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The Impact of Intervention

The Dominican Republic during the U.S. Occupation of 1916–1924

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dero Michel, José del Castillo, Frank Moya Pons, and Nazre Sansur Tuma. And I want to thank my editors, including Scott Lubeck, Holly Carver, and Christina West, who deserve much credit for making this a better book.

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Introduction

The decade of the 1980s has begun with the U.S. government and the Reagan administration deeply involved in the internal politics of the Central American nations and threatening military intervention there and in the Caribbean. To the historically minded, the situation is familiar, for the events unfolding now bear a serious resemblance to what has been going on between the great northern power and its weaker southern neighbors for decades. Indeed the scenarios of the 1980s, except for the names of individual actors and the specific content of the rhetoric, could be used to describe with remarkable accuracy many situations which took place twenty, thirty, sixty, or even eighty years ago. The events of today are reflections of an unequal relationship which has existed for almost a century.

The heyday of direct North American military intervention in the Caribbean lasted from 1898 to the mid 1930s. The subject of this book, the Dominican Republic during the U.S. occupation of 1916 to 1924, is a major chapter in the history of that period. Although the story of Washington's entanglement in the republic's affairs begins in the nineteenth century, the particular train of events which led to the invasion of 1916 commenced in a period of chronic political instability that followed the fall of a dictatorial government in 1899. From then until 1916, the United States steadily increased its involvement in and control over internal Dominican affairs. Facilitating this policy were political and financial manipulation, frequent threats and the occasional use of force, and the growing U.S. penetration of the private sector of the Dominican economy.

The Dominican Occupation: An Overview

In May 1916, in response to a revolution which threatened to topple yet another government, Washington intervened militarily. Although

few U.S. officials envisioned a lengthy occupation at that time, it was late 1924 before the last of the invading forces left the island nation. During the eight years of the occupation, a military government attempted to bring a number of fundamental changes to the republic in the hope that its reforms by fiat would create a stable and friendly neighbor, and a reliable customer, to the south of the United States.

The most important immediate cause of the U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic, aside from the logic of its ever increasing involvement in Dominican affairs, was strategic: the desire of the United States to protect the approaches to its southern coast and the Panama Canal against unfriendly powers, especially Germany. Also essential to this strategic concern was a larger economic consideration: to preserve U.S. hegemony over the entire circum-Caribbean region, which contained or was adjacent to areas of considerable importance to the U.S. economy. Of distinctly minor importance was the specific desire to protect U.S. control of the Dominican economy, of its trade and resources, which were insignificant relative to U.S. interests elsewhere. The republic had become a pawn in international sphere of influence politics by virtue of its location rather than its wealth.

The United States' aggressive intrusion into Dominican affairs in 1916 was not an isolated incident in the history of its Caribbean diplomacy. Though U.S. involvement in the area had generally been limited during the nineteenth century, this had changed in 1898 when, by virtue of the Spanish American War, Washington suddenly found itself in control of both Cuba and Puerto Rico. Thereafter, the U.S. presence in the Caribbean grew with each passing year. Washington maintained its hold over both Puerto Rico, turning it into a colony, and Cuba, instituting a protectorate with the Platt Amendment, and then embarked on a series of military interventions. The most important of these occurred in Panama in 1903, Nicaragua in 1909 and 1912, Mexico in 1914, Haiti in 1915, and Cuba several times. In addition, beginning in 1905 the United States had imposed customs receiverships to obtain financial and political control in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti. It would have done the same in Honduras but was blocked by a negative vote in the U.S. Senate. The Dominican occupation of 1916 to 1924 was clearly part of a general pattern of expanding U.S. influence in the Caribbean after 1898. And increased U.S. activity in the Caribbean was but part of a growing U.S. presence in Latin America, the Pacific, and the Far East.

The U.S. occupation of the Dominican Republic was more, however, than a diplomatic incident on the northern nation's way to

world power—it was an important episode in the history of the Dominican people. For six of the eight years of occupation, military officials tried to remake Dominican society, designing and implementing programs meant to change the republic's political, economic, and social life. In addition, occupation authorities continued the regular administrative activities of the government, in the process guiding the country through two periods of unusual economic stress, the first caused by World War I and the second by a severe worldwide depression which hit the republic in late 1920. The Dominican response to military government also lends significance to the occupation years. Depending on the issue, the place, and the time, this response ranged from enthusiastic cooperation to determined resistance. The latter included a five-and-a-half-year guerrilla war fought against U.S. Marines in the country's eastern region and a political-intellectual protest, conducted by nationalists both domestically and internationally.

Occupation officials implemented a wide range of programs and reforms by 1920, drawing on previous U.S. colonial experience, especially in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, on U.S. domestic models, and on previously existing Dominican laws and institutions. Among the most important programs were the creation of the country's first adequate road network, the implementation of other substantial public works projects, the rapid expansion and improvement of the republic's educational system, and the beginning of national public health and sanitation programs. Equally important was the reformation of the nation's military, with the establishment of an efficient, and theoretically apolitical, constabulary. Significant, but receiving less emphasis, were reforms of the Dominican treasury, the tax system, the courts and judiciary, the tariff structure, the land title system, the government agricultural service, and a host of other political, economic, and even social institutions.

This creative effort was concentrated in the first four years of the occupation, from 1917 through 1920. After that, severe economic problems and a contemplated U.S. withdrawal forced military officials to concentrate on trying to maintain what they had already created and, in a few cases, on completing projects already in progress.

The programs of the military government left a double legacy to Dominican society. First was their immediate and intended impact. This in most cases was limited, either because the projects themselves were limited or because, in the case of the more ambitious efforts, they were only partially successful and then were crippled by the depression of the early 1920s or by the opposition of Dominican nationalists. Second was their eventual and unintended effect, which

was often of greater significance than the first. Military officials, for instance, did not intend that the laws they promulgated concerning land and landholding, viewed as progressive at the time, would contribute to strengthening the system of plantation agriculture—thus creating an economic situation which condemned the republic's population to one of the lower standards of living in Latin America. Or, to cite a more famous case, neither did the designers of the new constabulary, the Guardia Nacional Dominicana, intend that it would serve as the primary vehicle for General Rafael Trujillo's thirty-one-year dictatorship.

Dominican resistance is as important to the history of the occupation as the record of the military government itself. Although it developed rather slowly, resistance eventually became quite strong, seriously hampering the work of the military regime and forcing the United States to move toward withdrawal.

In the east, peasants and sugar workers conducted a guerrilla insurgency from early 1917 until mid 1922, preventing the marines from controlling large areas of the region. Though unconnected with any other movement, the struggle was a nearly classical endeavor whose tactics might have come from a textbook on guerrilla warfare. The marines' advantages in weaponry and training were offset by the guerrillas' reliance on surprise, mobility, indigenous supply and intelligence networks, and an unsurpassed knowledge of the terrain. The Dominicans were masters of guerrilla war while the marines long failed to comprehend the nature either of their opponents or of the war they were fighting. This condemned them to make the same mistakes again and again. It also led to frustrations which caused some marines to brutalize Dominicans, both guerrilla opponents and ordinary citizens. This generated immense resentment against the marines, popular support and recruits for the guerrillas, and unfavorable publicity for the military government throughout Latin America and the United States. The war, debilitating to the military government and destructive to the east and its people, dragged on for five and a half years before the combined forces of marines and Dominican paramilitary auxiliaries finally began to put effective pressure on the guerrillas. This, combined with a pending agreement for the termination of the occupation, caused the insurgents to enter into negotiations and eventually lay down their arms in exchange for a nearly total amnesty.

In order to understand the guerrilla war for the purposes of this study, particularly why it occurred in just one area of the republic, it was necessary to look beyond the war itself at the society of the eastern region. Two phenomena which predated the war appeared to be

of critical importance. One was the fact that the east was in the midst of an economic revolution, as it rapidly changed from an area dominated by traditional subsistence agriculture and grazing into a modern, capitalist, sugar-producing center. In the wake of this economic revolution came a social one, destroying the traditional way of life and leaving unsolved social problems, bitterness, and tension. The second factor was the east's political system. When the marines ventured outside of the important eastern city of San Pedro de Macorís, they encountered a relic of nineteenth-century Latin America, the caudillo system, whose power had survived precisely because the region had for so long remained undeveloped. Failing to understand this traditional political system and its deep roots in eastern culture, the marines challenged it, causing caudillo leaders to go to war. Once alight, the flames of war were fed by the east's volatile social conditions. The dispossessed, the unemployed, the exploited workers, and the threatened small landowners were easy marks for guerrilla recruiters. These Dominicans, along with the many alienated by the marines in their disastrous conduct of a war they did not understand, were more than enough to prolong the eastern conflagration for over five years.

The necessity of understanding the guerrilla war thus opened up new areas of inquiry, particularly those concerning the nature of eastern society and its political system. This in turn required a look at the history of sugar agriculture in the republic, insofar as information was available, especially at the expansion of the corporate sugar estates in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This led inevitably to the study of the Dominican and then the military government laws that had opened the door to investment capital, especially from the United States, and to corporate expansion into Dominican agriculture.

The sugar industry, by far the largest investment of U.S. capital in the Dominican Republic, serves as a paradigm for understanding the relationship between the military government and U.S. investors. Examination of the occupation legislation affecting the sugar industry reveals a surprisingly mixed situation. Some laws substantially favored U.S. interests; others did precisely the opposite. A variety of contradictory influences were behind this inconsistency, including the startling fact that military officials were often ambivalent or even negative about the use of foreign capital in the Dominican economy. In this as in other areas, it appears, some occupation officials acted not only as agents of imperialism but also as representatives of U.S. domestic political currents, particularly the then popular Progressive movement.

The second principal aspect of the Dominican opposition to the occupation, entirely unconnected to the warfare and socioeconomic change of the east, was the political-intellectual resistance. This movement originated among a small group of officials and supporters of Dominican President Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal, whom the United States had deposed in 1916. Consisting of staunch nationalists who were, however, moderate in their approach, the Henríquez-centered movement was later joined in its work by a more radical organization, the Unión Nacional Dominicana, which pushed confrontation with the military government and a hard line in dealing with Washington. Together these forces created a vigorous, broad-based protest movement within the republic by 1920.

The nationalists did not confine their campaign for liberation to Santo Domingo. They worked vigorously in the large cities of the United States, Latin America, and Europe, aided by diplomats, politicians, labor leaders, writers, editors, and other crusading intellectuals. Their cause was also furthered by the military government itself, which acted with such harshness in opposing the nationalist campaign in Santo Domingo that the occupation became a diplomatic cause célèbre and an immense embarrassment to the State Department in Washington. The publicity and protests soon led to investigations and eventually to meaningful negotiations for withdrawal.

The efforts to arrange a withdrawal are in themselves a complex story. As the result of the pressures created by the nationalist movement, the United States began to devise a withdrawal plan in late 1920. But the plan featured such restrictions to Dominican sovereignty that a wave of protest and rejection greeted its announcement. Further negotiations produced slight U.S. concessions and several more proposals, but each failed to receive approval from the politically diverse groups of Dominicans now loosely united under the umbrella of the radical nationalists. Eventually, after a stalemate of nearly a year caused by the mutual intransigence of the U.S. and nationalist camps, a compromise agreement emerged—known as the Hughes-Peynado Plan. This 1922 accord, by offering the prospect of a prompt withdrawal under terms which seemed reasonable to nonradicals, rapidly led to the disintegration of the larger nationalist movement. Though hard-core nationalists continued to fight the new plan, they could not prevent its implementation. In October 1922 a Dominican provisional government took over administration of the country, and in July 1924 a newly elected constitutional government assumed control.

The Dominican Occupation: Its Place in History

The guerrilla war, and to some degree the nationalist movement in general, raised a historiographical question. The papers of the military government, when examined at the beginning of this study, clearly demonstrated that the eastern conflict was a major event of the occupation period. Yet it was shrouded in historical obscurity. Neither North Americans nor Dominicans had written more than a few lines about the war. Those who did usually dismissed the guerrillas as bandits and the war as a short-lived affair.

The military government papers themselves revealed one reason for the disappearance of the guerrilla war from history. U.S. military officials sought to disguise the real nature of events in the east by labeling the rebels as bandits. The guerrilla resistance and the other forms of opposition to the occupation were embarrassing to the United States—such resistance tarnished the image of the United States in Latin America, making diplomacy there more difficult. And in Europe it called into question the goals, particularly the right of national self-determination, for which the United States claimed to struggle, first in World War I and then at the Versailles Conference.

Unfortunately, the guerrillas themselves were not very helpful to those who in later years might have tried to justify them and to disprove the myths which the military government had created. In general, these peasant fighters were inarticulate. They were nearly all illiterate, and their testament remained largely unwritten. They also lacked a singular leader, in the style of Sandino or Castro, someone whose charisma and connections might have attracted outside attention. Perhaps for this reason, no Carleton Beals or Herbert Matthews took the trouble to seek them out and advance their cause in the world press. Neither were the guerrillas always clearly patriotic, being a classic example of Eric Hobsbawm's "primitive rebels," whose motivations and actions sometimes cross the ill-defined line which separates the personal from the political.

Politically conscious and literate Dominicans of the time, even those irrevocably and actively opposed to the military government, generally accepted the banditry thesis if they paid any attention at all to the events in the east. Why did the Dominicans themselves adopt this paradoxical antinationalist position? First, they lacked information. News in the heavily censored press concerning the guerrilla struggle was scarce and usually reflected the views of marine and military government publicists. Second, Dominican society, split

deeply into upper and lower sectors, put blinders on its elite. Their class orientation was away from the peasantry, whom they regarded as socially insignificant and politically backward. And the elite, at least the more intellectual stratum, were heavily influenced by the ideas of nineteenth-century liberalism and positivism, whose basic tenets of order and progress caused followers to look askance at popular social forces such as those represented by the guerrillas.

The Dominican historians writing immediately after the occupation were members of the liberal intellectual establishment. They, like other members of their social stratum, paid little attention to the guerrilla war; instead they devoted their energy to documenting the intellectual and political protest of their own class.[1] So, too, the North Americans who wrote extensively about the intervention, Sumner Welles and Melvin Knight, both failed to recognize the guerrilla war for what it was and all but ignored it.[2] Though their political predispositions toward the occupation were diametrically opposed, both took their cues about events in the east from Dominican intellectuals and discounted the guerrillas' importance. Welles, as a member of the State Department, was in addition defending U.S. policies and so endorsed the marines' banditry argument.

In Haiti—another country which saw its struggle against the United States denigrated as unimportant and criminal—national historians, such as Dantès Bellegarde, subsequently arose to clarify the record. But this failed to occur in the Dominican Republic because of the three-decade reign of General Rafael Trujillo, who made it clear to historians that it was best to ignore or gloss over the guerrilla war and the resistance in general. His motivation was obvious. The general owed his rise from humble origins to a position of great wealth and power to the opportunities afforded him by the military government and its institutions. In fact, Trujillo, a soldier in the U.S.-created and U.S.-controlled Guardia Nacional, had himself fought against the guerrillas.

Much the same fate befell the history of the elite's political-intellectual resistance and, indeed, the history of the entire occupation. Virtually all the histories of the period, usually in the form of document collections or personal memoirs, date from the 1920s (with the principal exception of Luis Mejía's *De Lilís a Trujillo*, published in Caracas in 1944). Afterward the severe repression of the Trujillo period assured that the occupation was rarely discussed in print. Similarly, in the United States, the occupation disappeared from view. After the decline of the radicalism of the 1920s and 1930s, U.S. historians seldom dealt extensively with any of the Caribbean occupations, particularly with such matters as anti-U.S. resistance movements. Behind their neglect were the general lack of interest in the usually quiet Caribbean of the postwar period, the fact that the Good Neighbor Policy and its aftermath invited the portrayal of the occupations as rather unimportant aberrations from the regular course of U.S. diplomacy, and the repressiveness of the McCarthy era, which discouraged thinking and writing on the subject. Only since the 1960s, after a series of events radically altered the situation in the United States, the Dominican Republic, and the Caribbean in general, have historians in both countries begun to analyze the events of 1916 to 1924.

This book, the first detailed examination of the Dominican occupation, joins a growing number of studies of U.S. intervention and occupation in the Caribbean area (and in the Philippines) between 1898 and 1935.[3] As a study of an episode in U.S. diplomatic history, this volume fits generally into the body of work produced by the "Wisconsin school" and by like-minded scholars. That is, it agrees with the concept of imperialism as a deep and ongoing phenomenon, often economically based, in the relationship of the United States with the non-European world. But, like other later writers of that general school, I am forced by the evidence to modify some of its original conclusions. I find particularly useful the work of Lloyd Gardner's student, Hans Schmidt, whose study of the Haitian occupation of 1915 to 1934 calls into question the applicability of the "open-door" concept to U.S.-Caribbean diplomacy. Also, Schmidt's dismissal of "liberal internationalism" as an element in U.S.-Haitian relations applies equally to the Dominican case. And his characterization of the occupation reform programs as "technocratic Progressive" in origin, which is to say Progressive without democratic political pretensions, is helpful in understanding the experience in Santo Domingo.

