



Entering History: Paulo Freire and the Politics of the Brazilian Northeast, 1958-1964

Author(s): Andrew J. Kirkendall

Source: *Luso-Brazilian Review*, Vol. 41, No. 1 (2004), pp. 168-189

Published by: [University of Wisconsin Press](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3513750>

Accessed: 22/09/2013 08:48

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at

<http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



University of Wisconsin Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Luso-Brazilian Review*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

Entering History: Paulo Freire and the Politics of the Brazilian Northeast, 1958–1964

Andrew J. Kirkendall

Entre 1958 e 1964, o nordeste tornou-se o foco de uma nova política no Brasil. Paulo Freire era uma figura destacada na região nessa época. Campanhas de alfabetização usando o método dele tentaram alistar mais eleitores em Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte, e Sergipe. Políticos como o Presidente João Goulart, o Governador Miguel Arraes (PE) e o Governador João de Seixas Dória (SE) viram no método de Freire a possibilidade de mudar a consciência do povo e transformar o país. O governo americano no princípio apoiou Freire no Rio Grande do Norte, mas logo os Estados Unidos e os militares brasileiros ficaram temerosos. Com o golpe de 1964, os participantes das campanhas de alfabetização foram perseguidos e tiveram que sair do país. Assim chegou ao fim uma época dinâmica no nordeste brasileiro.

“This part of Brazil is presently making history.”¹

The words of a rather anxious US State Department official in 1961 reflect more than just a new awareness of Brazil’s northeast as a “problem,” particularly in the wake of the Cuban Revolution; they highlight the unexpected dynamism of a long dormant region. From roughly 1958 to 1964, the northeast was not making news solely because of its longstanding high levels of poverty and unemployment; the region itself offered the possibility of solutions to some of Brazil’s more intractable problems, including illiteracy and the lack of political integration of a large portion of its population. Paulo Freire and his innovative literacy training methods, and the local, state, national, and international politics surrounding them, represented an opportunity to

move beyond the impasse that the Brazilian political system found itself in following the suicide of Getúlio Vargas in 1954. The sense of a changing historical reality is ever present in the rhetoric of this period.² New and old forms of paternalism, however, combined with the promise of mobilization and empowerment, raised the possibility of, and inhibited the potential for, the region to really reenter history and reshape Brazil in a more open democratic way. In this article, I will examine Paulo Freire and the politics of literacy in the context of three northeastern states (Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Norte, and Sergipe), in which the complex interplay of political forces raised hopes and fears of what Pernambuco Governor Miguel Arraes and others at the time called a “Brazilian Revolution.”³

The northeast had gained renewed attention nationally and internationally with the drought of 1958, the worst in decades. Journalist Antônio Callado in a series of articles for the Rio newspaper *Correio da Manhã* had created national interest in the problems of the sertão and the failure of previous government efforts to solve them. Internationally, the United States rather gingerly offered assistance for the relief effort but found the administration of President Juscelino Kubitschek reluctant to accept US aid, presumably not only because of issues regarding national pride, but also because of a belief that this was a problem with which the government was quite familiar already.⁴ Despite his administration’s emphasis on economic development, however, Kubitschek had paid relatively little attention to the region’s problems in his first two years in office.⁵ The authorization of the creation of the Superintendência do Desenvolvimento do Nordeste (SUDENE) in 1959, however, demonstrated that the federal government was going to devote more resources to the northeast.⁶ The United States would be ever more focused on the region as well. The northeast, with 15 percent of Brazil’s territory and one third of its population, “had the lowest per capita income in Latin America,” and a significant portion of the nation’s illiterates.⁷ By 1960, veteran *New York Times* reporter Tad Szulc was already noting “the makings of a revolutionary situation” in the “poverty-stricken and drought-plagued Brazilian Northeast.” With the arrival of the administration of John F. Kennedy in Washington (as well as the Jânio Quadros administration in Brazil), the United States began to focus on the northeast more directly. By early February of 1961, the United States was already interested in providing aid for the region “through the new Social Development program.” By mid-year, US anxieties regarding the region were quite pronounced. “The area contains many influential communist or pro-communist leaders,” one US official in Recife warned, “and efforts to subvert the area, already serious, may be expected to become more intensive and extensive during the immediate future [. . .]” The region was

“undoubtedly the priority area of Brazil, and, possibly, Latin America.” Officials in the region requested more personnel to handle “political reporting” and related responsibilities. “The eyes of the world are on Recife,” one State Department official remarked, noting that it had only recently been considered “a third-class outpost” by the State Department. Concerns about the influence of followers of Fidel Castro in the northeast were offset somewhat by analyses that suggested that the passivity and ignorance of the Brazilian peasantry mitigated against revolutionary agitation. “Most did not think they could help themselves.” By 1963, few of the northeastern peasants were familiar either with Castro or the Alliance for Progress, a US Information Service study concluded, and they were considered to be extremely difficult to organize.⁸

Paulo Freire’s new literacy training techniques, however, posed the potential of transforming traditional peasant mentalities, making them more likely to see themselves as historical actors and organize on their own. Since the 1930s, Brazil’s low literacy levels had been increasingly recognized as a hindrance to national economic development. Vargas’s creation of a Ministry of Education and Public Health at the onset of his administration was part of a larger effort to address educational issues on a national, and not just on a state, level. Adult illiteracy itself, however, only became an issue towards the end of the *Estado Novo*. In the postwar period, the newly created organization of UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, founded in November 1945) began to work more directly on “functional literacy” and other aspects of what was called “fundamental education” as social and economic development issues. The Brazilian government began to create its own programs; in January 1947, the *Serviço de Educação de Adultos* was created. In a new national campaign, primary attention was given to providing supplementary night courses for adults. Although this campaign officially ended in 1954, there continued to be work done on both state and national levels. One of the primary achievements of this program was to “raise interest in public education on all levels,” according to Celso de Rui Beisiegel. During the Vargas administration of 1951–1954, there was also a national campaign for rural education. Surprisingly perhaps, given its emphasis on national development, the Kubitschek administration paid little attention to education issues in its first few years in office.⁹ A new campaign intended to “eradicate” illiteracy as if it were a kind of disease was launched in 1958.

