without propriocep-
tive input, to specify the direction, speed and so forth of the perceiver's
movement. A familiar everyday illustration of the workings of optical flow
is the illusion one might have, when in a stationary train, that one is moving,
when a train one sees through the window is moving in the opposite
direction.

I must admit that I find the transition from Gibson to phenomenology
tricky. Precisely the same kind of 'ego-' or 'self-specifying information' is
appealed to in order to explain how fruit flies and other insects steer (and
is also being applied to robots). So the mere applicability of Gibsonian ex-
planations to perceptions doesn't of itself give us clues as to how to describe
the phenomenology, if any, of perceptions thus explained.

All turns on how we explain the pickup of the information, where this will
account for what gives the information self-specific significance for the per-
ceiver, and as far as I can tell there is not much agreement on this front. In the
fly's case it is simple, this will be cashed in terms of hardwired motor re-
sponses. But on some views, the link with action, not necessarily hardwired

(infants acquire it) also exhausts what there is to say about the self-specific significance in our own case. On the other hand, Bermudez thinks he can move directly from Gibson on self-specifying information in the optic flow to the claim that perceptions include non-conceptual representations of ourselves as material beings (Bermudez 1999). And then there is Peacocke's claim that links Gibson to his own account of phenomenal non-conceptual self-representation. It is just not clear, to me at least, what the 'rules of the game' are, and it would be good to hear more about the nature of Peacocke's appeal to Gibson.

To be clear, the issue is not whether the very idea of a non-conceptual self-representation makes sense: for what it is worth I think the case for positing some kind of non- or pre-conceptual self-representation, very close to Peacocke's own, is compelling when describing what is going on in infants' early social interactions. The issue at hand is, rather: how, and on what grounds, do we move from Gibson on the self-specifying information in the optic array to a description of our perceptions that would yield the claim that, contra Evans, we must include a phenomenal non-conceptual self-representation, of the kind Peacocke advocates, in the contents of our spatial perceptions.[1]

In raising these questions, I have been assuming that the phenomenology has, for Peacocke, independent force. In fact, many of his appeals to its existence turn on the explanatory role he thinks it has, and, as noted, I will focus on his claim that we must appeal to such contents to explain the rational justification for perception-based judgements such as 'I am to the left of the tree'. On the general picture, he adopts we should think of the contents of the judgement as the product of a rationally constrained transition from the contents of the perception. Just as we need to appeal to a non-conceptual counterpart of the predicative component ('left of the tree') in explaining the grounding of 'left of the tree' in the judgement, we need the non-conceptual counterpart to 'I' in the contents of the perception to explain the rationality of deploying the first person concept in making the judgement

In contrast, Evans says that I can come to know that I am on the left of a tree, on the basis of my perception, even though the perception has no element that corresponds to the 'I'. Suppose we put the claim this way: all that is required for explaining the justification for the use of the first person concept in knowledge-expressing judgements, is that the perception is from 'here', where 'here' refers to the perceiving subject's point of view. Given that the subject from whose point of view the experience is had is identical

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1 For the claim that appeal to Gibson does not take us beyond monadic contents, see Campbell, 1994, 115–121, who uses this to formulate a puzzle for how we can gain knowledge about ourselves, expressed using the first person, on the basis of perception.

with the subject judging, no further identification of the subject in the content of the perception is needed.[2]

The line one takes on this basic case has further ramifications. Here is a second Elusiveness Claim Evans makes.

[W]hat we are aware of when we know that we see a tree, is *nothing but a tree*. In fact, we only need to be aware of some state of the world in order to be in a position to make an assertion about ourselves. (231)

Suppose we add that the tree is perceived as being on the left. We can then put it as follows: in explaining the justification for a subject's use of the first person concept in judging 'I see a tree on the left', due to the transparency of the contents of perception to introspection, we need only appeal to the same facts we appealed to when explaining the justification of her use of the first person concept in her first-order judgement.[3] For Peacocke, in contrast, just as we need to appeal to non-conceptual self-representations to explain the rational justification of judgements such as 'I am to the left of the tree', we need to appeal to the *de se* contents of the latter to explain the justification for judgements such as 'I see a tree on my left'. Such judgements are based on, and include reference to, states with *de se* contents such as 'I am to the left of the tree'. In self-ascribing a perceptual experience, then, I need to refer to the first person concept employed in my first order judgement. These are cases of reflective self-consciousness, as he defines it (see 213–217).

