


This article was downloaded by: [University of Warwick]

On: 05 November 2013, At: 05:31

Publisher: Routledge

Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK



Slavery & Abolition: A Journal of Slave and Post-Slave Studies

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fsla20>

Slavery, citizenship and military service in Brazil's mobilization for the Paraguayan War

Hendrik Kraay^a

^a Department of History , University of Calgary , 2500 University Drive NW, Calgary, Alberta, T2N 1N4, Canada

Published online: 13 Jun 2008.

To cite this article: Hendrik Kraay (1997) Slavery, citizenship and military service in Brazil's mobilization for the Paraguayan War, *Slavery & Abolition: A Journal of Slave and Post-Slave Studies*, 18:3, 228-256, DOI: [10.1080/01440399708575220](https://doi.org/10.1080/01440399708575220)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01440399708575220>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the "Content") contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

Slavery, Citizenship and Military Service in Brazil's Mobilization for the Paraguayan War

HENDRIK KRAAY

In a dramatic public conflict over the historical meaning of the end of slavery, Rio de Janeiro's police and army troops prevented a march past the Duke of Caxias's pantheon in 1988. Military authorities feared that the black protesters would use the demonstration (the *Marcha dos Negros contra a Farsa da Abolição* [Blacks' March against the Farce of Abolition]) to repeat earlier publicized accusations that Caxias, the commander of Brazil's forces during part of the Paraguayan War (1864–70) and today revered by the army as its patron, used black soldiers as cannon fodder in the conflict.¹ The protesters' interpretation of the war owes much to the writings of a popular radical historian, Júlio José Chiavenato, who claims that 60,000 to 100,000 black men died in a war won 'by Brazil's slaves – freed en masse to join the army'.² Not only did the marchers besmirch a Brazilian army hero's reputation, they also challenged the corporation's modern self-image as an open institution free of racism, with a nineteenth-century heritage of anti-slavery activities. The April–June 1988 issue of the *Revista do Exército Brasileiro* featured two articles on the army's role in abolition. The Paraguayan War experiences shared by officers and black enlisted men, declared one, stimulated anti-slavery attitudes within the officer corps, attitudes that manifested themselves in officers' support for Brazil's abolition of slavery in 1888. To demonstrate the institution's acceptance of men of all races, the other article included a colour photograph of a black man in a full-dress cadet's uniform.³

That Brazil recruited slaves for the Paraguayan War is well known; in May 1988 Brazilians thus publicly debated radically different interpretations of an apparently familiar episode. For the army, the troubling questions posed by this recruitment can be comfortably ignored by incorporating the episode into its official history, in which officers play a leading role in abolition and the slaves liberated for the war a secondary part

Hendrik Kraay is in the Department of History, University of Calgary, 2500 University Drive NW, Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4 Canada.

as grateful recipients of freedom. The protesters, who raised questions left unasked during decades of military dictatorship, held that a powerful Brazilian state, in an unholy alliance with the dominant class of slave-owners, undertook a genocidal policy of social engineering at the expense of the country's population of African descent. Recent studies, although not subscribing to the genocide thesis, nevertheless stress the strength of the Brazilian state and its ability to coerce the enlistment of slaves.⁴

While it is true that the Brazilian government attempted to spare the country's free population the full burden of military service by drawing some army and navy manpower from the slave population, the difficulties inherent in such a practice – particularly slaves' status as property and the prerequisite of citizenship for military service – limited the state's capacity to act. Indeed, *slaves* were never *directly recruited* during the war; rather, owners manumitted them on condition of enlisting, upon which the freedmen were impressed. Often ignored or implicitly dismissed as an irrelevant semantic quiddity, the Brazilian government's refusal to enlist slaves was fundamental to the functioning of a self-proclaimed liberal and constitutional state in a slave society, where public authorities judiciously avoided intruding into the private sphere of masters' rights.⁵ As a result, the number of slaves freed to fight against Paraguay did not significantly exceed the officially reported total of just under 7,000, a figure confirmed by archival research in the provinces that supplied the largest numbers of slaves. The carefully crafted wartime policy toward slaves and military service – one that followed pre-war precedents – and the relatively small number of slaves freed to join the army and navy raise important questions about the legacy of the Paraguayan War. There is little evidence to suggest that the war significantly changed military attitudes toward slavery, and much less that officers came to see slaves as their (potential) social equals as a result of the conflict.

At the core of this article lies a detailed examination of slave recruitment in Bahia, the populous north-eastern province that contributed more men to the war effort than any other. Published data on Rio de Janeiro and scattered archival sources from other provinces supplements the Bahian evidence to provide a national picture of the enlistment of men freed for the war. A first section addresses the legal questions posed by slavery and military service and stresses that war-related manumissions in 1865 and 1866 depended entirely on the will of slave-owners. The surge in slave recruitment in 1867 and early 1868 is the subject of the next section. Government-compensated emancipations for military service provide an unusual opportunity to examine the philosophy that underlay state actions and the structure of the Brazilian slave market. Both point to the imperial state's unwillingness to challenge slave-owners and its respect for their property rights. After a brief

examination of the official statistics on ex-slave enlistments – which, in contrast to most historians, I find to be generally confirmed by archival records – this article concludes with the war's legacy, both for the Brazilian army and for the country's slave population.

Throughout, this study pays close attention to Brazilian law, as expressed both in legislation and in administrative and bureaucratic procedure. Law and practice, of course, diverge widely in Brazil, but to dismiss the law's relevance altogether for the study of slave societies, as historians have tended to do in reaction to Frank Tannenbaum's claims that protective Hispanic legislation ensured a mild slavery in Latin America, misses the importance of law and, more broadly, the institutional practices that grew out of legal principles when slaves came into contact with the state.⁶ As the imperial Brazilian state apparatus strengthened in the nineteenth century and filled with the graduates pouring out of the law schools, such contacts grew ever more frequent.⁷ Brazilian law's precision regarding the exclusion of slaves from military service leaves no doubt as to whose interests were being served. Slave-owning planters benefited from this precision as much as they benefited from the chaotic morass that was Brazil's land law.⁸ Legal definitions of slavery, freedom, citizenship (the latter two prerequisites for military service), and the carefully delineated recruitment procedures are thus fundamental to understanding the Brazilian government's contortions as it sought to recruit slaves – that is, turn them into citizens and soldiers – without calling into question slavery or abrogating slave-owners' property rights.

Slavery and Military Service, 1823–1866

Well before the Paraguayan War, Brazilian military jurisprudence and bureaucratic practice had clearly defined the position of the country's slave population. The Constitution of 1824 guaranteed property rights and obliged all citizens to take up arms to defend their country; both as property and non-citizens, therefore, slaves were exempt from recruitment. However coercive and undesirable it may have been, military service implied free status and citizenship; as a result, the army and navy attracted a steady stream of fugitive slaves, men who were to be promptly returned to their owners.⁹ As historian Manuela Carneiro da Cunha has stressed, the Brazilian state neither regulated manumissions nor arrogated for itself the right to free slaves before 1871 (when the free womb law initiated a gradual process of abolition). Manumissions were the exclusive right of slave-owners whose virtually unfettered control over the gateway to freedom served to maintain, as Brazilians put it, masters' moral authority over their human property.¹⁰ The only and severely limited exception to these

principles grew out of a Roman Law maxim that slaves who performed outstanding service to the state should not remain in bondage. First applied in 1823 to confer freedom upon the slaves who had fought in the campaign to expel the Portuguese colonial army from the Bahian capital of Salvador and were being reclaimed by their owners after the war, the principle was quietly applied to a few fugitives who, in subsequent decades, managed to enlist and distinguish themselves in the ranks. In these cases, owners were required to accept compensation from the government, after which the former slave served out his enlistment term as a freedman.¹¹

TABLE 1
ENLISTMENTS IN THE LAND FORCES FROM BAHIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, AND ALL BRAZIL
DURING THE PARAGUAYAN WAR, BY PRE-SERVICE STATUS OF RECRUIT AND TYPE OF
RECRUITMENT

	Bahia		Rio de Janeiro (City)		Brazil	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<i>Free Men</i>						
Voluntários da Pátria	7,764	51.7	6,231	67.2	37,438	43.1
Designated National Guardsmen	5,312	35.4	1,851	20.0	31,198	35.9
Regular Army Soldiers	1,861	12.4	1,170	12.6	17,465	20.1
Substitutions by Free Men	88	0.6	16	0.2	794	0.9
Total Free Men	15,025	100.1	9,268	100.0	86,895	100.0
<i>Slaves Freed for the War</i>						
Donations from Private Owners	12	5.0	630	28.7	799	20.0
Substitutions by Slaves	0		238	10.8	948	23.7
Government Allocations:						
Government-Owned	0		274	12.5	287	6.9
Imperial Household	0		67	3.1	67	1.7
Convents/Monasteries	12	5.0	27	1.2	95	2.4
Compensated Emancipations	218	90.1	960	43.7	1,807	45.1
Total Slaves Freed	242	100.1	2,196	100.0	4,003	99.8
<i>Total Mobilization</i>						
Free Men	15,025	98.4	9,258	80.8	86,895	95.6
Slaves Freed	242	1.6	2,196	19.2	4,003	4.4
Total	15,267	100.0	11,464	100.0	90,898	100.0

Source: 'Mappa da força com que cada uma das Províncias do Imperio concorreu para a guerra do Paraguay ...', Brazil, Minister of War, *Relatório*, 1872.

These well-established precepts governed the four ways in which slaves entered the ranks during the Paraguayan War. Some were donated to the war effort by their owners; others were presented as substitutes to replace pressed men; in 1867 and 1868 the government compensated owners who

freed their slaves on the condition of enlisting; and some ran away from their owners to join the army or navy, passing themselves off as free men. From Table 1, the army's retrospective summary of enlistments during the war, we can glean data on the relative weight of the first three of these four ways that slaves might end up in the ranks; in each, owners' rights were carefully protected.