Freire’s own techniques, however, developed initially not because of national aid or initiatives but because of broader local and regional impulses that were promising to transform the Brazilian northeast. To understand the unprecedented importance given to the issue of illiteracy during this period, one must turn to an examination first of political conditions in Freire’s home state of Pernambuco. At the same time, one must bear in mind the

international context. The Cuban Revolution's claims to have reduced illiteracy from 23 percent to less than 4 percent in one year helped inspire the United States to make its own promise to eliminate illiteracy in all of Latin America by 1970 through the Alliance for Progress.¹⁰

Pernambuco was at the time the heart of the Brazilian northeast, and, in many ways, the radiating center of new and more adventurous political forces. Recife's centrality was further enhanced after SUDENE began operating there in 1961. The city, Brazil's third largest in the early 1960s, was growing rapidly during this time period, as some people were being pushed off the land and others were actively choosing to make new lives in the city. The urban revolution that was transforming Brazil generally was changing the political dynamics in the northeast. Even more than was typical in the south, the growth of Pernambuco's capitol had far outstripped the growth in industry and infrastructure that provided employment and services to the newly urban population.¹¹ From 1958 on, laws on the books after decades of *trabalhismo* in the more industrialized regions of Brazil finally began to be applied in the northeast.¹² But it was not just in the city that new dynamics were at work. The "peasant leagues" had begun to develop, first in 1955 in Galiléia, 40 miles west of Recife. After an initial focus on issues affecting them directly, these organizations gradually become more oriented to larger issues of social transformation. By the early 1960s, particularly with the March 1963 Rural Workers Law, a broad array of forces, including the Communist Party (PCB), the Catholic Church, the federal government, and people with links to the Central Intelligence Agency were trying to organize rural workers in Pernambuco.¹³

State party politics could not remain unaffected by these trends toward mobilization. In post-war Recife, as politician Etelvino Lins remarked, "One [couldn't] win elections [. . .] without the support of the left."¹⁴ The 1958 election of governor Cid Sampaio, an engineer, *usineiro*, and União Democrática Nacional (UDN) dissident and Freire's one-time boss, who won with 59.68 percent of the vote, as well as that of Recife's mayor (and Sampaio's brother-in-law) Miguel Arraes, had been accomplished through the creation of a broad coalition of forces including the PCB. After his election, however, Sampaio distanced himself from some of the leftist elements in his coalition. By 1962, Miguel Arraes, who had included members of the PCB in his administration as mayor, was elected his successor. Arraes thought that by supporting *campesinos'* demands for respect for their rights he could promote modernization in the countryside.¹⁵ The United States had backed Governor Sampaio, but Arraes and US officials viewed each other suspiciously.¹⁶

It is in this context of social change and political turmoil that one must understand Paulo Freire. After graduating from the University of Recife law

school in 1947, Freire went to work for the Serviço Social da Indústria (SESI), which had been created by the Confederação Nacional de Indústria the year before (Law Decree 9403 June 25, 1946). The first president of Pernambuco's branch of the new organization was Cid Sampaio. Freire became the director of SESI's Education and Culture division in Pernambuco. He worked on "relations between schools and families" and the "difficulties that families from popular areas would have in confronting problems with the implementation of their own educational activity." In his career with SESI, Freire recalled trying to promote dialogue between officials and members of the urban and rural working classes. He wanted to progress from his own "discourse about the reading of the world to them" to motivate and challenge them "to speak of their own reading of the world." He further made a concerted effort to study popular language.¹⁷ In 1956 populist mayor Pelópidas Silveira named him to the Conselho Consultivo de Educação of Recife. His ideas during this period were heavily influenced by developmental nationalism and his own deeply held religious convictions. Freire himself became nationally known in educational circles after presenting a paper on teaching the "marginal population" of the mocambos at the Second National Congress on Adult Education in 1958 in Rio de Janeiro. In the late 1950s, he was one of the founders of the local Popular Culture Movement (MCP) in the state and had begun to develop his ideas about literacy training within that movement while working in poor neighborhoods in Recife. Encouraged by Recife mayor Miguel Arraes, the MCP, employing professionals, artists, and political activists, ran schools in neighborhood associations, sport clubs, and churches. Roughly 19,000 students in around 200 schools were exposed not only to a revitalized and valued nordestino culture but to an awareness of their social milieu in the discussion groups that typified MCP practice.¹⁸ By 1962, Freire was the extension services director of the University of Recife, employing many college students in literacy programs around the city. In that position, he began to work throughout the northeast.¹⁹

By the early 1960s, the United States had become quite concerned about the MCP that Freire had helped create. US officials considered the movement, "charged with the mission of politicizing Pernambuco's masses," to be "a vehicle for expansion of PCB influence," noting that the president of the organization in March of 1964 was Governor Arraes's cousin, Newton Arraes, a PCB member. US Minister Consul General Edward Rowell considered the "adult literacy program of the MCP as the program with the greatest potential for mass politicization." Although he had not seen the materials the MCP was using, Rowell felt confident that the course taught "class separation" and furthered "class antagonism" and "support for a 'popular' government." MCP teachers, for their part, told US officials that the literacy campaign would prevent the election of a "reactionary" government.²⁰ Pernambuco under Arraes

largely resisted any attempts to be drawn into the new patron-client relations that were being developed under the Alliance for Progress. In a report prepared for the Arraes government, intellectuals closely associated with the MCP rejected US aid for education in Pernambuco, which they considered a violation of Brazilian sovereignty. The US consulate in Recife, for its part, reassured the US Secretary of State that “No USAID funds” were being “used in Pernambuco for adult literacy programs.”²¹

In Rio Grande do Norte, the dynamics surrounding the politics of literacy were a complex blend of local, state, regional, federal, and international. The US consul in Recife considered Rio Grande do Norte “the number two state in political volatility.”²² There were two adult literacy programs ongoing in the early 1960s, one sponsored by the governor and one by the mayor of the state’s capitol, Natal. Rio Grande do Norte had a particularly low-income level, even by regional standards. (According to government sources, only Maranhão and Piauí were poorer.) The average lifespan was only 40 years, and the infant mortality rate in the capitol was 420 in 1,000. Ninety-two percent of the state was semi-arid, the majority of the population was employed in subsistence agriculture, and the economy was stagnant even as the population was increasing. Rio Grande do Norte officials considered the education system “one of the major obstacles to economic and social development.” The state lagged behind a number of the newly independent African countries in terms of school attendance rates. And although estimates of literacy rates varied from one report to another, more rigorous definitions of literacy in the early 1960s would have placed the state’s rate at only 20 percent. As the state’s top education official proclaimed, “Only the education of the people and progressive consciousness raising can bring the indispensable change in mentality that will give the state the primary conditions to change this picture” and move the state towards the process of industrialization that offered the only way out of the state’s precarious situation.²³

Politics was hardly absent from the literacy programs in the state. The governor, Aluizio Alves, was extremely popular; he had won with 68 percent of the vote, having gained the support of the Partido Social Democrático (PSD), the Partido Trabalhista Brasileira (PTB), and a dissident wing of the UDN. Alves had belonged to the UDN since it was founded, and had served as a federal deputy since his election in 1946 (he was only 22 at the time). As Alves later argued, however, the UDN nationally had lost its direction following Vargas’s suicide. When the governor of the state, Dinarte Mariz, had chosen another political rival as his successor, Alves created a broad-based coalition, including many elements opposed to the traditional domination of large landowners in the state. Alves gained the support of the urban population in his “Crusade of Hope,” as well as “some factions of the agrarian oligarchy.” Alves improvised a more broadly populist campaign in 1960, encouraging

people, as he later recalled, to lose their fear and to believe in the possibility of significant social and political change through the ballot box. His government eliminated the political police and extended the free exercise of the vote. Alves promised “education for everyone” and attempted to “mobilize the people against ignorance.”²⁴