As a study of Dominican history, especially in its social and economic aspects, this work tends to support the general views of the dependency theorists. Their analyses of the process of modernization and development-underdevelopment are particularly useful in understanding the Dominican Republic's deepening involvement in the world capitalist economic system in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During the occupation period, the economy of the republic seems to have been moving between the two types of historical dependency situations described by Fernando Cardoso and Enzo Falleto: from a dependency situation in which the economy is more or less nationally controlled (as with tobacco and cacao) to a new situation where the entire process is owned and controlled by foreigners (as with sugar). This trend, depending on the

cooperation of the generally foreign-oriented Dominican elite, was under way long before 1916, although some of the programs and legislation of the military government further advanced the process. Several contemporary Dominican historians have used the dependency theory as a means for understanding their nation's historical development. The most thorough analysis of the occupation period from this point of view is Wilfredo Lozano's *La dominación imperialista en la República Dominicana, 1900–1930.* I find myself in general agreement with Lozano's analysis, although the new data I have gathered here cause me to disagree with a number of the particular points of his argument.[4]

The increasingly numerous studies of U.S. intervention and occupation in the Caribbean area during the 1898 to 1935 period provide an inviting opportunity for a study in comparative history. As a group they provide ample material for a book-length study on intervention and its causes, on the nature of occupations and their programs, on the various forms of national resistance and/or adaptation, and on the complexities of withdrawal and the revival of national institutions. Unfortunately space limitations prevent the inclusion here of a detailed comparative essay on intervention and occupation. Briefly, however, I will note some of the important parallels and discontinuities which appear in this growing literature.

There has generally been a substantial difference between what North American and Latin American scholars have produced on the occupations. The North Americans, with relatively easy access to the most obvious original documents, have tended to write detailed monographs, often with a heavy emphasis on the process of policy formation. The Latin Americans, far from these documents and sometimes denied access to them by U.S. officials, have usually depended on secondary sources and have emphasized analytical and ideological concerns. The results are somewhat complementary—the Latin Americans compensating for the lack of analysis and of conscious ideology in the work of many U.S. authors. Similarly, the tendency of Latin American historians to emphasize the internal Latin American repercussions of occupation has counterbalanced the penchant of many U.S. writers to concentrate on the U.S. side of the matter.

The North American authors of studies on intervention have found a variety of forces shaping U.S. policy in the Caribbean (and elsewhere in the non-European world) beginning in the later nineteenth century. Monographs on specific incidents of intervention seem to agree in identifying strategic concerns as the most important, while broader studies, most notably David Healy's *U.S. Expansionism*, have identified other factors, economic, ideological-patriotic, and religious, as significant. Although the importance of some of these factors, such as the desire for empire and the "missionary impulse," seems to have been blunted by the difficult U.S. experience in the Philippines, they continued to operate. And, while economic forces appear increasingly obvious over time, they are much more influential in some cases than in others. They were less important, for example, in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, which featured small markets, few resources, and limited U.S. investments that were seldom if ever threatened. On the other hand, in Cuba and Mexico, where much more was at stake and U.S. interests were sometimes menaced, economic factors were more obviously significant. Important too is the fact that, even where economic factors seemed to have little direct impact on a given situation, they were still a critical background factor, heavily influential in overall policy considerations.

Some of the strongest parallels between the various occupations (but not the shorter interventions) can be drawn from their programs. In almost every case, beginning with Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines, U.S. officials set up programs to expand education, improve health and sanitation, create constabularies, build public works and communications, initiate judicial and penal reforms, take censuses, improve agriculture, and accomplish a wide range of other reforms. One reason for these parallels, besides the common needs exhibited by these societies, is clear. There was an extensive interchange of personnel between places occupied by the United States. The army and marine personnel who helped form policy in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines also conducted the later occupations of Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. Similarly, continuity was provided by the personnel of the State Department and the Bureau of Insular Affairs.

Inadequate or unclear policy often hampered the conduct of the interventions and occupations. Further complications arose from interdepartmental differences, usually between the State Department and the military but sometimes involving other agencies as well. The causes of these complications were differing departmental philosophies, interdepartmental competition, and political pressures which affected some departments, particularly the State Department, more than others. Haiti and the Dominican Republic stand as the worst examples of a lack of policy: after the marines had intervened, in both cases to end political turmoil, they were long left without clear guidelines. The reasons were that the onset of these occupations coincided with the increased involvement of the United

States in World War I and, more significant, that they affected two relatively unimportant small nations. Troubles in Mexico and Cuba, which occurred at the same time, received much greater direct attention.

Even the creation of a clear policy did not insure its implementation. On the contrary, a variety of factors often hindered the realization of occupation goals, resulting in changed, incomplete, and even failed programs and reforms. Among the problems were language difficulties, racism, cultural differences and misunderstandings, insufficiently trained personnel, and inadequate resources.

Important too was the matter of resistance. Perhaps only because the topic is so neglected in U.S. history, it is surprising to realize that nearly all the major U.S. interventions provoked resistance. In virtually every instance, portions of the elite mounted an intellectual-political resistance, though none was as successful as the Dominican campaign. Also common was armed guerrilla resistance, which occurred in the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and, on several occasions, very nearly in Cuba. In response to these guerrilla wars, U.S. forces developed tactics, such as the use of concentration camps, which they employed in a number of occupations, usually with very limited success. U.S. forces also exhibited similar forms of behavior, most commonly demoralization and indiscriminate brutality, in response to the frustrations of irregular warfare.

Nearly every analyst notes that it is much easier to begin an intervention than to end it. It is a relatively simple matter to send in troops. But once they are there, having destroyed the normal political process or having become more deeply involved in it, the necessity of keeping them there grows day by day. In addition, there is the problem of fulfilling policy goals. These are usually ill-defined at first but tend to grow over time and are seldom easily accomplished, thus creating a further impediment to withdrawal. There is also a classic catch-22: if there is no pressure to end an intervention, it continues; but if there is pressure, the occupiers resist, not wanting to appear to withdraw because of the pressure.

Nearly all students of intervention and occupation, whatever their political point of view, come to the conclusion that these armed intrusions seldom accomplish more than the most limited goals and that they are one of the most expensive ways, both monetarily and politically, to carry out foreign policy. Indeed it was the realization of this fact which caused the State Department to begin experimenting with new forms of control over Latin America after 1920. The successful use of alternative methods led to the announce-



The Dominican Republic in 1916

ment of the Good Neighbor Policy, to the liquidation of most of the occupations (except for the Philippines and Puerto Rico) by the mid 1930s, and to an increased hesitancy to use direct armed intervention as an instrument of foreign policy.

The Dominican Republic in 1916

The republic which the U.S. Marines invaded in 1916 was a poor and underdeveloped country. Fewer than a million people, of whom 85 percent lived in rural areas and engaged in agriculture, inhabited its 19,129 square miles. The cities, though they were important centers of power and wealth, were small. The two largest were the capital, Santo Domingo, and Santiago, with an estimated 21,000 and 14,000 residents each. In all the rest of the republic, only Puerto Plata, La Vega, and San Pedro de Macorís could boast of populations in excess of 3,000.[5]

The wealth which supported these cities, and the nation, came almost entirely from the land in the form of agricultural exports. Three crops—sugar, cacao, and tobacco—dominated, making up 92 percent of the $21.5 million in exports in 1916. The total figure had mounted steadily as the result of the rapid expansion of the republic's commercial agriculture in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; most important was the dramatic increase in the production of sugar, which by 1916 constituted more than half of the total exports.

The rest of the Dominican economy thus depended, directly or indirectly, on the prosperity of agriculture. The businesses of factors, exporters, and importers, whose earnings constituted a large share of the national income, were directly influenced by the success or failure of the annual crop and by the level of international commodity prices. Professional people, much of whose business came from the wealthy agricultural and business interests, were similarly dependent on the agricultural economy; ultimately, if less directly, so were shopkeepers, artisans, and laborers. Even the economic survival of the national government, which in 1916 drew 90 percent of its revenue from customs duties and other trade-related taxes, was directly connected to the success of export agriculture.

Imports, financed by expanding exports, had increased steadily in the early twentieth century; the dollar volume of $11.7 million in 1916 was more than quadruple the 1905 total. Imports consisted principally of manufactures and foodstuffs not produced in the republic. The United States had long dominated the Dominican import trade, competing particularly with Great Britain and Germany. But World War I had nearly eliminated competition from the latter nations, and by 1916 purchases from the republic's giant northern neighbor accounted for 90.4 percent of the dollar value of imports.

Most of the export-import business was in the hands of foreigners, with different nationalities dominating different aspects of the trade. Agricultural production, with the important exception of sugar, had tended to remain under Dominican control. But sugar, because it required ever larger amounts of capital and technology, was increasingly dominated by foreign owners.

Production, outside of agriculture, was left to a tiny group of industrialists, some of whom were hardly more than unusually enterprising artisans. Except for two cigar and cigarette factories owned by foreigners, most of these were small operations, financed with Dominican capital. They produced a variety of consumer goods, which generally supplied local needs only partially.

Despite the considerable economic activity of the abovementioned groups, the overwhelming majority of Dominicans remained poor. This was owed to the fact that the benefits of the economy flowed almost entirely to elite Dominicans and foreigners. Also, much of the nation's potential wealth remained undeveloped or underdeveloped. A variety of factors contributed to this situation, including over three hundred years of colonial neglect as a backwater of the Spanish Empire, the chronic political disorders of the nineteenth century, and—in the twentieth century—continuing political turmoil, a relative scarcity of domestic capital, an unwillingness to invest it productively by most who possessed it, and a population too small to form an adequate market for many modern enterprises.

Another problem was the infrastructure, which was wholly inadequate despite the efforts of several Dominican governments to improve it. In typical colonial and neocolonial fashion, transportation and communication were not adequate to unite the country, each region remaining politically and economically isolated because such ties as did exist usually led abroad. Thus no road suitable for commerce connected the two largest cities, Santo Domingo and Santiago, and the two railroads which served the Cibao area, of which Santiago was the chief city, both led to seaports from which the products of the region were shipped abroad. Dominican ports were poorly developed, and seaborne domestic commerce was limited to a negligible coasting trade.

The Dominican social structure in 1916 both reflected the general underdevelopment of the country and acted as a further obstacle

to creating something better. It was basically a society of two classes: a small upper class and a large lower class, separated from one another by a deep economic and social abyss.

Only in the cities and larger towns did one find much social differentiation. It was there rather than the countryside that most members of the upper class chose to live, and it was there that the economy afforded opportunities for a small middle sector to rise above the larger lower class. The rural areas, with neither a resident elite nor a middle group, were with few exceptions populated by the poor majority, peasants and agricultural laborers.

The upper class was divided into two strata by what is best described as a caste distinction. Those of the historically most important families, whose lineage society at large generally acknowledged, were the *gente de primera* (the elite, literally persons of first quality). They were followed by the *gente de segunda* (those of second quality, forming a sort of upper middle sector), persons of some substance, education, and culture who somehow lacked the credentials which would admit them into the highest society. The two strata were as one, however, relative to the masses.

A variety of factors other than lineage divided Dominicans from Dominicans. Some of the most important of these were occupation, wealth, race, and education; also significant were regional and urban-rural differences. Occupation and wealth were perhaps the most obvious distinguishing characteristics. Constituting the elite *gente de primera* were the owners of land and real estate, the leaders of commerce, professionals, and higher government officials. These pursuits generated large incomes which, in addition to wealth accumulated over the years, put the elite in a dominant economic position. The *gente de segunda* followed similar careers but as a group were slightly less wealthy than the elite.

In urban areas the remaining members of society fell into two groups. First there were the artisans, mechanics, small shopkeepers, clerks, and peddlers, who formed a lower middle sector. Beneath them was the lower class: common laborers, servants, a few factory workers, and the unemployed. Neither of these groups had significant incomes relative to the upper class, although important economic differences separated them. An inadequate number of steady jobs meant that there was tremendous competition for work; high unemployment and low wages were facts of life for lower-class Dominicans.

One substantial group, the immigrants, did not properly fit into any one social category, though they were found in fairly large numbers throughout the country. Sephardic Jews from Curaçao, Spaniards, Italians, Germans, English, North Americans, Chinese, Arabs, Canary Islanders, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and other West Indians arrived in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in noticeable numbers or in small numbers made visible by economic success. Many immigrants, mostly blacks from the West Indies, were imported as laborers for the cane plantations, and if they remained they often gravitated toward the rural lower class or the urban artisan group. Others, such as the Canary Islanders and Puerto Ricans, tended to join the lower middle sector, working as artisans and small merchants. Some, in particular the Chinese and Arabs, despite their considerable economic success as a group, stood somewhat apart from the rest of society, either by choice or because they encountered resistance to their assimilation. A few immigrants became part of the elite or at least solid members of the upper middle sector. These were generally Western Europeans, North Americans, and Sephardic Jews, all of whom were white and many of whom were financially successful.

The matter of race, whether one was white or black or where one fell on the scale in between, was an important factor in determining social status. Most Dominicans were of mixed ancestry racially, but generally the highest social strata were the lightest and the lowest were the darkest. This, plus several historical factors, established a clear bias in favor of whiteness. There were exceptions to the general pattern of white-black stratification, but the basic concept ruled. According to the loosely defined standards of the national census of 1920, the country was 25 percent white, 25.3 percent black, and 49.7 percent mulatto.

Regionalism was a strong divisive factor in Dominican life which cut somewhat across class lines. At its heart was the rivalry between the northern region (often called the Cibao), centered in Santiago, and the south, which focused around the city of Santo Domingo. The two areas had long had regional differences, augmented in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by the extensive development of southern agriculture around sugar. Extensive sugar cultivation, especially to the east of the capital city, meant that Santo Domingo began a period of growth which resulted in its domination of the balance of economic power in the republic. Sugar also caused the growth of the south's black population, because of the numerous immigrants from Haiti and neighboring Caribbean islands, and a resulting *mulatización* of such integral aspects of life as language, food, and religion. Other parts of the republic also had their special flavors. The geography, the life-style, the customs, and the speech of the east, the southwest, and the north each exhib-

ited uniqueness, and even within these regions there were strong contrasts.

Urban-rural differences, which correlated strongly with economic and racial patterns, were pronounced in the Dominican Republic. While urbanites were generally wealthier and lighter-skinned, rural residents tended to be poorer and darker. Within rural areas, the divisions which existed between people were based on their relationship to the land. Aside from a tiny minority of wealthier persons, most rural inhabitants were peasants, squatters, or the landless. A surprisingly large number owned land, most commonly as *pesos de terrenos comuneros* or shares of collectively held land. Some of these small proprietors led relatively comfortable if simple lives, although the primitive agriculture which they practiced generally offered no hope of substantial economic advance. Squatters lived in virtually the same way, but without title to their lands. However, members of either substratum might suddenly find themselves demoted to the third or landless group, put off their land by some large landowner or corporation. This happened with increasing frequency around 1916, owing especially to the expansion of the large sugar estates in the south.

A peasant without land had several options. One was to sharecrop, often for an absentee landlord who preferred life in town. A second option was to work as a laborer on an agricultural estate, often one of the large sugar corporations, thus becoming part of a rural proletariat. This difficult work was poorly paid, and most of it was seasonal. A third possibility for the landless was to move to an urban area such as Santo Domingo or San Pedro de Macorís, where they formed part of the lower class.

Urban residents, particularly the upper class, had a virtual monopoly over many aspects of Dominican life. Nearly all that was modern, scientific, or intellectual existed for their exclusive use. The educational facilities functioned almost entirely on their behalf, as did the republic's medical and legal systems. Most newspapers and magazines were written by and for the upper class, their contents often reflecting the elite's cultural orientation away from the Dominican Republic toward Europe and the United States.

The republic's urban areas also offered a more varied social life than the rural districts. At its center were the private social clubs, strictly segregated by social status, which served as gathering places for men and as the locations of a variety of cultural and recreational activities. There were also fraternal, ethnic, religious, and charitable organizations, theaters, a few cinemas, and the more common recreations provided by municipal bands, evening promenades, public



The eastern region of the Dominican Republic

dances, sports, and gambling. The rural areas, though hardly as diverse as the cities, had their own forms of entertainment. Undoubtedly the most popular were cockfights, gambling, dances, and folk religious ceremonies.