The category of private owners refers to donations to the war effort. During the first months of the conflict, patriotic Brazilians contributed liberally to their country's cause; as generosity flagged in the middle of 1865, the government pressured property owners to part with some of their wealth in the name of patriotism. Some offered slaves, and eight of the twelve donated by Bahians can be specifically accounted for.¹² The overwhelming majority (630) of donated slaves came from the city of Rio de Janeiro, suggesting that pressure to contribute to the war effort was strongest in the national capital. Such donations, charged an opposition deputy, might even earn the slave-owner a patent of nobility or membership in one of the honorific orders, according to a table in which a baronetcy cost ten slaves.¹³ That traffic in titles existed is well documented; contemporary critics roundly condemned the Brazilian nobility's venality. The donation of slaves alone to the war effort, however, probably never earned anyone a title; rather, such contributions were but one form of the currency with which Brazilians acquired nobility, a currency that included monetary contributions to charities and public service but which could only be spent by those who enjoyed social standing and court connections.¹⁴

The unpopularity of Paraguayan War service, undeniable after the first wave of patriotism wore off in 1865, prompted impressed men to invoke legal provisions that permitted them to present substitutes. Historians, often citing the Bahian chronicler, Manoel Querino, suggest that such recruits frequently offered slaves as their substitutes, men who would thus gain freedom in return for assuming the risk that masters refused to take.¹⁵ Army figures record only 948 slave substitutions nation-wide, 437 of them from the province and city of Rio de Janeiro and 305 from Rio Grande do Sul, but none at all from Bahia (Table 1). In Bahian archives only one offer of a slave could be found, in this case to replace a man already at the front. Presumably the offer was not accepted, for there is some evidence of army reluctance to permit the replacement of trained soldiers with hastily-freed recruits.¹⁶

What is therefore most striking about slave substitutions is their relative rarity (scarcely one per cent of the army mobilization) and their complete absence in some provinces. Indeed, given the legislation regarding military service in force during most of the conflict, recruits had little or no economic incentive to offer them. Brazil recruited manpower for its land

forces under three different regimes: the regular army, the *Voluntários da Pátria*, and the mobilized National Guard. Prospective army soldiers (either free men or freedmen) could voluntarily enlist for a six-year term; impressed recruits (who would serve for nine years) enjoyed, until September 1867, the right to exempt themselves from service by presenting a substitute or paying 600\$000.¹⁷ Given that a slave healthy enough to pass an army physical examination cost substantially more (see below), army recruits had no reason to offer slaves to go in their stead during the first years of the war. It made more sense to sell a slave and pay the cash requirement. In any case, the lower-class men targeted by impressment included relatively few slave-owners, not to mention few who would have 600\$000.¹⁸

Rather than expand its regular army in 1865, the Brazilian government created a special volunteer corps, the *Voluntários da Pátria*, whose soldiers earned special salary supplements and served only for the duration of the conflict; upon Brazil's victory, these men could look forward to the payment of an enlistment bonus, land grants in government colonies, and preference for civil service jobs. The decree that created the *Voluntários* made no mention of substitutions or exemptions – such provisions would have been redundant in a volunteer corps. Late in 1865, however, as recruitment became more coercive, impressed *Voluntários* were formally permitted to pay 600\$000 to exempt themselves.¹⁹

Parallel to the raising of the *Voluntários*, Brazil mobilized its militia, the National Guard. Reorganized in the early 1850s, Bahia's Guard alone counted 111,813 men on paper, 94,337 listed as capable of active service in 1863, all of whom were subject to, in the parlance of the day, designation for the war effort.²⁰ The 1850 National Guard Law contained no provisions for the purchase of exemptions from mobilization and only permitted guardsmen to present substitutes. The decree that extended *Voluntários'* benefits to guardsmen did not, as the Council of State specifically ruled in early 1866, permit them to buy their way out of their civic duties. Their only option was to present a substitute.²¹

If the legislation regarding substitution and pecuniary exemptions is relatively clear – before mid-1867, 600\$000 bought army recruits and impressed *Voluntários da Pátria* out of going to the war while designated National Guardsmen had to find a personal substitute, free or slave – determining actual practice is more difficult. The hiring of substitutes was presumably difficult (though not impossible) during a war, so mobilized guardsmen might well have had a strong incentive to offer slaves if the rules forbidding purchase of exemptions were actually enforced. The fact that 82 per cent of the 4,126 men enlisted in Rio Grande do Sul were mobilized guardsmen may therefore explain the province's contribution of 305 slave

substitutes, almost one third of the Brazilian total. Bahian authorities, in contrast, designated 5,312 guardsmen and recorded not a single slave substitute. Instead, despite the law, Bahian guardsmen could purchase exemptions. Of the seven offers to pay 600\$000 that I located (all date from 1865), four were from designated guardsmen, one from a man pressed into the army, and two came from men whose enlistment status is unknown. Apparently, all were accepted.²² Although the Brazilian government eventually banned the buying of exemptions in wartime, the fact that Bahian guardsmen could purchase their way out of going to the front for much less than the price of a slave helps explain the lack of slave substitutions from the province.

Although those who donated slaves and the recruits who presented them as substitutes were often pressured (or enticed) into doing so, neither of these two forms of slave recruitment formally violated owners' property rights. The final decision to part with a slave rested solely with the master, who freed him on condition of enlisting. Similarly, the primacy of masters' rights over military needs emerges clearly in the treatment of runaways. Despite the wartime need for manpower, fugitive slaves who enlisted or were inadvertently impressed during the conflict were routinely returned to their owners (providing of course that the master proved ownership and that the slave had not distinguished himself in some way).²³ Precisely because of these constraints, the first two years of the war saw but few slaves freed to serve in the ranks; as long as the government respected masters' property rights, slaves remained effectively outside of Brazil's mobilization.

Government Intervention: Compensated Emancipations, 1867–68

With recruitment among the free population faltering in late 1866 and no end in sight to the conflict, the Brazilian government reconsidered its policy of not recruiting directly among the slave population. The Council of State discussed slave enlistment in a lively session that dealt with both the principle and the practical details of such recruitment.²⁴ The debate addressed the fundamental issues that bedevilled a strikingly legalistic state seeking to mobilize the captive manpower of a slave society.

Four members of this advisory body voted against any slave recruitment. As the Viscount of Jequitinonha bluntly put it, such a measure would be 'impolitic, indecorous, ineffective, and onerous to the public coffers'. His colleagues in the minority developed these arguments further: recruiting slaves would only raise aspirations for total abolition, leading inevitably to insurrection among those not freed. Even worse, the resort to slave enlistments would confess before the 'civilized world' Brazil's 'impotence' to defend itself against 'outrages suffered from a little Republic'. In any

case, were systematic slave recruitment undertaken, owners would simply take advantage of the government to rid themselves of their least capable slaves, leaving army manpower problems unresolved.

The six councillors who favoured recruiting slaves shared some of the minority's fears of an army composed of freedmen but saw no shame in doing so: any policy that transmuted men from slave to free status would be applauded by 'civilized nations', argued José Thomas Nabuco de Araujo. How to accomplish this alchemy was, of course, the principal question. The Council considered three categories of slaves: those belonging directly to the government, those belonging indirectly to the state through the monasteries, and those of private owners. The former two classes of slaves could simply be freed and drafted by fiat but they numbered few and their military value would thus be limited. Inexorably, therefore, the Council was drawn into a discussion of the extent of masters' property rights at a time when *raison d'état* appeared to demand their abrogation. As two councillors noted, legislation authorizing the expropriation of private property already existed; Nabuco incorrectly added that the expropriation of slaves was not unprecedented for the government had obliged owners to free them to fight for independence in 1823.²⁵ Neither he nor his colleagues, however, recommended such a course, leaving them only to consider moral suasion and compensated emancipations, in effect the purchase of slaves. Several doubted that the Treasury had the means to buy a significant number and advocated a programme of voluntary donations or encouragement to the presentation of substitutes. Behind this fig leaf of fiscal responsibility lay an underlying opposition to any government interference in master-slave relations, even if it merely involved buying slaves. Nabuco, whose recommendations most closely approached the subsequent policy, however, saw 'no danger ... in the purchase of slaves to be freed and serve in the army, for the slaves will not themselves be called up; rather the masters will be invited to sell [them] if they [the masters] so desire; ... [their rights] will not be violated.'

In an ominous undertone, José Antonio Pimenta Bueno especially advocated the resort to the slave population, hoping that it would spare 'labourers, the sons, relatives, and employees of farmers, many of whom represent the nuclei of future working families, nuclei which the war will snuff out'. Furthermore, he concluded, 'It is preferable to spare the most civilized and virtuous class of society, and not the other which is less [civilized and virtuous] and could be dangerous.' At its highest level, the Brazilian state did consider the eugenic effect of freeing slaves for the war effort and Pimenta Bueno's argument does smell of genocide.

One day after the meeting, the imperial government began implementing Nabuco's proposals by decreeing freedom for all government-owned slaves

capable of serving in the army and simultaneously drafting the men. Pleased that the War Ministry had also resolved to free the wives of those impressed, Emperor Pedro II urged haste, worrying that the slaves on the imperial Santa Cruz estate would learn of their fate before police authorities could arrange orderly health inspections and enlistments.²⁶ By the end of December 1866, in response to invitations from the War Ministry, the Abbot of Salvador's St. Benedict Monastery had freed ten slaves to go to the front; a few weeks later, the Benedictines of Olinda contributed eight more.²⁷ Government-compensated emancipations began somewhat haphazardly for the army in early 1867 and accelerated in the middle of that year with the despatch of special Navy Ministry agents to north-eastern provinces. In Bahia, Dr Pedro Joaquim de Vasconcelos established himself in Salvador's navy yard and advertised his commission in the press, inviting prospective sellers to present their 'robust' male slaves for medical examinations.²⁸ The government, of course, would never own the slaves, for it merely compensated the owners who freed them on condition of enlisting, but even contemporaries did not always make this distinction: later references to slaves 'bought' for the war effort occasionally surface.²⁹

Throughout 1867 and well into 1868, the acquisition of slaves in this manner remained a priority. The emperor took a personal interest in the matter, insisting to the War Minister in February 1867 that only the large-scale enlistment of former slaves could satisfy manpower needs; War Ministry circulars reminded provincial presidents of this recruitment's importance.³⁰ Presidents and ministers probably needed reminding for, as might be expected from the Council of State's lukewarm endorsement, slave recruitment proved controversial. 'Protests expressed at all levels of society', according to a later Bahian chronicler, accompanied the first compensated emancipations, presumably from planters who feared the loss of their captive labour force and the undermining of slavery implied by the recruitment of bondsmen. By March 1867, Rio de Janeiro was rife with rumours that an imminent executive decree would order the expropriation of 10,000 slaves; a civil servant in the Ministry of Agriculture heard talk of both abolition and abdication and judged the situation 'far from reassuring'.³¹ Fears that the government might use the need for recruits as a justification for tampering with slave-owners' property rights were not entirely groundless. Pedro II strongly advocated slave recruitment and privately hoped that the freeing of government-owned slaves to serve in the army would lead to further abolitionist steps; he subscribed 100,000\$000 out of his personal fortune to assist with compensated emancipations and set an example by freeing 67 slaves belonging to the imperial household (Table 1). Like the worried bureaucrat, the British minister discerned portents of a 'general emancipation' in the emperor's actions.³² Imperial enthusiasm for

slave recruitment thus combined with the monarch's well-known abolitionist sympathies to produce disquiet among slave-owners; his pressure on the Council of State to consider proposals for the ending of slavery only added to the tension.³³

