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50. Ibid., xxxviii. Consider as well Blackmur's assertion that "James was impervious to every force to which he could not give a form and what makes him a writer of great stature was the gradual deepening of the themes which beset him to find them form." *The Outsider at the Heart of Things: Essays by R. P. Blackmur*, ed. with an introduction by James T. Jones (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 192.
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CHAPTER 9

Ecoglobalist Affects: The Emergence of U.S. Environmental Imagination on a Planetary Scale

Lawrence Buell

To THINK "ENVIRONMENTALLY" or "ecologically" requires thinking "against" or "beyond" nationness even more self-evidently than thinking "culturally" does. Seldom do jurisdictional borders correspond to ecological borders. For the island nation of Iceland, yes. For the U.S.-Canada and the U.S.-Mexico borders, clearly not. Arguably "the oldest form of globalization" is environmental rather than economic or political.[1] Species have been migrating ever since life on earth began. Individual states have never effectively legislated against disease, toxic fallout, plant and animal invasions—less so in recent times than ever before. Smallpox took three millennia to spread worldwide, AIDS three decades. Particularly during the last half century, supposedly integral "landscapes" have become "timescapes" subject to inexorable reshaping by exotic permeations we are just starting to learn how to measure.[2] The Rachel Carson of social theory, Ulrich Beck, may be right in asserting that a global "risk society"—a shared climate of anxiety about the threats of environmental deterioration—has come into being that comprehends the rich as well as the poor.[3] During the past quarter century, the prospect of global warming, whatever the culture of denial within the present U.S. administration, has reinforced a tendency to think of environmental belonging and citizenship in planetary terms, and for international accords unprecedented in seeking to guard against predicted catastrophes that are still a long time off.[4]

From this standpoint the case for a planetary perspective over against a nation-centered approach to environmentality seems open and shut. The whole earth image taken from the moon a third of a century ago has long since become a logo, a cultural cliché.[5] But ecoglobalism, that is a whole-earth way of thinking and feeling about environmentality, is at this time of writing more a model that has begun to take root than an achieved result: a model for inquiry, furthermore, that is quite unevenly distributed across the disciplines. The average contemporary geologist or ecologist or environmental economist is better equipped to operate on a global scale than is the average sociologist or historian, and the average ethicist more so than the average literary critic. This essay, then, will be a partial account of an emergent critical

project that for understandable substantive and pragmatic reasons is almost certainly destined to remain a work in progress, well in arrears of the bolder acts of ecoliterary imagination for decades to come.

The Ambiguous Place of Nationness in the Context of Ecological Modernization

What might account for the slow and uneven advance of ecoglobalism as a settled conviction and critical modus operandi relative to its ostensible cogency, relative to nationness, as an image or notion? One hypothesis would be aversiveness toward "globalization" or "globalism" conceived as the aspiration of a particular nation (the United States, for instance) or block of nations (the G-8 or the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, for instance) to control world affairs. A more satisfactorily comprehensive explanation, however, suggested by these same examples, would be that there's simply no possibility that the nation form, however much nation-centrism be deplored or deconstructed, will go away any time soon, even in an arena like environmentality that is inherently border crossing in nature and planetary in ultimate scope. Transnational accords on environmental policy are cobbled together by national representatives. Decisions made unilaterally from national self-interest increasingly have the potential for altering environments on a planetary scale, especially if the country in question has the world's biggest economy.

Meanwhile, in the arts, literary production and academic study have been from Enlightenment even into Postmodernism profoundly shaped by a "Herderian imperative" to conceive of literary cultures as expressions of national cultures, an imperative that has been in certain respects reinforced even as it has been increasingly regulated by a global system of print culture channeled through a handful of cultural centers.[6] Discourses that aspire self-consciously to transnational or global reach can easily wind up recontained by nation-centered mentalities.

Ecocriticism—as the burgeoning movement of environmentally oriented literary studies of the last fifteen years has come to be called—is ironically a typical case in point. Most ecocritics tend in practice to adopt a single-country-focused approach, notwithstanding that most, like me, believe in principle that thinking about environmentality in terms that are either more microscopic (e.g., local, regional) or macroscopic (e.g., bioregional-transnational, continental, oceanic, or planetary) than the nation-level. Ecocriticism started as an insurgency that located itself explicitly within U.S. literary studies; and despite having spread long since throughout the Anglophone world and beyond, its practitioners still tend to direct what from a planetary standpoint seems disproportionate attention to putatively national modes and

myths of landscape imagination, such as the value traditionally set on "nature" and "wilderness" as definers of U.S. cultural-geographic distinctiveness.[7] Even when conducted skeptically, concentration on such topics can wind up reinforcing a nation-centripetal disposition toward environmentality.