Catholicism exerted its influence in both urban and rural areas, although the church was less pervasive and powerful in the Dominican Republic than in the rest of Latin America. Religious observances varied widely by social stratum: the upper class, especially women, practiced a European sort of Catholicism while the lower class, particularly in rural areas, had created its own Afro-Catholic folk religion.

Deep cleavages thus divided Dominican society. First, a horizontal pattern of economic stratification divided the rich from the poor in both urban and rural areas, the upper stratum also being divided by caste differences. Second, a vertical division separated the city from the country. The distance across the whole scale was immense—from the wealthy and educated urbanite, living amid the technology of the twentieth century, to the poor rural inhabitant whose life was not appreciably different from a poor person's of the sixteenth century.

The deeply divided society and neocolonial economy provided a poor environment for the representative and democratic form of government instituted by Dominican lawmakers. Since the republic in 1916 had as essential elements such features as general economic underdevelopment, a poor distribution of income, widespread poverty, low social mobility, a backward transportation and communication network, and an inadequate educational system, it is not surprising that the government was in the hands of a few and tended to be weak, ineffective, and unstable.

The Dominican constitution in force in 1916, the nineteenth such document adopted since 1844, provided for a president, a Senate, and a Chamber of Deputies, all elected by universal male suffrage. The president chose the seven heads of the executive departments, selected the twelve provincial governors, who controlled most local officials, and commanded the armed forces. Thus the constitution gave the chief executive considerable power, but in fact he had to be an exceptionally strong and effective leader to use it—only three of the forty-three men who held the office between 1844 and 1916 completed their terms. An independent judiciary, appointed by the Senate, interpreted the nation's basic law (an adaptation of the Napoleonic code) as well as the laws of Congress and executive decrees.

Technically, a party system governed the competition for political office. But the political parties tended to be extremely personalistic, frequently named after their leaders, and difficult to distinguish ideologically. Often there was great rancor between the followers of one faction and another. In the years just preceding 1916, the two most important parties were the Jimenistas and the Horacistas, named after leaders Juan Isidro Jiménez and Horacio Vásquez and nicknamed *bolos* and *rabudos* after two kinds of fighting cocks. A third leader of note was Federico Velásquez, leader of the Velasquistas or Progresistas.

The constitutionally based party structure masked a deeper reality. Because of such factors as regionalism, allowed to flourish by the lack of adequate transportation and communication, the national government could not ordinarily monopolize power in the republic. Its survival depended on gaining the consent or temporary submission of popular regional leaders, the caudillos, whose authority ultimately rested on their military skills. However politically pragmatic this solution was, it was also unstable. There was continual competition, often in the form of revolution, between alliances of regional caudillo leaders, focused particularly around the rival aspirations of the elites of the Cibao and Santo Domingo City for control of the national government.

There was no shortage of grass-roots support for these revolutionary tendencies. In the relatively static economy and society of the Dominican Republic, rebellion had become one of the most promising means of upward social mobility. President Ulises Heureaux (1882–1899) and other important figures stood as permanent reminders of how much one might build from nothing with military skill, political acumen, and intrigue.

Revolution, or the threat of revolution, impaired development because it alienated investors and caused discontinuity between governments and programs. It was also costly: it paralyzed farming, dried up credit, and increased military expenditures to such a point that they absorbed the lion's share of the national budget. In 1903, for instance, the military accounted for 71.7 percent of the government's expenditures; in 1904, it accounted for 72.6 percent.

Money, or the lack of it, was always central to the problems of the Dominican government. Revenue was insufficient in part because, like most governments, that of the Dominicans ultimately depended on the nation's prosperity and, even in the best of times, the Dominican Republic was poor. Another defect was the inadequate tax structure, designed to spare the wealthy from having to support the cost of government. And the flow of revenue was irregular because when international economic factors brought a decline

in prices for the republic's agricultural commodities there was an immediate drop in customs collections, which provided about 90 percent of the public income. At the same time, the shortcomings of the revenue system made necessary large foreign loans, which saddled the government with heavy interest payments.

Thus various forces conspired to keep the republic as it was, undeveloped and unstable. Indeed, the nation was caught in a perpetual cycle of weak and short-lived governments and an inadequately developed economy and society. The U.S. military government which Washington created late in 1916 resolved to change this state of affairs. Inspired with a confidence which sprang from a mixture of good intentions, misunderstandings, and a false sense of superiority, occupation officials would work long and hard to solve the republic's problems. But the occupiers, like previous Dominican reformers, would find that these problems were deeply rooted, that they often had international dimensions not subject to control from Santo Domingo, and that, ultimately, they were very resistant to change.

1

The Occupation Begins: 1916

The United States had a long record of involvement in the affairs of the Dominican Republic prior to 1916, beginning sporadically in the nineteenth century and continuing, with increasing regularity and intensity, into the first decade and a half of the twentieth century. Growing political and economic involvement gradually changed the relationship; indifference gradually gave way to constant interference and, finally, to the destruction of Dominican sovereignty in 1916. The Dominicans, almost as though they had come to accept the inevitability of this meddling, at first offered little resistance to their loss of independence.

A variety of forces brought the United States to the Dominican Republic. None of them, however, offered an adequate basis for an occupation policy and Washington, with its interest focused increasingly on Europe, failed to create one. Lacking an overall policy, it remained for occupation officials to piece together a program on an ad hoc basis. This they accomplished slowly, assembling it from a wide range of elements. Cooperating in the process were occupation military officers, the officials of various U.S. agencies, personnel from U.S. colonial possessions, and, as passions cooled, a number of Dominicans.

U.S.-Dominican Relations to 1890

The 1890s were a watershed in U.S.-Dominican relations as they were in the relations of the United States to other countries of the world. Before 1890, the Washington government was generally indifferent toward its Caribbean neighbor, a disposition reflected by the fact that North American officials waited until 1889 to create a permanent diplomatic mission to the Dominican Republic, having pre-

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viously left official business to commercial agents and temporary special envoys.[1] Most of the impetus in diplomatic relations came from two sources, Dominican politicians and North American entrepreneur-adventurers.

The dominant political figures during the years from independence in 1844 to 1874 were Pedro Santana and Buenaventura Báez. Both worked hard to persuade the United States or a European power to establish some sort of protective relationship with the Dominican Republic, through either outright annexation or the establishment of a protectorate. The leading motivations for this unnationalistic behavior were fear of the neighboring Haitians, who often threatened to repeat their 1822 to 1844 takeover of the republic, and the Dominican leaders' desire to maintain their personal power, which the abundant money and arms of one of the great powers would make easier. The bait which Santana and Báez held out to interest other nations was the Bay of Samaná, which had great potential as a deepwater harbor and coaling station.

The Dominican leaders found surprisingly few takers. Except for a brief and tumultuous fiasco during the years 1861 to 1865, when Santana reconverted the republic into a colony of Spain, the European powers and the United States generally displayed a greater interest in preventing each other from usurping Dominican sovereignty than in actually taking over the country.

Not everyone, however, was deaf to the siren song of Santana and Báez. Two serious moves toward annexation were promoted by a U.S. citizen, General William L. Cazneau, an opportunistic veteran of the annexation of Texas. Cazneau saw the Dominican situation as a chance to obtain personal wealth and political power. His first attempt, which featured the cooperation of William L. Marcy, secretary of state (1853–1857) to President Franklin Pierce, and Dominican President Santana, was stillborn—owing especially to the strenuous opposition of France and Great Britain. During the second and more serious episode, Cazneau enlisted the services of Secretary of State William H. Seward (1861–1869) during the administrations of Presidents Andrew Johnson and Ulysses S. Grant. The expansionist Seward, who proposed to establish a West Indian naval base, found Dominican President Báez eager to accommodate him, first with the Bay of Samaná and then with the republic itself. But in 1871, with Yankee warships propping up Báez' falling regime, the treaty went down to defeat in the U.S. Senate.

Dominican-U.S. Relations after 1890

If the events associated with the attempted annexations were somewhat extraordinary in the context of nineteenth-century U.S.-Dominican affairs, they would not have appeared so in the twentieth century. During the 1890s, for various reasons, government officials in Washington began to take a different view of the relationship with their southern neighbor. One reason for this was economic—a growing direct investment in the Dominican Republic, especially in sugar and, after 1892, in an operation known as the Santo Domingo Improvement Company.[2] Organized by a group of North American investors, one of them in the cabinet of then president Benjamin Harrison, the company bought up the extensive interests of a Dutch concern, and by the turn of the century it was worth $4.5 million. Its holdings included the national bank, one of the country's two railroads, and most of the national debt, the latter secured by a lien on Dominican customs revenues. Trade was also involved in the changing U.S.-Dominican relationship. The growing U.S. interest in Latin America and world trade during the 1890s found its reflection in Santo Domingo in a treaty of reciprocity signed between the two countries in 1891.

Strategic and political factors also contributed to these stepped-up relations. Some were timeworn, like the United States' desire, stated in the Monroe Doctrine, to keep the western hemisphere free of European control and its wish to protect its Gulf coast and the eastern approaches to the long-planned isthmian canal. The weight of these considerations increased tremendously, however, around the turn of the century. The U.S. attitude underwent considerable change as Puerto Rico and, to some degree, Cuba became part of the new North American empire, as a U.S.-dominated canal across Panama became a reality, as the government in Washington began to develop a global naval strategy, and as Germany began its rapid and successful commercial inroads into Latin America. The United States began to move to consolidate its political and military control over the Caribbean area.[3]

Hans Schmidt, a historian who has studied U.S. foreign policy in regard to Haiti in the early twentieth century, has noted that "the pattern of diplomacy in the Caribbean and the Pacific contrasted strongly with American diplomacy elsewhere in the world." Schmidt argues that "the framework of mutual respect which characterized United States relations with European nations" was absent from dealings with the nations of the Caribbean, because they were small

and weak and because North Americans looked upon their people as inferiors. Furthermore, the liberal internationalism of the Open Door Policy on which Washington insisted in China, where its influence was limited, was forgotten in the Caribbean and in some areas of the Pacific, where it "exercised sufficient military power to enforce its own absolute hegemony." Interventions in particular, Schmidt writes, "were primary instruments of American control in the area."[4]

Schmidt's analysis is quite relevant to U.S.-Dominican relations, especially after 1899, when assassination ended the seventeen-year dictatorship of President Ulises Heureaux. The removal of this strongman plunged the republic into revolutionary turmoil which lasted on and off for the next six years and which further aggravated the financial condition of this poor and often insolvent country. Dominican financial straits resulted in heavy pressure from foreign creditors, represented by the German, French, Belgian, British, Dutch, Italian, Spanish, and U.S. governments. In response to this situation, as well as to the Anglo-German blockade of Venezuela from 1902 to 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt formulated his famous corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. This sought, in the case of the Dominican Republic, to eliminate the danger of another foreign government physically intervening to enforce the demands of its creditor-citizens by having the United States act as a collection agent.

To facilitate this plan, the United States began to pressure the Dominican Republic to allow North American agents to take over the collection of customs and thus control Dominican financial affairs. It justified the move as necessary to satisfy the claims of foreign bondholders, both European and North American. By 1905 this pressure led to the imposition of a modus vivendi by which the Dominican Customs Receivership, headed by an appointee of the president of the United States, would collect all customs, keeping 55 percent of the total revenues to pay off foreign claimants and remitting 45 percent to the Dominican government. In 1907 the parties agreed to modify the agreement by converting it into a treaty which preserved the original structure of the receivership, placing it under the administrative supervision of the U.S. Bureau of Insular Affairs. The treaty also included provisions for a loan of $20 million through a New York bank by which all outstanding legitimate claims would be paid immediately, thus making the United States the Dominican Republic's only foreign creditor.[5]

In the interim, by 1906, the Dominicans had elected a new president, Ramón Cáceres. Unlike previous administrations since that of Heureaux, Cáceres' regime proved both popular and stable. The new president was concerned with economic growth and thus began to modernize and develop the country, apparently with some success. In Washington the State Department was delighted with the stability and economic vitality of the Cáceres regime, conditions which U.S. officials attributed more to the beneficial effects of the Customs Receivership than to the abilities of Cáceres himself. In November of 1911, however, an assassin ended Cáceres' life, and from then until 1916 there ensued a period of almost constant revolution and, consequently, economic stagnation.

Creating a Diplomatic Cul-de-Sac, 1911–1916

Between 1911 and 1916 the United States, under the administrations of Presidents William H. Taft and Woodrow Wilson, sought constantly, though ineffectively, to reestablish stable government in the Dominican Republic. To this end, U.S. officials intervened in Dominican affairs more and more frequently, often on a daily basis, and with increasing belligerence, keeping up a steady pressure on the Dominicans to carry out various reforms—the implementation of which, it was supposed, would lead the republic back to normalcy. The United States used both diplomatic means and force or threats of force to persuade the Dominicans.[6] The republic was the object of numerous visits by North American warships sent to observe, to make shows of force against the government, to threaten revolutionaries, or to protect the lives and property of foreigners.[7] The result of this outside pressure and interference, combined with domestic political turmoil, was eight separate administrations in Santo Domingo in five years.[8]

After the death of President Cáceres in 1911, one of the main goals of the United States was to establish a stable, freely elected, and cooperative Dominican government. Among the more notable specific tactics it used to achieve that end was the sending of a special commission, accompanied by 750 marines, to Santo Domingo in 1912. The commission, by cutting off Customs Receivership funds to the republic and threatening to impose a military government, compelled the Dominican government to accept the U.S. fiat concerning the long-disputed border with Haiti, obliged Dominican officials to initiate certain reforms, forced the resignation of the constitutionally elected president, Eladio Victoria, who was besieged by revolutionaries, and, finally, imposed a new, interim president, Monsignor Adolfo A. Nouel, the archbishop of Santo Domingo.[9]

But disorder continued, which soon resulted in the resignation

of President Nouel and prompted the United States to continue meddling throughout 1913. The State Department displayed an attitude of distinct hostility to the new chief of state, General José Bordas Valdez, once having U.S. gunboats fire on his forces while he besieged revolutionaries. On several other occasions Washington cut off government funds from the Customs Receivership to force Bordas to accept reforms; in August 1914, he was finally pushed from office.

The United States obtained Bordas' ouster through the work of a commission sent to Santo Domingo by President Woodrow Wilson. The commissioners' instructions formed the so-called Wilson Plan, which demanded that all revolutionaries lay down their arms, that a provisional president be selected in place of Bordas, whose legal right to the presidency Washington refused to recognize, and that open and fair elections, closely observed by U.S. officials, be held. Accompanying the delivery of these nonnegotiable demands was a "considerable show of force." Dominican compliance with the terms led to the inauguration of President Juan Isidro Jiménez in December 1914.

When, after endless interference and manipulation, the United States had achieved its goal of a freely elected democratic government under President Jiménez, it proceeded to put pressure on that government, which soon destroyed it. Since 1911 officials of the State Department had begun to formulate certain reforms which they believed would, in conjunction with the Customs Receivership, bring stability to the revolution-racked republic. The most important of these reforms was a plan to place two North American officials, appointed by the president of the United States, in strategic positions in the Dominican government, one as director of public works and one as a financial adviser. Both officials were to be above dismissal. The director of public works would govern all aspects of his office, awarding contracts and controlling the considerable patronage; the financial "adviser" was to draw up a budget for the national government and enforce it by requiring his personal authorization for each public expenditure. The Customs Receivership, moreover, was to expand its functions by collecting and controlling internal revenues, formerly the responsibility of the Dominicans themselves.

President Jiménez, though amenable to the proposed changes, met tremendous resistance. The Dominican Congress refused to cooperate, and there were soon threats of rebellion or impeachment. The response of the Wilson administration to Jiménez' predicament

was not to withdraw its demands or to compromise but to threaten to send in a naval force to obtain them as well as to defeat any attempt, parliamentary or military, to unseat the president.

Pressed by the United States on the one hand and by the realities of Dominican political life on the other, President Jiménez was in an impossible position. And the situation grew worse as time passed. During 1915 the U.S. government escalated its original demands. State Department officials demanded greater powers for the financial adviser and added a new requirement, that the Dominican government disband its armed forces and replace them with a constabulary to be controlled by a nominee of the president of the United States. The terms of these demands, presented to the Dominican government in November 1915 by U.S. Minister William Russell in his Note No. 14, were such that no Dominican politician could have agreed to them and survived. Public opinion universally condemned them, and the Dominican government formally rejected the proposals as "an abdication of national sovereignty."[10] Increasingly, the State Department put itself into an untenable diplomatic position. Soon officials would have no alternative but to back down or to destroy Dominican sovereignty.

