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MAROON COMMUNITIES IN THE CIRCUM-CARIBBEAN

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MAROON societies consisted of runaway slaves and their offspring who sequestered themselves in the circum-Caribbean wilderness.¹ The existence of Maroons manifested the opposition of some African slaves to their enslavement and a persistent desire to create a free society of their own. In the Western hemisphere, Maroon societies emerged virtually whenever and wherever a slave population existed. None the less, at any given time, Maroons comprised no more than a tiny fraction of the local Afro-Caribbean community. The survival of Maroon societies depended on a combination of circumstances, not only the local geography, but also the local social, political and military resources of the Maroons and neighbouring slaveholders.

As early as 1520 the economy of the more settled Caribbean colonies – Hispaniola, Puerto Rico, Jamaica and Cuba – was gradually shifting from mining to market gardening, ranching and tobacco cultivation. Imported African slaves increasingly replaced local Amerindians as the predominant form of coerced labour for the Spanish colonizers, although the Caribbean islands quickly became only marginal components of the vast Spanish American empire. Nevertheless, by the mid-seventeenth century several other nations had developed their central colonial holdings in the Caribbean archipelago and the adjacent Guianas, where they concentrated on plantation and trading economies, especially based on sugar, cotton and coffee production. An expanding population of African slaves provided the labour. This constant supply of imported slaves resulted in increasing marronage and a proliferation of Maroon societies.

Marronage represented part of a spectrum of forms of resistance to slavery. Slave resistance was a feature of every slave society, its manifestations usually found in 'day-to-day resistance' including 'a vague but threatening insolence ... malingering, various forms of negligence or outright destruction of plantation property ... and more serious actions such as murder, especially by poison.'² Resistance was also expressed in more

permanent responses such as suicide and self-mutilation and in large-scale group actions such as conspiracy and rebellion. Marronage could be expressed in the action of an individual or group running away, either temporarily or permanently. When the desertion was prolonged or permanent, and led to sequestered groups, it may be said that the marronage resulted in the formation of a Maroon society.

Of paramount importance in the establishment of any Maroon community was the opportunity to escape to a sufficiently remote and defensible destination, yet not so remote that the group could not maintain social and economic viability. The larger and less settled the territory, the steeper and more impenetrable its mountains and the denser its natural vegetation, the greater chance a Maroon band had of successful, continuous long-term survival. In this respect, potential Maroons from colonies located at the edge of a continental wilderness, such as in Suriname or the Guianas, had a clear advantage over islanders. Nevertheless, some of the most successful Maroon settlements were on the ruggedly mountainous island of Jamaica.

Maroons had to be able to produce what they needed or acquire by trade what they could not produce. Availability of hunting and planting grounds, and avenues of trade and/or raiding were therefore essential for procreation. Maroon bands needed a sexually mixed population within the fertile age range of 15 to 45 years, always one of the most difficult requirements to fulfil, given the harsh and often embattled conditions of Maroon life. For protection in what was often a perpetual state of siege, Maroons needed weapons and skill in guerrilla warfare, as well as a style of living, at least in the initial phases, that tolerated frequent, impromptu relocation to new areas of settlement. Another factor affecting the survival of any given Maroon band was the degree to which it inconvenienced or threatened the slaveholding class, and how much of their economic, military and human resources the slaveholders were prepared to devote to eradicating or 'neutralizing' the Maroons. Sometimes, when the Maroons were sufficiently tenacious, the slaveholders tired of trying to rout them and a political solution was arranged, as in Jamaica or Suriname, where treaties were signed and the existence of that particular group of Maroons was legally recognized. Sometimes this legal settlement provided advantages for both Maroons and the local slaveholding class.

Maroon settlements: location and timing

An account of the location and timing of Maroon settlements in the Caribbean during the era of slavery requires a distinction between the possibilities of marronage as a term generally indicating escape and the

actual existence of continuous social structures that may be called 'Maroon settlements'. The expression 'marronage' may describe the action of slaves who escaped to town and assumed the guise of free blacks, slaves who absconded from the plantation for a few days or weeks, returning on their own initiative, or individual slaves who escaped to the wilderness. Only a community of escaped slaves assembled through particular acts of marronage on a relatively long-term and autonomous basis should be described as a Maroon settlement or society.

The history of the Maroon societies bears a strong correlation with that of the settled, organized and symbiotic colonial states. In many instances individual settlements lasted only briefly, as in Puerto Rico, Cuba and St Domingue, while in neighbouring Jamaica they have exhibited historical continuity up to the present. A survey of the location and chronological instance of these settlements underlines the relationship between particular forms of slave society and local geographical factors and the potential for Maroon settlements.

Belize is a case in point. In this mainland colony, slaves had a better chance of complete escape than on the islands of the Caribbean. In the Spanish Mexican empire, the Yucatan peninsula was peripheral, both in terms of geography and in terms of Spanish settlement and economic policy. In the 1620s British subjects began to establish timber export operations in the Bay of Honduras, or Belize. In the Treaty of Paris of 1763, Spain conceded to Britain the right to continue such harvests, but did not overtly cede administrative authority over the territory. The Spanish attempted to reassert control over the settlement in 1779 but again ceded effective control to the British in 1783. Nevertheless they saw the usefulness of harassing the British by offering succour to a slave population which far outnumbered their owners. When labour-intensive mahogany extraction began in earnest in 1783, a few thousand slaves working for a handful of owners were scattered in small and largely unsupervised groups throughout the forests of the sparsely populated territory. Escape was relatively easy for these slaves. The settlers had few resources to devote to recapture and more than one Maroon settlement was established in the mountains. Maroon communities within Belize were well situated to coordinate attacks upon the slave owners, but the slaves' apparent ability to find ready refuge in neighbouring Spanish territory militated against major uprisings. Slaves escaping north into the Yucatan were offered freedom and protection by the Spanish Commandant just across the Rio Hondo. When the newly-independent Spanish states abolished slavery in 1821, many Belizean slaves escaped to these republics, with the Peten area in Guatemala a favoured destination.⁵

Cuba, north-east of Belize, and the largest of the Greater Antilles, represented another set of circumstances. From the 1530s onwards, Cuba

contained Maroon settlements called *palenques*, first established by Indians escaping from forced labour. One recent study by Gabino De la Rosa Corzo identifies 62 completely separate *palenques* located in three areas of the island: the low mountains west of Havana; further east in the highlands near the highlands of Matanzas; and in the foothills of the lofty Sierra Maestra mountains. These 62 *palenques* constitute only those identified in the records of the colonial authorities.