Whereas for Evans it is 'elusiveness all the way up and down', then, for Peacocke it is 'self-representation all the way up and down'. Somewhat para-doxically, Peacocke's own account of the subject reflexivity of states with content that include the first person concept makes it easier to state elusiveness intuitions clearly, without the obscurities and metaphysical excesses that often accompany them. Moreover, in sketching the elusiveness alternative to his own

2   In his discussion of his Elusiveness Claims, Evans raises the puzzle: 'How can it be that we have knowledge of a state of affairs which involves a substantial and persisting self simply by being aware ... of a state of the world?' (231). His response is to appeal to background knowledge and understanding that must be in place. His account of the necessary understanding includes requirements which for Peacocke are extrinsic to grasp of the first person concept, as he defines it, and which are criticized by Peacocke in his discussion of Williams on Descartes and Strawson on Kant. However, the idea could be re-formu-lated in Peacocke's terms by appeal to the need for a 'self-file' to be in place with the proviso that the file includes 'level 0.5' information.

3   On this view, then, as far as deploying the first person concept goes, the same egocentric spatial perceptions can ground either judgments such as 'I am on the left of the tree' or judgments such as 'I see a tree', without the latter needing to go through reference to the first person concept deployed in the former. In effect, Evans' challenge can be read as the claim that as far as the rationality of using the first person concept is concerned, in explaining the self-ascription of perceptions that locate the subject, we should appeal to the kind of explanation Peacocke suggests holds for the use of the first person concept in the self ascription of pains. (See pp. 214, 216).

account I have borrowed heavily, if crudely, from the general structure of his explanations of immunity from error through misidentification of perception-based 'I' judgements. For what it is worth, the elusiveness 'all the way up and down' fits better with how things seem to me on introspection, as it has to many others before. But introspection is a notoriously devilish guide when it comes to the self, so it cannot be the sole arbiter when comparing the relative merits of these two very different accounts, and it would be good to hear more about why Peacocke thinks his own iterative account is to be preferred.

3. Interpersonal awareness and second person thought

Returning to our walk-in-the-park example: the debate I have been sketching concerns the account we should give of the spatial contents of your, and your companion's, spatial perceptions. Our next question is how should we describe the way you and your companion are aware of each other once you have established, by an exchange of glances or a smile, say, that you are attending jointly to the kingfisher. Peacocke's answer appeals only to first and third person ways of thinking or being aware of oneself and others. The contrasting view says that there is a primitive 'you-awareness' that each of us has of the other in such situations, a kind of awareness that cannot be thus reductively explained. I begin by trying to get clearer about what the dispute is about; then go on to consider how it shows up in another debate Peacocke discusses in this chapter, and end with suggestions about how the two debates connect.

According to Peacocke, the distinctive kind of awareness each of you has of the other in such situations is that you are each aware of featuring as a self-conscious subject in the other's consciousness. He labels this kind of aware-ness 'ascriptive interpersonal self-consciousness'. He introduces his account of this kind of awareness by having us consider a soldier who suddenly becomes aware of being a target for someone he can't see, say on hearing the click of a rifle. The soldier is aware of figuring in someone else's consciousness as a person and hence as a self-representing subject, e.g. as a subject who is thinking 'The man with the rifle is aware of me'. Although this kind of awareness is easy enough to describe informally, as Peacocke argues, and shows, getting its structure right is quite complicated. On the account Peacocke develops, this requires crediting the subject of such self-consciousness with three levels of embedding of the first person concept.

Coming back now to joint attention, according to Peacocke, the difference between the soldier case and cases such as joint attention is that in the latter it is true of each of you that you are interpersonally self-conscious, there is, as he puts it, a symmetry lacking in the solider case, but the fact that you are now in a situation of what people call 'face-to-face interaction' makes no difference to the structure of such awareness. In contrast, someone who believes there is such a thing as a primitive kind of 'you' awareness will insist, first, that the

relation in which you stand to each other in cases such as joint attention does make possible a new way of being aware of each other, and, second, that it is not possible to give an exhaustive account of the way people are aware of each other in such situations in wholly first and third person terms.

We can take this dispute a bit further, and make it somewhat more precise by having before us the following stipulation. Let us say that when people stand to each other in a relation that puts them in a position to address each other using the second person pronoun they stand to each in other in a 'second person relation'. I will say that when people stand in such relations they adopt a 'communicative stance' towards each other. People can be in such a position in virtue of having a conversation with each other, giving and obeying orders, playing at least some games, and, jointly attending to an object. These are the kinds of situations in which Peacocke would say that each person in the relation is in a position to be interpersonally self-conscious. I will take it that someone who, in contrast, believes there is such a thing as a primitive you-awareness, will say the following. Standing in such a relation to another makes possible a kind of *sui generis* way of being aware of the other, which is unavailable in the absence of this relation being instantiated, and which can only be expressed by means of 'you'. I will call this the 'you-indexicality claim'.