The Jiménez government was on its knees by early 1916. Armed revolutionists were in the field and impeachment proceedings appeared imminent in the Dominican Congress. And while the United States was willing to intervene militarily to maintain the government, a proposal which President Jiménez refused, it denied the president the opportunity to defend himself effectively. The State Department would not allow the receivership to release to the Dominican government the money it needed to station extra troops in potentially rebellious areas; such a policy reflected a willingness to let the Jiménez government fall despite official U.S. support, since its demise would justify an armed intervention and the imposition of U.S. demands, as had occurred in Haiti during 1915.

The United States had for some time considered full-scale military intervention. As early as September 1912, Minister Russell had contemplated the beneficial effects of "complete control by our Government,"[11] and U.S. officials had several times thereafter used the threat of military takeover as a diplomatic club. Finally, in mid July 1915, the United States had thrown down the gauntlet by publicly announcing that it would intervene militarily to preserve the Jiménez government and public order.

The Armed Intervention of 1916

In April and May of 1916, the Dominican political situation collapsed. When President Jiménez attempted to move against some of his insubordinate military officers, chief among them his minister of war, General Desiderio Arias, the general's followers in Congress carried out a resolution of impeachment against the president. Arias went into open rebellion and was soon in control of the capital. The United States faced a moment of truth: it had to forget its previous threats or to send in troops against the rebels. Minister Russell pressured President Jiménez to request the landing of U.S. Marines from the two warships which soon arrived at Santo Domingo, but, after some wavering, Jiménez asked only for weapons.[12]

Ignoring Jiménez' wishes, marines landed in Santo Domingo City, their announced purpose being to protect the U.S. legation. However, they also took possession of Fortaleza San Gerónimo on the western outskirts of the city, of the Haitian legation, where a group of foreigners had gathered, and of the offices of the Customs Receivership, fortuitously located "in a strategic position on the heights overlooking the city." Simultaneously U.S. warships proceeded to San Pedro de Macorís, Sánchez, and Puerto Plata, other important ports of the republic. President Jiménez thereupon resigned on 7 May 1916, refusing to exercise an office "regained with foreign bullets," thus leaving General Arias in control of the capital and the probable successor to the presidency. The State Department was, however, determined to humble Arias; on 13 May 1916, the commander of the U.S. forces, Rear Admiral W. B. Caperton of the navy, presented an ultimatum signed by himself and Minister Russell which threatened the occupation of the city and the forcible disarmament of the revolutionaries if Arias did not surrender by 15 May. Arias sidestepped a confrontation by evacuating his troops, and a U.S. force of six hundred men occupied the city peacefully.[13]

Government continued in Dominican hands. Jiménez' remaining cabinet ministers, threatened by Russell with a military government if they resigned, formed a Council of Ministers to carry on the business of state.[14] General Arias, meanwhile, announced from a safe distance in the countryside that he had not actually raised "a revolutionary banner," that his flag was that of the Dominican people, and that he would surrender his arms to any president selected by the Chamber of Deputies.[15] He clearly hoped that the new president would be himself.

U.S. warships were located off every major port city of the republic by late May; on the first day of June, combined forces of sailors and marines began to occupy the northern part of the country, ostensibly to support the constitutional authority against the revolutionaries. Although the northern cities had shown considerable anti-U.S. sentiment, military resistance was in general ineffective. Monte Cristi fell without opposition. At Puerto Plata, though the governor had vowed to fight a landing, the ayuntamiento or city council begged the citizens to be calm and not to aggravate the situation,[16] and the occupiers encountered only "a brief resistance" of "heavy but inaccurate small-arms fire." Santiago, the largest city of the north and the "stronghold of the Arias party," was the obvious target for the invaders, but Admiral Caperton awaited reinforcements before marching inland.[17]

In late June, a regiment of marines having arrived from San Diego, California, the U.S. forces, under the command of Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton, began a two-pronged march on Santiago from Monte Cristi and Puerto Plata. On both routes the invaders encountered considerable harassment and sniping, but the marines' vastly superior weapons made the fighting, and the casualties, very unequal. The Dominicans' major defensive effort occurred on the Monte Cristi road at Guayacanes,[18] where a small group of patriots, led by Máximo Cabral, heroically but futilely attempted to stop the marines' advance. On the Puerto Plata road, the leader of the Dominican resistance was Wenceslao Báez, a mere sergeant. He was mortally wounded and carried back to Santiago, where the Junta de Defensa Nacional ceremoniously rewarded him with the rank of brigadier general before he died.[19]

The leading citizens of Santiago who so honored Báez' heroism had also formed a peace commission to negotiate the surrender of the city. In telegraphic exchanges with Admiral Caperton, mediated by Archbishop Nouel, the commissioners were able to obtain few concessions. Caperton promised to guarantee life and property and the right of the ayuntamiento of Santiago to choose a new governor from among persons not aligned with Arias. In return, Arias and his men were to surrender their arms, for which they would each receive a payment of five dollars; any opposition, threatened Caperton, would be severely chastised. If there was no further opposition, neither Arias nor his men would be punished for bearing arms.[20]

On 5 July 1916, with the terms of the surrender already laid down, the peace commission and the new governor, Juan B. Pérez, went to meet with Colonel Pendleton. Together they made final arrangements; on 6 July, the marines moved into Santiago, occupying

the Fortaleza San Luis and the Castillo, a fortified hill overlooking the city. After settling into Santiago, Colonel Pendleton and his staff began visiting the major towns of the surrounding Cibao region. In Moca, La Vega, and San Francisco de Macorís, Pendleton conferred with local officials and arranged for the marine occupation of those towns. Before the end of July, each had a marine garrison; only in San Francisco de Macorís, where a group of Dominican soldiers led by the governor of Pacificador Province occupied the local stronghold, was there even symbolic resistance.[21] With the garrisoning of the Cibao, the progress of the occupation stopped until 1917. Both the eastern and the western provinces, except for the northwestern port of Monte Cristi, were left unoccupied, though U.S. gunboats controlled access to the ports of every region.[22]

Why was the initial Dominican resistance to intervention so limited? In the first place, it was obvious to most Dominicans that the odds were overwhelming. No one was more opposed to the intervention than Dr. Américo Lugo, yet he wrote in 1916 that it would have been suicidal "to organize a resistance against the invaders . . . and to declare war against the United States." All the important leaders of political parties, as well as Archbishop Nouel, agreed with Lugo and said so publicly.[23] Propertied Dominicans, like the leaders of Santiago, also wished to prevent the possible destruction of their homes and businesses. Furthermore, no one, not even U.S. officials, realized in May and June of 1916 that the intervention would expand into a military government which would rule the Dominican people for the next eight years. The dominant impression in mid 1916 among the Dominican leaders, wrote Américo Lugo, was that "the Americans would remain in the country only as long as was necessary to guarantee 'free elections' in accord with the first Wilson Plan."[24]

Even as U.S. troops occupied their country, Dominican politicians continued their fratricidal struggles for power, particularly over control of the now vacant presidency.[25] Rather than uniting against the intervention, at least some opportunist political leaders tried to use the situation to their own advantage. General Arias' partisans, for instance, tried to convince intervention officials that the followers of Horacio Vásquez were about to rebel and suggested a preemptive U.S. strike against them.[26]

In late May 1916, a majority of the Dominican Congress agreed to support a compromise candidate, Federico Henríquez y Carvajal, the chief justice of the Supreme Court. The United States, however, was adamantly opposed to his election because he refused to make preelection promises to meet State Department demands for reform.

When, on 5 June 1916, a final vote of the Dominican Senate was about to confirm Henríquez' election, Minster Russell, in collusion with Federico Velásquez of the Council of Ministers, engineered a plan to arrest some of the pro-Henríquez senators. Though the scheme partially backfired by causing a tremendous public reaction, it accomplished its purpose. Henríquez was so disgusted with the "officious meddling" of the United States in Dominican electoral procedures that he withdrew his candidacy.[27]

A deadlock then developed in the Dominican Congress among the various political factions, including the followers of General Arias (whose selection U.S. officials refused to allow), of Horacio Vásquez, of expresident Jiménez, of Federico Velásquez, and of other lesser leaders. In late July 1916, however, with sessions about to expire by law, the legislators finally threw politics aside and hurriedly elected Dr. Francisco Henríquez y Caravajal, brother of Federico, to a five-month term as provisional president. In electing Dr. Henríquez, the Congress ignored U.S. demands for prior approval of the candidate. Nonetheless, Henríquez took the oath of office on 31 July 1916, cheered on by a large crowd in Santo Domingo. But, despite widespread public enthusiasm, the politicians nominally supporting his administration continued to fight among themselves over other issues throughout his term of office.[28]

Francisco Henríquez was an honest, intelligent, educated, capable, and patriotic man. With degrees in medicine from Paris and Havana, a degree in law, and experience as a physician, a university professor, and a diplomat, he was as well prepared as any Dominican to solve the problems which faced his nation in 1916. And, as he stated in his inaugural address, he was determined to do so.[29] But he confronted a nearly impossible situation. Minister Russell, without ever having dealt with the new president, judged him "not satisfactory" and recommended withholding recognition until he met the demands which the State Department had made upon previous administrations, especially those concerning financial control and a constabulary.[30]

Recognition was soon to be of critical importance to the Henríquez administration. After fewer than three weeks of its existence, U.S. officials, without warning, cut off all funds from the Customs Receivership. The receivership's public notice of 18 August 1916, nicknamed El Decreto de Hambre (The Decree of Hunger) by Dominicans, announced that the Dominican government would receive no further revenue until it had agreed to meet all the demands of the United States or, what amounted to the same thing, until the Washington government extended diplomatic recognition to the

Henríquez administration.[31] The financial stranglehold was all the more effective because of an earlier unilateral decision by Russell, in June, to extend the control of the receivership to all Dominican revenues, internal as well as external.[32]

Dr. Henríquez was a patriotic nationalist, but he was not intransigent. Because he wanted to carry out certain basic reforms and was willing to accept the help of the United States in doing so, he earnestly sought to negotiate with the representatives of the State Department. In fact the new president agreed, in essence, to permit U.S. control of all finances and of a new constabulary; however, he considered it constitutionally impossible to accede to the further demand that he bind future administrations to these arrangements without the consent of the Dominican Congress.[33] When it became apparent that Russell's instructions were to refuse anything less than total capitulation, the Dominican government attempted to break the deadlock by sending a cabinet minister, Francisco J. Peynado, to Washington to approach officials there directly. But this step was also rebuffed. U.S. officials consistently showed little inclination to negotiate. Instead, Minister Russell proposed to raise new demands in August concerning Samaná Bay and a new land title law (essential to the U.S.-owned sugar companies and other buyers of land), rather than compromise the original ones.[34]

The Initial Reaction to Intervention

Immediately after the seizure of Santo Domingo on 15 May, a strong wave of anti-U.S. sentiment swept the country, especially in Santo Domingo. This grew stronger each time some outrageous incident occurred, such as the seizure of the senators to prevent the election of Federico Henríquez or the cutoff of the revenues of the Dominican government.[35] Most of the anger and opposition generated by these events was expressed peacefully. Though the city of Santo Domingo had been riotous the night before the entry of U.S. troops, with people running about noisily and talking anxiously—some vowing to fight and making preparations to leave the city with General Arias—a call for receiving the invaders with a silent protest, a *duelo público* (public mourning), finally prevailed.[36]

When U.S. forces entered Santo Domingo in the early dawn hours of 15 May, they encountered deserted streets, closed doors, shuttered windows, and Dominican flags draped with black crepe. During the day scarcely anyone traversed the streets, while social centers, theaters, and other gathering places remained closed. On the second day of the occupation, however, the city came back to life. Newspapers greeted the invaders with condemnatory editorials, while ordinary citizens, officials, and organizations published protests.[37]

In the weeks following, the citizens of Santo Domingo, Santiago, and other towns of the republic formed *juntas patrióticas.* With the ayuntamientos, they sent delegations of "the most distinguished personalities" to protest to Admiral Caperton. In Santiago the Centro de Recreo, the most formidable redoubt of the city's elite, shut its doors in protest for the month of June, and its directors barred fiestas until the Christmas season of 1916. The masses expressed their feelings in a popular anti-Yankee song of many verses which appeared after the marines seized Puerto Plata.[38]

The resistance to the intervention, except for the few incidents which occurred in 1916 and the peasant struggle which developed in the east during and after 1917, was to be a war of words. It was waged by the republic's educated elite in the press, books, letters, and the theater and from the lecture platform and the soapbox. Newspapers, including some which sprang up for the purpose, became the principal means of expressing displeasure with the presence of the U.S. forces. Writers, prominent among them Fabio Fiallo, Enrique Deschamps, and Américo Lugo, often criticized policy or its implementation, and they were always anxious to publicize the incidents of friction which occurred with increasing regularity during 1916 between the general population and the armed intruders.[39] There was also a rash of self-criticism. While critical of the intervention, many writers looked inward to try to see what elements of the Dominican national character and experience had contributed to the state of affairs which brought about the intervention.[40]

The theater was another vehicle of protest in the first days of the occupation, although censorship caused it to diminish thereafter. During June and July an actors' group, the Cuadro Lírico, presented a series of original works by the playwright José Narciso Solá. *El intruso*, *No más yes*, and *Un matrimonio a lo yanqui*, as their titles suggest (*The Intrusion*, *No More Yes*, and *Marriage Yankee-Style*), were all concerned with the intervention. Among the plays of other writers, a comedy by Arturo Logroño and Rafael Damirón entitled *Los yanquis en Santo Domingo* presented a more self-critical view, caricaturing Dominican politics and politicians.[41]

Before long U.S. officials began to bring pressure to silence their critics, though it was difficult without the right of censorship. In one

incident, a marine officer tried to force the civil governor of Santo Domingo Province to silence critics—this caused tremendous resentment. In a typical reaction, a Santo Domingo editor wrote sarcastically that the incident "shines out as a great triumph of Pan Americanism. In its beak the Yankee eagle carries liberty and justice to Spanish America." Nevertheless, the confrontation convinced the governor to warn editors "to think the matter over seriously." U.S. pressure was also responsible for the conviction by a Dominican judge of Miguel A. DuBreil, the editor of *El Loro*, a satirical weekly, for having insulted President Woodrow Wilson.[42]

In early October 1916, Dominican writers organized the Asociación de la Prensa to defend freedom of expression. This early nucleus of intellectual resistance included many notable Dominicans residing both in the republic and abroad, in Europe and the United States. One of their first actions, besides soliciting operating funds from theater owners, was to investigate the case of editor DuBreil. Minister Russell, in arguing for strict censorship in December 1916, paid a backhanded tribute to the effectiveness of one aspect of the association's work. It was, he wrote, founded "for the purpose of spreading anti-American propaganda throughout Latin America, and the effect of its work was beginning to be shown in the local press in the way of articles copied from newspapers of other countries, principally Cuba and Porto Rico."[43]

Not all encounters between Dominicans and the occupying forces were limited to words. The situation was, obviously, explosive and grew more so as time passed and pressures increased. Compounding the differences of language and customs which can cause friction between the people of any two cultures were other factors peculiar to the intervention, especially feelings of frustration and resentment on the part of the Dominicans and a sense of superiority and, on some occasions, belligerence on the part of the occupying forces. One concrete factor was that U.S. forces had assumed certain police powers, which brought the two sides into regular confrontations.

Disarmament and the enforcement of arms regulations were among the usurped police powers. Sporadic shooting, not aimed at anyone but productive of frayed nerves and general tension, had regularly occurred at night in Santo Domingo during the first months of the occupation.[44] Presumably to curb the shooting and to diminish chances of attacks on marine patrols, U.S. military officials on 14 September decreed the revocation of all permits to carry arms issued before 12 August 1916. The actions of North American troops attempting to enforce this decree led to confrontations and, in a number of cases, to violence. Military officials also determined that the order granted them the right to make forcible searches of homes for suspected weapons. These incidents led to bitter protests, especially in one case where marines allegedly threatened to torture a householder to make him reveal supposedly hidden weapons.[45]

Disarmament was only one problem. For a variety of reasons, a succession of violent incidents occurred in the occupied Dominican cities, especially Santo Domingo, between Dominicans and North Americans. During September, October, and November 1916, newspapers reported the following events in the capital city: a marine lieutenant shot and wounded a Dominican woman; a drunken U.S. soldier assaulted a schoolteacher and her mother in their own home, an outrage followed the next day by the beating of a North American soldier by Dominican men; a number of U.S. troops severely beat a man and killed another who had interfered; a group of Dominican girls and various spectators accused a number of North American troops of molesting them on the street; a marine patrol, thinking it heard shots from the direction of a café, charged it and shot to death a man crossing the street, a boy eating his dinner next door, and the sixty-seven-year-old owner of the establishment, who was also bayoneted in the abdomen as he attempted to close his door; and a marine shot to death a deaf-mute who failed to obey his command to halt. The worst outbreak of violence occurred in a Santo Domingo suburb, Villa Duarte, when a marine patrol went to arrest General Ramón Batista for an alleged offense which took place before the intervention. He and some relatives and friends fired on the marines, killing two and wounding others. The U.S. troops then returned with reinforcements, killed their attackers and an innocent woman in the neighborhood, and smashed and burned several houses. In the aftermath marines belligerently roamed the streets of Santo Domingo, killing two Dominicans and wounding or beating numerous others.[46]

The Villa Duarte incident finally moved the Dominican government to accuse the U.S. forces publicly of arbitrary and illegal actions, of various outrages and depredations including the use of the *ley fuga*—the shooting of prisoners while they "attempted to escape." Worst of all, the government complained, U.S. grievances against Dominicans resulted in prompt action, whereas all kinds of North American crimes and misdemeanors went unpunished. Despite the promise of U.S. officers to punish future depredators if exact information were provided, little changed.[47]

The Imposition of a Military Government

Continuing conflicts between U.S. military personnel and Dominican citizens changed the attitude of the residents of the republic from one of friendliness to one of nearly universal hostility. This fact was a source of great discomfort to the government in Washington and a strong inducement to resolve the situation. In addition, developments in internal Dominican politics were creating another pressure, the threat of a new, constitutionally elected president to replace the interim chief executive.