Not that this *need* be a problem in and of itself. After all, most if not all modernized nations, for example, have myths of nationness that identify it with "heartland" and traditions of pastoral nostalgia for a more land-based existence than their intelligentsia now enjoy. The problem arises when these phenomena are studied in isolation rather than in conversation with each other.[8]

Obviously national environments do have repertoires of unique environmental features. Just to name a few physiographic basics, this nation has numerous unique plant and animal species and unique geologic "wonders": Yellowstone, Niagara Falls, the South Dakota badlands, Death Valley, and so forth. No nation-state has greater extremes of climate. A hundred or so miles inland from its coasts, the U.S. population thins out to a degree that might astonish one whose entry point or primary base of operations is New York or Los Angeles. (But also remember Australia, Canada, Siberia.) Homeland myths, furthermore, are hardly interchangeable. German valorization of *Heimat* does not *equate* to U.S.-style "nature's nation"-ism, which hardly equates to (say) Chicano Atzlan or Jewish Zion or Hopi Túwanasavi. It is rather the complex, tangled, coevolving interaction between what seem to be the environmental "givens" and emergent cultural imaginaries—a process typically not autonomous and hermetically sealed like a controlled laboratory experiment but syncretic and porous to extrinsic influences—that produces a *national* environmental imaginary, which in turn acquires to a lesser or greater extent the powers to produce what pass as distinctive myths of landscape that then inscribe themselves on the physical environment, partly to underscore and partly to produce what passes as distinctively national environmental forms. In U.S. history, the most important strand of this imaginary, as long observed by celebrators and detractors alike, has been the vision of a vast land of abundant resources whose natural advantages promised an inexhaustible opportunity for settlers and a guarantee of future national greatness.[9]

The first grand-scale example of the hybrid fusion of ideology and physical landscape was the legacy of the late-eighteenth-century Jeffersonian land survey that mapped the vast transappalachian hinterland in rectilinear grids, which in turn became the units of purchase and settlement for much of the lower forty-eight states. This gridwork reflected a vision of "democratic social space," a potential distribution of landscape at least notionally egalitarian (however compromised in practice by land speculation), in terms of which land parcels were defined as interchangeable and fungible commodities in utter disregard of topographic contours, differential rainfall and soil fertility, and the like. The patchwork quilt of Mondrian squares stretching across the

midcontinent is the engineered result.[10] During the past century, an even more proliferate, transregional form of U.S. "democratic" landscape reengineering is postage-stamp pastoral suburbanization, of which the "development" of multiple single-family tract houses is the typical icon.[11]

The fact that national land(scape) myths and ideologies can produce large-scale refashioning of a nation's physical landscape does not justify studying these effects only at the level of the nation, however. Indeed, quite the contrary. On the one hand, there are family resemblances among national landscape ideologies. The Australian settler ideology of *terra nullius*, the notion of a vast vacant land available for the taking, has close affinities with American promised-land ideology. On the other hand, landscape engineering may bespeak transnational repercussions and/or interdependencies. Neither of the two paradigmatic landscape forms just described, the Jefferson-instigated hinterland gridwork and the suburban subdivision, has been sustained by national resources alone. The former depends for its prosperity upon a lavishly expensive system of price supports that have destabilizing effects on world markets. The latter requires ever larger conurbations of increasingly remote exurban parcels dependent upon further proliferation of automotive-based transportation networks that make the United States increasingly energy-dependent on foreign suppliers. Neither the domestic agricultural subsidy system as such nor the consumer culture that canonizes the suburban "dream house" and the "love affair with the American lawn" are more unique to the United States than are the basic types of pastoral nationalism they reflect and perpetuate: the myth of a national agricultural heartland and the myth of a green "middle landscape" between urban and outback. The exceptionalism is more of degree than of kind. Writing in the days of the early republic of the transformation of the American northeast from "wilderness" into orderly self-sufficient agricultural villages, Calvinist minister Timothy Dwight insisted, with only slight excess of zeal, that such an achievement was a phenomenon "of which the eastern continent and the records of past ages furnish neither an example, nor a resemblance." But what understandably amazed Dwight most was the scale and speed of the experiment. It would be interesting to know how he would have reacted to megascale American suburbanization.[12] From a turn-of-the-twenty-first-century standpoint, this seems especially responsible for the fact that the United States leaves by far the largest "ecological footprint" of any nation on earth,[13] and for its being bound for the foreseeable future within a web of global entanglements around the procurement of such extracted resources as oil, rare minerals, and timber.

In quotidian middle-class existence, this side of American ecoglobalism tends to be hidden in plain sight. How many people, including even intellectuals, regularly ponder where ordinary household objects come from? Hence the value of a book like John Ryan and Alan Thein During's *Stuff*, a primer on common products on which middle American families depend: coffee, newspapers, T-shirts, bikes, and so forth. The authors track the transcontinental flows of raw materials, the story of their assemblage across space and time, the hidden as well as the nominal costs involved.[14] Yet by other standards of measurement national ecoglobal imagination is self-consciously alert. U.S. citizens are also the world's largest bankrollers of environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), even if not the most generous contributor on a per capita basis.