In this context, Pedro's public recommendation in the May 1867 throne speech that legislators consider the emancipation of Brazil's 'servile element' may represent not a bold step but an acknowledgement that he needed to take slave-owners' views into account when dealing with the issue of slavery; indeed, he pledged his support for the protection of 'existing property'.³⁴ With the question of abolition safely in the hands of the planter-dominated legislature, controversy over slave recruitment subsided by mid-1867. To be sure, a recruitment reform bill that crawled through parliament during the war quietly acquired clauses excluding freedmen from military service in an apparent attempt to prevent the practice in the future³⁵ but legislative debate often dwelled on curiously peripheral aspects of the issue. Christiano Ottoni condemned compensated emancipations 'with all the fibre of [his] being', not out of concern to protect slave-owners but because he simply feared, as had some members of the Council of State, that masters were selling off their most troublesome slaves to an unsuspecting military.³⁶

Ottoni's declamation, in fact, points to the limitations of public debate over slavery in the last decades of the Empire and the ambiguity of slave recruitment in 1867 and 1868. Unlike their colleagues in the antebellum southern United States, Brazilian slave-owners formulated no defence of slavery as a positive good.³⁷ Indeed, given the end of the slave trade in the early 1850s and the inability of the Brazilian slave population to reproduce itself, all knew that slavery was doomed. What statesmen debated, therefore, was the best way to manage slavery's elimination in light of the changing composition of the slave population, and the appropriate role of the state in fostering a smooth transition to free labour.³⁸ By mid-1867, fears that wartime recruitment of slaves would lead to expropriation were laid to rest by the government's cautious approach and compensated emancipation came to be seen as a moderate abolitionist policy, one that could garner considerable support at a time when the end of slavery was inevitable.

The connection of slave recruitment to moderate and gradual emancipation appears most clearly in two cartoons published in Rio de Janeiro's *Semana Illustrada*. In one, the artist gave pride of place to the master as he removes the chains from a grateful slave and hands him a rifle, under the approving gaze of Marianne, the all-purpose symbol of liberty, here safely frozen in stone and attached to a pedestal (Figure 1). In the second, an owner and his two sons present the emperor with eight uniformed and disciplined men whom, as the caption notes, he has

FIGURE 1
EMANCIPATION FOR THE WAR EFFORT, AS SEEN BY *SEMANA ILLUSTRADA*



U grande Condé dizia que para concluir-se a guerra no mais breve espaço de tempo, era necessário duas coisas: homens e dinheiro: e o Sr. José Luiz Alves, respeitante de grosso trato a este ponto, compreendeu perfeitamente a intenção do Condé: comprando e libertando um escravo, oferecendo-o para marchas para a libertação da guerra, pagando-lhe adiantado um custo de fardamento, soldo e estapa. Assim, praticou esse um acto de patrio-tismo, disciplina e coragem dos escravos e augmento a dos soldados. Parabéns ao honrado Fluminense. Hora a elle e a todos os que servem ao velho exemplo!

Source: Reproduced in R[aimundo] Magalhães Júnior, *O império em chinelos* (Rio de Janeiro, 1957), facing p.44.

transformed from slaves into citizens and soldiers (Figure 2). Lest the reader miss the message, the texts proclaim that these are worthy examples to follow. Grateful and disciplined former slaves who would serve their country and their benevolent superiors were, in fact, the goal of many an abolitionist and a stint in the army, as Nabuco had noted when considering slave recruitment, might be just what was needed to discipline newly freed men.³⁹ Indeed, after the war, opponents of the government's free-womb law held up slave-owners' willingness to manumit slaves for the war effort as evidence of their support for emancipation. The measure then being considered – the freeing of all children henceforth born to slave mothers – however, threatened not only property rights but also the 'moral force' of absolute power on which masters' authority rested.⁴⁰ If emancipation were necessary, these men were determined that it should come only from masters' hands, without state intervention.

Compensated emancipations had come perilously close to trampling on slave-owners' rights but the wartime policy, in retrospect, was far less offensive to conservative slavocrats than the free-womb law. Wartime

FIGURE 2
THE EMPEROR RECEIVES A DONATION OF MEN FREED FOR THE WAR,
AS SEEN BY SEMANA ILLUSTRADA



O commendador Mathias Bóro e seus filhos Abílio e Manoel, com os seus escravos cidadãos dos cidadãos soldados.
O coração do Imperador e a voz da pátria, os braços do Brasil sempre a seguir.

Source: Reproduced in Raimundo Magalhães Júnior, *O império em chinelos* (Rio de Janeiro, 1957), facing p.29.

respect for slave-owners' rights testifies to the caution of the Brazilian imperial state, its legalism, and the strength of slaveholder interests. Instead of seizing masters' property, the Empire entered the slave market to bid against them for manpower.

Compensated Emancipations and the Slave Market

The acquisition of slaves for military service presents a unique opportunity to analyse the structure of the national Brazilian slave market, about which remarkably little is known.⁴¹ Given the similarity of the slaves acquired throughout the country – healthy Brazilian-born young males (Table 2),⁴² two features of the data on compensation paid to owners are noteworthy: the sharp increase in slave prices in Bahia and the significant variation in regional prices, which increase with proximity to Rio de Janeiro (Table 3). Regional price differences reflect the relative decline of the Northeast's sugar economy and the strength of the coffee economy centred on Rio de Janeiro, differentials which made profitable the interprovincial slave trade in which an estimated five to ten thousand slaves per year flowed from north to south from the 1850s to the 1870s.

TABLE 2
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SLAVES ACQUIRED FOR THE PARAGUAYAN WAR,
1867-68

	North and Northeast*	Bahia	Rio de Janeiro**
Brazilian (%)	100.0	100.0	95.2
Average Age	22.6	23.0	-
Age Range	18-39	16-36	15-44
Aged 20-29 (%)	68.2	68.1	55.7
Number	107	984	2,903

*Pará, Maranhão and Pernambuco.

**All manumissions for war effort, 1865-70.

Sources: Arquivo do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Brasil, lata 407, pastas 27, 29, 30, 31; Arquivo Nacional, Seção de Poderes Executivos, XM, maço 1109; Arquivo Público do Estado da Bahia, Seção de Arquivo Colonial e Provincial, maços 2870, 2884; 'Matrícula de Recrutas', Arquivo Público do Estado de Pernambuco, Fundo Secretaria da Presidencia, Vol. 43, fols. 1r-29v; Jorge Prata de Sousa, *Escravidão ou morte: os escravos brasileiros na Guerra do Paraguai* (Rio de Janeiro, 1996), pp.96-7.


TABLE 3
AVERAGE COMPENSATION PAID TO OWNERS OF SLAVES ACQUIRED FOR THE
PARAGUAYAN WAR, 1867-68 (MILREIS)

	1867		1868	
	Jan.-June	July-Dec.	Jan.-June	July-Dec.
Pará			1:133\$333	
Maranhão			1:278\$542	
Pernambuco			1:382\$979	
Bahia	1:141\$762	1:381\$236	1:683\$125	1:687\$500
Rio de Janeiro*			1:985\$000	

*Average price for 1,111 manumissions for the war effort, 1865-70.

Sources: See Table 2.

FIGURE 3
SLAVE PRICES IN SALVADOR, 1850-1875



Notes: Andrade: Assessed Values of Adult Male Slaves in Probate Inventories; Nishida I: Prices of Brazilian-Born Male Slaves Sold in Sé Parish (Five-Year Averages); Nishida II: Self-Purchase Price of Brazilian-Born Male Slaves (Two-Year Averages); Mattoso *et al.*: Prices of Manumitted Adult Male Slaves (Two-Year Averages).

Sources: Maria José de Souza Andrade, *A mão de obra escrava em Salvador, 1811-1860* (São Paulo, 1988), p. 212; Mieko Nishida, 'Gender, Ethnicity, and Kinship in the Urban African Diaspora: Salvador, Brazil, 1808-1888' (Ph.D. Diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1991), pp.219, 220; Kátia M. de Queirós Mattoso *et al.*, 'Research Note: Trends and Patterns in the Prices of Manumitted Slaves: Bahia, 1819-1888', *Slavery and Abolition*, Vol.7, No.1 (1986), p.62; Table 3.

The surge in slave prices by almost 50 per cent over three semesters in Bahia and the government's apparent payment of a premium of as much as 75 per cent over prices recorded in probate inventories raise numerous questions (Figure 3). Was the supply of slaves so inelastic that the purchase of 218 for the army and 1,300 for the navy drove up their price by half?⁴⁴ Does the premium paid over slave prices reflect supply constraints, perhaps caused by a reluctance of owners to sell slaves for military service? Or were compensated emancipations an excellent opportunity to recapitalize property in a period of generally declining slave prices, as Sousa has suggested?⁴⁵

Factors other than inelastic supply account for much of the apparent difference between slave prices and compensation paid to owners, as well

as the increase in the level of compensation. The volume of slaves on the Bahian market probably sufficed to supply military needs, as can be inferred from the collection of export duties on an annual average of 894 slaves in the nine and a half years between 1860 and 1874 for which presidents reported this revenue (and many more were no doubt slipped past customs officials), during which time Bahian slave prices drifted steadily downward (Figure 3).⁴⁶ Elsewhere in Brazil, none of the four regional slave markets for which price series exist show significant increases in 1867 and 1868. All of these series, however, are based on sources that understate real prices and respond slowly to market signals, such as the assessed values of slaves in post-mortem inventories and self-purchase prices, and none is limited to the prime-age male slaves recruited for the war.⁴⁷

The nature of payment introduces an additional complication. Most, but not all, owners received part of their compensation in public debt bonds and only the balance in cash. A portion of the premium therefore compensated sellers for the risk that they incurred in accepting paper from a government sinking into debt to finance the war. Declining bond values suggest that the risk was perceived to be increasing and foreign consuls reported considerable currency instability during the war; that the government would eventually be able to cover its debts without printing money was probably not clear at the time.⁴⁸ In the first half of the 1868, the Treasury officially acknowledged that its bonds were worth but 88 per cent of face value.⁴⁹ Even so depreciated, they were bad business in the short term. When the Bahian Treasury tried to prevent bondholders from transferring their titles in 1867, the former slave-owners sold them at below face value to speculators. Seven months after he accepted 62:000\$000 worth of bonds as partial payment for 36 slaves in February 1868, one slave dealer tried to escape the consequences of his poor choice of investments by soliciting 5:880\$000 as compensation for falling bond prices.⁵⁰ In short, both the overstatement of the real value of compensation paid to slave-owners and the understatement of real slave prices suggest that the government paid about the market price to acquire men for the war.