“The Northeast,” Alves argued in July of 1963, “is already in motion. It is beginning to advance, defeating the residual resistance of consciousness formed in the past and numbed by centuries of immutability.” Alves himself claimed to “have no commitments either with the past or with its inadequate traditional structures.” The traditional northeastern social order itself was “subversive,” Alves claimed, “not because we have an interest in subverting it through violence or revolution but because that order is a permanent invitation to violence and revolution.” Alves “repudiated equally immobility and subversion.” The traditional order and Brazilian democracy itself, which kept the majority of the population from receiving an education and then excluded the illiterate from voting, were unrepresentative. The beginnings of the “awakening of consciousness” were increasing the “inquietude” in the interior and the impatience in the cities, particularly among the young, who “are skeptical in the face of the slowness of democracy.”²⁵

Alves was not only popular in his home state; he was becoming one of the most prominent northeastern politicians, second only to Pernambuco’s Arraes. Alves was considered to be a likely vice-presidential candidate in 1965. Moreover, he had gained the support and admiration of the United States, and considered the United States to be an invaluable new patron in his plans for social reform. US State Department officials considered him “a welcome relief [. . .] because of his constructive talk about the problems of the northeast. His words are low in political, ideological, and demagogic content.” Alves, who also praised the United States frequently, argued that he could be a pragmatic nationalist “without any elements of class ideology.” He was a vocal supporter of the Alliance for Progress, which the United States officials clearly appreciated. If little had yet been done by the Alliance for Progress, he argued, it was “already considerable in a region of such scarce resources.” Alves was the first Brazilian governor to sign an agreement with the US Agency for International Development. The United States, in turn, tried to encourage his attempt to extend his influence throughout the region.²⁶

The state’s literacy efforts began with an inaugural class in January 1963 of a special pilot program in Angicos. The governor’s hometown was located in the hot, arid center of the state; it had a population of roughly 1,550, 75 percent of which was illiterate or only partially literate. USAID funding for the literacy program caused quite a polemic among the Brazilian left, even among those who agreed to participate in the program. Marcos Guerra, a law student at the recently created Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte,

who had worked with Church literacy programs and was the president of the state branch of the União Nacional de Estudantes (UNE), was put in charge of the program. Guerra was the son of an influential Catholic intellectual who was involved in the on-going reforms of the Catholic Church now popularly known as Vatican II. Freire and other instructors from the extension service of the University of Recife, with Arraes's permission, taught Guerra and 15 other student colleagues Freire's new literacy training methods. Teachers went door to door in Angicos looking for people who did not know how to read and write. They announced from a loudspeaker mounted on a jeep that they would teach anyone who wanted to learn. As one of those involved in the program later remarked, the traditional night school of earlier Brazilian literacy campaigns "was replaced by culture circles" of the type created by the MCP. Teachers were now "dialogue coordinators," and students "small group participants." An examination of the local community and interviews with the local population allowed the Guerra team to create a "vocabulary universe, roughly 400 words related to their students' daily activities." Beginning in January 1963, 299 students (156 men and 143 women), most between the ages of 14 and 29, began the course. (The oldest student was 72 years old). The single largest occupation represented was domestic workers (94). (There were also classes taught in the local prisons.) The students viewed slides depicting their daily lives and discussed what they saw, as they learned to write words such as "fair," "goalie," "vote," and "people." One of the slides chosen for discussion portrayed a man from the northeast voting. Teachers and administrators sought to combat what they saw as the "accommodating, conformist, indifferent, and fatalistic" attitudes of their malnourished and prematurely old students, who could not see any way to improve their lives. Freire argued at the time that Brazil was undergoing a fundamental transition in search of new values and attitudes. The students were challenged to adopt "more critical positions" through dialogue and debate. Class monitors posed questions that were intended to promote discussion. (Although debates were generally lively, teachers lamented the fact that women and younger students participated less frequently.) In the classes, the group learned the difference between "massa" and "povo." The "masses" were illiterate; "people" were those who were conscious of themselves as citizens. As one student remarked, "People is what we are at election time." At the end of the course, a newly literate 32-year-old washerwoman named Francisca Andrade wrote to the Brazilian president, proclaiming that "now I am no longer part of the 'masses,' I am 'people' and I can demand my rights." One of Guerra's own classes that began with the notion of work as culture continued with a discussion of constitutional rights to an 8-hour day and a minimum wage; Guerra and the students then discussed the possibility that foreign owners of local fazendas and salt businesses be thrown out of the country. Even discussions

of sports turned political, as monitors compared soccer teams to rural workers' unions; both required unity for victory. President Goulart attended the last class on the 2nd of April (as did General Humberto Castelo Branco). A 51-year-old man named Antônio da Silva declared that while years before Vargas had come to satisfy their stomach's hunger, now Goulart had come to fill their "head's" needs. Freire, for his part, remarked that the newly literate would not vote for godfathers or coronéis but only for those who would truly serve the people. Impressed by what he had seen, Goulart expressed his wish that hundreds of these courses could spread out throughout Brazil, so that people could have the "right [. . .] to participate and integrate themselves in the life of the nation," as the students in Angicos were now able to do, to demand their rights and make sure that laws on the books were borne out in practice. At the same time, according to the state secretary of education, veteran journalist and native son Francisco Calazans Fernandes, Goulart saw the political potential of the program and noted that if they could make "6 million more voters with the Angicos method," the federal government would have the political support to accomplish land reform. (Calazans Fernandes claims to have turned down an opportunity to work with Goulart in Brasília.) US Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, after a visit to Rio Grande do Norte, recommended that other northeastern states who had signed agreements with USAID adopt Freire's method. In a letter to the governor, Gordon invoked the cooperation of Rio Grande do Norte in the Second World War and suggested that the governor's programs as a whole constituted a new "trampoline for victory" against hunger, illness, and illiteracy. Following the success of the initial education program in Angicos, the state promised to provide the students with more classes that would focus on educating the newly literate on their role as active citizens in a democracy. For Guerra, the student director of the Angicos program, "We don't consider it enough to teach people to read and write alone [. . .] without making it possible for him to become a conscious and true participant in Brazilian democracy, paying attention to the needs of the historic moment we are living."²⁷

The literacy program drew national and international journalists to Angicos. With its claim of having taught people to read and write in only 40 hours of class time, Alves gained national acclaim and Freire too became a national and international figure. Freire's unconventional and relatively inexpensive method and the rapidity with which it achieved its goals inspired the Rio Grande do Norte secretary of education to dream of eliminating "illiteracy in the state [thereby] permitting the integration of a greater number of adults into the rights and conquests of social and economic development of their communities." "We like to say," Alves noted in 1963, "that we are realizing in our little state, a Revolution through Education," "the beginning of other peaceful and democratic revolutions." In the short term, working in

five other cities (including Natal), the state hoped to teach 12,000 adults to read and write. By 1965, it was hoped that at least 100,000 in the state could learn. State officials promised “to do in three years what has not been done in three centuries.” Alliance for Progress money via SUDENE and the United States Agency for International Development continued to support Alves’s government’s efforts in this area in 1963.²⁸