Prima facie, this is a mendacious paradox: to purport to care for what amounts to the distant impact of the chronic indulgence of which one remains negligently unaware—whether the "one" is a person or a populace. It is hardly consoling that the paradox more or less holds for other economically potent nation-states—the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan, for example. Yet the self-contradiction also makes sense. Nothing is commoner than disparities between notional assent to a principle and full internalization. The gap between environmental attitudes and behavior specifically is largely explicable by the alienation of modern daily living from the processes of extraction and production, as well as by a lack of felt urgency among even the moderately well-off, not to mention the truly affluent. U.S. public opinion polls indicate that the state and fate of "the environment" matters much more to respondents in principle than as a top-priority crisis in the here and now. Environment is expected to become a pressing concern a few decades hence, but not imminently. Everyone wants a safe and attractive environment, but enough citizens—poll respondents, anyhow—are buffered from immediate bad effects to make environmental welfare seem more like an amenity to be expected than a emergency that calls for drastic changes in behavior.[15]

To the extent that this paradoxical mentality of half-awakeness and self-division with regard to the responsibilities of ecological citizenship at national and individual levels can be credited with an implicit ethos of any sort, it can be typed as a semiconscious version of the mentality that European social theorists have started to call "ecological modernization." Like its more familiar semisynonym "sustainable development,"[16] ecological modernization favors a mode of economic evolution that will somehow be regulated by respect for environmental risks and constraints, and holds that something like a worldwide network of environmental policy-making institutions has begun to gain a "momentum and internal 'logic' which can no longer be reduced to a narrow economic rationality."[17]

To a considerable extent, this vision of the birth of a semiautonomous global environmental public sphere may be wishful thinking. (N.b.: the writer in question cites NAFTA and the World Bank as venues traditionally associated with free market values in which an "increasing advance of environmental considerations" is visible.) At best we are talking about two steps forward, one step back. Be that as it may, to the extent that there is a "paradigmatic" or normative disposition that marks ecoglobalist sentiment within the United States today, and in other modernized nations as well, ecological modernization is probably it.

The sections that follow will attempt to show how this state of affairs makes literary-historical sense. The emergence of U.S. ecoglobal imagination is symbiotic with the history of economic modernization. I hope to unfold some of the key stages in this history in such a way as to avoid the facile extremes of capitalism-bashing (which blocks one from understanding how a "responsible" ecoglobalism might arise as a messily partial yet partially honorable reaction against the conquest mentality itself) and of maintaining that any actor in this drama no matter how admirable can be exonerated from the culture of economic entrepreneurialism that has largely driven American settlement from its inception. Beyond this, I hope also to help clarify both why U.S. environmental imagination might crystallize in nationalistic ways and yet at the same time remain markedy transnational or global in character.

Literary U.S. Ecoglobalism as Literary Affect: Some Contemporary Examples

By "ecoglobalist affect" I mean, in broadest terms, an emotion-laden preoccupation with a finite, near-at-hand physical environment defined, at least in part, by an imagined inextricable linkage of some sort between that specific site and a context of planetary reach. Either the feel of the near-at-hand or the sense of its connection to the remote may be experienced as either consoling or painful or both. Diaspora can feel wrenching and liberatory by turns. Ecoglobalist affect entails a widening of the customary aperture of vision as unsettling as it is epiphanic in a positive sense, and a perception of raised stakes as to the significance of whatever is transpiring locally in the here and now that tends to bring with it either a fatalistic sense of the inexorable or a daunting sense of responsibility as the price of prophetic vision.

Three late-twentieth-century literary excerpts will ramify.[18]

> I sit in the shade of the trees of the land I was born in.
> As they are native I am native, and I hold to this place as carefully as
> they hold to it,
> I do not see the national flag flying from the staff of the sycamore,
> or any decree of the government written on the leaves of the walnut,
> nor has the elm bowed before monuments or sworn the oath of allegiance.
> They have not declared to whom they stand in welcome.
> In the thought of you I imagine myself free of the weapons and the official
> hates that I have borne on my back like a hump,
> and in the thought of myself I imagine you free of weapons and official hates,
> so that if we should meet we would not go by each other looking at the ground
> like slaves sullen under their burdens,
> but would stand clear in the gaze of each other.
>
> —Wendell Berry, from "To a Siberian Woodsman" (1968)

> There was no end to it; it knew no boundaries; and he had arrived at the point of convergence where the fate of all living things, and even the earth, had been laid. From the jungles of his dreaming he recognized why the Japanese voices had merged with Laguna voices, with Josiah's voice and Rocky's voice; the lines of cultures and worlds were drawn in flat dark lines on fine light sand, converging in the middle of witchery's final ceremonial sand painting. From that time on, human beings were one clan again, united by the fate the destroyers planned for all of them, for all living things; united by a circle of death that devoured people in cities twelve thousand miles away, victims who had never known these mesas, who had never seen the delicate colors of the rocks which boiled up their slaughter.
>
> —Leslie Marmon Silko, from *Ceremony*

> The Matacão, scientists asserted, had been formed for the most part within the last century, paralleling the development of the more common forms of plastic, polyurethane and styrofoam. Enormous landfills of nonbiodegradable material buried under virtually every populated part of the Earth had undergone tremendous pressure, pushed ever farther into the lower layers of the Earth's mantle. The liquid deposits of the molten mass had been squeezed through underground veins to virgin areas of the Earth. The Amazon Forest, being one of the last virgin areas on Earth, got plenty.
>
> —Karen Tei Yamashita, from *Through the Arc of the Rain Forest*

Kentucky regionalist Wendell Berry's Vietnam-era Cold War poem hopes that similarity of ecocultural context might unite rustic husbandmen across the world and thereby neutralize official enmity. By distinguishing culturally representative figures who will never meet, and by itemizing a local landscape on the American side that includes only native tree species, the poem creates an effect of "solidarity" without presuming to claim "identity" (ecophilosopher Val Plumwood's prescription for the most responsible sort of environmental caring).[19] Ecoglobalism for Berry means parallel worlds of analogous but distinct niches, in which like ecocultural backgrounds produce like results. He imagines a traditional land-based stay-at-home existence for both himself and his Soviet counterpart in a world made safe from Cold War madness by a sodality of sturdy, sensible peasants for whom *patria* still bears its original Latin meaning: not bonding to "nation" but to one's home place.