Regardless of the real value of the compensation that owners received, none of the authorities charged with this recruitment ever complained of an inability to find willing sellers. As the navy agent in Bahia observed, most of the people who sold slaves did so because they needed money, not out of a desire to convert their investments from slaves into government debt.⁵¹ In both Bahia and Rio de Janeiro, sellers of single slaves accounted for a majority of the emancipations. Little information is available on these men and women; titles reveal the presence of barons, doctors, vicars and military officers. The predominance of sellers of single slaves suggests that these were small-scale urban slave-owners contributing to the gradual decline of

TABLE 4
PROVINCIAL ENLISTMENT OF MEN FREED FOR THE PARAGUAYAN WAR

	Army	Navy	Total	Male Slaves, 1872
Amazonas	1		1	487
Pará	65	45	110	13,908
Maranhão	157	215	372	36,889
Piauí	165		165	11,945
Ceará	121		121	14,941
Rio Grande do Norte	2		2	6,571
Paraíba	51		51	10,681
Pernambuco	140	51	191	47,023
Alagoas	37		37	17,913
Sergipe	40		40	10,840
Bahia	272	881	1,153	89,094
Espírito Santo	16		16	11,859
Côrte (City of Rio de Janeiro)	2,196		2,196	24,886
Rio de Janeiro	200	116	316	162,394
São Paulo	112		112	88,040
Minas Gerais	31		31	199,434
Paraná	15	60	75	5,506
Santa Catarina	25	36	61	8,069
Rio Grande do Sul	357		357	35,686
Goiás	0		0	5,372
Mato Grosso	0		0	3,632
Unspecified		1,498	1,498	
Total	4,003	2,902	6,905	805,170

Notes: The navy total includes 853 men transferred to the army, whose receipt the army does not record

Sources: 'Mappa da força com que cada uma das províncias do Império concorreu para a guerra do Paraguay ...', Brazil, Minister of War, *Relatório*, 1872; 'Mappa dos recrutados, engajados e libertos ... 1.º de janeiro de 1868 a 31 de março de 1869 ...' and 'Mappa dos libertos adquiridos pelo ministério da marinha ...', Brazil, Minister of Navy, *Relatório*, 1869; Brazil, Directoria Geral de Estatísticas, *Recenseamento da população do Imperio do Brazil a que se procedeu no dia 1.º de agosto de 1872* (Rio de Janeiro, 1873-1876), Vol.19, p.1

slavery in Brazilian cities.⁵² One such owner turned a nominal 100 per cent profit as he freed a domestic servant for 1:600\$000 in January 1868, after having bought the slave for 800\$000 in October 1867; others realized more modest profits over longer periods of time.⁵³ Compensated emancipation was a quick and convenient way to liquidate property, especially when payments were made in cash. After the death of a National Guard major in Paraguay, his executor resolved to sell a slave to the navy, perhaps to spare himself the risk and inconvenience of maintaining the man pending distribution of the inheritance. In the midst of a drawn-out quarrel over an inheritance, one of the executors and beneficiaries of the will sold a slave to the government to avoid his sequestration by the probate judge.⁵⁴

TABLE 5
 ENUMERATED BAHIAN SLAVES FREED FOR THE PARAGUAYAN WAR

	Army	Navy	Unspecified	Total	Source
1867	272			272	1
1867			756	756	2
1868	67			67	3
1868		881		881	4
1867-69	271	1376		1647	5
1869	0			0	6
1865-70	272			272	7

Sources: 1 - 'Mappa dos libertos que têm assentado praça desde o começo da guerra', Brazil, Minister of War, *Relatório*, 1868; 2 - Orders for compensation of slave-owners and letters of liberty in Arquivo Público do Estado da Bahia, Seção de Arquivo Colonial e Provincial, maços 2870, 2884; 3 - 'Mappa dos individuos alistados no exército no anno de 1868 ...', Brazil, Minister of War, *Relatório*, 1869; 4 - 'Mappa dos recrutados, engajados e libertos, recebidos para o serviço da armada durante o periodo de 1.º de Janeiro de 1868 a 31 de Março de 1869 ...', Brazil, Minister of Navy, *Relatório*, 1869; 5 - Bahia, President, *Relatório*, 11 Apr. 1869, pp.17-18; 6 - 'Mappa dos individuos alistados no Exército no anno de 1869...', Brazil, Minister of War, *Relatório*, 1869; 7 - 'Mappa da força com que cada uma das Provincias do Imperio concorreu para a guerra do Paraguay ...', Brazil, Minister of War, *Relatório*, 1872.

There was also money to be made in handling compensated emancipations. At least 211 of 984 such manumissions in Bahia involved one or more of three slave dealers who specialized in arranging them: Emiliano Moreira de Carvalho e Silva, João da Silva Freire, and Domingos Fernandes Moreno. Moreno and Silva apparently worked together in early 1868, with Moreno scouring the countryside for likely sellers and his partner handling the paperwork in the provincial capital. On his death in 1887, Freire was still involved in the export of slaves from Bahia to Rio de Janeiro, by then an illegal trade.⁵⁵

Just as government acquisition of slaves for the war effort afforded slave-owners a means to raise capital and presented slave dealers with a new line of work, so slaves found ways to take advantage of the new opportunities. Some requested that their masters sell them to the government. Thomaz de Aquino, imprisoned for assault causing bodily harm and sentenced to receive 200 lashes in 1867, petitioned to be sent to the army instead, noting, 'I have long had a vocation for brawling'. Probably considering that a slave with such an avocation would not subject himself to military discipline and, more important, recognizing that only masters had the right to present slaves' services, the president declined the offer. A more subtle and determined Quinto forced his masters' hand. He repeatedly ran away and attempted to enlist only to be turned away by local authorities who recognized him as a slave; when he finally prevailed upon a recruiting agent to enlist him, his master gave up and requested compensation.⁵⁶

How many slaves participated in the war effort? Historians have – in addition to Chiavenato's total – frequently cited the estimate of 20,000, a figure first proposed by a French abolitionist in 1881.⁵⁷ Others, pointing to the shortfall between the War Ministry's official tallies of slave enlistment and other partial figures, suspect that the government deliberately understated the scale of slave enlistment.⁵⁸ However, given that the Navy acquired almost as many slaves as the army, most of these discrepancies evaporate when both ministries' totals are combined for an official count of 6,905 (Table 4).⁵⁹ Archival evidence from Bahia and Rio de Janeiro – the largest sources of slaves – in fact, confirms the combined totals published by the army and navy. Jorge Prata de Sousa counted 2,903 letters of liberty designating slaves for the war effort in Rio de Janeiro's registry books. A reasonable assumption that many of the 1,498 unidentified navy freedmen came from Rio de Janeiro – the capital was a major naval base – would account for the difference between the army's total of 2,196 and Sousa's count of 2,903.⁶⁰ Table 5 shows the figures for Bahian slaves in the war effort. Assuming that the 756 slaves who can be identified in manuscript sources for 1867 include most of the 272 men sent to the army that year and that the 67 slaves listed by the army for 1868 had already been counted in Bahia in 1867, there is a striking coincidence between the manuscript and navy sources (1,637 men) and the president's report in 1869 that Bahia had contributed 1,647 slaves. The small number of slaves contributed by Pernambuco, which leads Sousa to suspect undercounting, is confirmed by a register of all recruits embarked from the province in 1868, which includes only 159 freedmen among 761 soldiers and sailors.⁶¹

Overall, then, only 0.86 per cent of Brazil's male slave population went to the front, with Bahia and the city of Rio de Janeiro contributing some 60 per cent of those whose regional origins are known. The coffee plantation provinces of São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro contributed only 0.1 per cent of their nearly 450,000 male slaves, in contrast to the north-eastern provinces and the city of Rio de Janeiro which together supplied 1.5 per cent of their 1872 male slave population. These figures are entirely consistent with the broad changes in Brazilian slavery during the last decades of the nineteenth century, particularly its decline in the cities and in the sugar economies of the Northeast. Coffee planters, desperate for manpower to cultivate expanding groves and still finding slave labour both necessary and profitable, felt neither a need nor an obligation to free slaves for the war effort.

Consistent with the trends in the national slave market and confirmed by independent counts of wartime slave liberation, the army and navy's official figure of just under 7,000 Brazilian slaves freed for the war is probably close to the truth. The occasional impressed slave-owner or the designated

National Guardsmen had little economic incentive to free a slave to fight in Paraguay, for the presentation of such a substitute was far more costly than purchasing an exemption. While substitutions and donations brought only a few slaves into the army, the government's purchase of slaves in 1867 and 1868 increased significantly the number of men who gained liberty as a result of the war, but not to the degree claimed by Chiavenato. Moral indignation, however, is not entirely misplaced. The Council of State did, after all, consider the recruitment of slaves as a means of 'improving' the population. Most slaves freed for the war effort had little choice as to whether they would go to the front but neither did the freedmen and the free men impressed or designated for service against Paraguay; regardless of pre-service status, a good number – perhaps most – of the soldiers at the front were not in uniform by choice.