In private, however, Alves increasingly was disturbed by his colleague Carlos Lacerda’s accusations that Freire and his associates were communists and their methods suspect; an editorial writer for the Rio daily *Jornal do Brasil* warned that Alves was “liberating social forces that he did not know how to control.” The first strike ever on record in Angicos occurred shortly after the class ended. Despite some mixed feelings within the Alves administration, the state government declared the strike to be based on legitimate demands by the workers. Alves was increasingly attacked from the right as well as by those leftists who resented the Alliance for Progress funding for the Angicos program. He himself was increasingly leaning toward the right-wing conspirators active in the UDN party and working throughout Brazil against the Goulart administration. The state’s secretary of education resigned in December of 1963 because of feelings of suspicion and envy within the legislature and the governor himself. US officials expressed regret that this had taken place; they considered Fernandes “competent and hard-working.” “Much of the past success of the [Rio Grande do Norte] education program was directly due to his leadership,” it was argued. One US official wondered whether Fernandes thought Alves was using education as a political instrument or whether it was Alves who suspected that Fernandes “was building his own little empire.”²⁹

In the capitol city of Natal, a city of only 160,000 in the early 1960s, 30,000 of whom were illiterate, a competing literacy program was also at work. The city’s mayor, Djalma Maranhão, was as popular as Alves with the electorate, having been elected with roughly the same percentage of the vote (66 percent). Maranhão, who had been expelled from the Communist Party during its brief period of legal existence after the war and had become a member of the small Partido Social Progressista under João Café Filho afterwards, was far less popular in US circles than Alves was. Maranhão represented an alternative to traditional, oligarchical politics, despite his willingness in the 1950s to work with the cotton-and-ranching elites represented by Dinarte Mariz. He broke with Mariz in 1958 and became a federal deputy on the Partido Trabalhista Nacional ticket. Alves and Maranhão were allies during their respective campaigns; the mayoral candidate found Alves to be more sympathetic to his plans for “social advancement” than governor Mariz. Alves, however, was more of a modernizer and Maranhão a left-wing nationalist.³⁰ Once in office, their paths began to diverge.³¹

As his city's first elected mayor, Maranhão made education a primary concern of his administration. This was in large part because of pressure from the neighborhood organizations called "Nationalist Committees," which had helped get him elected and which had participated in discussions regarding the priorities of a Maranhão administration. His adult and child education program, called "With One's Feet on the Ground, One Also Learns How to Read," was launched in February 1961. "To have one's feet on the ground," the top education official in Natal later remarked, "signified that you knew the reality and the magnitude of the problem." But it also meant that education was no longer going to be for the privileged few but even for those without shoes. The program included not only 2,000 makeshift schools made out of coconut trees in poorer neighborhoods, but also popular libraries and a wide variety of other cultural activities. Although the primary focus was on educating children, there was also a concerted effort to teach illiterate adults, particularly the parents of children who attended the newly constructed schools during the day. As the program developed, in 1962, local educators began contacting members of the Popular Culture Movement in Recife and getting training in Freire's methods. By 1963, roughly 3,000 adult students were enrolled in literacy programs. As with the Angicos program, secondary and university students played a critical role; other volunteers were involved, as well as people who were employed by the mayor's office.³² The ideological content of Natal's textbooks was more clearly leftist than that of other literacy programs in Brazil. Cuba was described as the "first country to achieve success in the great drive for national liberation." Popular culture was treated as a "political means, the work of preparing the masses for the conquest of power."³³

The combative mayor proudly proclaimed that his own literacy programs, unlike those of the state's governor, were being supported with Brazilian and not US funds. The US Minister Consul General in Recife, Edward Rowell, grudgingly conceded that the program had been "partially successful in bringing a degree of literacy to Natal's uneducated," while also being "somewhat successful as an instrument of politicizing the masses and orienting them in Maranhão's favor." The city's education programs had "enhanced the mayor's popularity noticeably." In early March of 1964, the Natal mayor hosted a meeting of 40 mayors from the state's interior to form the Municipal Popular Education Front. Natal would aid the mayors in setting up their own programs; the mayors hoped to gain support as well from the federal government. Rowell argued that the program was an attempt to expand his popularity throughout the state and make him a more attractive candidate for governor in 1965.³⁴

Unlike in Pernambuco, where the dynamics involved in literacy programs were primarily internal, or in Rio Grande do Norte, where municipal, state,

regional and international actors played a role, in the small state of Sergipe, the principal motivating factor was the federal government, which was fully engaged with the issue of literacy training and its political potential after Angicos. Minister of Education Paulo de Tarso Santos invited Freire to Brasília in June of that year to begin work on a national literacy program.³⁵ Inspired by the success of the Rio Grande do Norte project and determined to get more voters on the rolls by the time of the presidential elections in 1965, the National Commission of Popular Culture had been formed in July of 1963 to create a "National Plan of Literacy Training." Representatives of the student left were particularly active in the national campaign. There were an estimated "20 million illiterates of voting age in Brazil," according to Education Minister Júlio Sambaqui, who replaced Santos in October. The failure of proposals to grant illiterates the right to vote led the Goulart government to focus attention on mass literacy campaigns. The UDN's Carlos Lacerda argued that the literacy campaign represented a kind of "brainwashing." US officials shared the fears of many traditional Brazilian politicians. More to the point, US officials noted, the "primary short-range intent of the literacy program is to add substantial numbers of newly-literate and 'suitably' indoctrinate voters to the electorate [. . .]. In longer-range terms, a campaign of this nature could grow into an important instrument for the political organization of a major and previously untapped segment of the population."³⁶

The Goulart administration looked to Sergipe (as well as the state of Rio de Janeiro) to inaugurate the initial stage of a national campaign that could teach 5 million to read and write in two years.³⁷ The National Literacy Program was launched on 21 January 1964. In Sergipe, the program was intended to teach 400,000 residents to read and write in three years. Sergipe was evidently chosen for the pilot program because of its small size and ease of communication.³⁸ Only a third of Sergipe's total population of 760,000 was literate in 1950.³⁹ The populist project of the Center South had limited influence in the state prior to the mid-1950s, according to the state's premier political historian. Like other northeastern states, the state had experienced little in the way of industrialization, and the popular classes had not yet been brought into the political arena. The UDN was the largest party, but it had not captured the governor's office. The decline of the PSD in much of the northeast in the latter half of the 1950s created opportunities for other political parties to gain ground. Unlike in many southern states, the northeastern UDN was more "open to populist policies." A nationalist front including students, intellectuals, Catholics, and Communists was formed in March of 1958 in Sergipe.⁴⁰ As in the case of Rio Grande do Norte, one of the principal political figures was a dissident member of the UDN, federal deputy João de Seixas Dória. Seixas Dória, who had played an important role in the Quadros presidential campaign in 1960, represented the nationalist wing of the party.⁴¹ A

split in the Sergipe UDN over the choice of a gubernatorial candidate led him to form a coalition in 1962 with the PSD and the PTB; his campaign manager was trabalhista José Conrado de Araújo. His victory with 47 percent (due largely to support in more urban areas of the state) over his closest competitor's 40 percent upset the traditional party blocs within the state.⁴² Following his inauguration in January 1963, however, Seixas Dória discovered how precarious the state's finances were. He spent much of his short time in office traveling, trying to bring federal funds to the state. He was criticized in September of 1963 for traveling to the United States, as well, but he argued that he had made it clear in his talks with US officials that he was only interested in Alliance for Progress funds under certain conditions. He said that he would accept US aid if it was intended to help transform Brazil's archaic economic structure. "But if the Alliance intends to strengthen the status quo, we will refuse and repudiate" that aid. He claimed to have spoken to US officials as "equal to equal" and he said that the North Americans seemed receptive to his frank way of speaking (although he admitted that perhaps they were just being diplomatic).⁴³