Such is too the denouement awaiting Laguna Pueblo novelist Leslie Silko's protagonist. But by contrast to Berry, Silko and Japanese American fabulist Karen Tei Yamashita evoke what cultural geographer Doreen Massey calls a global sense of place: the vision of a particular site understood to be a nodal point of interconnected force fields of planetary scope.[20]

In *Ceremony*, the site in question is the unholy birthplace of the atomic age: an abandoned uranium mine on Laguna land, whence came raw materials for the atomic bombs developed and tested close by. In addition to evoking the sense and memory of the "nuclear sublime,"[21] the place provokes two planet-fusing epiphanies for the war-damaged Indian veteran Tayo, the seeds

of both having been planted earlier by his medicine man mentor Betonie. One is the perception of the bomb as the work of the white "destroyers" anciently let loose on the world, according to a widely told Native American story. The other is Tayo's realization of the logic of his own "irrational" fantasies of the likeness between Japanese faces and familiar Indian faces. The link, he now fully sees, goes all the way back to the ancient continuum of (nonwhite) aboriginal via the prehistoric land bridge from Asia to the Americas, and forward to their mutual victimage by the forces of destruction.

In *Through the Arc*, a fast-paced boom-and-bust magical-realist narrative, the site is a vast area of former Amazonian jungle laid bare by soil erosion. The so-called Matacão turns out to be a hard plasticoid substance made up of the compacted residue of the world's trash dumps. In the short run, it proves amenable to a mind-boggling array of commercial uses, from artificial feathers to ferris wheels, from which the U.S.-based multinational corporation exploiting it profits enormously. But it also proves vulnerable to an invasive bacterium that reduces the burgeoning commercial empire's regional base and global affluence to nothing in a matter of days. After which, the rainforest takes over again.

Much might be also said about how Silko's and Yamashita's narratives are minoritized as Berry's poem is not, based as it is around a figure offered as a typical ordinary American. And about the fact that *Through the Arc*, a Brazil-set novel with a Japanese expatriate protagonist, is only marginally an "*American*" or "ethnic American" literary text. (Asian Americanists have found Yamashita's work tricky to categorize.)[22] But the point I want to stress here is the common thread of conceiving the United States as connected to or impinging upon far-distant lands via its environmentality, whether this be its groves, its uranium, or its garbage. Each text offers an identifiably late-twentieth-century image of remote points on earth linked by remembered or hypothetical global cataclysm: the solemn image of the *omphalos* of the atomic age, the zany image of Amazonia as *literally* a first-world dumping ground, the homey image of the hinterland rustic haunted by the struggle between superpowers that he hopes his Soviet counterpart hates as much as he does. Yet the possibility of planetary consciousness these images render is prefigured in U.S. writing more than a century before. Let's now turn to that backstory.

Early American Anticipations: Transnational Landscapes of Possession and Displacement

The oldest and most familiar form of ecoglobalist affect in the writings of the settler cultures that populated what later became the United States was of course the dream of transhemispheric migration and possession by advocates of colonization. Such as Puritan chief John Winthrop commending New England as "the Lord's Garden" "given to the sons of men," lying in wait for "improvement." Or colonial poetaster William Becket imagining the apotheosis of Philadelphia. ("There stately Oaks, shall lofty Piles adorn; / and yet preplex'd with various Weeds and Thorn / Here Industry & Peace shall fix their Seat, / & Plenty make her Pleasant, Happy, Great.") Or early national poet Philip Freneau imagining the prototypical emigrant fleeing "Europe's proud, despotic shores" for "fair plains" and "rural seats" vacated by "the unsocial Indian," where in time he will help "happier systems bring to view, / Than all the eastern sages knew."[23] In painting, this utopic-expansionist urge reached its apogee during the mid-nineteenth century, in Romantic artifacts of the "magisterial gaze" like Emánuel Leutze's *Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way* (1862), a mural commissioned for the national capitol that depicts a pioneer band scaling the Continental Divide, and John Gast's painting *American Progress* (1872), in which a large scantily clad pseudoclassical goddess floats over the Great Plains stringing telegraph wire, as Indians retreat from the scene before a covered wagon and a group of prospectors, and below the goddess appear a farm scene and a stagecoach, with several railroad trains close behind, and beyond that, in the far distance, a glimpse of the urbanized East Coast and a hint of the old world from which the pioneers have come.[24]