These settlements were invariably well hidden and well fortified – *palenque* means ‘palisade’ – and it is certain that many more remained undiscovered.⁴ Though a given location might remain the site of a *palenque* for decades, the population on that site, almost exclusively male, displayed little inter-generational coherence. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries ex-slaves sometimes shared these *palenques* with pirates and other outlaws. The authorities spent enormous amounts of money and military effort to eradicate these Maroon settlements, but many of the *palenques* survived through Cuba’s sugar boom and the years of slavery, ultimately marking the location of small rural towns.⁵

Jamaica, although a relatively small island compared with neighbouring Cuba and Hispaniola, nevertheless contained extremely rugged regions. The Spaniards had occupied Jamaica since 1509, but at the time of the British invasion of 1655 only about 1500 blacks and the same number of white Spanish subjects tried to defend the island. The Spaniards freed their slaves and both black and white took to the hills. By 1660 the Spaniards had surrendered, but the remaining ex-slaves formed the embryos of Maroon bands which would menace the British settlers. Evidently the remnants of these Spanish Maroons ultimately settled in the mountains in the interior of the island.⁶

As the British came to establish a sugar plantation economy the number of African slaves in Jamaica increased, with more slaves deserting to the eastern mountains or to the equally rugged limestone mountains of the centre and west, known as the Cockpit country. By the early eighteenth century, Maroons in the west consolidated themselves into a tightly-knit band, and those of the east developed a federation of individual ‘towns’. In 1739, after years of plantation raids and guerrilla warfare between Maroons and British subjects, both Maroon groups, about 1000 people in all, signed treaties with the colonial government. By means of these treaties the Maroons were granted their freedom and in turn agreed to hunt down and turn back any newly-escaped slaves, which they did. After a second major war with the British in 1795, the Maroons signed a second peace treaty reaffirming the earlier conditions. Some of the descendants of these ‘treaty Maroons’ still live in their own towns in Jamaica.

Conditions on Hispaniola, characterized by rugged mountains and a small, scattered population of colonists, were also conducive to Maroon settlements. Populous Maroon enclaves existed throughout the slave era. By 1546 it was estimated that over 7000 Maroons were hiding in the forests and mountains all over the island, drawn from a slave population of about 30 000.⁸ After the division of the island between the French and Spanish in 1697 the greater proportion of Maroon settlements were to be found on the French side, because of a higher slave to white ratio due to the much more established plantation economy. Most Maroon settlements in St Domingue were located between the cultivated plains and the mountainous regions, around Le Cap (northern), Cul de Sac (east-central) and Les Cayes (southern). The most infamous area of Maroon settlement in French St Domingue was Le Maniel, located in the central mountains, just over the border from Spanish Santo Domingo. Persistent efforts to eradicate Le Maniel and other Maroon holdouts met with minimal success.⁹

Puerto Rico, the easternmost of the Greater Antilles, was a relative backwater in the Spanish empire, with very little plantation activity until the early nineteenth century. With only a small population, slave or white, the island became a favoured destination for slaves escaping by water from other islands, particularly islands of the Lesser Antilles. Blanketed with a large proportion of original forest until the early nineteenth century, the mountains of Puerto Rico provided a refuge for escaped slaves. Benjamin Nistal Moret, after studying the phenomenon of marronage in Puerto Rico between the years 1770–1870, reports (on the fragmentary evidence available) the existence of several Maroon bands prior to 1850, especially in the 1820s, comprised of a peculiar combination of slave fugitives who came to Puerto Rico by sea, as well as of Maroons from the island itself.¹⁰

Danish St Thomas was first developed as a plantation colony after 1688, and by the 1730s this development had resulted in the removal of the island’s natural forest cover. The intervening decades saw island slaves taking full advantage of the limited possibilities for Maroon settlements, living in sea cliffs and caves. Neville Hall relates that ‘they chose well, with a keen strategic eye, for the cliffs could not be scaled from the seaward side and the landward approaches were difficult because of the vegetation.’¹¹

By the 1720s hunts were being organized to dislodge the Maroons. This, combined with the elimination of vegetative cover, drove prospective Maroons to flee to nearby Puerto Rico, the less populous Leeward Islands and beyond. Ironically, the development of sugar plantations brought the opportunity for occasional small-scale Maroon settlements in the form of huts erected among the tall canes, thus relatively undetectable during the six months before the summer harvest.

St John (acquired by the Danish in 1717) and St Croix (acquired in 1733) went through cycles of deforestation similar to that in St Thomas. By the 1760s *Maronbjerg*, or 'Maroon Mountain' in the north-western corner of St Croix was no longer considered a safe retreat, so potential Maroons from that island also tried to ship out to more sparsely settled islands such as Puerto Rico.¹²

St Kitts, first claimed as a British West Indian colony in 1623, became a permanent British possession in 1783. The situation for Maroons on St Kitts is indicative of that on many of the small islands of the Lesser Antilles. Richard Frucht describes why successful Maroon settlements were unlikely:

The island is relatively small, some 68 square miles, and the only refuge areas are found in the dense woodlands and rain forests of the upper levels of the mountains that form the spine of St Kitts. Runaways would hide in thatched huts during the day and raid provision grounds at night. Almost all runaways were caught and returned to their master(s) for punishment¹³

Population figures for Antigua reflect a socio-economic change after 1670 with the arrival of sugar and an increase in marronage. In 1672 the 570 slaves were owned by a few of the 600–800 white British settlers. By 1708, 2892 whites lived among 13 000 slaves. Slaves deserted into the Shekerly mountains in the south-west portion of the island. In 1687 the legislature claimed that the slaves were plotting to revolt and that many had already fled to the Shekerly Maroons. The whites attacked a fortified Maroon camp of 20 houses (about 40 to 50 individuals) in these mountains, and routed the Maroons. After that time, as in the Danish Leeward Islands, potential Maroons apparently concentrated on waterborne avenues of escape: David Barry Gaspar notes that some reportedly fled to Dominica, St Lucia and St Vincent during the first half of the eighteenth century, when both of those islands were still controlled by the Caribs.¹⁴

Carib islanders prevented the Spaniards from settling Guadeloupe and Martinique in 1493. French colonists developed important centres for sugar production on both islands after 1635. For about 100 years there was erratic Maroon activity on the two islands, but as Gabriel Debien indicates, only those well-established bands causing serious trouble – usually crop damage – were recorded in official correspondence. On Martinique several hundred Maroons were reported to exist in 1665. In Guadeloupe a group of 30 Maroons were seen in the vicinity of Grande-Terre in 1668. In 1726, 200 Maroons were said to be on Guadeloupe, apparently divided into four groups.¹⁵ 'Petit marronage', running away for a few days and returning, was a commonplace on these islands and Debien notes that among the managers,

as among the planters, there seems to have been a genuine casualness about it.¹⁶

In 1763 the French ceded Dominica to the British. In the next ten years the nature of the island economy changed from dependence upon coffee and spice production to sugar plantation, and the number of slaves roughly trebled, from 5872 to 15 753. The number of whites also doubled, from 1718 French to 3850 British subjects. Bernard Marshall, after examining the correspondence of the Dominican government, relates that 'throughout the eighteenth century the Dominica Maroons were rated second in organization, discipline, strength and unity of purpose to their counterparts in Jamaica.' One contemporary description of the Maroons of Dominica held that they were originally slaves of Jesuit missionaries, who fled to the interior rather than acknowledge British owners at the change of government in 1763. There they were joined by other runaway slaves. Whatever its history, in 1785 the estimated population of the Maroon settlement was 300. It was hidden in the mountains of the island's interior, which 'abounded in fastnesses, places of concealment and roads that were almost impassable.'¹⁷

About this time the Maroons apparently began open raiding on plantations. The British government tried to stop the rebels, first through negotiation, then by a military offensive, that finally forced 559 Maroons to surrender in 1814, after several decades of fighting. The British were greatly aided in their pursuit of the Maroons by the assistance of captured rebels who revealed the location of Maroon hideouts and planting grounds in exchange for their personal freedom.

South of Martinique the chain of the Lesser Antilles Windward Islands, including St Lucia, St Vincent, Grenada, and Tobago with their fierce Carib populations, remained free of European plantation settlement longer than the other islands of the chain. Depending on the prevailing Carib policy towards runaways, slaves from nearby plantation colonies such as Barbados sometimes found it advantageous to flee to these islands.