The Legacy of Slave Enlistment

Arguing for a more realistic lower figure for slave enlistment in the Paraguayan War is not to deny its significance for the men who thus gained their freedom; rather, it challenges us to see their experience in the larger context of the experience of all veterans. The few slaves freed for the war joined much larger contingents of volunteers and impressed men, who included freedmen, free men of colour, and white men (who, though somewhat underrepresented, were never absent from army ranks).⁶² Notable among the free black men who volunteered to serve their country was Cândido da Fonseca Galvão, better known as Dom Obá II, a prominent figure in the post-war black community in Rio de Janeiro; he brought 30 fellow black men with him from Lençóis (in the backlands of Bahia) to join an all-black company of Zuavos in 1865.⁶³ By eliding the distinctions between men like Dom Obá and the slaves liberated specifically to go to the front, Chiavenato confuses two discrete elements – the racial composition of the Brazilian army and the freeing of slaves for the war effort. Given the composition of the Brazilian population, men of colour dominated the ranks arrayed against Paraguay; they were probably not, however, in their majority freedmen and certainly not men freed for the war. The Bahian companies of black men, including some freedmen – the Couraças, Sapadores, and Zuavos – invoked the old colonial tradition of segregated military units that had fallen victim to liberal reforms in 1831.⁶⁴ Their numbers, however, cannot have exceeded 1,000 and most men of colour served in regular units. Although the Zuavo companies quickly lost their institutional identity in the reorganizations of Voluntários da Pátria units, the early twentieth-century chronicler of Bahian folklore, Manoel Querino, notes their exploits in the Paraguayan War, suggesting that they lived on in popular memory.⁶⁵

The absorption of these segregated companies into other units during the war symbolizes the merging of the wartime experience of both free and freed enlisted men. Likewise, after the conflict, veterans' problems lay not in defending their freedom but in ensuring that it was meaningful. Examples of ex-slave veterans reclaimed by their owners after the war have impressed historians who denounce the duplicity of a master class that freed slaves to defend their country only to re-enslave them.⁶⁶ In fact, all of the known cases of attempted 're-enslavement' of veterans involved runaways who had enlisted during the war and were subsequently demobilized along with their free comrades. These men posed a delicate legal question: how to reconcile extant owners' rights with the freedom and citizenship that the veterans had undeniably exercised, not to mention the services that they had rendered the Empire. The issue assumed urgency in 1870, for owners were recapturing these slaves, a spectacle akin to the kidnapping of war heroes. In a Solomonian ruling, the Ministry of Justice determined that such ex-soldiers had to be *treated* as free men; in other words, they could not be simply *clapped into prison on suspicion of being fugitive slaves*. This presumption of free status, however, did not amount to a grant of freedom, for the Ministry simultaneously invited owners to prove their claims.⁶⁷ In short, they were to solicit compensation from the government, as did the master of one Simão, who had enlisted in 1866. In 1871, he filed a claim for 1:800\$000, after unsuccessfully trying to have Simão arrested in 1870. When finally located in 1874 through the good offices of the port captain, Simão, now known as José Pinto de Carvalho and a sailor in the coasting trade, was brought to the police station in Salvador, not under arrest, but to testify on behalf of his (soon-to-be-officially-former) master's claim.⁶⁸ Walking the tightrope between masters' rights and the citizenship and freedom that soldiers enjoyed, the imperial government performed one more feat of legal and administrative gymnastics to avoid formally denying either.

Relatively few men freed for the war, however, returned home in 1870. The majority – those 'purchased' in 1867 and 1868 – were enlisted in the army and navy for nine-year terms; the survivors would thus not trickle back to civilian life until the late 1870s.⁶⁹ One who returned early was soon shipped back to the army. Aicácio José de Santa Anna, a man freed for the war and inadvertently discharged as a *Voluntário da Pátria*, was arrested in Sergipe in 1873; the army sought to collect his discharge bonus and the gratification that he had improperly received while serving as a *Voluntário*, presumably by garnisheeing his privates' pay.⁷⁰

Veterans who had absorbed the official wartime discourse about nation and citizenship and the implied egalitarianism that these concepts carried with them returned to profound disappointment. Both free and freed once again faced the social and economic hardships that they had suffered before

the war. In Salvador, the wounded and disabled, whether former slaves or free men, who showered the presidency with requests for assistance, were easily ignored by a Bahian elite more concerned with the victims of the Franco-Prussian War – for whom a benefit concert was held in 1870 – than for its own ex-soldiers. In Rio de Janeiro, where many Bahian ex-servicemen eventually settled, Dom Obá II's newspaper articles expressed the demands of victorious soldiers for political participation, as did the prominence of veterans in the *capoeira* street gangs that played a major role in the capital's violent postwar electoral politics.⁷¹ Manuel Pedro da Silva, freed in 1868, simply sought the respect due to 'a citizen who [had] served his country'. On his discharge in 1878, the army still owed him his 1877 uniform issue. His commanding officer refused to give him title to the uniform (with which Silva would have collected its value from the Treasury) and obliged him to accept a used one that had belonged to a deceased soldier. To recoup his losses, Silva posted a 'for sale' sign on the uniform and hung it in the window of his house. A few days later, the lieutenant-colonel threatened Silva and had soldiers remove the uniform. After Silva appealed to the president and published his complaint in *O Monitor*, a soldier (allegedly on the commander's orders) beat and stabbed him. The officer's defence is instructive: He recalled Silva's slave origins and accused him of 'rudely' demanding his receipt, concluding that the petition 'reveals his origins ... so much so that, ignoring the favourable treatment lavished on him by the army ... he did not hesitate to resort to ignoble means, hostile to the uniform'. In short, because of his failure to display the deference and gratitude expected of freedmen (idealized in the *Semana Illustrada* cartoons), Silva did not deserve the rights of a citizen.⁷²

The cases of Silva's uniform and Santa Anna's bonus raise questions about the impact on the army of Paraguayan War slave enlistment. As early as 1883, the abolitionist statesman, Joaquim Nabuco (son of the Nabuco who outlined the policy of compensated emancipation in 1866), argued that the Paraguayan War experience shared by officers and freedmen turned the army into the slaves' ally in the struggle for abolition, an argument widely shared by historians of Brazil.⁷³ It is also integral to army propaganda: official histories give the institution a central role in abolition, laud its allegedly harmonious internal race relations, present prominent officers as early abolitionists, and see the institution as a progressive force in Brazilian society.⁷⁴ To be sure, at least one officer recorded that he and a friend discussed emancipation while convalescing in Argentina and the commander of Brazilian occupation forces, the emperor's son-in-law, oversaw the final abolition of slavery in Paraguay in 1869 but, given the small number of slaves remaining in the defeated and devastated republic, this measure can hardly be seen as a significant step.⁷⁵ Closer to home, the

rough treatment of these two unfortunate soldiers belies any claims that the army as an institution was favourably disposed to slaves' struggles for freedom and former slaves' struggles for legal and social equality. Recent studies of the functioning of the Brazilian army during the war in fact point to a perpetuation of social and racial hierarchies on the battlefields and in the army camps, particularly after the freed recruits began arriving in 1867. The conclusion frequently drawn from this observation – that such hierarchies impeded the formation of modern army and prompted a professionalizing and modernizing core of officers to campaign against both slavery and eventually the imperial regime – reflects an overly teleological view of the incompatibility of social and racial hierarchies with modern class societies and even professional military institutions.⁷⁶ Like so many others in Brazilian society, those few army officers who actively opposed slavery had no difficulty holding views both 'anti-slavery and anti-slave', to quote a literary scholar's characterization of abolitionist writing.⁷⁷

Conclusion

The Paraguayan War illustrates the limits of state action in slave societies; however close the Brazilian government came to the line that demarcated the bounds of masters' authority, it never trespassed into slave-owners' preserve. What is striking about the recruitment of slaves for the war is the way in which, to shift metaphors, the Brazilian government navigated between the shoals of soldiers' status as free men and citizens and the reefs of owners' rights. Well before the war, state and army had charted a course through these dangerous waters by developing legal precedents and bureaucratic procedures for dealing with slaves who came into contact with the state through the army. The war increased the quantity of these contacts and military necessity eventually forced the government to consider recruiting slaves. The resulting policy of compensated emancipations, however, obeyed the fundamental principle of Brazilian slave law – the primacy of masters' rights over all other claims – and the Brazilian government slipped through the narrow passage identified well before the war.

This conclusion should not be surprising. The purpose of the Paraguayan War was not, after all, to call slavery into question; rather Brazilian propaganda presented it as a struggle of liberal civilization against the barbarism of a retrograde Paraguay: the president of Bahia hailed 'this war of law against violence, of justice against unlawful acts, of civilization against barbarism, [and] of liberty against despotism'.⁷⁸ Slavery, and the eventual resort to slave recruitment certainly contradicted Brazil's professed values and war aims, as the councillors who considered it indecorous well knew. In the other two remaining slave powers of the Americas, both

wracked by civil wars nearly contemporaneous with the Paraguayan War (the United States' Civil War, 1861–65; and the Cuban Ten Years' War, 1868–78), one party to the conflict made abolition a war aim; the recruitment of slaves could thus proceed with relatively few restrictions.⁷⁹ Brazil had no such option. The Empire's ability to recruit several thousand slaves, without violating masters' property rights nor promising anything to the men so freed, testifies to the strength of the imperial plantocracy that maintained control over the abolition process in the 1870s and well into the 1880s, ensuring that slavery would last longer in Brazil than anywhere else in the Americas.

NOTES

I thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the University of Texas at Austin, the Izaak Walton Killam Memorial Fund for Advanced Studies (University of British Columbia), and the Associação Brasileira de Estudos Canadenses for research and writing support. Portions of this article were presented to the Latin American Studies Association's XIX Congress, Washington, DC, 30 Sept. 1995, and the History Department of the Universidade Federal de Pernambuco, Recife, Brazil, 11 June 1996. I thank the participants at these meetings for their comments, as well as Richard Graham, Thomas Whigham, Peter Beattie, and Roderick Barman who discussed earlier versions of this paper with me. Roderick Barman, Roger Kittleson and Hal Langfur generously supplied me with additional sources; Renato Soares dos Santos assisted in the research in 1993. The following abbreviations are used in the notes: Arquivo Público do Estado da Bahia (APEBa), Seção de Arquivo Colonial e Provincial (SACP), and Seção Judiciária/Inventários e Testamentos (SJ/IT); Arquivo Histórico do Exército/Requerimentos (AHEX/RQ); Arquivo Nacional do Rio de Janeiro/Seção de Poderes Executivos (ANRJ/SPE); Biblioteca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro/Seção de Manuscritos (BNRJ/SM); Arquivo Público do Estado de Pernambuco (APEPe); Arquivo do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Brasil (AIHGB); Arquivo Histórico do Rio Grande do Sul (AHRGS); Brazil, *Collecção das Leis do Brasil (CLB)*; Brazil, *Anais da Câmara dos Deputados (ACD)*; Great Britain, Public Record Office, Foreign Office (PRO/FO).