It is tempting to read such settler-culture fantasies as expansionist hubris pure and simple.[25] For often they were, and doubtless almost always to some extent, although the elements of disinterested moral-religious idealism, aggrandizement, rapacity, racism, and sheer fortuity were blended differently from case to case. In U.S. settler culture history, land has always been defined predominantly as commodity.[26] Even more basic to the visionary rhetoric of continental settlement than possession per se, however, is what the scholar of British-American emigrant discourse Stephen Fender calls "the figure of anticipation": the anticipation of a "future culture" destined to spring up from "a present natural setting."[27] The rhetoric of possession, whether it bespoke motives mainly high-minded or avaricious, embedded a rudimentary ecoglobalist calculus: a visionary fusion of cisatlantic landscape (seen as raw material and future habitat) against the background of a distant transcontinental landscape of origin to yield a wishful vision of an ideal landscape of the future of world-historical import. Hence de Tocqueville's dry insistence that Americans "are insensible to the wonders of inanimate nature" because "their eyes are fixed" on the "magnificent image of themselves" marching "across these wilds, draining swamps, turning the course of rivers, peopling solitudes, and subduing nature."[28]

The figure of anticipation, Fender cautions, is often complicated by a range of characteristic anxieties, one of them the "anxiety about broken connections."[29] For many first-generation colonists, the affect was not landscape as possession but as displacement. As William Bradford, Winthrop's Plymouth counterpart, famously bemoans the Pilgrims' "safe arrival" at Cape Cod:

"What could they see but a hideous and desolate wilderness," without a Mount Pisgah from which to view a promised land as Moses did. Although "the affections and love of their brethren at Leyden was cordial and entire," the thought of this was more dreary than consoling, stuck at the edge of the world as they were.[30] This passage has been claimed as the inception of what late-twentieth-century Americanist criticism, following Harold Bloom, who followed Wallace Stevens, has called the "American sublime": the trope of a vast, "empty"-seeming landscape that the spectatorial consciousness must transfuse and sublate.[31] But strictly speaking the landscape Bradford describes isn't empty. It's charged with ritual significance. It's a tapestry of retrospective symbol-making sharply different from the documentary report of the Pilgrim band's first foragings in *Mourt's Relation* ("Here is sand, gravel, and excellent clay, no better in the world . . . and the best water we ever drank, and the brooks now begin to be full of fish").[32] Bradford deliteralizes the vista in order to reinvent it diasporically and biblically—and classically too. (Of the company's relief at reaching harbor, he effuses: "no marvel if they were thus joyful, seeing wise Seneca was so affected with sailing a few miles on the coast of his own Italy.") The point is not that the new world is a nowhere. But the actual "where" is here *felt* only in terms of where one had come from: tribally, intellectually, spiritually.

Few early colonial texts embed the paradox of virtual nonexistence *versus* symbolic plenitude of new world landscape more complexly than Mary Rowlandson's *Narrative* of her captivity during King Philip's War (1676):[33]

> And here I cannot but remember how many times sitting in their wigwams, and musing on things past, I should suddenly leap up and run out, as if I had been at home, forgetting where I was, and what my condition was; but when I was without, and saw nothing but wilderness, and woods, and a company of barbarous heathens, my mind quickly returned to me, which made me think of that, spoken concerning Sampson, who said, "I will go out and shake myself as at other times, but he wist not that the Lord was departed from him."

By this account, not once but repeatedly was the author brought to grief by the "hallucination of the displaced terrain"—the superimposition of a habituated landscape upon the place one actually is.[34] Rowlandson, so she claims, momentarily beholds the forests of Massachusetts as if they *were* her actual "home," the neo-English village landscape into which the Puritan settlers had been transforming the New England region. Even after awakening to where she "really" is, the persona still sees the forest in symbolic terms, taking refuge from the trauma of her predicament by identifying with another tribally sanctioned, biblical, landscape. She is a modern Sampson waking up to the discovery of impotence now that his locks have been shorn. Ironically, as the *Narrative* has just explained, Rowlandson has just now also begun to wake up to how to read the woods with a literality that her stylized rendering of her

predicament belies. By the end of her ordeal, she has picked up at least a few wilderness survival skills and begun to understand Native American coping strategies there. But she can't bring herself, at least in public, to assign any significance to the forest except as an antiplace.

To experience landscape through the lens of cultural displacement, one might think, would disenable a person from engaging its materiality on its own terms. But Rowlandson's *Narrative* shows that pragmatic savvy can override ideology, even though the author's investment in representing her experience as an exemplum of communal affliction keeps her from expressing, maybe even from realizing, this point. Mary Austin's turn-of-the-twentieth-century sketches of the forbidding aridlands along the California-Nevada border, *Land of Little Rain*, similarly describes an English "pocket hunter" or small-time prospector who never bonds to the region where he hunts for gold as a native would, or even as the Illinois-born author comes to do; his ambition is simply "to strike it rich and set himself up among the eminently bourgeois of London." Yet he manages to thrive in this alien, unforgiving locale through his seeming "faculty of small hunted things of taking the color of his surroundings."[35]

In some versions of immigrant experience, importation of old-country ways can produce acute maladaptation to new-world conditions and exemplary environmental citizenship at the same time. Such has been the case with Amish culture, much praised by Wendell Berry (who would object to "maladaptation" as a diagnosis of Amish tribal separation in self-consciously distinct and culturally coherent communities). Willa Cather's *O Pioneers!* a novel of Scandanavian immigration to the Nebraska plains in the late nineteenth century, scripts this paradox explicitly through the figure of old Ivar and his relation to the protagonist, Alexandra Bergson. Prone to emotional seizures and religious fanaticism, Ivar is the book's most culturally regressive figure. He never even learns to speak English. But he is also the most intimately linked to the natural world. Alexandra turns to him as a kind of environmental guru for guidance about livestock, crops, soil. In the long run, her farming prospers while his fails because she has the entrepreneurial shrewdness to negotiate modern agribusiness; but her respect for old-country peasant culture is correlated with her ability to make the shrewd decisions as to what to buy and build and what to plant when that gives her the jump on her brothers and neighbors.