When runaways fled to St Vincent, the longest-standing Carib territory, Caribs initially returned them to enslavement. In the second half of the seventeenth century, when the St Vincent Caribs realized that the colonial powers had serious designs on their island, they adopted a policy of welcoming these Maroons, according to Hilary Beckles. So many Maroons arrived that they quickly outnumbered the Caribs, and the Caribs then invited the British and French troops to invade the island and rid them of the Maroons. In 1719 the French invaded, but the Maroons fended them off, and managed to hold on to St Vincent during the first half of the eighteenth century.¹⁸

Barbados, the easternmost of the Caribbean islands, was claimed by the English government in 1627. Beckles reports significant evidence of slave

and servant marronage within the island before 1670; both groups fled to a few caves and gullies, as well as the remaining but rapidly diminishing wooded zones. Sugar cultivation was introduced during the early 1640s, and by the mid-1650s the 'sugar revolution' had occurred. By the 1670s, 70 per cent of the island was under sugar cultivation, and the militia was able to patrol the rest when necessary; slaves began to seek other options for escape, such as making their way to neighbouring islands like St Vincent.¹⁹

The Guianas in the north-east corner of the South American continent represented a geographically and topographically ideal situation for marronage. The coastal colonial settlements and plantation economies of these colonies were very much part of the Caribbean area but their continental geography presented great advantages for potential Maroon settlements. As in Belize, when Maroons escaped their path took them not to some nearby restricted mountain interior, as on most of the islands, but further away from colonial settlement, in this case towards the south, along the many rivers that run through the seemingly limitless interior of the Guianas.

In 1814 the Dutch formally ceded Guiana to the British who had in fact already assumed effective control by the 1780s. Both powers concentrated on coastal sugar plantations and by 1770 the colony had more than 15 000 slaves. Escaped slaves established Maroon colonies in the wilderness of the interior, with a particular influx of Maroons during the period of colonial reorganization after the Dutch West Indian Company's colonial charter expired in 1792. The planters brought down the numbers of the Maroons of British Guiana by the end of the eighteenth century by giving the Amerindians incentives to hunt them down; they paid the Amerindian a bounty of 300 guilders for every right hand of a dead Maroon. About the same time a similar tactic helped rid the planters of French Guiana of the Maroons of Lead Mountain, to the west of the principal settlement, Cayenne.²⁰

Suriname, or Dutch Guiana, located between the French and British colonies, had a very different outcome to its Maroon history. When the Dutch took over Suriname in 1667, the British had already begun to develop plantations and already a few hundred Maroons lived in the interior. By 1738, with 57 000 slaves in Suriname, the number of Maroons was estimated at 6000. Despite frequent armed patrols from the plantations, these Maroons were able to develop their societies in relative freedom, dividing themselves into clans and sharing the riverside territories between these clans. In the 1760s, several Maroon clans made peace treaties with the white settlers, but despite agreements on the return of newly-escaped slaves, new Maroon groups continued to form, spreading into the hinterland of French Guiana. Several of these groups have maintained a high degree of autonomy into the present era.²¹

Maroon settlements: social and political structure

A correlation can therefore be found between the longevity of Maroon settlements in particular areas and the type of political and economic relations the Maroons developed with the settled colonial society. Besides serving the interests of their own band, Maroon societies were often useful both to the colonial authorities and to the slave societies. Maroons provided an important trade link for slaves and colonists alike, purchasing from as well as selling to the plantations. To slaves, the Maroons represented what was at least the theoretical possibility of attaining liberty. To the authorities, those Maroon societies with whom they had established treaties represented some form of control over future runaway slaves.

The examples of Maroon societies in Cuba, St Domingue, Jamaica and Suriname, and their social and political conditions provide evidence that those Maroon societies which were able to negotiate useful treaties with the incumbent colonial powers had much better prospects of survival over a period of generations. Their communities, freed from the need for unceasing military activity, were able to concentrate on developing and perpetuating their culture and society. Though the physical locations of Maroon settlements might remain the same for years, even without the protection of treaties, these settlements were much less likely than those of the treaty Maroons to have a stable membership with multi-generational ties.

Cuba's Maroon settlements, or *palenques*, offer an example of this transience. Hundreds of these fortified settlements existed in Cuba throughout the period of slavery, despite sustained efforts to eradicate them on the part of the slave owners. Ever vigilant and ready to flee at a moment's notice, the *apalencados*, who lived in the settlements, built their huts of flimsy materials such as twigs and mud, and surrounded them with piles of stones to hurl at *rancheadores* (Maroon hunters). Keeping constant guard, scouts patrolled the area and communicated with neighbouring *palenques*. The *apalencados'* skill at evasive tactics and guerrilla warfare is reflected in De la Rosa's statement that 'In the official reports of attacks on *palenques* only very rarely is there mention of the capture of more than three *apalencados* at one time.'²² But it might also indicate the relatively small number in these *palenques*.

Indeed, these communities rarely had more than 50 inhabitants: the average *palenque* contained between 10 and 30 huts, each hut normally accommodating no more than two Maroons. José L. Franco cites an 1830 description of the cabins of the *palenque* Bumba, near Santiago de Cuba, recounted by Commander Antonio de Leon, leader of a military operation

against the *palenque*, 'the huts are so spread out that it is only possible to surprise 2 or 3 at one time. They are so low that they cannot be seen over the bushes and cannot be detected except at a very close distance. Each hut has 2 doors with a small clearing on each side.' Commander de Leon described some of the other protective devices the *palenques* incorporated: 'A few steps forward and I found myself in a ditch full of pointed sticks The Second obstacle seemed insuperable: ... a steep, rugged hill, covered with *tibisi* (undergrowth), which had two very narrow, winding paths that we followed endlessly.'²³

The *apalencados* travelled in small groups and followed river beds rather than paths, leaving no trails and going circuitously to foil the *rancheadores* and their dogs. They travelled at night when the *rancheadores* were nearby. With a serious shortage of firearms, most *apalencados* carried *chuzos*, long, hard, wooden sticks sharpened and scorched at the tip.²⁴

The *apalencados*' organization reflected their constant warfare. They had an elected chief, or captain, whose power of command was absolute. Normally the captain selected a site for settlement, and then planned its defence. To eliminate the chance of betrayal, Maroons who did not defend themselves from pursuers were killed, and generally no escaped slave was allowed to leave the vicinity of the *palenque* for a long period – as much as two years after he had joined it.²⁵

Apalencados cultivated many of their own crops in planting grounds near their huts. Their staples included plantain, beans, sugar-cane, manioc and *malanga* (a type of tuber). In the more isolated eastern *palenques* they also grew tobacco, coffee, cotton and fruits, and sometimes even constructed small simple sugar mills.²⁶ They trapped animals and fished in nearby streams. Surplus crops were sometimes sold at market, but the most tradeable items were wild honey and beeswax, exchanged for clothing, gunpowder, weapons and tools. *Apalencados* traded with pirates, white farmers or merchants, or through black intermediaries on nearby plantations. Their trade was sometimes carried out in regular networks stretching to markets on other islands. Bumba, the *palenque* near Santiago de Cuba, traded with Hispaniola and Jamaica via several small boat operators.

Raids on estates and plantations were carried out when trading opportunities were either not available or not sufficient. During these night-time raids *apalencados* took a quantity of tradeable items, such as food (especially meat), clothing and firearms, as well as new recruits, whether voluntary or forced. Women particularly were sought to bring back to the *palenques*, due to an understandable shortage of females in these camps.