Despite his ties to Quadros and membership in the party that historically had opposed both Vargas and Goulart, Seixas Dória came to admire Goulart (he acknowledged that Goulart had little interest in administration). Although considered by some to be merely an opportunist, Seixas Dória clearly had made his mark as a strong supporter of nationalist measures; as governor, he became associated with Goulart's attempts to promote basic reforms in Brazilian society. The governor promised new agrarian reform measures and refused to move against peasants who had occupied abandoned federal property. This created conflict within the Seixas Dória regime, and in February of 1964, the state secretary of agriculture resigned.⁴⁴

The State's Secretary of Education, Luiz Rabello Leite, was one of the founders of Sergipe's nationalist front, and the governor's "principal supporter in reform moves." The US consulate in Salvador did not consider him to be as far left as Seixas Dória himself but noted that he "interprets Pope John XXIII's encyclicals liberally, as an authority on the social doctrine of the Church, and has strong views on basic institutional reforms needed to modernize Brazil." In an "impassioned speech" to teachers he argued for the "necessity of making citizens aware of the 'Brazilian reality' and of having them become 'politically conscious.' The Secretary's most cogent statement of the aims of his educational activities in the state and of the literacy campaign is that he hopes to make the people 'the subject—and not the object of history.' In the next election, he predicted, the people 'will not be led to the ballot box like sheep by a political boss.'"⁴⁵

Freire visited the state frequently during the second half of 1963 and early 1964, during a period in which there was an unusual level of political

mobilization in the state.⁴⁶ Local nationalist newspapers in Aracaju gave ample coverage to the planned literacy program and portrayed Freire's previous activities in Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Norte positively. There were heightened expectations regarding the political potential of the impact of the use of his method in Sergipe. Freire, "that intelligent Pernambucano [and] patriotic idealist," was praised for his interest in transforming education and making people more critically aware, thereby changing the political equation by bringing the previously marginal into active life in "this nation of privileged people." Where previously Sergipanos had only known how to sign their name so that they could vote for their patron, now they would know how to spell the word "latifundia," and understand, as well, why it was an unproductive form of agricultural production.⁴⁷ Accompanying Freire on his visits in January 1964 was Minister Sambaqui, who decried accusations that the literacy program represented an attempt to "Cubanize" Brazil and accused "reactionary" forces of trying to hold back the "economic development" that would accompany the success of a large-scale literacy program.⁴⁸ Tests were administered to pick teachers for the literacy program; would-be monitors were encouraged to think of their role not as one of providing political guidance to illiterate people, but of facilitating debate and of encouraging a general understanding of the "sociological reality" in which students lived. Those chosen included public functionaries and students, particularly those involved with UNE and Ação Popular (including people who had protested the recent visit of US Ambassador Lincoln Gordon).⁴⁹

In Sergipe, however, the literacy program did not have a chance to move beyond the initial training of teachers. The tide had turned against Freire's literacy programs. In January, the Agency for International Development withdrew its support, alleging administrative inadequacies within the program, although critics of the US move argued that it was motivated by the same fears of subversion that were animating the right-wing conspiracy against the Goulart government.⁵⁰ More importantly, the military itself was politically conscious and soon acting in a more direct way than by simply voting. The military coup itself, beginning on 31 March 1964, brought to power a general from the northeast, Humberto Castelo Branco. Following the coup, many of those most closely associated with the literacy program would either flee or be put in prison.

Arraes and Seixas Dória were two of only three governors deposed and arrested following the coup, the other being Rio's governor, Badger Silveira, of the PTB, who, like the other two, had also participated in the March 13 rally in which President Goulart had promised to move toward more fundamental reform (and in whose state another literacy program was planned).⁵¹ In Rio Grande do Norte, onetime political allies ended up on opposite sides of the line dividing acceptable and unacceptable behavior under the new

military regime. Maranhão denounced the coup and was imprisoned on the 2nd of April. Libraries connected with his “Feet on the Ground” program were raided and closed and educational materials seized. Those associated with the program remained in prison for months afterward.⁵² Alves, who had not been involved directly in the planning of the military coup, was one of the few more directly identified with the literacy campaigns to remain in office. Despite his close ties to the United States and to the conspirators, Alves was not as enthusiastic initially about the coup as expected. His “statement of support for the revolution was the most hedged of any made in the northeast,” one US official noted, obviously forgetting the lack of enthusiasm among those governors who had been deposed and imprisoned.⁵³ Nevertheless, Alves soon supported the creation of an investigation into “subversion and corruption” in Rio Grande do Norte.⁵⁴ (His loss of political rights in 1969, when he was once again a federal deputy, seems to have been due to his rivalry with Dinarte Mariz, who was closely tied to military hard-liner President Artur Costa e Silva. Alves had ties with the by then deceased former president Castelo Branco.⁵⁵) Maranhão would die in exile in July of 1971 in Uruguay. Marcos Guerra and others were imprisoned and interrogated numerous times, as was Sergipe’s Secretary of Education, Rabello Leite.⁵⁶

The military found it difficult to determine whether many of those who were in training for the program in Sergipe were themselves subversives or even whether Freire’s method was, in its essence, subversive. The military itself had subverted a constitutional government. Some of the prospective teachers rejected the premises of their interrogators, noting that the word “subversion” was “used frequently by regimes of force.” The military was split over whether to blame Freire or his associates. The military accused Paulo Pacheco, one of the leading figures in the Sergipe training program, of distorting Freire’s method there and “turning it into a partisan instrument” of indoctrination. If Freire’s method was used correctly, it “could have good effects,” one investigator suggested.⁵⁷ Many of the teachers rejected their military interrogators’ assertions that there was an attempt to “agitate” or to indoctrinate people in a partisan way. The issues that were discussed during the training sessions, one woman responded, were those which were being discussed widely in Goulart era Brazil, such as votes for the illiterate, basic reforms, and unionism.⁵⁸ One teacher, perhaps more politically naive than many of the others, claimed that she had not known that the program was subversive but that after the Revolution of April she had come “to understand the truth.”⁵⁹ The coup, in that sense, created its own transformed consciousness. The military also tried to prove that the directors of the campaign in Sergipe and elsewhere were personally corrupt. They questioned the would-be instructors at length regarding Pacheco’s use of a Volkswagen sedan, in part because he took it with him when the coup took place, which,

considering the fate of those involved in the literacy campaign generally, seems to have been a prudent move. Over the next few years, the case against Pacheco bounced back and forth between civil and military courts as judges quarreled over who had jurisdiction. Ultimately, the case against Paulo Pacheco was dropped in 1981.⁶⁰