At first sight, Alexandra might seem a quintessential figure of anticipation, hankering to enact the Freneauvian dream of eager emigrants bringing the primordial hinterland to a new state of fruition and prosperity. For a book written by an author reared only a generation later in the same region who must have known that the Native dispensation didn't just vanish into thin air, the novel seems only too willing to indulge the expansionist stereotype of landscape primordialism.[36] The climax of the first section is Alexandra's mystical encounter with the "Genius of the Divide," an unmediated experience of

connectedness with "the land" that gives rise to her vision of how to farm it successfully. But the environmental psychology of this "aha experience" is actually the obverse of that of the magisterial gaze. Alexandra, or so the text asserts, does not conquer; she opens herself up to the feeling of the land and submits. Her capacity to do so is congruent with and follows from the receptivity to land-wisdom that draws her to Ivar. That is what enables her, unlike the stereotypical Whitmanian pioneers to which the title alludes ("We the virgin soil upheaving," etc.), to reverse the customary order of the transaction between settlers and new-world environment encapsulated by the opening line of the poem Robert Frost delivered at the Kennedy inaugural: "The land was ours before we were the land's."[37] To be sure, Alexandra's submission to the land enables control of the land. But to insist on submission first is a significant revisionist move. And so is the novel's insistence that diasporic land-memory can actually solidify place-connectedness in a strange new world as well as the old. When Alexandra starts to feel out of place again near the end, it is because the system of agrarian modernization that has profited her materially now threatens to destroy the traditional values for which she likes to think she stands—although the assertive role she plays as clan leader is anything but traditional.[38]

Industrial Revolution and/as the Emergence of Modern U.S. Ecoglobalism

In the discourse of displacement as well as possession, the emergence of a sense of environmentality of transnational reach is inseparable from a sense of the incipient commodification of environment, exuberant in the former and troubled in the latter, in itself also potentially transnational. U.S. ecoglobalist consciousness emerges in symbiotic tension with, first, the rise of imperial commerce and then of entrepreneurial capitalism, both perceived in succession as world orders in which the nation is destined to play a central if not *the* central role. By the mid-nineteenth century, a generation before the advent of institutionalized environmentalism, this mentality is already well in place.

In canonical U.S. literature, Henry Thoreau's *Walden* is an especially notable case precisely because it is so doggedly local in its focus.[39] Concord, Massachusetts, the oldest inland town in British America, had been settled for more than two centuries before Thoreau began to write; and he remained fiercely loyal to his home place. But Thoreau cannot think locally without bringing in the rest of the world. He can't walk over the expanse of snow-covered ice on nearby Flint's Pond without being reminded of Baffin's Bay (271). In order to relish the view from his cabin across Walden Pond, he must imagine the vista stretching "away toward the prairies of the West and the steppes of Tartary, affording ample room for all the roving families of men" (87). Here and repeatedly, Thoreau doesn't merely succumb to but positively riots in the hallucination of the displaced terrain. Why? That he was compensating for cabin fever, that his stay-at-home habits concealed a hankering for armchair travel and travel books—Thoreau's favorite genre of contemporary literature—are true but insufficient.[40] Thoreau is also betraying consciousness of the fact that Concord's environment was indissolubly connected with the rest of the world and defining himself not as a local character but as a local cosmopolitan.

In *Walden* this comes out especially in a wintertime passage that starts out as a complaint at the invasion of his hermitage by a gang of ice harvesters dispatched by a Boston merchant to collect a shipment for export to India. Once the persona manages to strike the right aesthetic distance, beholding the workmen from the distance of his cabin as if they were "a picture as we see on the first page of the almanac," he warms to his subject and tranquilly imagines "the pure Walden water . . . mingled with the sacred water of the Ganges." This symbolizes *and* literalizes the potential payoff of his own discursive stream, which has been inspired by the Bhagavad Gita and other Indian sacred texts. ("I lay down the book and go to my well for water, and lo! there I meet the servant of the Brahmin . . . come to draw water for his master, and our buckets as it were grate together in the same well.") Thoreauvian ecoglobalism transparently depends upon even while resisting the momentum of economic history: that Yankee-spearheaded maritime capitalism was making the world smaller. Massachusetts ice baron Frederic Tudor had been conducting trade with Asia for more than forty years.[41] An inveterate punster, Thoreau may even intend a wry double entendre here. This may be the first usage of "Brahmin" to connote New England blue blood or grandee.[42] Elsewhere, stirred by the sound of the railroad train whistling past the west end of Walden Pond, Thoreau is momentarily suffused with excitement at the romance of commerce. ("I feel more like a citizen of the world at the sight of the palm-leaf which will cover so many flaxen New England heads the next summer, the Manilla hemp and cocoa-nut husks" [119].) Ultimately, he valued the groves of Walden far more than the business of cutting them down for railroad ties and engine fuel. And his one-man revolt against the work ethic protests the standardization of labor ushered in by industrial revolution. Yet the new technology helped instill in him a global sense of place.