Many of the characteristics of Maroon organization in Cuba also obtained in St Domingue. As one historian summarizes, 'Escaped slaves set up communities, elected their leaders, cultivated the soil, built houses, and

constructed barricades against invaders. Operating from these bases, fugitives ... robbed passers-by on the highways at night, and went from plantation to plantation seizing cattle.'²⁷ One late eighteenth century account, related by M. L. E. Moreau de Saint-Méry shows how many of the same techniques of construction were employed by the Maroons of St Domingue:

secured behind an earthen parapet the Negroes defied their adversaries by dancing. These latter, infuriated, rushed right into ditches, the bottom of which had been filled with pointed stakes of pine and covered over with lianas and creeping plants ... half of the attackers were maimed.²⁸

One distinctive characteristic of the Maroon situation in St Domingue was the presence of a frontier linking two European colonies: French and Spanish. Relations between these two colonial powers were often strained, and the Maroons of St Domingue were able to exploit the political antipathy of the neighbouring powers to their own advantage. The Maroons of Le Maniel provide a case in point. Because the Spanish in more sparsely settled Santo Domingo had far less of a problem with slave desertion than did the French of neighbouring St Domingue, individual Spanish settlers and the Spanish colonial government acted with impunity in offering the escaped slaves refuge and assistance.

Established in the vicinity of the Bahoruco mountains by the southern French border, the Maroons of Le Maniel brought their merchandise to nearby Spanish frontier towns, where Spanish merchants received the goods and factored for the Maroons. To protect their economic interest in the settlement, these merchants would warn the Maroons when French reprisals were imminent. When the settlement of Le Maniel was attacked, members of the band slipped across the border to Santo Domingo, where they bided their time unmolested until they could return to rebuild their huts and gardens, destroyed by the frustrated French.²⁹

In 1872, after decades of pursuing the Maroons of Le Maniel, the French increased their efforts to resolve the problem because of colonists' interest in developing plantations in the area, where a boundary agreement had recently been signed by the French and Spanish authorities. M. de Saint-Larry, a former militia lieutenant and local settler, made contact with Spanish merchants associated with the Maroons.³⁰ Negotiations were begun for a Maroon surrender and a halt to plantation raids in return for outright freedom and land. A tentative agreement was reached, whereby the 125 French Maroons and their Spanish Maroon leader, Santiago, were to settle in a specific location in French territory, and hunt down future runaways.

In February 1786, the Maroons announced that they would not settle in the area described in the agreement. As Moreau de Saint-Méry relates, the

French suspected that the sudden refusal devolved from the negative advice 'of several Spaniards who got [of the Maroons] their sustenance for practically nothing.'³¹ Moreau de Saint-Méry adds that from that time the Maroons of Le Maniel desisted from further raids on the white settlements, but new settlers still kept away for fear of the Maroons. Spanish settlers had effectively precluded French economic expansion through their influence with the Maroons.

Jamaica's Maroon population and their history have been the subject of considerable study, particularly focusing on the 'Maroon war' of 1739, and eighteenth century Maroons in Jamaica had isolated settlements in the western and eastern mountains, close to the colonists on the coastal plains. Before the treaties Maroons preying on neighbouring plantations sometimes served to discourage agricultural expansion. With the highest absentee proprietor rate in the Caribbean, the Jamaican planters were ill-prepared to ward off the Maroons. During this era the colonial government petitioned with frequency for the home government to send military assistance against the Maroons:

We are not in a condition to defend ourselves, the terror of them spreads itself everywhere and the ravages and barbarities they commit, have determined several planters to abandon their settlements, the evil is daily increasing and their success has had such influence on our slaves that they are continually deserting to them in great numbers and the insolent behaviour of others gives but too much cause to fear a general defection, which without your Majesty's gracious aid and assistance must render us a prey to them ... [Address of Governor, Council and Assembly of Jamaica to the King, 21 February, 1734].³²

The Maroon bands themselves appear to have been somewhat discomfited by their great success in attracting recruits. Once settled in the mountains, Maroon groups often did not particularly welcome new members, who represented additional mouths to be fed and a greater possibility of attention and suppression by white colonists. The Spanish Creole Maroons who remained in the hills after the British takeover in 1655 were the first grudging hosts. Mavis Campbell reports that:

From about the decade following the 1660s the fate of the *bozales* [newly-arrived Africans] who took flight to the hills ... was considered intolerable in view of the bad treatment meted out to them by the Spanish Creole, and they actually returned to their former plantations ... as a result of the Spanish Creoles brutality to them.³³

Those who stayed in the hills often joined up with others of their own ethnic background, and as more slaves from Africa continued to be imported, they gradually became the majority in the Maroon enclaves.

Jamaica had a particularly high rate of slave rebellions, and many of the Maroons in Jamaica fled as a group, often retaining the ethnic preponderance characteristic of the particular plantation which they had left. The original leeward Maroons appear to have been Akan-speaking Coromantees (from the Gold Coast), who rebelled in 1673 and took to the hills. According to Barbara Kopytoff, in 1690 this group was augmented by another 200 Coromantees who escaped after an uprising at Sutton's plantation. Their common ethnic heritage may have facilitated this merging. The leader of the Sutton's uprising became head of the leeward Maroon groups, and his son, Cudjoe, succeeded him. Cudjoe ruled his group with absolute authority. When other bands of Maroons came from the east to settle in the territory of the leeward Maroons, Cudjoe invariably learned of their presence, hunted them down, and incorporated them or sent them back if they appeared to be too numerous or not amenable to his absolute rule.³⁴ Both Cudjoe and his father were successively headman for life of the leeward Maroons.

By contrast, the windward Maroons had a succession of headmen, who were easily replaced on the grounds of having lost a battle or committed some other tactical error. As mentioned in the previous section, the Maroon bands of the east were not so much united as 'federated', agreeing to defend each other in battle and accept each other's refugees.

Kopytoff provides a useful summary of major characteristics of the pre-treaty Maroon societies in Jamaica:

... by the early eighteenth century, a number of ethnically diverse groups of Maroons had drawn together into two polities in the eastern and western interior of the island. The fact that their societies were at war with colonial Jamaica led both groups of Maroons to impose a harsh discipline, in which the headmen applied the death penalty freely when they were disobeyed. Both maintained an impressive and well coordinated military organization which engaged in raiding as well as defence. Among both sets of Maroons the headmen, who were political and military leaders, were complemented by obeah men and women. In the east, where Cudjoe concentrated power firmly in his own hands, the one obeah man we find mentioned does not rival him in importance. In the east, however, the obeah woman, Nanny, is the single outstanding figure, overshadowing the headmen.³⁵

Among the pre-treaty windward Maroons of Jamaica, the headman was often not long in office, but 'Nanny', an obeah woman, invested the

windward groups with a measure of religious and political stability. Though she did not carry a political title comparable to 'headman', Nanny is credited with coordinating windward Maroon alliance and resistance to the British. Her name is not recorded on the windward treaty, but the official land grant for the windward Maroons records the establishment of 'New Nanny Town', replacing the former Nanny Town destroyed by the British during the war. In all likelihood Nanny was the administrator of this town.³⁶

A rise in the number of slaves escaping to the Maroons and consequent increase in plantation raiding during the first decades of the eighteenth century led to redoubled efforts by the British to suppress the Maroons. In 1730, two regiments of regular troops were brought in to fight them, along with 'other hired parties and the whole body of militia.'³⁷ By 1739, all the principals, including the white settlers, British soldiers and leeward and windward Maroons were nearly prostrated by the constant engagements, and were prepared to treat for peace.