All currency figures are nominal milréis (written 1\$000). The milréis's value fluctuated considerably during the Paraguayan War, as reflected in the average value of the pound sterling, which fell from 9\$600 in 1865 to 4\$117 in 1868, recovering to 10\$878 in 1870, calculated from Eugene Ridings, *Business Interest Groups in Nineteenth-Century Brazil* (Cambridge, 1994), pp.xiii–xiv.

1. *Jornal do Brasil*, 12 May 1988, *Cidade* Section, p.8; *O Globo*, 12 May 1988, p.8.
2. Júlio José Chiavenato, *O negro no Brasil da senzala à Guerra do Paraguai* (São Paulo, 1980), pp.197, 199; *Os Voluntários da Pátria (e outros mitos)* (São Paulo, 1983), p.27; *Genocídio americano: a Guerra do Paraguai* (São Paulo, 1979), pp.116–18.
3. Alberto Martins da Silva, 'Abolição: a galharda atuação do exército', *Revista do Exército Brasileiro*, Vol.25, No.2 (April–June 1988), pp.23–8; A[ureliano] de Lyra Tavares, 'O exército e a abolição: uma visão retrospectiva', *ibid.*, pp.7–13. See also the army's official justification for blocking the march, 'Nota explica mudanças no itinerário da passeata', *O Globo*, 12 May 1988, p.8.
4. Jorge Prata de Sousa, *Escravidão ou morte: os escravos brasileiros na Guerra do Paraguai* (Rio de Janeiro, 1996); André Amaral de Toral, 'A participação dos negros escravos na Guerra do Paraguai', *Estudos Avançados*, Vol.24 (May–Aug. 1995), pp.287–96; and Ricardo Salles, *Guerra do Paraguai: escravidão e cidadania na formação do exército* (Rio de

- Janeiro, 1990). The best English-language work on the Paraguayan War remains Charles J. Kolinski, *Independence or Death: The Story of the Paraguayan War* (Gainesville, 1965). For recent Brazilian historiography, see Maria Eduarda Castro Magalhães Marques (ed.), *Guerra do Paraguai: 130 anos depois* (Rio de Janeiro, 1995).
5. For a recent examination of this issue, see Jurandir Malerba, *Os brancos da lei: liberalismo, escravidão e mentalidade patriarcal no Império do Brasil* (Maringá, 1994).
 6. Frank Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas* (New York, 1946); Alan Watson, *Slave Law in the Americas* (Athens, 1989).
 7. Roderick Barman and Jean Barman, 'The Role of the Law Graduate in the Political Elite of Imperial Brazil', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol.18, No.4 (Nov. 1976), pp.423–50; José Murilo de Carvalho, *A construção da ordem: a elite política imperial* (Rio de Janeiro, 1980), ch.4. For a reconsideration of the impact of changing legal definitions of slavery and freedom, see Judy Bieber Freitas, 'Slavery and Social Life: Attempts to Reduce Free People to Slavery in the Sertão Mineiro, Brazil, 1850–1871', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol.26, No.3 (Oct. 1994), pp.597–619.
 8. James Holston, 'The Misrule of Law: Land and Usurpation in Brazil', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.33, No.4 (Oct. 1991), pp.695–725; Warren Dean, 'Latifundia and Land Policy in Nineteenth-Century Brazil', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol.51, No.4 (Nov. 1971), pp.605–25. For a consideration of the uses of law, see June Starr and Jane F. Collier, 'Introduction: Dialogues in Legal Anthropology', in *History and Power in the Study of Law: New Directions in Legal Anthropology* (Ithaca, 1989), pp.1–28.
 9. Articles 145 and 179, paragraph 22, 'Constituição política do Império do Brasil', *CLB*; Agostinho Marques Perdigão Malheiro, *A escravidão no Brasil: ensaio historico-juridico-social* (Rio de Janeiro, 1866), Vol.1, pp.2–3; Dezembargador Procurador da Coroa to President, Salvador, 16 Sept. 1865, APEBa/SACP, maço 3432; Hendrik Kraay, "'The Shelter of the Uniform': The Brazilian Army and Runaway Slaves, 1800–1888", *Journal of Social History*, Vol.29, No.3 (Spring 1996), p.638.
 10. Manuela Carneiro da Cunha, 'Silences of the Law: Customary Law and Positive Law on the Manumission of Slaves in 19th Century Brazil', *History and Anthropology*, Vol.1, No.2 (1985), pp.429–30.
 11. Malheiro, *Escravidão*, Vol.1, p.179; Decisão 113, 30 July 1823, *CLB*. For the peacetime application of this principle, see Kraay, "'Shelter'", pp.640–1.
 12. Commander of Arms to President, Salvador, 26 July 1865, APEBa/SACP, maço 3448; Manoel Lopes da Costa Pinto to President, Salvador, 23 Sept. 1865, *ibid.*, maço 2886; 'Registro de donativos', 30 Sept. 1865, *ibid.*, maço 3675–1, fols. 132v–133r; Galdino Joze de Souza Barretto to President, Salvador, 7 Jan. 1867, *ibid.*, maço 3671; José Mendes de Carvalho to President, Lençoes, 17 March 1867, *ibid.*, maço 3675; Minister of War to President of Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, 7 June 1868 (confidential), *ibid.*, maço 2886.
 13. Speech of Christiano Benedicto Ottoni, 30 July 1867, *ACD* (1867), Vol.3, p.418. See also Joaquim Nabuco, *O abolicionismo*, facsimile ed. (Recife, 1988), p.61. Historians have referred to this practice, unfortunately without identifying those ennobled by the donation of slaves, Sousa, *Escravidão*, p.101; Salles, *Guerra*, p.66.
 14. See, for example, the questions posed about the reputation of a merchant who donated three slaves, Minister of War to President of Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, 7 June 1868 (confidential), APEBa/SACP, maço 2886; and an abortive postwar abolitionist proposal that titles of nobility be granted to owners who freed slaves, regardless of their 'qualities' or 'worthiness' of such honours, speech of Baron of Villa da Barra, 11 July 1871, *ACD* (1871), Vol.3, p.100. On the sale of titles, see Eul-Soo Pang, *In Pursuit of Honor and Power: Noblemen of the Southern Cross in Nineteenth-Century Brazil* (Tuscaloosa, 1988), pp.161–88.
 15. Manoel Raimundo Querino, *A Bahia de outrora* (Salvador, 1955), p.194; Maria Inês Côrtes de Oliveira, *O liberto: o seu mundo e os outros, Salvador, 1790–1890* (São Paulo, 1988), p.23; Eduardo da Silva, *Prince of the People: The Life and Times of a Brazilian Free Man of Colour*, trans. Moyra Ashford (London, 1993), p.23; Robert Conrad, *The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery, 1850–1888* (Berkeley, 1972), p.76; Dale T. Graden, 'From Slavery to Freedom in Bahia, Brazil, 1791–1900' (Ph.D. diss., University of Connecticut, 1991), p.172.
 16. Commander of Arms to President, Salvador, 25 Nov. 1867, APEBa/SACP, maço 3416. On

- the rejection of slave substitutes for men already at the front, see Decisão 334, 24 Aug. 1868, *CLB*. In addition, Pierre Verger has published an 1865 newspaper advertisement in which a healthy young slave (who wanted to enlist) was offered for sale. Whether a recruit purchased this man is not known, *Flux et reflux de la traite des nègres entre le golfe de Bénin et Bahia de Todos os Santos du XVIIe au XIXe siècle* (Paris, 1968), p.518.
17. Article 3, Lei 1220, 20 July 1864; Article 3, Lei 1246, 28 June 1865; Article 3, Lei 1471, 25 Sept. 1867, *CLB*.
 18. On recruitment for the regular army, see Hendrik Kraay, 'Soldiers, Officers, and Society: The Army in Bahia, Brazil, 1808-1889' (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1995), ch.6; Peter M. Beattie, 'The House, the Street, and the Barracks: Reform and Honorable Masculine Social Space in Brazil, 1865-1945', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol.76, No.3 (Aug. 1996), pp.439-73; Joan E. Meznar, 'The Ranks of the Poor: Military Service and Social Differentiation in Northeast Brazil, 1830-1875', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol.72, No.3 (Aug. 1992), pp.336-51.
 19. Decreto 3371, 7 Jan. 1865, *CLB*; Resolução, 23 Dec. 1865, in Cândido Pereira Monteiro, *Consultas do Conselho de Estado relativamente a negocios do Ministerio da Guerra desde o anno de 1843 a 1866 ...* (Rio de Janeiro, 1872), p.243.
 20. Bahia, President, *Relatório*, 1 March 1863, p.20.
 21. Resolução, 16 March 1866, in Monteiro, *Consultas ... 1843 a 1866*, p.300.
 22. Petitions of Felipe de Santiago Telles to President, c.1865, APEBa/SACP, maço 3669; Manoel Olegario da Silva to President, c.1865, *ibid.*, maço 3670; Mariana Amancia do Nascimento to President, *ibid.*, maço 3438; Martiniano Chaves to President, Salvador, 21 Jan. 1865, *ibid.*, maço 3492; and Delfina Maria Barboza to President, Salvador, 30 Aug. 1865, *ibid.*, maço 3490; and Commander of Arms to President, Salvador, 2 Sept. 1865, *ibid.*, maço 3462; and 17 Aug. 1865, *ibid.*, maço 3438.
 23. I located 36 cases of wartime return of fugitives in Bahia, Kraay, "'Shelter'", p.639, and Sousa found 140 in Rio de Janeiro, *Escravidão*, pp.41, 66-7; they are frequent in Pernambuco as well, Commander of Arms to President, Recife, 19 March; 4 and 18 Oct.; 20 Nov. 1867; and 18 March 1868; APEPe/CA, Vol.79, fol.501; Vol.82, fols. 23, 86, 276; Vol.83, fol.107; and they can also be found in Mato Grosso, Vice-President to Commandante Superior, Cuiabá, 21 Dec. 1865, 'Livro de Registro de Ofícios Expedidos pela Presidência ...', 1865-66, fol.49r, Arquivo Público do Estado de Mato Grosso. When faced with still another fugitive serving on his ship, a navy officer in Rio Grande do Sul observed that, 'in similar cases, [such slaves] have been returned to their owners', marginal note, Commander of *Apd.*, interrogatório of Eugênio, 5 Jan. 1869, AHRGS, Secretaria da Polícia, maço 13.
 24. The following discussion is based on Minutes of Conselho de Estado, 5 Nov. 1866, Brazil, Senado Federal, *Atas do Conselho de Estado: obra comemorativa do sesquicentenário da instituição parlamentar* (Brasília, 1973), Vol.6, pp.71-90.
 25. In fact, the formal freeing of slaves occurred only *after* the independence war ended in July 1823.
 26. Decreto 3725A, 6 Nov. 1866, *CLB*; Pedro II to Minister of War, Rio de Janeiro, 12 Nov. 1866, in B.F. Ramirez Galvão (ed.), *Contribuições para a biographia de D. Pedro II (Parte I.a)*, (Rio de Janeiro, 1925), p.377. Incidentally, the emperor's concern that the wives of the Santa Cruz draftees be freed indicates that, on this plantation, slaves lived in families much as they had in the late eighteenth century, Richard Graham, 'Slave Families on a Rural Estate in Colonial Brazil', *Journal of Social History*, Vol.9, No.3 (Spring 1976), pp.382-402.
 27. Manoel de São Caetano Pinto to President, Salvador, 20 and 24 Dec. 1866, APEBa/SACP, maço 2896; Manoel de São Caetano Pinto to Minister of War, Salvador, 24 Dec. 1866, AHEX/RQ, M-160-4139; Antonio do Patrocínio e Araujo to President, Olinda, 16 Jan. 1867, APEPe/AE, Vol.13, fol.9r.
 28. *Diário da Bahia*, 23 July 1867, reprinted in R[aimundo] Magalhães Júnior, *D. Pedro II e a Condessa de Barral através da correspondência íntima do imperador, anotada e comentada* (Rio de Janeiro, 1956), p.92. The appointment of an agent for Pernambuco is mentioned in President to Commander of *D. Januária*, Salvador, 7 May 1868, AIHGB, lata 407, pasta 27.
 29. President to Minister of War, Salvador, 29 Nov. 1873, ANRJ/SPE/IG1, maço 127, fol.414.
 30. Pedro II to Minister of War, 7 Feb. 1867, in *Contribuições para a biographia*, ed. Galvão,