To Herman Melville, the first canonical U.S. author to have sojourned in the developing world and to have perceived the effects of gunboat diplomacy there from the standpoint of its indigenous victims,[43] the rise of U.S. industrial might on a global scale was an issue of far deeper interest. Whereas *Walden*'s scene of Thoreau meeting the Brahmin's servant looks forward to Wendell Berry's apostrophe to the antipodal Siberian woodsman, *Moby-Dick* more closely anticipates the whole-earth ecoglobalisms of Silko and Yamashita. It was indeed the first canonical novel about an extractive industry of global

scope, dominated by Yankee entrepreneurs for a brief but spectacular interval during the antebellum years. Even if Cesare Caserino's arresting conjecture is ruled out, that Melville's archaization of whaling as epic tragedy uncannily anticipates the industry's imminent collapse that nobody in 1851 could have been expected to foresee, the scene of factory-ship confinement and disciplined regimen makes *Moby-Dick* in important ways a paradigmatic exposé of early industrial overreach. Ahab's overruling of Starbuck's sound business sense can be read as symptomatic of that excess at least as plausibly as it can be read as a rejection of standard bourgeois values.[44]

Ishmael/Melville's passion for cetological detail cannot be accounted for simply in these terms, however. Until recently this aspect of the book was short-shrifted by students and specialists alike. Fortunately, during the last two decades the situation has changed. In particular, new Americanist-inflected scholarship on literary texts as ideological representations have scrutinized *Moby-Dick*'s cetological dimension more closely. William Spanos, for example, reads Ishmael's rompish classification of whales in "Cetology" as a "carnivalesque parody" of the Linnean mode of "the high imperial Linnean ground and the schematizing imperatives of natural science," whose pretensions to objective knowledge production were concurrently underwriting expansionist and technodominationist subjugation of the American wilderness. Samuel Otter, in a different application of somewhat similar premises, reads the cetology chapters as undermining the racist pseudoscience of anthropometry.[45] Yet neither quite accounts for the element of encyclopedic *zest* this novel evinces for whaling. Doubtless this passion is as overdetermined as the deconstructive satire. But one dimension of it, surely, is fascination with the global reach of both cetacean ecology and whaling praxis. Something like this is at the bottom of the effusion "To produce a mighty book, you must choose a mighty theme," a whale and not a flea.[46] The gusto arises as much from the gigantic spatial scale of the endeavor as from the giganticism of the cetaceans.

The chapter "The Chart" is especially instructive here. Ishmael ponders Ahab pondering the charts of whale migration routes. These charts are a form of knowledge production that Ishmael takes much more seriously than his classification system and his later measurements of the whale's skeleton, although he also stresses that Ahab will not and should not go by them alone, despite studying them to the point that his furrowed brow itself looks like a chart. There is also a predictable unpredictability to whale behavior that the seasoned mariner needs to anticipate. Though appalled by Ahab's monomania, Ishmael is fascinated by both the phenomenon of whale migration, the claim that the global movements of sperm whales might "be found to correspond in invariability to those of the herring-shoals or the flights of swallows," and the evidence of whalemen's sagacity in negotiating the combination of predictability and fortuity, its mixture of systematic empirical knowledge and

intuition.[47] Despite whatever might be said either in praise or denigration about its farcical spoofing and overheated symbolistic byplay, the novel responds excitedly and also elegantly to the challenge of representing the global proportions of whaling ecology and the business of whaling. As I have shown elsewhere, although the case for *Moby-Dick* as a protoecological text is not so strong as is the case for *Walden*, Melville's novel is striking for interrogating speciesism (the assumption of a solid human/nonhuman borderline in an ethical pyramid of the orders of creation where humans occupy a place of special privilege at the top) no less vigorously than dominationism in the social sphere.[48] And with respect to eco*globalism*, *Moby-Dick* on cetology far surpasses *Walden* on limnology.

Neither Thoreau's local cosmopolitanism nor Melville's global epic devote more than a limited amount of attention to theorizing global environmentality as such. But to the extent they do, both anticipate the work of their fellow northeasterner, George Perkins Marsh, whose magnum opus *Man and Nature* (1864) became the first significant conservationist manifesto in the English language. An intellectually hyperactive polymath who knew twenty languages and had tried out almost as many professions by the time he settled into a consular career that allowed him ample time to research and write, Marsh was the first American clearly to grasp the planetary scope of the environmental side effects of modernization. Like Melville, Marsh wondered if whales were destined for extinction.[49] Like Thoreau and Dwight (both of whom he read attentively), Marsh was deeply impressed by the consequences of rapid New England deforestation, which as a one-time agricultural and industrial entrepreneur he himself had helped perpetrate. But unlike them, Marsh sensed the history of new world landscape—or rather landscapes, plural, since he viewed U.S. environmental history comparatively, with a broader interest in Euro-settlement worldwide—in relation to the much longer history of species transfer/migration/extinction, of deforestation, desertification, and land reclamation in the Mediterranean world from prehistoric antiquity to the present. Marsh felt forced to conclude that even "in his earliest known stages of existence, [man] was probably a destructive power upon the earth," and that modern European settler colonies, the United States chief among them, were showing unmistakable "signs of that melancholy dilapidation which is now driving so many of the [European] peasantry from their native hearths." Although American natural resources were still abundant, without major changes in environmental policy and practice, a "desolation, like that which has overwhelmed many once beautiful and fertile regions of Europe," Marsh prophesied, "awaits an important part of the territory of the United States, and of other comparatively new countries over which European civilization is now extending its sway."[50]