The British approached Cudjoe's band before any other band. On 1 March, 1739 Cudjoe signed a treaty which recognized the freedom of the Maroons, and granted them specified parcels of land. Their responsibilities, according to the treaty, were to assist in the island's defence against foreign invaders, and to hunt down and return future Maroons and runaways. Their headmen were recognized as holding office for life, and as having the right to impose any punishment other than the death penalty for crimes committed in the community. A white 'superintendent' lived in the community in order to facilitate relations with the colonial government. Maroons were given the right to sell their produce at open markets. Quao, or Quaco, then the current headman representing the windward Maroons, signed a similar treaty a few months later.

Once they had determined that they did not have sufficient resources to eradicate the Maroons, the colonial British authorities negotiated treaties so that the taxing warfare with the Maroons could be halted, incentive for slaves to run away and 'join the Maroons' would be removed, and colonists would be able to settle and establish plantations in territory formerly rendered virtually uninhabitable by the continuous Maroon threat. As Kopytoff notes, the content of the treaties shows that the authorities clearly intended to have the Maroons handle their own internal affairs. In order for the Maroons to perform the promised tasks of hunting down and returning runaway slaves, they would have to be able to maintain some semblance of their prior military order. But factionalism, which would have spelled rapid destruction for the Maroons as an outlaw band, began to run rampant in the several Maroon towns acknowledged by the treaties.

Two forces contributing to the potential for factionalism were encouraged by the treaties themselves. First, the Maroon captain was denied the

ultimate punishment of the death penalty for crimes committed by members of his band. Precisely because the death penalty had been imposed by the headman prior to the treaty, this denial seriously undermined the headman's absolute authority within his band. Previously, the headman had used the death penalty or the threat of it in cases of challenges to his political authority. For example, in the pre-treaty years Cudjoe punished by death any member of his band who harmed a white without provocation during a plantation raid, in violation of his strict orders. The death penalty was also a deterrent to opponents of Cudjoe's absolute authority. As Kopytoff points out, 'the British were hardly likely to sentence a Maroon to death for challenging the authority of his chief, that is for political crimes within the settlement, unless his actions were punishable by death under British law.'³⁸

The second problematic characteristic of the treaties to the Maroons was the clause reserving to the British the right of appointing headmen for the Maroon towns, and the determination that the headman so chosen would govern for life. These clauses were to take away sufficient autonomy from the Maroons for their established political structure to be undermined and no longer functional. The British quickly recognized the internal dissension that characterized the post-treaty Maroon towns. They soon began to pass supplementary laws relating to the Maroons. These laws gradually extended the power of the white superintendents living in the Maroon towns. The laws also organized Maroon slave hunters under white leaders, rather than leaving them under Maroon leadership as originally agreed. In 1744 the British formed the Maroons into military companies, thus making the Maroons subject to Jamaican military regulations.

Another unhappy result of the signing of the treaties, at least from the Maroons' point of view, was the strict limits the treaties placed on where the Maroons were entitled to hunt, fish and cultivate land. Very shortly after the treaties were signed, more white settlers began to arrive. The Maroons quickly realized the restricting nature of the treaties, especially how little land the treaties actually set aside for them. At the time of signing it had appeared to be a good deal of land, since with few other settlers the Maroons were able to continue their practice of hunting in a wide area, and of planting where they chose within a relatively large wilderness. Within the very year of signing the treaties the Maroons found themselves enmeshed in border disputes with neighbours claiming land where the Maroons had previously hunted or cultivated.

The 'second Maroon war' of 1795 was sparked by a relatively minor incident, but underlying this was discontent about conditions of Maroon life directly traceable to the provisions of the 1739 treaties. Limited to the Maroons of Trelawny Town – one of the two towns of Cudjoe's heritage – on the northern part of the island, the war was sparked by an incident in which

two Maroons accused of stealing swine were sentenced by the Montego Bay authorities to be publicly whipped by a recaptured runaway slave. The Trelawny Maroons were already agitated because a white superintendent whom they disliked had been appointed to replace another, particularly well-liked superintendent, who had resigned. Underlying these complaints was the Trelawny Maroons' growing unease about land: in the face of a growing population (due to natural increase) their land was insufficient and already overworked.³⁹

These local grievances were aggravated by the French Revolution in St Domingue, where the slaves had risen *en masse* demanding liberty from their owners. Admittedly afraid due to the wider context of revolution, and warned by various sources that French agents were about Trelawny Town and the other Maroon towns inciting revolution, the British responded with a heavy hand against the Trelawny Maroons. The new governor of Jamaica, the Earl of Balcarres, ordered an infantry regiment of 1000 men and several smaller military units to Montego Bay. He intercepted a convoy carrying troops to St Domingue, and diverted them to Montego Bay. To these British troops he added white militia units, black troops and baggage slaves. This massive force faced an estimated 660 Maroons of all ages at Trelawny Town.⁴⁰

During the five-month siege that followed, the Trelawny Maroons proved that they had not forgotten how to use the difficult terrain of the Cockpit country to their advantage. The British suffered heavy casualties in repeated ambushes and surprise attacks. What finally caused the Trelawny Maroons to surrender was the threat of attack by over a hundred Cuban dogs specially trained for Maroon hunting. The British had promised not to deport the Maroons if they surrendered. Immediately upon surrender, however, the British reneged on their promise. The Trelawny Maroons were expelled, first to Nova Scotia, where they spent several long, cold winters, and then the survivors were initially sent on to Sierra Leone.

Formal treaties, concluded after a prolonged period of warfare, provided a similar dividing mark in the history of the Maroons of Suriname. During the pre-treaty period, the Maroon societies of Suriname, like those of Jamaica, were occupied in developing their internal structural coherence and replicability, which incorporated a constant preparedness for battle with external (slave society) forces. In review of some writing on the Suriname Maroons, Silvia W. de Groot characterizes the pre-treaty era of Maroon history in Suriname:

'First time' (*fesi-ten*) is the period regarding the formation of Maroon community in freedom ... the period from 1685 to 1762. The Maroon sense of identity is derived from the memory of this period of the origin of their community: their liberation from slavery and from

plantation life, their wandering and the struggle for survival in the wilderness, their defence against armies and patrols sent by the whites and their attacks on the plantations In this period clans were formed, land rights were divided, succession procedures were established, ritual centres of power were established, in short, the whole social fabric originated during these 77 years.⁴¹

Separate Maroon bands concluded treaties with the Dutch authorities in 1760, 1762 and 1767. By and large these treaties marked the end of warfare between the Maroons and the government, a significant change in relations for both Maroons and white settlers. But as de Groot indicates, the predominant characteristics of Suriname Maroon society were already established before the treaties were ever negotiated.

When the Dutch took over Suriname in 1667, a group of several hundred Maroons were already settled on the Coppename river. In 1684 the Dutch governor made peace with them, and from that time they did not disrupt the Dutch settlement. In the early 1700s two new groups, known as the Saramaka and the Djuka, were formed. Like the earlier Suriname group, these Maroon bands, or clans, were far larger than any encountered on the islands of the Caribbean. By 1738 an estimated 6000 Maroons were settled in Suriname. After 1750 a third, smaller group of Maroons, the Matuaris, was formed. They stayed in the coastal area, much closer to the plantations than the two previous groups. With more Maroons needing larger quantities of commodities only available on the white plantations, raiding escalated into guerrilla warfare.