Although the United States had supported Goulart's overthrow, not all US officials were equally optimistic about the military government's plans for Brazil in the first few months following the coup. Even US Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, for all of his suspicions regarding President Goulart's intentions, was concerned about the early actions of the military government. Nevertheless, Gordon confidently asserted in a telegram that the "greatest hope for avoidance of undemocratic excesses rests in character and convictions of Castelo Branco."⁶¹ But there were particularly concerns about what the coup would mean for the northeast. US Minister Consul General in Recife Rowell warned in early April, "The economic and social problems which led Pernambuco's voters to elect Arraes remain as real as they ever were [. . .]. The new administration will have to prove that it can do a better job than Arraes in promoting real reform and progress."⁶²

By April 14, the national literacy program inaugurated only months before had been extinguished by military decree. Freire was relieved of his duties on the 20th. He then spent roughly 70 days in prison, a period that he later claimed transformed his thinking on political matters. He was freed but he anticipated being interrogated again and so sought asylum in September in the Bolivian embassy. He left for Bolivia, expecting to work for the Bolivian ministry of education, but a coup there put a halt to those plans. He then settled in Chile in November, where he soon joined Goulart's former Minister of Education Paulo de Tarso Santos and other Brazilians as an integral part of recently inaugurated President Eduardo Frei's plans to transform Chilean society. If Angicos in Rio Grande do Norte had been the setting for the first systematic employment of Freire's teaching methods, Chile would be Angicos writ large. There he would have an opportunity to test out his theories on a grand scale with ample governmental resources.⁶³ Freire would accomplish more in exile than he had been allowed to do in his native country. Decades later, at least some students were still wondering why the northeastern Brazilian literacy programs had been canceled. A former student named Maria Luíza da Silva from Angicos asked Paulo Freire why he had been imprisoned; he replied, "Because you learned too much."⁶⁴

The belief Miguel Arraes and others held in the early 1960s that Brazil had changed fundamentally and that what he called the Brazilian Revolution was irreversible was clearly an illusion. The vast majority of Brazilians were not so active or conscious as they thought. As Sergipe historian Íbarê Dantas has argued, popular participation was uncoordinated and not institutionalized;

the triumphalist rhetoric of many on the left blinded them to the fact that the powers of reaction, and the military, in particular (which, for its part, claimed to have its own revolutionary agenda) were much stronger than the divided left was.⁶⁵ As José Willington Germano has argued regarding Djalma Maranhão's program in Natal, there was an overly optimistic faith in the transforming power of education.⁶⁶ The military coup of 1964 would guarantee that the on-going mobilization of the Brazilian population would be halted and reversed, but it would also guarantee that the northeast as a region would be, once again, defined more as a problem than as a generator of possible solutions. In early December 1964, US official Rowell commented, "At the moment Northeastern Brazil is incapable of influencing Brazilian national political affairs to any significant extent, but it remains a socio-economic problem area which may well prove to be another powder-keg in the future." The military largely replaced innovative leaders with leaders with no connection with or understanding of the more dynamic trends in the region. Even US officials had to admit that the replacement for Maranhão's "vigorous administration" (and for many others in the northeast, as well) was, at best, "uninspired." "Somehow, the political system is going to have to come to terms with these newly self-conscious masses," Rowell warned.⁶⁷ The military sought to reinforce old habits of deference by employing repression more extensively in the northeast and particularly on peasants and union members even more than on literacy teachers, thus making plain the dangers of a heightened consciousness.⁶⁸ For much of the next 20 years, military rulers and their own "Brazilian Revolution" would count on greater political support in the northeast than in the Center South. Ultimately, the military government would seek to resolve its northeastern problem through migration more than transformation.⁶⁹

Notes

1. Ernest S. Guaderrama, "Operations Memorandum: Request for Additional Personnel," 4 May 1961, p. 4 in National Archives II, Record Group 84 Lot 66 F 121 Acc. No. 67A 1450.

2. See, for example, Miguel Arraes, "Discurso de Saudação a João Goulart," in his *Pensamento e Ação Política* (Rio de Janeiro: Topbook, 1997), p. 37.

3. See Arraes, "Discurso de Posse," in *Pensamento e Ação Política*, pp. 18–21 and 33. For an examination of literacy programs in another northeastern state, see Afonso Celso Scoguglia, "Paulo Freire e a CEPLAR da Paraíba (1961–1964)—História de uma Experiência Pioneira de Alfabetização Política com o Método Paulo Freire," May 1998, available at the Instituto Paulo Freire, São Paulo, Brazil.

4. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–60: Volume V: American Republics* [hereafter *FRUS*] (Washington, D. C.: Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1991), pp. 683–684.

5. Claudio Bojunga, *JK: O Artista do Impossível* (Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, 2001), pp. 517–524.

6. For an analysis of the creation of SUDENE, see Amélia Cohn, *Crise Regional e Planejamento: Processo de Criação da SUDENE* (São Paulo: Editora Perspectiva, 1973), particularly pp. 57–72, 108–110, 132–151, and 153–159.

7. Riordan Roett, *The Politics of Foreign Aid in the Brazilian Northeast* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972), pp. ix and 28–38.

8. *FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XII: American Republics*, “Paper by the Operations Coordinating Board,” February 1, 1961, p. 423; Joseph A. Page, *The Revolution that Never Was: Northeast Brazil, 1955–1964* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1972), pp. 12–13; Albert A. Rabida, “Operations Memorandum to Department of State,” RG 84, Lot 66, F 121, Acc No. 67A1450; Edward T. Walters, “Recommendation for Re-establishment of Consular Operations in Natal, RGN,” 13 June 1961, RG 84, Lot 66, F 121, Acc No. 67, A 1450; Ernest S. Guaderrama, “Operations Memorandum: Request for Additional Personnel,” p. 3; “U. S. I. S. Poll on Peasant Attitudes in Northeast Brazil,” 22 July 22, 1963, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, 1963.

9. Celso de Rui Beisiegel, *Estado e Educação Popular (Um Estudo sobre a Educação de Adultos)* (São Paulo: Livraria Pioneira Editora, 1974), pp. 8, 67–69, 78–96, 121, 128, 154, 157–158, 170–172; Vanilda Pereira Paiva, *Educação Popular e Educação de Adultos* 4th Edition (São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 1987), pp. 175–194 and 215–221.

10. For a general discussion of the Alliance for Progress, see Stephen G. Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), pp. 148–172. For information on education issues in the Alliance, see Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onís, *The Alliance that Lost its Way: A Critical Report on the Alliance for Progress* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 279–306.

11. Page, *Revolution that Never Was*, pp. 52–53.

12. José Arlindo Soares, *A Frente do Recife e o Governo do Arraes: Nacionalismo em Crise: 1955–1964* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1982), p. 43.