The same act of the Dominican Congress by which Dr. Henríquez y Carvajal had been chosen interim president had created a constitutional assembly to write long-advocated reforms to the 1908 constitution, including a new system for electing the president of the republic. Failing completion of the reform document within the five months beginning 31 July 1916, elections were to be held according to the provisions of the old constitution.[48]

Quarrels between the various political parties prevented even the opening of the constitutional assembly until 29 September 1916. And thereafter factional debates continued to impede the delegates' progress. When it became apparent in mid November that the constitutional reforms would probably not be completed in time, the president issued a decree for the convocation of the provincial electoral colleges on 3 December. The colleges' task was critical, for they were to elect both a new constitutional president and replacements for Dominican senators and deputies whose terms would expire on 29 November 1916.[49]

The impending convocation brought matters to a head. Because Washington officials thought elections would result in control of the Dominican government by General Arias, the State Department moved to implement a previously conceived plan to create a military government. This drastic step was necessary, according to the State and Navy Department officials who originated the plan, because there seemed no other way to obtain complete satisfaction of U.S. demands for economic and military control, because of the growing economic crises in the republic, which had resulted from withholding receivership funds, and because of the continuing violence between North Americans and Dominicans. Also of concern were the numerous protests regarding the Dominican situation which had arrived in Washington from all parts of the hemisphere. A confidential message to President Henríquez in mid November concerning the conference's decision brought no substantial change in the Dominican position.[50]

On 29 November 1916 Captain Harry S. Knapp, commander of the Atlantic Cruiser Force of the navy, proclaimed the establishment of a U.S. military government in the Dominican Republic. "This military occupation," the proclamation read, "is undertaken with no immediate or ulterior object of destroying the sovereignty of the Republic of Santo Domingo, but on the contrary, is designed to give aid to that country in returning to a condition of internal order that will enable it to observe the terms of the treaty [of 1907]." Dominican administrators were to remain in office under the guidance of military officials, Dominican law was to continue in effect as long as it did not conflict with the goals or regulations of the occupation, and the court system was to remain, but in conjunction with military tribunals which would deal with matters directly affecting the military government and its personnel. All revenues of the republic were to be collected by the receivership and paid to the military government, which would then meet the regular administrative expenses of the country as well as those of the occupation.[51]

On the day Captain Knapp announced the U.S. takeover, the Dominican constitutional assembly sought to meet the challenge by quickly adopting a new constitution. This was complete with special provisions which would have insured the continuity of constitutional government, pending a new election, by establishing a new interim president after Dr. Henríquez' mandate expired and by permitting senators and deputies whose terms were expiring to continue temporarily in office.[52] But the assembly's action was stillborn, a futile assertion of an independence which was already lost.

The proclamation of a military government appeared the next day in Dominican newspapers, along with orders establishing censorship of the press, of speech, and of radio and other telecommunications, abolishing all permits to keep and carry arms, and making arrangements for the payment of all past-due salaries. Reflecting a populist tendency often present in subsequent military legislation, officials directed the Customs Receivership to pay these wages in an elaborate way intended to prevent moneylenders from collecting usurious interest, rumored to be as high as 75 percent in some cases, on the unpaid government salaries which they had bought up.[53]

U.S. authorities had planned in advance for the possibility of a military government. In Santiago, for instance, when the marine commanding officer, Colonel Theodore P. Kane, received word of the proclamation a little after midnight on 29 November, he immediately canceled all liberty and sent out patrols to gather up individ-

ual marines from the city's bars and other places of recreation. The commander then strengthened marine patrols and put all his troops on alert. The next morning he appointed a censor, a provost marshal, and a provost judge, all officials who could act quickly to suppress any open manifestation of sentiment against the new government. After these preparations were complete, Colonel Kane summoned Santiago's ayuntamiento, the local judiciary, the chief of police, and other officials, announced the imposition of the military government, and asked the Dominicans to continue in their posts. Despite some obvious displeasure with the situation, all of them agreed, and Santiago remained tranquil. Similar episodes took place in other occupied cities.[54]

The laws of the military government, many of them destined to become part of the permanent law of the Dominican Republic, were called executive orders. The first one appeared on 4 December 1916, declaring Dominicans ineligible to hold the cabinet posts of Interior and Police and of War and the Navy, both positions which controlled portions of the Dominican military. Captain Knapp, now military governor, invited the other cabinet members to continue in charge of their portfolios, without pay or official recognition. By 8 December, however, all cabinet members had stated their refusal to serve under the military government, a fact recognized by Executive Order No. 4, which declared their offices vacant and designated U.S. military officers to replace them.[55]

The last remaining high official of the executive branch was President Henríquez himself. Unrecognized and overpowered, he continued to protest until no vestige of Dominican sovereignty remained. Finally, he left his country on 8 December, last setting foot on Dominican soil at the still unoccupied port of San Pedro de Macorís, where the people and the ayuntamiento of the city gave him a warm reception and presented him with a loan of two thousand dollars.[56]

The legislative branch of the Dominican government disappeared almost as quickly as the executive. Within a few days after the proclamation of 29 November, U.S. officials noted many members of the Congress leaving Santo Domingo City for their hometowns. In mid December Military Governor Knapp, on the advice of Minister Russell, decided that the new constitution voted by the constitutional assembly was itself illegal, thus disposing of those senators and deputies whose terms had expired in late November. On 26 December the military government ordered that no elections were to take place until further notice, making the elections of replacements impossible. Then, using as an excuse the lack of a quorum in the Dominican Congress, the military government suspended its sessions indefinitely on 2 January 1917.[57]

Thus, within little more than a month, military officials had eliminated two of the three branches of representative, democratic government. Except for many lower officials and employees of the executive branch, only the judiciary remained. Most state governors and other provincial employees stayed at their posts. And, on the local level, the members of ayuntamientos or city councils remained in office, despite the expiration of their legal tenure, by fiat of the military government. Subsequently, military authorities reappointed or dismissed these formerly elected officials as they pleased.[58]

Adjusting to Military Rule

There was little show of resistance to the proclamation of a military government, much less, in fact, than there had been to the initial occupation earlier in 1916. Perhaps this was because the announcement of 29 November merely made de jure an already de facto situation. In any case, the only immediate military reaction was that of Governor Manuel de Jesús Pérez Sosa, nicknamed Lico, of Pacificador Province, who had earlier refused to surrender the stronghold at San Francisco de Macorís. Although this refusal was primairly symbolic, as the Dominicans made no attempt to use the building or its less than a dozen troops for any active military purpose, the marine commander considered the situation intolerable. When on 29 November a squad of marines successfully stormed the lightly defended fort, killing several Dominicans and wounding others, Governor Pérez and a group of fellow citizens angrily declared a rebellion. But, because the marines immediately sent reinforcements into the area and because many Dominicans worked to persuade the governor to avoid a bloody confrontation, the subsequent violence never escalated beyond occasional incidents of sniping. Nevertheless, Executive Order No. 3 declared Governor Pérez an outlaw in early December, replacing him with Juan Ramón de Lara, and in March 1917 Pérez surrendered to the military government.[59]

Another governor, Fidel Ferrer of the province of Samaná, apparently refused to continue to serve as a public official under the occupation. Executive Order No. 13, of 26 December 1916, stated that he had abandoned his office and replaced him with Volney Thomás Boisrond. Ferrer, a onetime schoolteacher and author of a textbook

on Dominican history, later joined with peasant guerrillas fighting the marines in the east and was killed in 1918.[60]

However, the predominant reaction of Dominicans to the proclamation of 29 November was peaceful. "Notwithstanding the people's muffled murmur of protest," noted an eyewitness, "their inaction was as great as their stupor." Both members of government and leaders of the political parties had counseled the population not to resist, believing that an armed struggle would be useless.[61] The Henríquez government confined its reaction to the diplomatic front. The Dominican representative in Washington, Armando Pérez Perdomo, composed a strong formal protest to Secretary of State Robert Lansing against "the illegal actions of the intervening United States' forces in the territory of the Dominican Republic" and sent other legations a memorandum explaining the situation in detail. Similarly, before his ouster, the Dominican secretary of state, José María Cabral y Báez, sent a protest to Lansing.[62]

President Henríquez sought to confront U.S. officials personally, to convince them of the error of their policy or at least to obtain an assurance that the military government was only a temporary measure. Accompanied by his son, Dr. Max Henríquez Ureña, who officially served as secretary to the office of the president, Henríquez journeyed first to San Juan, Puerto Rico, where he received fervent expressions of sympathy from the beleaguered nationalists of that island, and then to New York and Washington. He found officials in Washington unwilling to discuss Dominican affairs. Only through the newspapers could he be heard, and the United States' approaching entry into World War I, which attracted most of the public's attention, rendered even that platform ineffective. Since a successful antioccupation campaign in the United States appeared at least temporarily impossible, Henríquez went south to Cuba. There, in Havana and Santiago, with the help of other Dominicans, he took the first steps in a nationalist campaign of publicity and agitation which would last until the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1924.[63]

In the weeks following the proclamation, U.S. personnel wrote various dispatches commenting with pleasure on the situation throughout the country. Marine officials in various northern towns reported that all was quiet, with most citizens ignoring politics and going about their business and some sympathetic, friendly, and openly cooperative.[64] U.S. Minister Russell reported in a similar vein that "prominent citizens and former officials of Santo Domingo" had indicated to him "their opinion that present control by the United States was what the Dominican Republic needed and that petty politicians are the only people dissatisfied."[65]

Though Russell was stretching the truth to complement U.S. policy, it is certain that some Dominicans had been happy to see the crisis of 1916 resolved, especially because of the economic difficulties which the suspension of Customs Receivership payments had caused. An apparently common feeling was that, the deadlock having been broken, the United States would arrange matters as it wanted—perhaps for the better—hold new elections, and then leave.

Dominicans who opposed the military government found it difficult to make their views known. Owing to strict prior censorship, it was impossible to publish, in any form, any opinions "of a violent or inflammatory character, or which tend to encourage hostility or resistance to the military government" or are "unfavorable to the government of the United States of America or to the military government in Santo Domingo"; indeed, no material concerning the occupation or the policy of the U.S. government could be published which had not been submitted to and approved by the censor. When one editor, Dimas Frías, declared that he would not abide by the rules of the censors, the military authorities suppressed his newspaper, the *Heraldo Dominicano*. When the editor then published a handbill critical of censorship, he was imprisoned "for circulating literature against the American occupation." A military court found him guilty and imposed a fine.[66]

One of the ironies of censorship was that U.S. newspapers printed material concerning the military government which never appeared in the Dominican press. And U.S. or other publications which contained such material were frequently refused entry to the republic.

The Policy of the Military Government

Why had the United States intervened in the Dominican Republic and, having intervened, what did North American policymakers hope to accomplish? How did Washington organize the military regime to bring about the changes which it desired? And what were the principal endeavors of the military government?

The proclamation of the military government declared that the Dominicans had caused the intervention. They had allegedly violated article 3 of the 1907 U.S.-Dominican treaty by increasing their public debt without the required prior agreement of Washington officials. Because the debt was the result of expenses incurred quelling revolutions, the reasoning continued, the United States had inter-

vened to reestablish domestic peace, to institute certain reforms to secure the continuance of peace, and thus to insure future compliance with the treaty.[67]

If the proclamation offered a somewhat superficial explanation of the rationale for the intervention, it was at least a statement of a legal and diplomatic position, and it was with this position that Dominicans did battle while the intervention continued. Nationalists argued that the occupation and the military government were illegal, that the Dominicans had not increased their public debt but had only done the short-term borrowing necessary to the daily operations of any government. They also noted that they had faithfully made every required payment on the $20 million loan established by the 1907 convention to liquidate the Dominican debt, repaying even more than the specified minimum amounts. Furthermore, even if the alleged increase of the debt had occurred, they argued correctly, there was nothing in the treaty or in the international law which would justify the destruction of a constitutional government and of Dominican sovereignty as a result. Finally, a military government, with dictatorial powers based on the laws of war, had no place in governing a people who were in no sense at war with the United States.[68]

Behind the reasons advanced as a legal justification for the occupation were other, unstated motives which did not have any legal weight but which were actually closer to the real causes of the intervention. These factors, which have been previously discussed in the context of preintervention Dominican-U.S. diplomacy, included the desire to protect U.S. interests in the Caribbean and Panama Canal region, especially against the possible encroachments of Germany;[69] the Wilson administration's "missionary impulse," the desire to set things right in the Latin American republics by imposing good leaders, democracy, and stability;[70] and the wish to protect North American economic interests in the Dominican Republic.[71] Because these goals appeared threatened by the republic's instability, the United States had tried to obtain economic, military, and thus political control over the country. When Dominican statesmen had found it impossible to cooperate, the State Department's diplomacy had become more and more belligerent, soon leading to the use of force. Thus the accrued weight of these actions themselves became a powerful factor leading to intervention.

A classic antiimperialist explanation of the intervention, such as that of Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, would argue that economic imperialism was the cause, that the primary purpose of Washington's Dominican policy was to protect established economic interests or to enhance investment opportunities or economic control in the future. In a narrow sense, this does not seem to have been of paramount importance. In terms of the U.S. economy or even of U.S. investments elsewhere, such as in Cuba or Mexico, the investment in Santo Domingo was tiny; besides, there was no threat to this investment in 1916. Nor did those in Washington generally view the republic—with its small population, wealth, and resources—as an important place for future investment. Moreover, Dominican governments had consistently acted to favor the interests of foreign investors. It is in the larger sense, in the context of U.S. hemispheric policy, that the concept of economic imperialism is a useful explanation. Control of the Dominican Republic was important to maintaining domination of the sea routes to the Panama Canal, which was vital to U.S. domestic and world trade, and to controlling the Caribbean area and South America, which harbored large investments, markets, and quantities of raw materials.

What were the goals of U.S. officials after they had assumed dictatorial powers in the Dominican Republic? The surprising answer to this question is that there were no clearly stated goals. "Although we maintained a military government in Santo Domingo for eight years," noted one critic, "neither we nor the Dominicans have ever received an authoritative statement of why we were there and what we were trying to accomplish."[72] Another writer, otherwise favorably disposed toward the intervention, complained in late 1921 that "there is no evidence that Washington had at the outset, or had developed since, any well-thought-out policy or program. . . . Seemingly Washington has drifted along in a hopeful attitude, settling problems as they have arisen but holding no clear vision of what it wants to do. The men on the ground have been left to their own devices."[73]

The "men on the ground" in Santo Domingo after 1916 were Military Governor Knapp and U.S. Minister Russell. These two, with Knapp in the more powerful position, would gradually work out and begin to implement a policy during the first year of the occupation. Though they looked to Washington for approval of major decisions, that approval was generally given with slight consideration because both the State and the Navy departments were becoming more and more involved in affairs in Europe. Washington failed to pay serious attention to its agents in the Dominican Republic until after World War I and the Versailles Conference, when the military government began to suffer internal problems and attacks from an increasingly vocal nationalist movement. But by then, in most cases, it was too late to make policy. U.S. officials had to devote all

their energy to carrying out existing commitments and to negotiating a withdrawal.