- p.382; Minister of War to President, Rio de Janeiro, 2 Oct. 1867 (confidential), APEBa/SACP, maço 2886. This advisory was, in fact, a circular sent to all provincial presidents, Antonio José Amaral, *Indicador da legislação militar em vigor no exercito do imperio do Brasil organizado e dedicado a S.M.I. pelo ...*, 2nd. ed. (Rio de Janeiro, 1870), Vol.1, part 1, pp.72–6.
31. Aristides A. Milton, *Ephemerides cachoeiranas*, facsimile ed. (Salvador, 1979), p.141; João Batista Calógeras to Michel Calógeras, Rio de Janeiro, 21 March 1867, in *Um ministério visto por dentro: cartas inéditas de João Batista Calógeras, alto funcionário do império*, ed. Antonio Gontijo de Carvalho (Rio de Janeiro, 1959), p.234.
 32. Pedro II to Countess of Barral, Rio de Janeiro, 23 Nov. 1866, in Magalhães, *D. Pedro*, p.89; Edward Thornton to Lord Stanley, 6 March 1867, PRO/FO 13, Vol.445, fol.86r-v; and 7 Dec.1866, *ibid.*, Vol.437, fol.279r.
 33. Joaquim Nabuco, *Um estadista do império* (Rio de Janeiro, 1975), pp.611–25; Conrad, *Destruction*, pp.70–80.
 34. Brazil, Secretaria da Camara dos Deputados, *Falas do trono desde o ano de 1823 até o ano de 1889, acompanhadas dos respectivos votos de graça da camara temporaria* (Brasília, 1977), p.374.
 35. Sousa, *Escravidão*, pp.46–7.
 36. Speech of Ottoni, 30 July 1867, *ACD* (1867), Vol.3, p.418. The army's rejection of Sabino, who displayed 'enormous scars from floggings on his buttocks' – suggesting that his owner had tried to sell a rebellious slave to the government after punishing him – appears to confirm Ottoni's fears, Commander of Arms to Chief of Police, Salvador, 19 Dec.1867, APEBa/SACP, maço 6464. For similar concerns, see speech of Tomás Pompeu de Sousa Brasil, 11 July 1868, Brazil, *Anais do Senado*, Vol.3(1868), p.105.
 37. Eugene D. Genovese, *The World the Slaveholders Made: Two Essays in Interpretation* (Middletown, 1988).
 38. George Reid Andrews, *Blacks and Whites in São Paulo, Brazil, 1888–1988* (Madison, 1991), pp.32–4; Sandra Lauderdale Graham, 'Slavery's Impasse: Slave Prostitutes, Small-Time Mistresses, and the Brazilian Law of 1871', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.3, No.4 (1991), pp.669–94.
 39. Minutes of Conselho de Estado, 5 Nov. 1866, Brazil, Senado, *Atas*, Vol.6, p.83. For examples of these concerns as expressed in the debates on the free womb law, see petition of Alexandre José de Mello Moraes, 21 Aug. 1870, *ACD* (1870), Vol.4, p.302; and speech of João José de Oliveira Junqueira, 11 July 1871, *ACD* (1871), Vol.3, p.103.
 40. For a particularly cogent statement of this view, see speech of Antonio Marques Perdigão Malheiro, 10 June 1871, *ACD* (1871), Vol.2, p.52.
 41. No work comparable to the recent exhaustive study of Cuba's slave market exists for Brazil, Laird W. Bergad *et al.*, *The Cuban Slave Market, 1790–1880* (Cambridge, 1995).
 42. Their health can be inferred from the rejection of the unfit, Commander of Arms to Chief of Police, Salvador, 13 Nov. 1867; and 4 Dec.1867, APEBa/SACP, maço 6464; Joaquim Antonio da Silva Carvalhal to President, Salvador, 28 Feb. 1867, *ibid.*, maço 3678; 'Relações dos escravos inspecionados ...', [Rio de Janeiro], 1868, AIHGB, Iata 407, pasta 28; Commander of Arms to President, Recife, 2 July 1867 and 2 March 1868, APEPe/CA, Vol.81, fol.21; and Vol.83, fol.6.
 43. Herbert S. Klein, *The Middle Passage: Comparative Studies in the Atlantic Slave Trade* (Princeton, 1978), p.97; Robert Conrad, *World of Sorrow: The African Slave Trade to Brazil* (Baton Rouge, 1986), p.179.
 44. Army purchases are noted in Table 1; at the end of June, the President of Bahia reported that compensation had been paid for 1300 slaves freed for the navy, President to Minister of Navy, Salvador, 29 June 1868, ANRJ/SPE/XM, maço 850.
 45. Sousa, *Escravidão*, pp.98–9.
 46. Conrad, *World*, p.182. Curiously, the presidential reports do not list revenue from the slave export tax for fiscal years 1866–67, 1867–68, and 1868–69, spanning the entire period of compensated emancipations.
 47. Slave price data collected for Rio de Janeiro (by Pedro Carvalho de Mello), Rio Claro (Warren Dean), Vassouras (Stanley Stein), and Pernambuco (Peter L. Eisenberg)

- conveniently presented and analysed by Bergad *et al.*, *Cuban Slave Market*, pp.147–53. On the methodological questions, see *ibid.*, pp.17–19; and Maria José de Souza Andrade, *A mão de obra escrava em Salvador, 1811–1860* (São Paulo, 1988), p.164.
48. Thornton to Lord Clarendon, Rio de Janeiro, 9 July 1866, PRO/FO 13, Vol.437, fols. 17–19; Mathew to Stanley, Rio de Janeiro, 7 Feb. 1868, *ibid.*, Vol.455, fols. 46–49. On the long-term economic impact of the war, see Rui Guilherme Granziera, *A Guerra do Paraguai e o capitalismo no Brasil: moeda e vida urbana na economia brasileira* (São Paulo, 1979), pp.102, 120–1.
 49. In the second week of February, when the highest cash compensation in Bahia was 1:750\$000, one owner accepted two 1:000\$000 bonds, at 88 per cent worth only 1:760\$000, while, in May, Rio de Janeiro owners of slaves valued at 2:000\$000 took home bonds with a face value of 2:200\$000 and only 64\$000 in cash. See carta de liberdade, Alexandre Alves Peixoto, 13 Feb. 1868, ANRJ/SPE/XM, maço 1109; and requisitions for May 1868 in ANRJ/SPE/GIFI, 12.4, 4H-199.
 50. Pedro Joaquim de Vasconcellos to President, Salvador, 12 Aug. 1867 (secret), APEBa/SACP, maço 2870; Sousa, *Escravidão*, p.100.
 51. Vasconcellos to President, Salvador, 12 Aug. 1867 (secret), APEBa/SACP, maço 2870.
 52. Sousa, *Escravidão*, pp.104–5, notes a similar profile of sellers in Rio de Janeiro. On the decline of urban slavery, see Mary C. Karasch, *Slave Life in Rio de Janeiro, 1808–1850* (Princeton, 1987), pp.367–8; Andrade, *Mão*, pp.65–89.
 53. Carta de liberdade, Narciso Piedade, 10 Jan. 1868; escritura de venda, Narciso, Salvador, 22 Oct. 1867, AIHGB, lata 407, pasta 29. For other indications of profitable transactions, see the following cartas de liberdade with escrituras de venda, Jacintho Pereira, 9 March 1868; Abel Ariani, 10 March 1868; Florentino Ariani, 10 March 1868, Evaristo, 18 March 1868, ANRJ/SPE/XM, maço 1109.
 54. Alvará de autorização, 7 Feb. 1868, ANRJ/SPE/XM, maço 1109. The major's death in Paraguay is noted on in the registration of his testament, will of Jaime Leopoldo Pessoa da Silva, Tuiuti, Paraguay, 20 Oct. 1867, APEBa/SJ/Livros de Registro de Testamentos, Vol.46, fols. 21v-23v. The inheritance quarrel can be followed in inventário, José Bruno Antunes Guimarães, APEBa/SJ/IT, 05/2006/2477/11, fols. 6r, 46r-v, 133r, 139v-140r, while the slave's sale is recorded in carta de liberdade, Manoel José Henriques, 6 March 1868, ANRJ/SPE/XM, maço 1109.
 55. On their deaths, each of these men had slave sales pending, inventários, Domingos Fernandes Moreno, APEBa/SJ/IT, 04/1908/2380/03, fol.58r; Emiliano Moreira de Carvalho e Silva, *ibid.*, 02/851/1320/02, fol.16r; and João da Silva Freire, *ibid.*, 05/2068/2539/25. For two examples of Silva and Moreno's *modus operandi*, see the paperwork included with the cartas de liberdade of Victorino and Bartholomeu da Silva, issued on 10 March 1868, ANRJ/SPE/XM, maço 1109. Sousa identifies ten slave dealers involved in Rio de Janeiro emancipations, *Escravidão*, 99; in Ceará, slave dealers published newspaper advertisements offering good prices for healthy men whom they would free upon receipt of compensation in Rio de Janeiro, Raimundo Girão, *A abolição no Ceará*, 2nd rev. ed. (Fortaleza, 1969), p.30, n.3.
 56. Petition of Thomaz de Aquino to President, n.p., c.1867, APEBa/SACP, maço 3671. For other examples, see Abilio Cesar Borges to President, Salvador, 24 Jan. 1867, *ibid.*, maço 3675; Costa Guimarães to President, Salvador, 10 Dec.1867, *ibid.*, maço 2884. Petition of Antonio Paim de Andrade to President of Rio Grande do Sul, n.p., 7 March 1867; President to Chief of Police, Porto Alegre, 8 April 1867, AHRGS, Correspondência dos Governantes, maço 109.
 57. Conrad, *Destruction*, p.76. Conrad is but the most recent in a long line of Brazilianists who have accepted this figure. He cites Rollie E. Poppino's textbook, *Brazil: The Land and People* (New York, 1968), p.172. Poppino's source was, most likely, Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen*, 1946), p.56. Tannenbaum attributes the figure to Percy Alvin Martin, 'Slavery and Abolition in Brazil', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, Vol.13, No.2 (May 1933), p.174, who cites Louis Couty, a French doctor who worked in Brazil from 1879 to 1884, *A escravidão no Brasil*, trans. Maria Helena Rouanet (Rio de Janeiro, 1988), p.62.
 58. Sousa, *Escravidão*, 82–90; Peter M. Beattie, 'Transforming Enlisted Army Service in Brazil,