13. Page, *Revolution that Never Was*, pp. 149–169.

14. Soares, *Frente do Recife*, p. 38.

15. For a sophisticated analysis of the complex forces at work in state politics, see Luciana de Barros Jaccoud, *Movimentos Sociais e Crise Política em Pernambuco, 1955–1968* (Recife: Fundação Joaquim Nabuco, Editora Massangana, 1990), particularly pp. 9–10, 93–94, and 121. See also Soares, *Frente do Recife*, p. 97.

16. See Roett, *Politics of Foreign Aid*, pp. 130–140.

17. Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of Hope: Reliving Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Translated by Robert R. Barr (New York: Continuum, 1994), pp. 17–31.

18. Regarding the Popular Culture Movement, see Paulo Cavalcanti, *O Caso Eu Conto Como o Caso Foi: Da Coluna Prestes a Queda de Arraes: Memórias* Volume I (Recife: Guararapes, 1980), pp. 302–305. To understand the evolution of Freire’s ideas, see Vanilda P. Paiva, *Paulo Freire e o Nacionalismo-Desenvolvimentista* (Rio: Editora Civilização Brasileira, 1980).

19. Celso de Rui Beisiegel, *Política e Educação Popular (A Teoria e a Prática de Paulo Freire no Brasil)* (São Paulo: Editora Ática, 1982), pp. 125–142.

20. For US officials' attitudes towards the Popular Culture Movement, see, for example, Edward J. Rowell, Minister Consul General, AmConGenRecife, 4 March 1964, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–1966, Box 1936; D. Eugene Delgado-Arias, American Consul General, "Airgram Weekly Summary No. 37," 13 March 1963, National Archives RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1963, Box 3833.

21. Edward Rowell, "Pernambuco Education," 23 March 1964 telegram; Grupo de Trabalho, Governo do Estado de Pernambuco, *Aliança para o Progresso: Resultado de Inquérito* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Brasiliense, 1963), pp. 21–26, 45–52, and 80.

22. Edward T. Walters, "Recommendation for Reestablishment of Consular Operations in Natal, RGN." 13 June 1961, RG 84, Lot 66 F121 Acc No. 67 A 1450.

23. "Plano de Aplicação dos Recursos dos Fundos de Ensino Primário e Médio, Destinado ao Estado do Rio Grande do Norte, por Contado Plano Trienal de Educação," June 1963, pp. 1–2 Arquivo Público Estadual—Rio Grande do Norte (hereafter APE/RGN), SECERN, 1963, "Secretaria de Educação e Cultura" Box; see also the "Plano de Aplicação," p. 2.

24. See *Memória Viva de Aluizio Alves*. Second Revised and Expanded Edition (Natal: Ed. UFRN, 1998), pp. 95, 112–116, 126, and 136–137; *Segundo Mensagem Anual Enviada a Asembléia Legislativa a 1 de Junho de 1962*, p. 38 and 42–43. See also his biographical study of a political idol of his, José da Penha, *A Primeira Campanha Popular no Rio Grande do Norte* (Natal: Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Norte, 1976), particularly page 16. Regarding his campaign, see Marlene da Silva Mariz and Luiz Eduardo Brandão Suassuna, *História do Rio Grande do Norte Contemporâneo 1934 a 1990: Estado, Evolução, Política, Social, e Econômica* (Natal: CDF Gráfica e Editora, 2001), pp. 82–83. Sérgio Luis Bezerra Trindade, *Um Síntese da Abertura Política no Rio Grande do Norte, 1974–1979* (Natal: n.p., 1998), p. 21.

25. See July 29, 1963 speech, reprinted in Aluizio Alves, *Sem Odio e Sem Medo*. Second Edition (Rio de Janeiro: Nosso Tempo, 1969), pp. 155 and 170–171.

26. Daniel M. Braddock, Minister Consul General, São Paulo, "Weekly Summary No. 87, 30 August 1962," RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, Box 3834. See also AmConGen Recife D. Eugene Delgado-Arias, "Aluisio Alves Bids for Regional Leadership," RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 2 September 1963 and AmConGen Recife Edward J. Rowell, "Airgram, 14 November 1963; RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files, Box 3312; Alves, *Sem Odio, Sem Medo*, p. 168. See parts of Alves's speech before SUDENE contained in Itamar de Sousa, *Fascículos do Diário de Natal* (Natal: Diário de Natal, 1999), p. 233. Regarding the US support for the Alves government, see also Roett, *Politics of Foreign Aid*, pp. 111–112 and 118–126.

27. See Heinz Peter Gerhardt, "Angicos—Rio Grande do Norte—1962/63 (A Primeira Experiência com o Sistema Paulo Freire)," *Educação e Sociedade* (Maio 1983): 10, 11, 14–15, 22, and 28; Francisco Calazans Fernandes, "Melhoramento e Ampliação do Sistema de Educação Primária e Básica no Estado do Rio Grande do Norte, do Nordeste Brasileira," pp. 7–8, APE/RGN SECERN 1962–1965 "Plano de Aplicação" Box; "Plano de Aplicação," pp. 37–38; Equipe Eduplan—São Paulo, "Projeto Campanha de Alfabetização de Adultos—Rio Grande do Norte, 1963," not paginated in "Programma de Ensino Primário do Estado do Rio Grande do Norte," APE/RGN

SECERN “1964” Box. Regarding Marcos Guerra and student involvement in the Angicos program, see Justina Iva de A. Silva, *Estudantes e Política: Estudo de um Movimento (RN 1960–1969)* (São Paulo: Cortez Editora, 1989), pp. 87–88, 95, and 97–99; For two accounts by participants, see Calazans Fernandes and Antonio Terra, *40 Horas de Esperança: Política e Pedagogia na Experiência de Angicos* (São Paulo: Editora Ática, 1994), pp. 19, 99–100, 106, 110, 152, and 192; Carlos Lyra, *As Quarentas Horas de Angicos: Uma Experiência Pioneira de Educação* (São Paulo: Cortez, 1996), pp. 20, 23, 48, 63, 95–97, 119–135 and 139–145. For a critique of the populist use of the word “povo,” see Francisco Corrêa Weffort, *O Populismo na Política Brasileira* 2nd Edition (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1978), pp. 37–39.

28. Francisco Calazans Fernandes, “Melhoramento e Ampliação do Sistema de Educação Primária e Básica no Estado do Rio Grande do Norte, do Nordeste Brasileira,” page 6, March 3, 1963 APE/RGN, SECERN 1962 a 1965, “Plano de Aplicação” Box. See also pp. 1–5 of his May 1963 report in the “Curso de Treinamentos para Professores Leigos,” folder in SECERN/1963; “Uma Aliança para o Progresso,” pp. 8 and 13. See also Alves, *Sem Odio, Sem Medo*, p. 170 and Fernandes and Terra, *40 Horas de Esperança*, pp. 134–135.

29. Fernandes and Terra, *40 Horas de Esperança*, pp. 114, 116, 136–138, and 194.

30. See *Memória Viva de Aluizio Alves*. Second Revised and Expanded Edition (Natal: Ed. UFRN, 1998), p. 112; José Willington Germano, *Lendo e Aprendendo: “A Campanha de Pé no Chão”* (São Paulo: Cortez, 1982), pp. 62–70.