Significant obstacles hampered the formulation of policy. Most important was the fact that three separate and coequal agencies of the U.S. government were involved in the Dominican Republic. The three were the Department of State, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of War, which controlled the Bureau of Insular Affairs, the parent agency of the Customs Receivership. The Bureau of Insular Affairs resolved part of the problem of divided authority almost immediately, in December 1916, when it ordered the receiver general of customs to "place yourself at the disposition of the Military Government,"[74] but relations between the State and Navy departments remained ambiguous. Minister Russell, who continued to represent the interests of the United States before the "Dominican" government of Captain Knapp (a diplomatic charade intended to demonstrate the unimpaired sovereignty of the republic), merely received instructions to consult and cooperate with the military governor.[75]

After early 1917 the State Department, though theoretically maintaining its control of policy, tended to leave Dominican matters to the Navy Department, which in turn granted the military government considerable freedom. Over time the pattern of Navy Department dominance in Dominican affairs became institutionalized, as the State Department discovered to its chagrin when it attempted, unsuccessfully, to reassert its control in early 1919. Thereafter the absence of a clear policy and the problem of overlapping authority caused increasing tension and at times open conflict between the two departments. But it was not until late 1920, after the military government had created an international cause célèbre over censorship, that the State Department, with support from the office of the president, managed to reclaim control.[76]

How did Knapp, Russell, and their aides establish the objectives of the military government? In the first place, they had to deal with obvious and immediate necessities resulting from the destruction of the Henríquez government. The occupiers had to organize the new military government, take up the operations of the old administration, and establish their authority throughout the republic. Captain Knapp, soon to be rear admiral, attacked the first major problem by appointing U.S. military officers to take over the various departments of the Dominican government.[77]

The structure of the new administration mimicked that of the executive branch of the former Dominican government except that, alongside the civil structure, there stood a parallel military one. At

the head of both was the military governor, a powerful figure responsible only to the U.S. secretary of the navy. At the top of the military structure was the commander of the Second Provisional Brigade, later called the Second Brigade, of the U.S. Marine Corps. Under the brigade commander were two (later three) regimental commanders, each responsible for a large section of the country. Reporting to them were the commanding officers of the battalions and companies located in the various towns and villages of the republic. Other important officials were the provost marshals. Operating in conjunction with the provost courts, they were the top police and judicial officials of the military government.

Though many Dominican civilian officials continued in office, there was little doubt who held the real power. Henry C. Davis, a battalion commander in San Pedro de Macorís, made this abundantly clear in the course of lecturing a member of a citizens' group who hoped to change the personnel of the ayuntamiento there. Davis told the man that his proposal was presumptuous, warned him to stop his "political agitation," and "informed him in no uncertain manner that I was head of the Government as far as this Province is concerned and when I considered any changes desirable they would be made and not before."[78] Davis' conduct was apparently not unusual, prompting one observer to note the tendency of local military commanders to act "like little kings." The problem, commented Marine Colonel Rufus H. Lane, was that "military authorities . . . were inclined to be somewhat arbitrary and to apply military principles and discipline to the civilian population at large."[79]

Once the structure of the military government had been established, its cabinet-level officials, naval and marine officers under the direction of Military Governor Knapp, immediately set about continuing the daily operations of the former administration. This task they accomplished with the help of the Dominican employees who remained at their posts and the Dominican budget for 1916, which, though allegedly "ridiculous" in some of its provisions, was extended into 1917.[80]

The military government had to immediately establish its authority throughout the republic. To this end military officials enforced the newly instituted censorship rules, employed the military courts, and soon put to work a secret service. They considered disarmament a necessity for obtaining domestic peace—by mid 1917, they had collected 43,418 firearms and 187,720 rounds of ammunition.[81]

The military government proved much less quick to act on larger questions. No doubt these issues seemed less pressing; but

they often involved large commitments of time and money, thus seeming to require careful planning. Furthermore, in the absence of any clearly stated policy, it was necessary for high officials of the occupation to formulate their own policy, based on what they understood of Washington's goals and the necessities of the Dominican Republic. The resulting policy, which emerged during 1917, was the work of the military governor and his advisers, Minister Russell, and to a lesser degree Clarence H. Baxter, the head of the receivership. They solicited ideas from the U.S. consul (who was also the representative of the United Fruit Company) in Puerto Plata and from many Dominicans—middle-rank bureaucrats who continued to work for the government as well as prominent citizens who conferred extraofficially with military administrators.[82]

Officials of the military government did have some reasonable bases for deciding upon the goals of their policy, despite the lack of clear direction from Washington. In the first place, the diplomatic struggle which preceded November 1916 had clearly identified several issues, namely, the U.S. government's desire to create a mechanism for financial control and its wish to establish a constabulary to replace the traditional armed forces of the republic. In addition, other matters had received attention in diplomatic correspondence from time to time, sometimes in the form of suggestions from Russell himself. These concerned strengthening U.S. authority over Dominican public works and extending it further to the state-owned railroad and the telephone and telegraph systems (measures contemplated to improve efficiency and to end graft), enacting a new land title law to facilitate taxation and the buying of real property by large North American corporations, and establishing a naval base in Samaná Bay. Military Governor Knapp, as he became more familiar with the Dominican situation, also noted aspects of Dominican life which he believed needed improvement, in particular education and transportation.[83]

From these various ideas, all of which either predated the military government or followed within several weeks, came the basic programs of the occupation. In addition to the daily business of administration and the surprisingly difficult task of subduing the east militarily, U.S. officials focused most of their energy on public works, particularly road and harbor construction and improvement, education, public health, the development of a constabulary, and a land survey program.[84] Other objects of preintervention diplomacy, such as financial control, followed automatically from the creation of the military government.

The vague demands and proposals for reform made by the State Department generally fell far short of concrete measures for their implementation. And so it was up to the military government to create the policies and the detailed plans which would effect them. As many critics within and without the military government have pointed out, the military officers in charge of the various departments of the government usually lacked any understanding of and experience with Dominican problems and did not have the training necessary to accomplish the technical aspects of their jobs. They had to turn to others, both North Americans and Dominicans, for help.[85]

The military government employed Dominicans in as many positions as possible, at least below the cabinet level. But it was difficult to find Dominicans with the special training needed for certain jobs and, in any case, antioccupation hostility made it almost impossible to persuade educated citizens to accept positions of responsibility within the military government, especially in the first months after November 1916. The problem had several solutions. One was the use of military officers in civilian positions. Though the Department of the Navy at first objected to this policy and Minister Russell persisted in his efforts to change it, Washington allowed the military government to continue the practice until the inauguration of the Dominican provisional government in 1922.[86]

A second solution to the shortage of qualified and cooperative Dominicans was to turn to what might be called the U.S. "colonial service." In 1917, occupation officials gratefully received from Brigadier General Frank McIntyre, the chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, a list of names of civilians who had previous experience in the U.S.-held Philippine Islands. Thereafter military officials often looked to former personnel of U.S. administrations in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba and employed a number of men with this background.[87]

The military government borrowed information as well as officials from previous colonial experiences. In 1917, the author of a proposed reform of the prison system based his ideas on an earlier project in the Philippines, noting that "the work in the Philippines seems in many ways more like this in Santo Domingo than any other."[88] The writers of contemplated laws on labor and immigration ordered copies of Puerto Rican and Philippine as well as U.S. legislation on the subject before beginning their own drafts. "Information as to the experience in similar countries is most valuable," noted Military Governor Thomas Snowden, Knapp's successor, as

he ordered copies of the *Reports of the Governor General of Cuba* as well as works by the earl of Cromer and Viscount Milner on the British administration of Egypt.[89]

Puerto Rico entered into the administration of the Dominican Republic in another way. The military government recruited and hired Puerto Ricans, usually for middle-status jobs of a kind which demanded native Spanish speakers but which few Dominicans could be persuaded to carry out, such as collecting the unpopular new taxes, spying, and interpreting. The nature of these jobs, the alleged superior air which Puerto Rican officials used in dealing with Dominicans, and the fact that some Dominicans viewed them as betrayers of the Hispanic people made them thoroughly disliked.[90] J. Luis Cintrón, a Puerto Rican deported because he sympathized with the Dominican nationalist position, revealed a popular conception of Puerto Ricans when he charged that the Puerto Rican Association in Santo Domingo was "nothing but a bunch of spies." Ironically, U.S. mainland personnel looked down upon their Puerto Rican fellow citizens working with them for the occupation.[91]

Eventually, Dominicans became involved in the military government and contributed to the policies of the occupation. Although U.S. officials had claimed from the first that many educated Dominicans supported the military administration, most qualified Dominicans had refused to take positions of responsibility in the new regime or to have any intimate association with it. But, as it became evident that the occupiers were planning to stay for some length of time, increasing numbers of persons began to come forward. Dominicans, especially members of the bourgeoisie, naturally began to see the military government as a patron—as a source of jobs, as a potential customer, as a possible sponsor for their favorite projects, or even as an ally in settling grudges against other Dominicans.[92] Some Dominicans, it must be added, aligned themselves with the occupation government with no ulterior motive but simply because they believed that it would effect benefits which no Dominican administration could achieve. Even some of the intervention's most active opponents, frustrated with the republic's traditional political life, hoped that this would be the case.

One of the first breaks in the wall of noninvolvement came as the result of the action of Félix María Nolasco, a chief clerk in the Ministry of Interior and Police, who had made himself known to his superiors as "from the beginning a warm friend of the military government." Nolasco and an associate presented officials with a whole list of names of persons they described as "friends of progress as well as sympathizers with the American occupation . . . , not politicians,

but true and sensible people." From this list, which bore the names of several influential Dominican families, came the republic's new envoy to Washington, Manuel de Jesús Galván, and several other future appointees of the military government. In return for Nolasco's helpfulness, the military authorities looked favorably upon his desire to be named *síndico* of the ayuntamiento of Santo Domingo and later named him to an administrative board.[93] Other Dominican cooperators also received preferment for their support.

Beginning in March 1917, a number of very important Dominicans approached the military government, either to offer their support or to present advice to military officials. Mario Fermín Cabral, a ranking member of the oligarchy and president of the Senate before the intervention, offered Military Governor Knapp his wholehearted support, even giving speeches in favor of the new regime. Haim H. López-Penha, of a wealthy and socially important family, wrote a long memorandum concerning "Some Necessities of the Dominican People," and Francisco A. Herrera, an exchief of the Ministry of Treasury and Commerce, offered his support as well as a long list of problems and suggested reforms. Also volunteering advice to the military government were P. A. Ricart, vice-president of the Santo Domingo Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture; Francisco J. Peynado, a prestigious lawyer, diplomat, and former cabinet official; and Dr. A. Fiallo Cabral, the superintendent general of public education.[94]

Particularly helpful to the military government were the overtures from the leaders of political parties. Horacio Vásquez visited Military Governor Knapp in March and publicly gave his support to the occupation's disarmament program. Luis F. Vidal did the same in a public announcement asking for the cooperation of his followers in the Legalista party. Federico Velásquez, a personal friend of Minister Russell who was considered sympathetic to U.S. policy, waited a respectable amount of time to present himself publicly to the new authorities, but he cashed in all the same. "Under the Military Government a large majority of offices were filled by members of this [Velásquez'] party," wrote Russell later.[95]

In April, Emilio Joubert, a high official of Horacio Vásquez' party, wrote a letter to party members announcing the chief's decision to back the occupation: "We have no just reasons to consider the American intervention as a covert and artful conquest and so has it been understood by the leader of the party, whose patriotism no one may doubt. [Vásquez], not only by his remonstrance but by his example, has shown that he wishes that the period of unfruitful civil warfare be ended and that efforts be made to hasten the termination

of the present abnormal occupation by cooperating to suppress the obstacles which prolong it." Later that month, Joubert privately suggested that Vásquez' party was interested in coming to an accommodation with the United States over the demands of Russell's infamous Note No. 14 of November 1915.[96] Joubert himself early decided to associate with the military government by accepting paid positions on several advisory commissions; he later received a reward for his action, being named the Dominican representative in Washington. "I have always been willing to give myself, body and soul, to the task of helping the Military Government or the State Department in any endeavor tending to promote the good of the Dominican Republic," he wrote in 1922.[97]

These examples are from the largest cities of the republic. The same pattern asserted itself in other towns and regions. Some citizens remained aloof, many went about their business and ignored the intruders, and some fraternized. As the occupation became more established, the higher officials of the military government developed a coterie of Dominican individuals and organizations which they consulted regularly. On economic and business matters, for example, the military governor and his staff often approached the chambers of commerce in Santo Domingo and Santiago, even asking them to help in the drafting of certain laws. The communication was not one-way, as both individuals and organizations felt free to put their ideas before the military government, which sometimes responded by adopting them into its program.[98]

As military officials began to feel more familiar with circumstances in the Dominican Republic and as the political situation began to thaw, the military government began to appoint a series of commissions with Dominican, North American, and sometimes Puerto Rican members. These panels were to study and to make recommendations concerning public education, the Dominican diplomatic service, and the republic's "food situation" in light of the increasing world shortage of goods and transportation caused by World War I. Another group was to study all claims against the Dominican government after 1907 and to make recommendations for the settlement of those found legitimate. Similarly, military boards began to examine other problems, such as the Dominican prison system. In another scheme military officials undertook a poll of ayuntamientos all over the republic, asking them to submit lists of public works projects of both national and local importance. Dominicans, North Americans, and Puerto Ricans also participated in less formal discussions, analyzing various matters, examining proposed laws, and drafting projects.[99]

Slowly the military government created a policy and began to implement it. During the first half of 1917, it moved to improve education, to revive stalled public works projects and to plan new ones, to organize a public health service, to create the rudiments of the new constabulary (the Guardia Nacional Dominicana), to take a national census, to survey the nation's lands in order to improve the chaotic land title situation, and to better Dominican agriculture. Numerous other matters such as taxation, the disputed Dominican-Haitian border, the establishment of a national penitentiary, the improvement of communications, and reform of the judicial system would only "receive attention as rapidly as well digested programs can be thought out."[100]

These initial endeavors served to define most of the effort of the military government during the next seven years. Because the projects were complex, difficult to carry out, and costly, they often moved forward very slowly. Lack of progress and the incompetence of officials became a cause for complaint as early as September 1917, and some of the projects were still incomplete when the provisional Dominican government took over in 1922.[101]

The military government thus initiated the occupation of the Dominican Republic without having received a clear statement of future policy from Washington. And because it never received one, it was up to officials of the military government to create a policy, drawing on various sources to do so. Most of the decisions concerned concrete matters, such as what to do and how to do it. Certain broader matters, such as how long the occupation should continue, could not be decided in Santo Domingo. Some of these were never decided, despite various suggestions and some debate among U.S. officials.[102] Washington, clearly, had its attention focused elsewhere.

tinent, and when compared to the lasting hostility towards the American people which the Occupation created in the hearts of a very great number of the Dominican people."[15]

One must conclude that foreign intervention, as practiced by the United States in the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924, was a policy neither wise nor just, a policy basically unproductive for all concerned. It was an episode which, if humans were really to learn from experience, could have saved the United States and the less powerful victims of its interventionist diplomacy incalculable waste of life and wealth in the future.

Notes

Introduction

1. The most balanced Dominican account of the 1916 to 1924 period is the work of Luis F. Mejía, *De Lilís a Trujillo: Historia contemporánea de la República Dominicana*, chaps. 6–8. Other books treat individual aspects of the intervention. Max Henríquez Ureña, *Los Estados Unidos y la República Dominicana: La verdad de los hechos comprobada por datos y documentos oficiales*, documents the period up to and including the overthrow of the last Dominican government in late 1916. Henríquez Ureña's book was republished in 1929, with additional data on the occupation itself, as *Los yanquis en Santo Domingo: La verdad de los hechos comprobada por datos y documentos oficiales*. Fabio Fiallo, *La Comisión Nacionalista Dominicana en Washington, 1920–1921*, and Federico Henríquez y Carvajal, *Nacionalismo: Tópicos jurídicos e internacionales*, detail the intellectual resistance. Antonio Hoepelman and Juan A. Senior, *Documentos históricos que se refieren a la intervención armada de los Estados Unidos de Norte-América y a la implantación de un gobierno militar en la República Dominicana*, presents considerable material from the 1921 to 1922 hearings on the Dominican Republic and Haiti of the U.S. Senate, biographical sketches of the Dominicans who testified, and other documents. A number of other works might be mentioned in a more exhaustive list; all of them are cited in the following chapters.
2. Sumner Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic, 1844–1924*, 2 vols.; Melvin M. Knight, *The Americans in Santo Domingo*.
3. Concerning the Caribbean area, the largest number of recent works treat the several Cuban interventions. On the first intervention, there are David F. Healy's policy-oriented *The United States in Cuba, 1898–1902* and James H. Hitchman's *Leonard Wood and Cuban Independence, 1898–1902*. On the second intervention, Allan R. Millett, *The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906–1909*, joins David A. Lockmiller's earlier *Magoon in Cuba: A History of the Second Intervention, 1906–1909*. And Louis A. Pérez'

several books, particularly *Intervention, Revolution, and Politics in Cuba, 1913–1921*, detail the later period along with David A. Lockmiller, *Enoch H. Crowder: Soldier, Lawyer and Statesman*. On Haiti the two outstanding recent works are David F. Healy, *Gunboat Diplomacy in the Wilson Era: The U.S. Navy in Haiti, 1915–1916*, and Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934*. They complement earlier works by Arthur C. Millspaugh, Emily G. Balch, and Dantès Bellegarde. On Nicaragua, Neill Macaulay, *The Sandino Affair*, joins a number of less well documented books by Latin American authors on this historic figure, while Richard Millett, *Guardians of the Dynasty: A History of the U.S. Created Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and the Somoza Family*, takes a wider view. On Mexico, Robert Freeman Smith, *The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico, 1916–1932*, is but one particularly apt study from a large number of books by North American and Mexican scholars on the subject of U.S.-Mexican relations. Similarly, there is a large useful bibliography on the United States in Puerto Rico, although no one recent book recommends itself. Several more general works are also essential, including David F. Healy, *U.S. Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s*; Joseph S. Tulchin, *The Aftermath of War: World War I and the U.S. Policy toward Latin America*; and Dana Gardner Munro's excellent two-volume study, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900–1921* and *The United States and the Caribbean Republics, 1921–1933*. Cole Blasier, *The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America*, although generally treating later interventions, leads the way for further comparative analyses.