- 1864–1940: Penal Servitude versus Conscriptio and Changing Perceptions of Honor, Race, and Nation' (Ph.D. diss., University of Miami, 1994), pp.106–8; Salles, *Guerra*, pp.63–76.
59. The official total is close to the figure of 6,000 cited by Charles H. Haring, *Empire in Brazil: A New World Experiment with Monarchy* (New York, 1958), p.94; and accepted by Karasch, *Slave Life*, p.80.
 60. Sousa, *Escravidão*, p.95.
 61. Sousa, *Escravidão*, p.87; 'Matrícula de Recrutados', APEPe/Fundo Secretaria da Presidência, Vol.43, fols. 1r-29v.
 62. On the racial composition of the peacetime army rank and file, see Kraay, 'Soldiers', pp.259–62.
 63. Silva, *Prince*, pp.22–5, 28.
 64. See the proclamations issued by the organizer of most of these companies in Bahia, Joaquim Antonio da Silva Carvalhal, in BNRJ/SM, II-34, 5, 47; and Commander of Arms to President, Recife, 29 July 1867, APEPe/CA, Vol.81, fol.207.
 65. 'Mappa demonstrativo do pessoal das Companhias de Zuavos, Couraças e Sapadores organizados pelo Coronel Comandante Superior Joaquim Antonio da Silva Carvalhal', 12 Nov. 1871, APEBa/SACP, maço 3675. In addition to the 742 men in nine companies organized by Carvalhal, Colonel José Carlos Ferreira and Dr. Salustiano Ferreira Souto each organized one company of Zuavos. On their disappearance, see Paulo de Queiroz Duarte, *Os Voluntários da Pátria na Guerra do Paraguai* (Rio de Janeiro, 1981–9), Vol.2, tomo 1, p.66; tomo 2, p.181; tomo 4, pp.56–7; tomo 5, pp.13, 35, 63; and Dionísio Cerqueira, *Reminiscências da Campanha do Paraguai, 1865–1870* (Rio de Janeiro, 1980), p.104. On the Zuavos in popular memory, see Querino, *Bahia*, p.78.
 66. Especially Sousa, *Escravidão*, pp.67, 72, 102, 113.
 67. Decisões 54 and 158, 9 Feb. and 15 June 1870, *CLB*.
 68. Simão's disappearance is mentioned in Commander of Arms to President, Salvador, 10 Sept.1866, APEBa/SACP, maço 3413; the arrest attempt is denounced in *O Alabama*, 20 Aug. 1870, pp.1–2; for the testimony, see 'Auto de perguntas feito ao crioulo José Pinto de Carvalho', Salvador, 29 Aug. 1874; and Chief of Police to President, Salvador, 1 Sept.1874, APEBa/SACP, maço 2887.
 69. Some of the donated slaves were also enlisted for full terms, as can be inferred from the marginal notes on Commander of Arms to President, Salvador, 5 Jan. 1867, APEBa/SACP, maço 3415; and there is evidence that authorities sought to sign National Guard substitutes to six-year enlistments, speech of José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, 26 March 1866, *ACD* (1865–6), Vol.3, pp.84–5; Decisão 181, 3 June 1867, *CLB*.
 70. Commander of Arms to President, Salvador, 29 Dec.1873, APEBa/SACP, maço 3430.
 71. For examples, see petitions of João de Deos de Araujo to President, Salvador, 8 Oct. 1870, APEBa/SACP, maço 3753; José Simplicio do Nascimento to President, Salvador, c.Nov. 1871, *ibid.*, maço 3753; Arcenio Antonio to President, Salvador, 28 Nov. 1876, *ibid.*, maço 3754; Laurentino Cherubino Ferreira Paes to President, Salvador, 22 Nov. 1882, *ibid.*, maço 3782. On the Franco-Prussian War benefit, see João Teixeira Chaves to President, Salvador, 28 Nov. 1870, *ibid.*, maço 3801. Perhaps because Bahians' generosity had been exhausted by five years of appeals for donations to Brazil's cause, this event grossed only 113\$200; Silva, *Prince*, pp.107–33; Carlos Eugênio Libano Soares, *A negregada instituição: os capoeiras no Rio de Janeiro* (Rio de Janeiro, 1994), pp.192–5, 238, 258–60.
 72. Petition of Manoel Pedro da Silva to President, Salvador, 2 May 1878, APEBa/SACP, maço 3438; 'Para o Ex.mo Sr. Ministro da guerra ver como se pratica com um pobre soldado', *O Monitor*, 4 May 1878, p.2; 'Para S. Ex. o Sr. ministro da guerra ver como se trata um cidadão que serviu á pátria', *ibid.*, 8 May 1878, p.2. Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding, Sixteenth Infantry, to Commander of Arms, Salvador, 5 May 1878 (copy), APEBa/SACP, maço 3438. On the president's orders, Silva received his receipt, Commander of Arms to President, Salvador, 10 May 1878 (confidential), and 11 May 1878, *ibid.*
 73. Nabuco, *Abolicionismo*, p.62. The argument reappears in Paulo Mercadante, *Militares e civis: a ética e o compromisso* (Rio de Janeiro, 1977), p.107; Robert B. Toplin, *The Abolition of Slavery in Brazil* (New York, 1972), p.216; William S. Dudley, 'Reform and Radicalism in the Brazilian Army, 1870–1889' (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1972), pp.429–30;

- Nelson Werneck Sodré, *História militar do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1965), pp.141–5; Francisco de Paula Cidade, *Síntese de tres séculos de literatura militar brasileira* (n.c., 1959), p.261. For a rare contrasting view, see Celso Castro, *Os militares e a república: um estudo sobre cultura e ação política* (Rio de Janeiro, 1995), pp.76–9.
74. Alberto Martins da Silva, 'O ideal abolicionista nas forças armadas', in Arno Wehling, ed., *Abolição do cativo: os grupos dominantes, pensamento e ação* (Rio de Janeiro, 1988), pp.94–101; Claudio Moreira Bento, 'O exército e a abolição', in *ibid.*, pp.83–93; Brazil, Estado Maior do Exército, *História do exército brasileiro: perfil militar de um povo* (Brasília, 1972), Vol.2, pp.668–73; Tavares, 'O exército e a abolição', p.8; Silva, 'Abolição: a galharda atuação', *passim*. An English-language work imbued with these arguments, although it glosses over abolition, is Robert A. Hayes, *The Armed Nation: The Brazilian Corporate Mystique* (Tempe, 1989).
75. André Rebouças, *Diário: a Guerra do Paraguai (1866)*, ed. Maria Odila Silva Dias (São Paulo, 1973), p.162; Jerry W. Cooney, 'Abolition in the Republic of Paraguay', *Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas*, Vol.11 (1974), pp.149–66.
76. Salles, *Guerra*, pp.131–48; Wilma Peres Costa, *A espada de Dâmocles: o exército, a Guerra do Paraguai e a crise do império* (São Paulo, 1996), ch.7; Vitor Izecksohn, 'O cerne da discórdia: a Guerra do Paraguai e o núcleo profissional do exército' (MA thesis, IUPERJ, 1992), pp.181–200. These latter two studies rely heavily on the work of John Schulz, recently published, *O exército na política: origens da intervenção militar, 1850–1894* (São Paulo, 1994).
77. David T. Haberly, 'Abolitionism in Brazil: Anti-Slavery and Anti-Slave', *Luso-Brazilian Review*, Vol.9, No.2 (Dec.1972), pp.30–46.
78. President of Bahia, 'Proclamação!' c. Jan. 1865, ANRJ/SPE/IG1, maço 125, fol.231.
79. Leon F. Litwack, *Been in the Storm So Long: The Aftermath of Slavery* (New York, 1979), pp.64–103; Ira Berlin *et al.*, *Slaves No More: Three Essays on Emancipation and the Civil War* (New York, 1992), pp.187–223; Rebecca J. Scott, *Slave Emancipation in Cuba: The Transition to Free Labor, 1860–1899* (Princeton, 1985), pp.48–62; Karen Robert, 'Slavery and Freedom in the Ten Years' War: Cuba, 1868–1878', *Slavery and Abolition*, Vol.13, No.2 (Dec.1992), pp.181–200; Ada Ferrer, 'Esclavitud, ciudadanía y los límites de la nacionalidad cubana: la guerra de los diez años, 1868–1878', *Historia Social* (Valencia), Vol.22 (1995), pp.101–25.