Each of these large Maroon groups were comprised of smaller groups, known as 'lo', composed of slaves who had escaped from the same plantation together. The names of these 'lo' were modifications of the names of the plantation the original group members escaped from. These 'lo' groups formed social entities which came to be regarded as individual kin groups.⁴² Matrilineal descendants of kinsmen within each group were considered family and marriage with 'family' members was proscribed. Members of these 'families' claimed the same ancestors, sharing the responsibility of homage to these forebears.

The responsibilities of daily life in the Maroon settlement were divided among members of the 'lo' groups. Except for manufactured goods, the Maroons provided for their own needs, including food. When their scouts signalled the approach of Maroon hunters, 'they gathered as much as possible [of their crops] in baskets [and then replanted them]. Usually the new plots of lands had already been prepared.' Salt came from palm tree ashes, oil from palm kernels and their houses were built of timber and palm leaves.

Prolonged, expensive and unsuccessful attempts to subdue the Maroons by force caused the Dutch government by the mid-eighteenth century to sue the Maroons for peace. In 1760 the Djuka Maroons signed peace treaties with the government. In 1762 the Saramaka Maroons, and in 1767 the Matuari (from the coastal area) did likewise. The conditions of the treaties were very similar to those between the Jamaican Maroons and the British signed in 1739, and they were in fact modelled after those treaties. The Suriname Maroons were not as assiduous as the Jamaican Maroons at keeping other slaves from running away and establishing their own Maroon settlements. New runaways were not as threatening to their existence, since there was far more space to be divided among new and old Maroon groups in Suriname than in Jamaica. Consequently their tolerance towards new recruits caused occasional serious strains in the Maroons' treaty relations with the Dutch government.

A new Maroon group of between 300 and 600 aggravated the treaty relationship. These were the Boni, who came into being around 1765. When the government requested help in subduing them, the Saramaka and Matuari Maroons refused, considering themselves too far away to be concerned. The Djuka only responded when the Boni began to encroach on Djuka territory. In 1777 they attacked the Boni, but that same year negotiated an agreement that lasted until 1791. For its own political ends, the colonial government tried to reawaken hostilities between the two groups. A series of attacks and counterattacks culminated in 1793 in the death of several key Boni warriors, including the chief.

As the case of the Boni indicates, the peace that followed the treaty signings was not entirely harmonious. The colonists, fearing renewed attacks from the Maroons, instituted a pass system, which severely limited the rights of the Maroons to approach the plantation areas. The Maroon groups, preferring their isolation, settled individually on territory along rivers, distant from other groups. In these settled communities, the Maroon cultures developed along the line established during the pre-treaty era.⁴³

Some conclusions

Formal treaties, when they were concluded, invariably appear as watersheds in Maroon history. Treaties provided a valuable respite for both Maroons and the colonial authorities. The latter were relieved of the economic and military burdens of waging war against a particular Maroon society. Formal treaties also guaranteed allies against future runaways, as long as the Maroons felt sufficiently compelled to keep their side of the bargain.

For the Maroons, treaties gave relief from incessantly assigning part of their limited resources to waging war. The treaties denoted legal recognition, at least theoretically, of the Maroons as a virtually separate political entity, a 'state within a state'. With the treaties came specific grants of land. The treaties also brought significant new sources of income, particularly the bounties earned in capturing runaways, and in the case of the Jamaican Maroons, regular paid appointments with the British military. The Maroons were granted these economic concessions on a tax-free basis. The stability introduced by these changes invariably brought a rise in the natural Maroon birth rate, allowing the Maroon communities to feel more secure about their long-term as well as their short-term prospects.

In the long run, however, the treaties usually proved deleterious for the Maroons in certain respects. Maroon societies evolved under warlike conditions and this was reflected in their political forms. The political structure of pre-treaty Maroon society centred around a headman whose word was law, chosen by the group because they believed in his ability to make judicious military and civil decisions favourable to their interests. In Jamaica, this meritocratic system broke down with the treaties, since the British appointed headmen and white superintendents. Maroon society started to break down. In Suriname, the greater isolation of the Maroons and the less intrusive Dutch colonial society allowed greater retention of pre-treaty political forms. Maroons there maintained more internal social and cultural unity than their Jamaican Maroon counterparts.

Unlike white colonial settlements Maroon communities were not consciously structured. Opportunities for escape to the hinterlands were circumstantial. Maroons did not always know with whom they would create a settlement nor did they establish its social rules beforehand. A large proportion of Maroons were African born, especially prior to the abolition of the slave trade. Creole slaves often had better opportunities of escape in urban areas since they blended more easily with the population of freedmen. Though slaves often developed Maroon polities with other members of their ethnic group, this was by no means universal. Maroon societies were not reconstituted African polities.

Africans of many distinct ethnicities were brought to the Americas during the era of the Atlantic slave trade, and their variety was reflected in the composition of Maroon communities. Each African group spoke a different language, and displayed distinct cultural attributes. Even when particular Maroons remembered regional African cultural ways and practised them, they had to compromise with other band members versed in different ways in order to develop a common society.

Cudjoe, leader of the leeward Maroons, was a Maroon-born Creole. Yet he was considered Coromantee because of his parentage, a clear example of

the persistence of African ethnic identity within the Maroon band. Still, Cudjoe understood the necessity of compromise among different ethnic groups, and insisted that all the members of his band speak only English. His intention was to unite and promote a Maroon identity shared by members of the Coromantee majority and members of the minority groups such as the Madagascar.⁴⁴

Maroons had to adapt what was available in their immediate environs to serve their needs. African-born Maroons adapted some of the practices learned in Africa, but they were intent on developing a functional mode of existence, not with recreating a 'pure African' society or political structure. Kopytoff describes this characteristic of flexible African identity among the Maroons as a '*linking principle* rather than a *fixed attribute*' [Author's emphasis].⁴⁵ Maroons were socially opportunistic and eclectic. Practices derived from any available culture area – African, European, plantation slave culture, occasionally even Amerindian – were incorporated.⁴⁶

Though men dominated among the military leadership and civilian authorities in Maroon groups, those societies which contained women had a much better long-term survival record. Without women the Maroon society could only maintain its size with the constant incorporation of new recruits. Women often strengthened their society by their leadership in encouraging social and cultural unification and among both the Jamaican and Suriname Maroons women were the primary spiritual practitioners. Females who make intercession with the ancestors are still of great importance in the functioning of Suriname Maroon societies today.⁴⁷

Understanding the cultural and ideological significance of marronage is a task historians of this subject often set for themselves. Kopytoff describes the motivation for this task:

... several [writers] have attempted analysis of marronage in general. The interest in marronage is two-fold. First, it bears on the question of the slaves' resistance or accommodation to slavery. Second, because it offered Africans and Afro-Americans a unique opportunity to create their own societies outside the control of plantation America, it adds a dimension to our plantation-bound vision of black history and culture.⁴⁸

The subjects of 'Maroon' and 'marronage' provide an opportunity for some writers to express a perceived identity of motivations shared by people still enslaved, individual escaped ex-slaves, and members of the slave class living in autonomous groups. If Maroon settlements represented the ultimate expression of the 'unique opportunity' some slaves had to create independent (and independent-minded) societies, describing the far more common slave practice of spontaneously leaving the plantation for a few

days or a few weeks as 'petit marronage' invests those actions with a similar independence of thought.