4. Wilfredo Lozano, *La dominación imperialista en la República Dominicana, 1900–1930*.
5. This overview of the Dominican Republic in 1916 is based on H. Hoetink, *El pueblo dominicano, 1850–1900: Apuntes para su sociología histórica* and "The Dominican Republic in the Nineteenth Century: Some Notes on Stratification, Immigration, and Race"; Otto Schoenrich, *Santo Domingo: A Country with a Future*; George William Lloyd, "Economic and Social Changes in Santo Domingo, 1916–1926"; Juan Bosch, *Trujillo: Causas de una tiranía sin ejemplo*; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*; A. Hyatt Verrill, *Porto Rico, Past and Present, and Santo Domingo of Today*; Fred R. Fairchild, "The Public Finance of Santo Domingo," *Political Science Quarterly* 33 (December 1918): 461–481; and República Dominicana, *Censo de la República Dominicana: Primer censo nacional, 1920*. For a much fuller description of the Dominican Republic in 1916, based on numerous additional sources, see Bruce J. Calder, "Some Aspects of the United States Occupation of the Dominican Republic, 1916–1924," chap. 2.

1. THE OCCUPATION BEGINS: 1916

1. This sketch of Dominican-U.S. relations to 1890 is based on Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, vol. 1, chaps. 1–4. For a detailed analysis, see Charles C. Tansill, *The United States and Santo Domingo, 1798–1873: A Chapter in Caribbean Diplomacy*, on the period to 1870 and David C. MacMichael, "The United States and the Dominican Republic, 1871–1940: A Cycle in Caribbean Diplomacy," on 1870 and after.
2. On post-1890 U.S.-Dominican relations, see MacMichael, "The United States," and Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, vol. 1, chap. 7, and vol. 2.
3. Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898*, chaps. 1–4.
4. Schmidt, *Haiti*, pp. 5–8.
5. Munro, *Intervention*, pp. 65–111. For a more Dominican view (written by a Haitian), see Antonio de la Rosa [Alexandre Poujols], *Las finanzas de Santo Domingo y el control americano*, pp. 15–162.
6. Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, vol. 2, pp. 680–770; Munro, *Intervention*, pp. 259–307. Munro's account is heavily based on documents found in the U.S. National Archives, record group 59, decimal file 839, *General Records of the Department of State*, also examined by myself and available on microfilm as U.S. National Archives Publication, microcopy 626 (hereafter USNA, 839, with the proper file number). For the Dominican view, see Mejía, *De Lilís*. Mejía was an active participant in Dominican affairs from 1907 through 1924. Another personal account, for 1899 to 1916, is Antonio Hoepelman, *Páginas dominicanas de historia contemporánea*.
7. Munro, *Intervention*, pp. 263–306, notes nine such occasions. The documents of USNA, 839.00/400–1000, record dozens of additional incidents.
8. Julio G. Campillo Pérez, *El grillo y el ruiseñor: Elecciones presidenciales dominicanas; contribución a su estudio*, pp. 131–146.
9. The following review of events to 1916, unless otherwise noted, is based on Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, vol. 2, pp. 695–766, and Munro, *Intervention*, pp. 260–305.
10. Américo Lugo, "Emiliano Tejera," *Boletín del Archivo General de la Nación* 4, no. 18 (October 1941): 304; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, vol. 2, pp. 761–763.
11. Russell to Sec. St. Knox, 19 Sept. 1912, cited in Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, vol. 2, p. 694.
12. Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, vol. 2, pp. 766–768.
13. Mejía, *De Lilís*, pp. 125–127; Edwin N. McClellan, "Operations Ashore in the Dominican Republic," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 47, no. 216 (February 1921): 238–239; Comdr. F. B. Benton, USN, to Surg. Genl., 27 Oct. 1919, USNA, RG38, E6, B13. Most of the important documents pertaining to the seizure of Santo Domingo, in-

cluding the announcement of the first marine landing, Jiménez' resignation, and the ultimatum, are contained in Henríquez Ureña, *Los Estados Unidos*, pp. 83–91, and in United States, State Department, *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916*, pp. 220–229 (hereafter *Foreign Relations*, with the appropriate year appended).

14. Mejía, *De Lilís*, p. 127; Bernardo Pichardo, *Resumen de historia patria*, p. 292. Pichardo was one of the remaining ministers.
15. Desiderio Arias, *Al País* (broadside), Campamento Jeneral de la Victoria, 22 May 1916, Colección Rodríguez Demorizi (hereafter this private collection of Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi will be referred to as CRD).
16. McClellan, "Operations Ashore," p. 240; Frank L. Polk, Acting Sec. St., to Sec. Nav., 29 May 1916, with enclosure, USNA, RG45, WA7, B644; J. M. Puig, Vice-Pres., et al., Ayuntamiento de la Común de Puerto Plata, *Al Pueblo* (broadside), 31 May 1916, CRD. For detailed descriptions of U.S. military actions during May and June 1916, see the cables in Office of Nav. Intel. Register No. 6598, USNA, RG45, WA7, B644.
17. Kenneth W. Condit and Edwin T. Turnbladh, *Hold High the Torch: A History of the 4th Marines*, pp. 36–37, and Russell to Sec. St., 10 May 1916, USNA, RG45, WA7, B643. Mejía, *De Lilís*, p. 129, presents some details on the defense of Puerto Plata.
18. Condit and Turnbladh, *Hold High the Torch*, pp. 50–62. For correspondence on these and subsequent actions, see Martin K. Gordon, ed., *Joseph Henry Pendleton, 1860–1942: Register of His Personal Papers*, pp. xiv–xvi, 59 ff.
19. Vetilio Alfau Durán, "Nuestros próceres: Wenceslao Báez (Laito)," *Listín Diario*, 17 Mar. 1940.
20. Two separate memoranda, both E. L. Roach, Ch. of Staff, to Adm. Pond, 20 Aug. 1916. These items are in a large file (no. 53-1) in package 27 concerning the surrender of Santiago and other important 1916 events, held with the military government papers in the Archivo General de la Nación, Santo Domingo (hereafter identified as AGN, P, with the appropriate number). See also the related documents located in the U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center, Geographical File, no. 2 (hereafter USMC, Geogr. File).
21. Condit and Turnbladh, *Hold High the Torch*, pp. 63, 65, 70.
22. McClellan, "Operations Ashore," p. 240.
23. Américo Lugo, *Listín Diario*, 2 Oct. 1916, quoted in Vetilio Alfau Durán, "Planes patrióticos de desocupación," *Ahora*, 6 Nov. 1967, p. 62; Mejía, *De Lilís*, p. 129. Gustavo Adolfo Mejía Ricart, *Acuso a Roma: Yo contra el invasor*, pp. 63–88, notes a few limited efforts to organize Dominicans against the U.S. invasion.
24. Lugo, "Emiliano Tejera," p. 313.
25. Emilio C. Joubert, *Cosas que fueron*, p. 207.
26. R. H. Dunlap, Ch. of Staff, to all CO's, U.S. Naval Forces Operating Ashore in Santo Domingo, 18 Aug. 1916, AGN, P27.

27. Munro, *Intervention*, pp. 307–308; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, vol. 2, pp. 773–776; Federico Henríquez y Carvajal, *Declinatoria* (broadside), 11 June 1916, from the document collection of the Casa de Don Federico y Biblioteca del Maestro, Santo Domingo (hereafter identified as HyC). Henríquez' personal recollections of this period, and some documents, appear in his *Nacionalismo*, pp. 1–17, 53–57.
28. Lugo, "Emiliano Tejera," p. 307; Henríquez Ureña, *Los Estados Unidos*, pp. 119–120; *Junta de Defensa Nacional al Poder Ejecutivo* (broadside), undated, CRD.
29. Henríquez Ureña, *Los Estados Unidos*, pp. 109–111; typescript of speech, hand-dated 31 July 1916, HyC.
30. Russell to Sec. St., 25 July 1916, USNA, RG45, WA7, B643; Munro, *Intervention*, p. 309.
31. Henríquez Ureña, *Los Estados Unidos*, pp. 127–128; Horacio Blanco Fombona, *Crímenes del imperialismo norteamericano*, pp. 115–116.
32. Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, vol. 2, p. 780; Russell to Sec. St., 17 and 20 June 1916, USNA, RG45, WA7, B643.
33. MacMichael, "The United States," pp. 420–440; Munro, *Intervention*, pp. 309–311; Mejía, *De Lilís*, pp. 113–134; Russell to Lansing, 25 and 26 Aug. 1916, 5 and 14 Sept. 1916, *Foreign Relations, 1916*, pp. 234–237. Dominican eyewitness accounts of the negotiations appear in Henríquez Ureña, *Los Estados Unidos*, pp. 111–116, 133–154, and in José M. Cabral y Báez, "Resumen de las actuaciones de la Cancillería Dominicana. . . ," in Hoepelman and Senior, *Documentos*, pp. 330–371.
34. Russell to Lansing, 25 Aug. 1916, and Lansing to Russell, 29 Aug. 1916, *Foreign Relations, 1916*, pp. 234–235; Sec. St. to Sec. Nav., 30 Aug. 1916, enclosing Russell to Sec. St., 18 Aug. 1916, USNA, RG45, WA7, B644.
35. Mejía, *De Lilís*, p. 128; Russell to Lansing, 6 June 1916, *Foreign Relations, 1916*, p. 231.
36. Tulio A. Cestero Burgos, *Entre las garras del águila*, pp. 26–28; letters, signed "La Juventud," Rafael E. Ricart and M. de J. Troncoso de la Concha, Pres. del Ayuntamiento, in *El Tiempo*, 16 May 1916, CRD.
37. Mejía, *De Lilís*, p. 127; Lugo, "Emiliano Tejera," p. 314; protests, *El Tiempo* and *Listín Diario*, 16 May 1916; Academia Colombina, *Memorial de protesta contra la arbitraria ocupación de la República Dominicana por tropas de los Estados Unidos de América.*
38. Mejía, *De Lilís*, p. 128; Pedro M. Hungría, *Apuntes para la historia de Santiago: Centro de Recreo, sociedad fundada el 16 de agosto 1894*, p. 27; Juan Gómez, "The Gallant Dominicans," *American Mercury* 17 (May 1929): 94.
39. Henríquez y Carvajal, *Nacionalismo*, p. 13; Max Henríquez Ureña, *Panorama histórico de la literatura dominicana*, vol. 2, pp. 406–407.
40. For example, Francisco Henríquez y Carvajal's program in *Las Novedades* (New York), 25 June 1916, reprinted in Henríquez Ureña, *Los*

Estados Unidos, pp. 111–116; the 1916 articles of Manuel Piña Benítez in his *Del pasado*; and the translations of Pelegrín Castillo's articles, originally published in the *Listín Diario* in August 1916, enclosed in Dir. of Nav. Intel. to Ch. of Nav. Op., 3 Mar. 1917, USNA, RG45, WA7, B643.

41. Jaime Lockward, *Teatro dominicano: Pasado y presente*, pp. 19, 50, 57, 58; Manuel de Jesús Goico Castro, "Raíz y trayectoria del teatro en la literatura nacional," *Anales* 10, nos. 37–38 (January–June 1946): 176, 179–181, 183–184; *Listín Diario*, 13 Sept. 1916.
42. Governor Juan Fco. Sánchez to various newspaper editors, 19 Sept. 1916, in Henríquez Ureña, *Los Estados Unidos*, pp. 156–157; Jacinto López in *La Nación* (Havana), reprinted in *Listín Diario*, 10 Nov. 1916; Blanco Fombona, *Crímenes*, pp. 17–18 (Blanco Fombona was the editor of *El Domingo* in 1916); reports from the newspapers *El Filorio* and *El Iris* (San Francisco de Macorís), in USNA, RG45, WA7, B643.
43. Persio C. Franco, *Algunas ideas*, p. 6; *Listín Diario*, 7 and 10 Oct. 1916; Russell to Sec. St., 6 Dec. 1916, USNA, RG45, WA7, B643.
44. CO, U.S. Landing Force Operating Ashore in Santo Domingo, to Comdr., Cruiser Squadron, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, daily reports beginning 11 June 1916, USNA, RG45, WA7, B643; Henríquez Ureña, *Los Estados Unidos*, p. 160.
45. Henríquez Ureña, *Los Estados Unidos*, pp. 155–156; Knight, *The Americans*, pp. 78–79.
46. These incidents and others are reported in various issues of the *Listín Diario* of Santo Domingo, in *La Información* and *El Diario* of Santiago, and in *La Nación* of Havana, cited in Henríquez Ureña, *Los Estados Unidos*, pp. 157–164, and in Teófilo Castro García, *Intervención yanqui, 1916–1924*, pp. 29–40.
47. Henríquez Ureña, *Los Estados Unidos*, pp. 161–164.
48. Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, vol. 2, pp. 783–784, 789.
49. Pichardo, *Resumen*, p. 298; Henríquez Ureña, *Los Estados Unidos*, pp. 165–171; Manuel Arturo Peña Batlle, ed., *Constitución política y reformas constitucionales, 1844–1942*, p. 635.
50. MacMichael, "The United States," pp. 428–436; Henríquez Ureña, *Los Estados Unidos*, p. 170.
51. Capt. H. S. Knapp, USN, "Proclamation," Sto. Dom., 29 Nov. 1916, *Foreign Relations, 1916*, pp. 246–247. Knapp's actions just prior to 29 November are detailed in a series of cables in Office of Nav. Intel. Register No. 6598a, USNA, RG45, WA7, B644.
52. Peña Batlle, ed., *Constitución política*, pp. 635, 668–676.
53. República Dominicana, *Colección de órdenes ejecutivas del número 1 al 116 inclusive . . . de noviembre 29, 1916 hasta diciembre 31, 1917*, pp. 6–7. (This is the first in a series of volumes which contain the laws of the military government, called executive orders. Subsequent references to this annual publication will appear as *Colección*, with the appropriate year.) Brewer, Chargé, Sto. Dom., to Lansing, 6 Dec. 1916, USNA, RG45, WA7, B643.