Peacocke does not explicitly consider this generalized version of the you-indexicality claim. Rather, he rejects a specific version, which applies to thoughts expressed using the second person; and then defends his rejection against the claim that you-indexicality for such cases is forced on us if we are to explain the communication of thoughts expressed using the second person. In what follows I first set out the basic structure of this particular debate; then say why I think the generalized version is the fundamental one we should be considering; and, finally point to some of the issues raised by a comparison of it with Peacocke's account of interpersonal self-consciousness.

A much cited rejection of you-indexicality for thoughts expressed using the second person, which Peacocke endorses, is Richard Heck's. He writes

Consider the indexical 'you'. As a matter of its standing meaning, an utterance of 'you' refers to the person addressed in that utterance. But in the sense that there is such a thing as a self-conscious, first person belief, there is no such thing as a second-person belief, or so it seems to me … I mean to deny that there is any such thing as an essentially indexical second-person belief. The phenomenon of the second person is a linguistic one … The word 'you' has no correlate at the level of thought … (Heck 2002: 12).

According to Heck, then, there is a kind of thought about oneself one can think only if one is the person thought about; and this precisely mirrors the

conditions for the correct use of 'I' to refer to a person – one can only use it if
one is that person. Such thinking is in this sense essentially indexical. Heck's
claim about the second person is that, in contrast, there is no way of thinking
about a person that can only be employed when conditions for the use of the
second person pronoun are met. This is the sense in which there are no
essentially indexical second person thoughts.[4]

Given the wide variety of contexts in which we in fact employ the second
person, a defender of you-indexicality for such cases will need to motivate a
restriction on what count as the paradigmatic conditions for the use of the
second person. I return later to the motivation but the restriction is already
there in the generalized version. Let us say that the paradigmatic conditions
for use of the second person in address are met when subjects adopt a com-
municative stance towards each other. The you-indexicality claim for
thought says there is a way of thinking of another that is expressed by the
use of 'you' which mirrors these conditions of use, and which can only be
employed when these conditions are met.

As noted, Peacocke does not so much give direct reasons for endorsing
Heck's claim as defend its endorsement against the view that we need to
reject if we are to explain how thoughts expressed using 'you' are commu-
nicated. Suppose S says to A: 'You are trailing sugar on the supermarket
floor.' To understand the statement S must think 'I am trailing sugar on the
supermarket floor'. Following Guy Longworth (2014), I will call the require-
ment the 'coordination claim'. On a proposal developed separately and in
somewhat different terms by Sebastian Rödl and Longworth, the best
explanation of this is that A and S share a thought, an I-you thought,
which S expresses using 'you' and A expresses using 'I'. It is, in this sense,
'a thought for two'. (See Rödl 2007: Ch. 6; Rödl 2014; Longworth 2013.)

The alternative proposed by Peacocke, in his discussion of Rödl's version
of the shared I-you thoughts claim is the following. When S says 'You are F',
to A, each of the participants in the exchange knows that what we have called
the 'coordination claim' holds, and this is reflected in S's intentions in com-
municating, which A picks up on. S intends that A employ the first person
concept in combination with the predicational information conveyed, and A,
in understanding what S intends duly does so. As Peacocke himself puts it:

> The utterer a refers to the first person type of mode of presentation and
> intends, of the instance of it that b is capable of employing in
> thought … that his hearer come to know the Thought that consists of
> it combined with concept <F> in predicational combination (149).

In most cases of face-to-face verbal communication, when we want to
explain what A understands and comes to know when S tells her something,

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4 On 'you-indexicality, see e.g. Longworth 2014, and Eilan 2014. For a critique of Heck, see
e.g. Longworth, 2014, Rödl 2007, Heal 2014, and Hasse 2014.

we appeal to the content of the thought expressed by S. Similarly, when we want to explain what S intends A to pick up on, we appeal only to the content of the thought expressed by S. This does not, on Peacocke's account, hold for thoughts expressed using the second person, and would also, presumably, not hold for thoughts expressed using the first person. In these cases, on his account, we need to introduce instructions, so to speak, in S's communicative intention, about which singular mode of presentation A should employ in picking up on S's thought.

The alternative, I-you sharing approach, retains appeal to the content of the thought expressed by A in explaining what A intends to convey and what S picks up on and comes to know. But it also makes an exception for such thoughts, by building special conditions for successful communication (first person pickup) into its account of what it is to think or grasp the content of the thought expressed.