Many historians agree that to most slaves the primary function of the Maroons was first as a symbolic opportunity for escape and second, as an example of the denial of planter assertions that the slave was not capable of living autonomously in freedom. Whether this conception was historically present or a recent ideological reading of the past is occasionally a problem. The clearest example of the possibility of over-interpreting the significance of the Maroons for the slaves may be found in the recent tradition of Haitian history, which has drawn heavily on the Maroons supposedly to illustrate a spirit of independence responsible for the Haitian revolution. Jean Fouchard even places the origin of the quest for national independence with the Maroons.⁴⁹

To the colonial white settlers, Maroon societies represented the constant threat of massive slave revolt. To many historians today they symbolize the existence among the mass of slaves of an independence of thought and the ability to conceive of their own freedom. Many historians write about the creation of Maroon societies in the context of slave rebellions, and a good deal of attention is paid to the influence of the Maroons on rebellious slaves.⁵⁰ It is certain that in some societies, such as that of Jamaica, slave rebellions led directly to augmentation of Maroon societies. Sometimes Maroons provided assistance to rebellious slaves, as the Jamaican Maroons of Accompong town did in 1742, or as the Maroons of Antigua were believed to be doing in the eighteenth century.

Whether or not Maroon societies functioned as practical alternatives to slavery for the mass of slaves, they certainly lived in symbiosis with settled societies, without which they could not easily survive. Autonomy on the colonial frontier was difficult. Maroons could not produce all of the commodities necessary for existence, so through raiding or trading networks they kept up contact with the colonial settlements. There were also cases of Maroons visiting family members on plantations, and vice versa, with the cooperation of slaves. Sometimes the raids were carried out in collusion with plantation slaves, who would gather up items needed by Maroons and bring them out to the field or some specified 'drop' area. Soon afterwards, a Maroon 'raid' would take place. Sometimes the slaves did not appreciate the marauding acts of the Maroons, particularly their destruction of slave gardens and kidnapping of slave women.

Maroon settlements in the Caribbean, Belize and the Guianas did present an alternative to slavery for some members of the slave class, however few. In Suriname, where perhaps the best opportunity was available, only an estimated 10 per cent of the slave class were Maroons at any given time. Successful Maroons always had a vested interest in maintaining

the status quo, and not encouraging many more slaves to join them, particularly in islands such as Jamaica. This self-interest was reinforced by signing treaties promising to deliver up runaways in exchange for guaranteed freedom and land. In Suriname, where more space was available, the pressure to prevent other slaves from becoming Maroons was not so great, although existing Maroon clans still functioned to some extent as a deterrent.

When slavery was abolished in the circum-Caribbean, colonial authorities that had made treaties with Maroon societies in their territories displayed single-minded self-interest in seeking to abrogate these treaties. In Jamaica, where slavery was abolished in 1834, a law of 1842 was intended to break up the common lands of the Maroons into separate lots. The British tried to levy taxes on the Maroons, and otherwise merge them with the general mass of ex-slaves, disregarding the fact that a legal document signed by representatives of the British government had given the Maroons the rights that set them apart. This policy was unsuccessful.⁵¹

In Suriname, even before abolition was declared in 1863, the government tried to persuade the Maroons to abandon their autonomous economic practices of occasional freelance labour combined with small-scale agriculture, and to take regular wage labour jobs. Again, due in large part to the isolation of these Maroons, they were able to resist governmental pressure, but since that time the Suriname Maroons have faced pressures to abandon their traditional ways, abandon their land rights and adopt a more 'modern' lifestyle.

At times, traditional Maroon territory has simply been taken away from the Maroon clans. Several years ago about half of the Saramaka's land was flooded to make way for a hydro-electric dam.⁵² The mistrust present-day Maroons feel for government is reflected in their prediction that the days of slavery and warfare 'shall come again'.⁵³ Almost inevitably, surviving Maroon societies are facing slow assimilation to the ways of the broader Afro-Caribbean communities.

NOTES

- 1 The English term derived from the early Spanish 'cimarron' which was originally used to describe escaped animals, and later, runaway Indians and slaves.
- 2 Monica Schuler, 'Day to Day Resistance to Slavery in the Caribbean During the Eighteenth Century', *African Studies Association of the West Indies, Bulletin* 6, 1973, p. 60.
- 3 O. Nigel Bolland, 'Slavery in Belize', *Journal of Belizean Affairs*, 6, January 1978, pp. 3-36.
- 4 Gabino De la Rosa Corzo, 'Los Palenques en Cuba: Elementos para su Reconstrucción Histórica', in *La Esclavitud en Cuba* (La Habana: Editora de la Academia de Ciencias de Cuba, 1986), pp. 86-123.

- 5 José Franco, 'Maroons and Slave Rebellions in the Spanish Territories', in *Maroon Societies*, pp. 35-48; Francisco Pérez de la Riva, 'Cuban Palenques', in *Maroon Societies*, pp. 49-59. Pérez de la Riva (p. 59) enumerates several of these towns noting that they 'later grew so much that they lost all trace or influence of the primitive *palenque*, except ... their names.' Several were simply known as 'Palenque'.
- 6 Mavis C. Campbell, 'Marronage in Jamaica: Its Origin in the Seventeenth Century', in Vera Rubin and Arthur Tuden (eds), *Comparative Perspectives on Slavery in New World Plantation Societies*, proceedings of a Conference held by the New York Academy of Sciences, 24-27 May, 1976 (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1977) pp. 292, 389-419.
- 7 Barbara Klamon Kopytoff, *The Maroons of Jamaica: An Ethnohistorical Study of Incomplete Politics, 1655-1905* (Diss: University of Pennsylvania, 1973; Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1973).
- 8 Franco, 'Maroons and Slave Rebellions', p. 39. This figure may be a serious over-representation on the part of planters. Maroons used various tactics to inflate the apparent population of their bands, and later planter estimates of thousands of Maroons in Le Maniel (St Domingue) were quite exaggerated.
- 9 Yvan Debbaasch, 'Le Marronage: Essai sur la Désertion de l'Esclave Antillais', *L'Année Sociologique*, 3rd ser., (1961), pp. 3-112; (1962) pp. 120-95.
- 10 Benjamin Nistal Moret, *Esclavos Profugos y Cimarrones: Puerto Rico, 1770-1870*, (Río Piedras: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1982), p. 13.
- 11 Neville A. T. Hall, 'Maritime Maroons: Grand Marronage from the Danish West Indies', paper presented at the *Sixteenth Annual Conference of Caribbean Historians*, University of the West Indies, Cave Hill, Barbados, 8-13 April, 1984, p. 2.
- 12 Neville A. T. Hall, 'Maritime Maroons', pp. 1-5.
- 13 Richard Frucht, 'From Slavery to Unfreedom in the Plantation Society of St Kitts, W. I.', in *Comparative Perspectives on Slavery in New World Plantation Societies*, p. 384.
- 14 David Barry Gaspar, 'Runaways in Seventeenth-Century Antigua, West Indies', *Boletín de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe*, 26 (June, 1979), pp. 3-14.
- 15 Gabriel Debien, *Les Esclaves aux Antilles Françaises* (Basse-Terre: Société D'Histoire de la Guadeloupe, 1974), pp. 412-13.
- 16 Debien, *Les Esclaves*, p. 423; 'Mais chez les gérants comme chez les colons rentrés est une part d'insouciance'.
- 17 Quotations are from Bernard A. Marshall, 'Marronage in Slave Plantation Societies: A Case Study of Dominica, 1785-1815', *Caribbean Quarterly*, 22 (June-September 1976), pp. 26-30.
- 18 Hilary Beckles, 'From Land to Sea: Runaway Slaves and White Indentured Servants in Seventeenth-Century Barbados', paper presented at the *Sixteenth Annual Conference of Caribbean Historians*, University of the West Indies, Cave Hill, Barbados, 8-13 April, 1984, pp. 19-21.
- 19 Beckles, 'From Land to Sea', pp. 1-7.
- 20 Charles F. Gritzner, *Guyana* (New York: Sterling, 1975), pp. 22-30.
- 21 Silvia W. de Groot, 'Maroons of Surinam: Dependence and Independence', in *Comparative Perspectives on Slave New World Plantation Societies*, pp. 455-60.
- 22 De la Rosa Corzo, 'Los Palenques en Cuba', *Cuban Palenques in Maroon Societies*, pp. 93-7: 'En los informes oficiales de asaltos a palenques son muy