54. Condit and Turnbladh, *Hold High the Torch*, pp. 69–70; Frank Anderson Henry, U.S. Consul at Puerto Plata, to Sec. St., 12 Dec. 1916, USNA, RG45, WA7, B644.
55. R.D., *Colección, 1916–1917*, pp. 9–12.
56. Henríquez Ureña, *Los Estados Unidos*, pp. 182–184.
57. Brewer to Lansing, 6 Dec. 1916; Knapp to Sec. Nav., 17 Dec. 1916, USNA, RG45, WA7, B643; Executive Orders Nos. 12 and 18, 26 Dec. 1916 and 2 Jan. 1917, R.D., *Colección, 1916–1917*, pp. 17, 21.
58. Exec. Order No. 44, 20 Mar. 1917, R.D., *Colección, 1916–1917*, p. 186; Henry C. Davis, "Indoctrination of Latin-American Service," *Marine Corps Gazette* 5, no. 2 (June 1920): 158.
59. Henríquez Ureña, *Los Estados Unidos*, pp. 180–181; Condit and Turnbladh, *Hold High the Torch*, pp. 70–75; Mejía, *De Lilís*, p. 142.
60. R.D., *Colección, 1916–1917*, p. 17; Ramón Batías [pseud.?], "El patriota se llamaba Fidel Ferrer," *Renovación*, 1969, p. 5.
61. Henríquez Ureña, *Los Estados Unidos*, p. 180.
62. Armando Pérez Perdomo, E. E. y Ministro Plenipotenciario, to Lansing, 4 Dec. 1916, and J. M. Cabral y Báez, S. de E. Rel. Ext., to Lansing, 4 Dec. 1916, in ibid., pp. 185–191, 178–179.
63. Fiallo, *La Comisión Nacionalista*, pp. 69–71; Max Henríquez Ureña, ed., *Pedro Henríquez Ureña, Antología*, p. xlv, and his *Los Estados Unidos*, pp. 184, 193–206.
64. Brewer to Lansing, 4 and 6 Dec. 1916, F. A. Henry to Sec. St., 12 Dec. 1916, and F. A. Ramsey, Brig. Intel. Off., to Ch. of Staff, 2 Jan. 1917, USNA, RG45, WA7, B643–644.
65. Russell to Sec. St., 14 Dec. 1916, enclosed in Frank S. Polk to Sec. Nav., [?] Dec. 1916, USNA, RG45, WA7, B643.
66. "Censura," signed H. S. Knapp, in R.D., *Colección, 1916–1917*, pp. 6–7; Dimas Frías, Director del *Heraldo Dominicano*, *Al Pueblo Dominicano* (broadside), undated, CRD; Daily Reports, CO, U.S. Forces, to Brig. Comdr., 1 and 3 Dec. 1916, USNA, RG45, WA7, B643; Henríquez Ureña, *Los Estados Unidos*, p. 79.
67. Knapp, "Proclamation," 29 Nov. 1916, *Foreign Relations, 1916*, pp. 246–247.
68. The Dominican minister to the United States, Armando Pérez Perdomo, outlined the Dominican position in his protest note to Lansing, 4 Dec. 1916, in Henríquez Ureña, *Los Estados Unidos*, pp. 185–187. President Henríquez expanded on it in his memorandum of 12 August 1921, printed in United States, Senate, Inquiry into the Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, *Hearings before a Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo* (hereafter U.S., Senate, *Hearings*), vol. 1, pp. 53–57.
69. Munro, *Intervention*, p. 313; Carl Kelsey, "The American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 100, no. 189 (March 1922): 178. Rayford W. Logan, *Haiti and the Dominican Republic*, p. 61, discusses the problem of stressing the importance of the German factor in U.S.-

Dominican policy. In my own research, I found that Germany is seldom directly mentioned in U.S. diplomatic and military papers on the Dominican Republic until *after* the military government had already been established. Another historian who has examined the German factor in U.S.-Dominican policy and, like myself, finds Germany more an important background factor than an immediate concern is Marlin D. Clausner, *Rural Santo Domingo: Settled, Unsettled, and Resettled*, pp. 165–167.

70. Arthur S. Link, *Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910–1917*, pp. 82, 93–94, 103.
71. See, for example, Russell to Sec. St., 14 Mar. 1916, *Foreign Relations, 1916*, p. 221. Many Dominican historians believe that the economic factor was of the utmost importance.
72. Henry Kittredge Norton, "The Ethics of Imperialism," *World's Work* 51 (January 1926): 328.
73. Kelsey, "American Intervention," p. 178.
74. McIntyre, Bur. of Insular Affairs, to Rec. Genl. of Customs, 2 Dec. 1916, *Foreign Relations, 1916*, p. 255.
75. Lansing to Russell, 20 Dec. 1916, *Foreign Relations, 1916*, p. 249. Concerning the fiction of a continuing Dominican government, see Sec. Nav. to Sec. St., 29 Nov. 1920, USNA, RG38, E6, B31.
76. Memorandum, "Conference with Rear-Admiral J. S. McKean . . . ," 27 Jan. 1919, USNA, 839.00/2124. Concerning several controversies, see Mil. Gov. to Ch. of Nav. Op., 16 Apr. 1919, and attached corres., USNA, RG38, E6, B17, and A. H. Mayo to Snowden and Snowden to Russell, 27 and 26 Dec. 1919, USNA, RG45, WA7, B646 and 645. Concerning the reestablishment of State's ascendancy, see Sec. Nav. to Sec. St., 27 Nov. 1920, USNA, RG38, E6, B31, and Richard Millett and G. Dale Gaddy, "Administering the Protectorates: The U.S. Occupation of Haiti and the Dominican Republic," *Revista/Review Interamericana* 6, no. 3 (Fall 1976): 394–398.
77. Knapp became a rear admiral on 20 March 1917. Russell to Sec. St., 11 Dec. 1916, *Foreign Relations, 1916*, p. 248.
78. Henry C. Davis, Batl. Comdr., to Brig. Comdr., 28 July 1918, USNA, RG38, E6, B23.
79. Otto Schoenrich, "The Present American Intervention in Santo Domingo and Haiti," p. 211; Rufus H. Lane, "Civil Government in Santo Domingo in the Early Days of the Military Occupation," *Marine Corps Gazette* 7, no. 2 (June 1922): 129.
80. Knapp to Sec. Nav., 17 Dec. 1916, USNA, RG45, WA7, B643.
81. Knapp to Sec. Nav., 30 Nov. 1916 and 26 Nov. 1917, USNA, RG45, WA7, B644; H. S. Knapp, "Annual Report of the Military Government of Santo Domingo . . . ," 21 July 1917, USNA, 839.00/2043.
82. See the comments of Military Governor Knapp concerning agriculture, public works, public health, and other matters in his "Annual Report of the Military Government of Santo Domingo . . . ," 21 July 1917, USNA, 839.00/2043; C. H. Baxter, Rec. Genl., to Knapp, 4 Dec. 1916, AGN, P44; M. A. Peters, "Recommendations for the Betterment of Dominican Affairs," 1917, enclosed in A. J. Peters, U.S. Treas. Dept., to Wm. Phillips, 17 Jan. 1917, USNA, 839.00/1991.

83. Munro, *Intervention*, pp. 302–303; Russell to Sec. St., 29 May and 18 Aug. 1916, *Foreign Relations, 1916*, pp. 249–250, 252–253; Knapp to Sec. Nav., 17 Dec. 1916, USNA, RG45, WA7, B644.
84. C. C. Baughman, "United States Occupation of the Dominican Republic," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 51, no. 274 (December 1925): 2311–2325; Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, vol. 2, pp. 810–817.
85. Russell, "Confidential Memorandum," to Stabler, 12 Sept. 1917, enclosed in Lt. Comdr. Charles Belknap, Office of Nav. Op., to Knapp, [?] Oct. 1917, USNA, RG38, E6, B6; Schoenrich, "American Intervention," p. 211; Kelsey, "American Intervention," pp. 178–179, 198.
86. H. S. Knapp, "Annual Report of the Military Government of Santo Domingo . . . ," 21 July 1917, and Russell to Sec. St., 11 Sept. 1917, USNA, 839.00/2043 and 2051.
87. McIntyre to Russell, 5 Oct. 1917, USNA, RG38, E6, B3. The names of various persons with Philippine experience appear in the Genl. Corres. file, USNA, RG38, E6, B3. See also Lt. Comdr. Arthur H. Mayo, Treasury and Commerce, to Mil. Gov. Snowden, 31 Mar. 1919, USNA, RG38, E6, B14, and Knapp to Arthur Yager, Gov. of Puerto Rico, 15 Sept. 1917, USNA, RG38, E6, B5. Biographies of several transferred officials appear in Harry Alverson Franck, "Santo Domingo, the Land of Bullet-Holes," *Century Magazine* 100 (July 1920): 304, 306.
88. Genl. Pendleton, Int. and Pol., to Knapp, 17 Oct. 1917, USNA, RG38, E6, B4.
89. H. S. Knapp, Memorandum, 1 July 1918, USNA, RG38, E6, B6; Mil. Gov. Snowden to José E. Benedicto, Acting Gov. of Puerto Rico, 14 and 17 June 1920, and to Sec. Nav., 9 Aug. 1920, USNA, RG38, E6, B27 and 31.
90. Kelsey, "American Intervention," p. 179; Mejía, *De Lilís*, p. 145; Schoenrich, "American Intervention," p. 211; Arthur J. Burks, *Land of Checkerboard Families*, pp. 106, 159, 226.
91. Julian N. Frisbee, Intel., Memorandum to Col. Macker Babb, citing a report from Maj. H. M. Butler, 16 Mar. 1920, USNA, RG38, E6, B22; copy of a confidential letter, signature removed, sent to Phillips, St. Dept., 18 Aug. 1918, filed with Knapp to Russell, 2 Nov. 1918, USNA, RG45, WA7, B644.
92. Many such letters are contained in the Genl. Corres. file, USNA, RG38, E6, B1 through 3, and in AGN, P59. Among the petitioners for jobs were several men later found among the most active nationalists, Rafael Damirón and Enrique Deschamps.
93. Félix María Nolasco and Alejandro Mencía to Genl. Pendleton, 22 Feb. 1917, and Knapp to McKelvey, 18 Oct. 1917, USNA, RG38, E6, B2 and 4.
94. Mario F. Cabral to Knapp, 19 Mar. 1917, and Knapp to Haim H. López-Penha, 12 Mar. 1917, USNA, RG38, E6, B3 and 2; F. A. Herrera to J. H. Edwards, Spec. Dep. Rec. Genl., Customs Receivership, translation en-

closed in Edwards to Knapp, 27 Sept. 1917, USNA, RG45, WA7, B645; P. A. Ricart, V. P., Cámara de Comercio, Industria, y Agricultura, to Knapp, 2 June 1917, USNA, RG38, E6, B1; Knapp to F. J. Peynado, 7 Dec. 1917, USNA, RG38, E6, BU ("BU" indicates a box number which is unknown); Dr. A. Fiallo Cabral, Superintendente Genl. de Enseñanza Pública, to Knapp, 16 Mar. 1917, USNA, RG38, E6, B2. Fiallo Cabral, despite his effort, was soon dismissed.

95. Velásquez to Knapp, 17 May 1917, and Knapp to Velásquez, 17 May 1917, USNA, RG38, E6, B5; Russell, Memorandum, 30 Aug. 1924, USNA, 839.00/2859.
96. Emilio Joubert, 1st V.P., National Committee of the Horacista party, to the members of Provincial and Municipal Committees, 19 Apr. 1917, quoted in Welles, *Naboth's Vineyard*, vol. 2, p. 821; Joubert to Knapp, 28 Apr. 1917, AGN, P23.
97. Exec. Orders Nos. 26 and 60, 22 Jan. and 26 June 1917, R.D., *Colección, 1916–1917*, pp. 55–56; Joubert to Robison, 17 May 1922, AGN, P45.
98. For example, concerning the adulteration of honey: Enrique A. Ricart, Pres., Cámara de Comercio, to Mil. Gov., 19 Feb. 1918, and J. H. Pendleton, Acting Mil. Gov., to E. A. Ricart, 28 Feb. 1918, AGN, P49. Concerning a forestry law: Dr. Alfonseca, Pres., Convención de Ayuntamientos del Cibao, to Mil. Gov., 18 Apr. 1918, AGN, P49.
99. Exec. Orders Nos. 25, 26, 50, and 60, 19 and 22 Jan. 1917, 14 Apr. 1917, and 26 June 1917, R.D., *Colección, 1916–1917*, pp. 28–30, 47–48, 55–56; Knapp to Col. Rufus H. Lane, 18 Oct. 1917, USNA, RG38, E6, B4; H. S. Knapp, "Annual Report of the Military Government of Santo Domingo . . . ," 21 July 1917, USNA, 839.00/2043.
100. H. S. Knapp, "Annual Report of the Military Government of Santo Domingo . . . ," 21 July 1917, USNA, 839.00/2043.
101. Russell, "Confidential Memorandum," to Stabler, 12 Sept. 1917, enclosed in Lt. Comdr. Charles Belknap, Office of Nav. Op., to Knapp, [?] Oct. 1917, USNA, RG38, E6, B6.
102. Russell to Sec. St., 5 Jan. 1917, *Foreign Relations, 1917*, p. 707; Knapp to Belknap, 6 Oct. 1917, and Ch. of Nav. Op. to Sec. Nav., 11 Oct. 1921, USNA, RG45, WA7, B644 and 647. These are but a few of many letters which discuss the desirable length of the occupation.

2. The Political Economy of the Military Government, I

1. United States, Military Government of Santo Domingo, *Santo Domingo: Its Past and Its Present Condition*; Knight, *The Americans*, pp. 97–107.
2. Exec. Order No. 25, 19 Jan. 1917, R.D., *Colección, 1917*, pp. 28–29. Some of the commission's papers are in AGN, P21 and 44.
3. Lane, "Civil Government," pp. 143–145; U.S. Mil. Govt., *Santo Domingo*, pp. 31–32; Clausner, *Rural Santo Domingo*, pp. 181–182.
4. Emilio Rodríguez Demorizi, ed., *Papeles de Pedro F. Bonó*, pp. 144–150; Hoetink, *El pueblo*, pp. 233–239; Clausner, *Rural Santo Domingo*, pp. 98–113, 181–182; Paul H. Muto, "The Illusory Promise: The Dominican Republic and the Process of Economic Development, 1900–1930," pp. 158–160.

5. Exec. Order No. 145, 5 Apr. 1918, R.D., *Colección, 1918*, pp. 46–87. Baughman, "U.S. Occupation," p. 2314, notes a controversy over the use of Spanish. Military Governor Knapp, quoted in Russell to Sec. St., 12 Sept. 1917, USNA, 839.041/5, advocated retention of Spanish.
6. U.S. Mil. Govt., *Santo Domingo*, pp. 34–37; Rufus H. Lane, Justice and Public Instr., to Mil. Gov., 1 Feb. 1921, AGN, P45. Lane was the officer in charge of public education from 1917 to 1921.
7. R. H. Lane, Order No. 47, 5 Mar. 1918, in República Dominicana, Servicio Nacional de Instrucción Pública, *Colección de órdenes emanadas . . .*
8. S. S. Robison, "Memorandum for Senate Committee," 6 Dec. 1921, AGN, P37. U.S. Mil. Govt., *Santo Domingo*, p. 34, claims higher salaries for 1920 than appear in the actual budget in Exec. Order No. 387, 17 Jan. 1920, R.D., *Colección, 1920*, pp. 9–77.
9. Kelsey, "American Intervention," p. 182; Lane to Mil. Gov., 1 Feb. 1921, AGN, P45; Clausner, *Rural Santo Domingo*, pp. 184–185.
10. U.S. Mil. Govt., *Santo Domingo*, pp. 35–36; A. T. Marix, Justice and Public Instr., to Mil. Gov., 14 Oct. 1920, AGN, P45. Marix became head of the ministry after Lane's departure.
11. U.S. Mil. Govt., *Santo Domingo*, pp. 35–36.
12. Pichardo, *Resumen*, p. 272; Henríquez y Carvajal, *Nacionalismo*, pp. 182–183; "Instituto Profesional de Santiago de los Caballeros, República Dominicana," *Anales* 3, no. 1 (January 1939): 150.
13. Knapp to Sec. Nav., 8 Oct. 1917, USNA, RG45, WA7, B644; R. H. Lane, Order No. 11, 3 Oct. 1917, R.D., Servicio Nacl., *Colección*; Lane to Mil. Gov., 1 Feb. 1921, AGN, P45; "Questionnaire," pp. 2–3 and 27, attached to Rear Adm. R. M. Kennedy to Surg. Genl., 7 Apr. 1921, AGN, P11 (hereafter this basic forty-page source will appear as "Questionnaire").
14. U.S. Mil. Govt., *Santo Domingo*, p. 35.
15. Marix to Mil. Gov., 14 Oct. 1920, AGN, P45; Clausner, *Rural Santo Domingo*, p. 185.
16. Knapp to Justice and Public Instr., 27 Sept. 1918, AGN, P64; Julio Peynado to Horace Knowles, 22 Apr. 1922, Papeles de la Familia Peynado (hereafter PFP). Salary reductions were made in a series of executive orders beginning with no. 607.
17. Snowden to Justice and Public Instr., 11 May 1921, and Marix to Mil. Gov., 13 and 20 June 1921, AGN, P8, 19, and 10; Fiallo, *La Comisión Nacionalista*, pp. 30, 83; Adolfo Nouel, Junta Consultiva, to Pres. Harding, 19 May 1921, USNA, 839.42/4; A. Pastoriza, Cámara de Comercio, Santiago, to Snowden, 7 June 1921, AGN, P9; Mil. Gov. Lee to Sec. Nav., 16 May 1924, USNA, RG38, E6, B74.
18. F. A. Ramsey, Justice and Public Instr., to Mil. Gov., 24 Jan. 1922, AGN, P37.