31. See June 6, 1963 telegram the mayor sent to Goulart, reprinted in Alves, *A Verdade que Não é Secreta* (Rio de Janeiro: Nosso Tempo, 1976), pp. 168–169.

32. Germano, *Lendo e Aprendendo*, pp. 71–72, 100, 102, 108–109.

33. Quoted in Germano, *Lendo e Aprendendo*, pp. 142–143

34. See AmConGeneral Recife, Edward Rowell, “Interview with Djalma Maranhão,” January 8, 1964, Record Group 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, Box 1941, and AmConGen Recife Rowell, “Djalma Maranhão Extends His Popular Education Program to Interior Towns,” 11 March 1964, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.

35. See Paulo Freire and Sérgio Guimarães, *Aprendendo com a Própria História* Volume I (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1987), pp. 13–15.

36. Quoted in AmEmbassy Airgram 16 January 1964, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–1966, Box 1932.

37. Paiva, *Paulo Freire e o Nacionalismo-Desenvolvimentista*, p. 15.

38. João de Seixas Dória, *Eu, Reu Sem Crime* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Equador, Ltda., 1964), pp. 89.

39. Seixas Dória, *Eu, Reu Sem Crime*, pp. 71–72.

40. José Ibarê Costa Dantas, *Os Partidos Políticos em Sergipe (1889–1964)* (Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasileiro, 1989), pp. 208–209, 232–233, 243 257, and 274.

41. The best single source on Seixas Dória is his *Recortes de uma Jornada* (Aracaju: Fundação Oviêdo Teixeira, 2001). Regarding his ideas on economic nationalism, see particularly his speech, “Nacionalismo e Desenvolvimento Econômico,” from 1957, pp. 27–46.

42. J. Pires Wynne, *História de Sergipe Volume II 1930–1972* (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Pongetti, 1975), pp. 265–267; Ibarê Dantas, *A Tutela Militar em Sergipe: 1964–1984* (Rio: Tempo Brasileiro, 1997), p. 6.

43. “Seixas Dória na Casa Branca Reaffirma Posição Nacionalista,” *Gazeta de Sergipe* 27 September 1963; Dantas, *Partidos Políticos*, p. 274.
44. Seixas Dória, *Reu sem Crime*, p. 24; “Seixas: ‘Não Utilizarei a Polícia Contra os Camponeses da ‘Bia,’” *Gazeta de Sergipe* 9 January 1964; Dantas, *Partidos Políticos*, p. 280. American Consulate, Salvador, “Visit to Sergipe, February 26–29, 1964,” 12 March 1964 Telegram.
45. Ibarê Dantas, *Partidos Políticos*, p. 265; American Consulate—Salvador Airgram 12 March 1964, “Visit to Sergipe, February 26–29, 1964.” RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files.
46. Ibarê Dantas, *Partidos Políticos*, p. 287.
47. See “Alfabetização do Povo,” *Gazeta de Sergipe* 18 January 1964; Juarez Ribeiro, “ABC do Povo e Conscientiãção,” *Gazeta de Sergipe* 9 February 1964.
48. See, for example, “Método Paulo Freire: 200 Mil Pessoas Serão Alfabetizadas,” 15 December 1963; “Quinta Feira em Aracaju o Ministro de Educação,” *Gazeta de Sergipe* 14 January 1964; “Sambaqui em Aracaju: Método Paulo Freire Não É Baleia,” *Gazeta de Sergipe* 17 January 1964.
49. Poder Judiciário, Estado de Sergipe, Comarca de Aracaju—Second Vara Criminal, Forum Gumercardo Bessa, Auditoria da Sexta Região Militar (Exército, Marinha, e Aeronautica) Bahia—Sergipe Number 27/65, 1965, [Hereafter Sergipe Inquérito] Copy Available in Instituto Paulo Freire, Interrogation of Jackson da Silva Lima.
50. Germano, *Lendo e Aprendendo*, p. 60; Levinson and Onís, *Alliance that Lost its Way*, p. 291.
51. John W. F. Dulles, *Castelo Branco: The Making of a Brazilian President* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1978), p. 350.
52. Germano, *Lendo e Aprendendo*, pp. 150–153 and 158–160.
53. Edward J. Rowell, AmConGen Recife, “Weekly Summary No. 37,” 8 April 1964, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, Box 1930.
54. Germano, *Lendo e Aprendendo*, p. 66.
55. See, for example, João Batista Machado, *Perfil da República no Rio Grande do Norte (1889–2003)* (Natal: Departamento Estadual de Imprensa, 2000), p. 191. Marlene da Silva Mariz and Luiz Eduardo Brandão Suassuna, *História do Rio Grande do Norte Contemporâneo 1934 a 1990: Estado, Evolução, Política, Social, e Econômica* (Natal: CDF Gráfica e Editora, 2001), p. 86; Bezerra Trindade, *Síntese da Abertura*, pp. 25 and 28.
56. Ariosvaldo Figueiredo, *História Política de Sergipe, Volume V: 1962/1975* (Aracaju: n.p., 1986), p. 84.
57. Sergipe Inquérito—Relatório—Jorge Henrique Leite Fontes 4 September 1964.
58. Sergipe Inquérito, Interrogation of Terezinha Silva Ribeiro, 19 August 1964.
59. Sergipe Inquérito, Interrogation of Maria Auxiliadora da Silva, 20 August 1964.
60. Sergipe Inquérito—Response to Report by Major Francisco Rodrigues da Silveira—September 1964; See also Ministério da Guerra, IV Exército, Sexta Região Militar, Quartel General, Comissão Geral IPM/6, 3 December 1964 from Manoel Mandes Pereira. Sergipe Inquérito—Letter from Dr. Rinaldo Costa e Silva, Juiz de Direito da Segunda Vara Criminal da Comarca de Aracaju, 30 September 1981.
61. See Lincoln Gordon 10 April 1964 telegram, RG 59 Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–1966 Box 1939, p. 2.

62. Edward J. Rowell, AmConGen Recife, "Weekly Summary No. 37," 8 April 1964, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, Box 1930.

63. See Freire's discussion of his imprisonment in *Aprendendo com a Própria História*, pp. 35 and 42–54. Regarding his Bolivian experience, see p. 68. See also Beisiegel, *Política e Educação Popular*, pp. 253–261. See also my article, "Paulo Freire, Eduardo Frei, Literacy Training, and the Politics of 'Consciousness Raising' in Chile, 1964–1970," *Journal of Latin American Studies* (forthcoming).

64. Lyra, *Quarenta Horas de Angicos*, pp. 12–14.

65. Ibarê Dantas, *Partidos Políticos*, pp. 313–314; see also Thomas E. Skidmore, *Politics in Brazil, 1930–1964: An Experiment in Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 292.

66. Germano, *Lendo e Aprendendo*, p. 178.

67. Edward Rowell, AmConGen Recife, 2 December 1964, "Politics in Northeastern Brazil," RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–1966, Box 1929.

68. See Scoguglia, "Freire e CEPLAR," p. 121.

69. Thomas E. Skidmore, *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–85* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 24–25 and 144–149.