- raros los casos en los que se informa la captura de más de tres negros.' [Official reports on attacks on *palenques* seldom tell of the capture of more than three blacks.] An *apalencado* was a resident of the *palénque* or Maroon settlement.
- 23 Quotations are from Franco, 'Maroons and Slave Rebellions', p. 46. Anyone walking on these paths was probably visible to the Maroon settlement.
- 24 De la Rosa Corzo, 'Los Palenques en Cuba', *Cuban Palenques in Maroon Societies*, pp. 93-4; Demoticus Philalothos, *Yankee Travels Through the Island of Cuba* (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1856), pp. 38-42; 'Hunting the Maroons with Dogs in Cuba', in *Maroon Societies*, p. 60.
- 25 Pérez de la Riva, 'Cuban *Palenques*', pp. 51-3.
- 26 De la Rosa Corzo, 'Los Palenques en Cuba', p. 112.
- 27 Gwendolyn Midlo Hall, 'Saint Domingue', in David W. Cohen and Jack P. Greene (eds), *Neither Slave nor Free* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1972), p. 180.
- 28 Médéric Louis Elie Moreau de Saint-Méry, *Description de la Partie Française de L'Isle Saint-Domingue*, (eds) Blanche Maurel and Etienne Taillemite (Paris: Société de l'histoire des colonies Françaises, 1958), II, 1131; 'Placés derrière un épaulement les nègres défiaient leurs adversaires en dansant. Ceux-ci furieux, se précipitèrent dans des fosses dont le fond était plein de pointes de bois de pin et le haut recouvert de lianes et d'herbes rampantes... la moitié des attaquants furent estropiés.'
- 29 Debbasch, 'Le Marronage', pp. 74-7, 108-9.
- 30 Moreau de Saint-Méry, p. 1133.
- 31 Moreau de Saint-Méry, p. 1135: 'que les insinuations de quelques espagnols qui avaient leur chasse et leur pêche presque pour rien, en ont été la vraie cause.'
- 32 Kopytoff, *The Maroons of Jamaica*, p. 17.
- 33 Campbell, 'Marronage in Jamaica', p. 409; Michael Craton, in *Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 75, concurs with this interpretation of the attitude of the Spanish Maroons, which contrasts with that of Kopytoff in 'The Early Political Development of Jamaican Maroon Societies', *William and Mary Quarterly*, **35** (1978), pp. 305-6; Kopytoff states that the Spanish Maroons developed a 'non-domination' policy, and merely ignored, or passively accepted the presence of new Maroons. She cites Spanish Maroon policy as having 'set the tone' for the 'federation' of Maroons in the windward mountains.
- 34 Kopytoff, 'Early Political Development', pp. 292-7; Kopytoff, *The Maroons of Jamaica*, p. 73.
- 35 Kopytoff, 'Jamaican Maroon Political Organization: The Effects of the Treaties', *Journal of Social and Economic Studies*, **25** (June, 1976), p. 90.
- 36 Kopytoff, 'Jamaica Maroon Political Organization', p. 90.
- 37 Bryan Edwards, *The History, Civil and Commercial, of the British Colonies in the West Indies*, 2 vols. (Baltimore: Cole and Thomas, 1810) I, p. 340.
- 38 Kopytoff, 'Jamaican Maroon Political Organization', pp. 94-9.
- 39 Richard B. Sheridan, 'The Maroons of Jamaica, 1730-1830', in Gad Heuman (ed.), *Out of the House of Bondage*, (London: Frank Cass, 1984), p. 158; also, *Slavery and Abolition*, p. 6.
- 40 Sheridan, 'The Maroons of Jamaica', p. 159.
- 41 Silvia W. de Groot, 'Review Article: The Maroons of Surinam', *Slavery and Abolition*, 5 September, 1984, p. 170.

- 42 John D. Lenoir, *The Saramacca Maroons: A Study in Religious Acculturation* (Diss: New School, 1973; Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1974), p. 19.
- 43 Quotations are from de Groot, 'The Maroons of Surinam', (Unpublished manuscript, 1987), pp. 7-14; de Groot, 'Maroons of Surinam: Dependence and Independence', pp. 455-60.
- 44 Kopytoff, 'The Development of Jamaican Maroon Ethnicity', *Caribbean Quarterly*, **22** (June-September 1976), p. 45.
- 45 Kopytoff, 'The Development of Jamaican Maroon Ethnicity', p. 35.
- 46 Eugene D. Genovese, *From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American Slave Revolts in the Making of the Modern World* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), p. 53.
- 47 de Groot, 'Maroon Women as Ancestors, Priests and Mediums in Surinam', *Slavery and Abolition*, 5 September, 1986, pp. 162-3; Kopytoff, 'Early Political Development', p. 301.
- 48 Kopytoff, 'Early Political Development', p. 287.
- 49 Jean Fouchard, *The Haitian Maroons: Liberty or Death* (New York: Edward W. Blyden Press, 1981). Fouchard is including all long-term runaways in this category, not just those who banded together in Maroon settlements, but he distinguishes these from practitioners of short-term 'petit-marronage'; David Geggus provides some commentary on this point in *Slavery, War and Revolution: The British Occupation of St Domingue, 1793-1798*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 27. See also Leslie Manigat cited below.
- 50 Among the works which consider these topics are Genovese, *From Rebellion to Revolution*, pp. 51-81. 'Black Maroons in War and Peace': Leslie F. Manigat, 'The Relationship between Marronage and Slave Revolts and Revolution in St Domingue-Haiti', in *Comparative Perspectives on Slavery in New World Plantation Societies*, pp. 420-38; Orlando Patterson, 'Slavery and Slave Revolts: A Socio-Historical Analysis of the First Maroon War, Jamaica 1655-1740', *Social and Economic Studies*, **19** (September 1970), pp. 289-325.
- 51 Kopytoff, *The Maroons of Jamaica*, pp. 277-9. Also see Kopytoff, 'Colonial Treaty as Sacred Charter of the Maroons', *Ethnohistory*, **26** (Winter, 1979), pp. 45-65.
- 52 Price, *Saramaka Social Structure: Analysis of a Maroon Society in Surinam* (Rio Piedras: Institute of Caribbean Studies, 1975), p. 23. Construction of the dam was a joint effort of Alcoa and the Suriname government.
- 53 Silvia W. de Groot, 'A Comparison between the History of Maroon Communities in Surinam and Jamaica', in Gad Heuman (ed.), *Out of the House of Bondage* (London: Frank Cass, 1984), p. 181; Quotation from de Groot, *Review Article*, p. 169.