Both accounts, then, make exceptions, of different kinds, for thoughts that are communicated using the second (and first) person. It seems to me that appeal, at this point, to this or that thought-theoretical framework for accounting for the coordination claim cannot carry the weight of making the case for one rather than another kind of exception-making account.[5] Both can be made to work, in my view, and neither is obviously incoherent. The fundamental issue at stake here arises whether or not the second person pronoun is, in fact, used but turns, rather, on how we should explain the kind of awareness people have of each other when they stand to each other in a relation that warrants the use of 'you' to address each other, which brings us back to issues raised by Peacocke's account of interpersonal self-awareness.

A recurring underlying intuition in various expressions of the generalized 'you-indexicality claim' is that when we stand in second person relations to each other, the other's first person perspective is in some way immediately present to us, in a way that is not captured by appeal to a combination of first person ways of thinking of oneself and third person ways of thinking of the other. I suggest that one way of beginning to articulate the idea is to note that the 'first-person pickup requirement' that holds for the communication of thoughts expressed using the second person also holds for a wide variety of activities or experiences which have what is sometimes referred to as a 'bi-polar' or 'I-you' or 'one towards the other' structure. Examples are A ordering B to do something or A telling B something. For such activities to succeed 'by their own lights', there must be first person uptake by B, accompanied by a reciprocal attitude to A, which would be expressed using 'you'.[6] The radical line I think we need to take if the idea of primitive you-awareness is to so much as get off the ground is to say that the way A is aware of B in such cases

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5 For example, Longworth argues that a Fregean approach to I thoughts can accommodate the shared I-you claim (Longworth 2013).

6 For more on this structure see Rödl, 2014, Eilan 2014.

constitutively depends on B meeting the first-person pickup requirement. In cases where such pickup is on the conceptual level, we need to refer to B's use of the first person concept in meeting this requirement in specifying how things are for A, from her perspective, in thinking about B in this way. That is, there is no saying what is going on in A's mind in such cases without referring to B's use of the first person concept in response to A, and vice versa. The claim would then need to be that it is partly constitutive of what it is to stand in a second person relation to another that it makes possible exchanges that have this structure.

Clearly this is both a very schematic and very minimal first move in articulating the idea that there is a kind of presence of another's first perspective to oneself that cannot be captured by appeal to purely first and third person ways of thinking of the other. Much more would need to be said about how the presence of B's first perspective in A's mind, as so far described, is manifested in the attitudes A adopts towards B, and in the kinds of engagement with A required from B. And if this is to be any help in the case of joint attention, in which A and B are sharing an experience of an object rather than engaged in any kind of activity, we would need an account of the kind of structure I have gestured at which generalizes to such cases. But there is enough here I hope to give a sense both of what I think is the price that needs to be paid here if we are to make good the idea that there is a kind of primitive you-awareness, not captured by Peacocke's account of interpersonal self-consciousness, and also of why Peacocke might be resistant to it.

To take this line seriously is to say that to explain what is going on in each subject's mind when she is aware of another as 'you' we must (i) treat the interaction between the two subjects as the basic unit of analysis and (ii) extract an account of what 'you awareness' consists in from the description of this kind of interaction. Although there is nothing in the picture as so far sketched that conflicts directly with specific claims Peacocke makes in his chapter 'Descartes Defended', it does run against the spirit of Cartesian self-sufficiency expressed in that chapter. For on the account just sketched, at least with respect to one way of thinking of another, getting right what it is like for a subject from the inside requires introducing a constitutive dependence on another's first person thought; and, at least for some contexts of using the first person concept, getting right what this involves requires reference to another's thought of oneself as 'you'.

Finally, and by way of connecting the two topics I have been discussing, I return briefly to the idea of non-conceptual self-representation. Earlier I raised doubts about whether there is a route back from an account of the spatial contents of perception to the postulation of non-conceptual self-representation in the contents of the perception. In contrast, it seems to me that the case for postulating such self-representation when explaining the structure of basic forms of interpersonal exchange is compelling. To take an example Peacocke himself discusses, a very young infant and adult

exchanging smiles: in such cases it seems to me to be exactly right to describe each participant as responding to the other's treatment of her as a subject of the emotions exchanged, where the kind of self-awareness this entails on the part of each is more primitive than the kind that involves exercising a first person concept. And, although I agree with Peacocke's observation that such exchanges are usually a whole lot more fun than various interpersonal exchanges between adults, it seems to me that the same explanation applies to, and the same kind of pleasure is to be had in, at least some adult exchanges, e.g. when you and your companion exchange a smile of delight when jointly attending to the kingfisher.

University of Warwick,
Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK
n.eilan@warwick.ac.uk

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