Environmental historians customarily set Marsh and Thoreau at odds as anticipators of the split between "preservationist" and "conservationist" camps at the turn of the twentieth century.[51] This is justifiable insofar as Marsh consistently argued that the remedy for environmental mismanagement was better management. It is hard to imagine Thoreau enthusing about "harbor and coast improvements," sea walls and the like, as "among the great works of man"; or praising the Suez Canal, had he lived to see its day, as "the greatest and most truly cosmopolite physical improvement ever undertaken." Marsh took for granted the legitimacy of anthropogenic environmental modification, not just locally but on a planetary scale; the question for him was how to make man "a co-worker with nature in the reconstruction of the damaged fabric which the negligence or the wantonness of former [generations] has rendered untenantable." On the other hand, Marsh's denunciations of man in practice as "everywhere a disturbing agent," a perennial disruptor of nature's harmonies,[52] often sound neo-Romantic and resonate with his late-life recollection that as a youth "the bubbling brook, the trees, the flowers, the wild animals were to me persons, not things."[53] It is telling that Marsh's single most far-reaching instance of possible ecoglobal management in *Man and Nature*, "the most colossal project" of human engineering ever proposed, inspires fear rather than hope. This is the proposal for a Panama canal in the form of "an open cut between the two seas." The audacity of the prospect intrigues him, but Marsh fears dire unintended consequences of global scope. In a striking anticipation of contemporary anxieties about the effects of global warming on polar glaciers, he imagines a rerouting of both the Pacific currents and the Gulf Stream, such as might precipitate "an immediate depression of the mean temperature of Western Europe to the level of that of Eastern America," possibly even ushering in "a new 'ice period'" as a result of "the withdrawal of so important a source of warmth from the northern seas."[54]

What most crucially links *Walden*, *Moby-Dick*, and *Man and Nature* as harbingers of contemporary ecoglobalist imagination is a combination of susceptibility to and skepticism about the ongoing conquest of natural environment on a planetary scale. Although the contribution of Yankee entrepreneurship specifically to this process is obviously of great interest to each, in the long run issues of cultural nationalism and national politics become subsidiary to a vision of Western culture in a state of ongoing, transnational modernization and with it the vexed question of what "man"'s relation to "nature" properly is or should be. "From that time on, human beings were one clan again," writes the narrator of *Ceremony* a century later, as we have seen. What Silko specifically had in mind, the nuclear age, those nineteenth-century writers could not have known. But they had seen enough of modernization to be able to intuit it. In Thoreau, Melville, and Marsh, something like the full range of contemporary ecoglobalist affects has begun to emerge.

Notes

1. Joseph Nye, *The Paradox of American Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 82.

2. Barbara Adam, *Timescapes of Modernity: The Environment and Invisible Hazards* (London: Routledge, 1998), which concentrates especially on the slow-working pervasive effects of nuclear toxification (with the Chernobyl disaster especially in mind) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (mad cow disease).

3. Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, trans. Mark Ritter (1986; reprint, London: Sage, 1992), esp. 19–84; Beck and Johannes Willms, "Global Risk Society," in *Conversations with Ulrich Beck*, trans. Michael Pollak (Cambridge: Polity, 2004), 109–52.

4. Karen Litfin, *Ozone Discourses: Science and Politics in Global Environmental Cooperations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 78–116, notes the unprecedentedness of the so-called precautionary principle as a motive for the ozone accords. See Peter Singer, "One Atmosphere," in *One World: The Ethics of Globalization* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 14–50, for discussion of global warming discourse as a harbinger and promoter of an ethic of global citizenship.

5. For an analysis of the uses and significance of this image, see Sheila Jasanoff, "Heaven and Earth: The Politics of Environmental Images," in *Earthly Politics: Local and Global in Environmental Governance*, ed. Jasanoff and David Rothenberg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 231–52.

6. Pascale Casanova, *The World Republic of Letters*, trans. M. B. DeBevoise (1999; reprint, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 75–81 and passim.

7. See for example *Literature of Nature: An International Sourcebook*, ed. Patrick D. Murphy with Terry Gifford and Katsunori Yamazato (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1998), a unique and useful but also balkanized collection of essays on traditions of environmental writing around the world. Chapters 1 and 3 of my *The Future of Environmental Criticism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005) comment, respectively, on the history of the ecocritical movement and its preferences both in principle and de facto as to subnational, national, and global scales of analysis.

8. A striking example is the nation-specificity of the two most significant precontemporary works on American and British pastoral, respectively, as culturally symptomatic modes: Leo Marx, *The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964); and Raymond Williams, *The Country and the City* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973). Marx did publish a complimentary review of Williams's book, but neither seems to have been in any way influenced by the other. For a further discussion, see Buell, *The Future of Environmental Criticism*, 13–16 (on Marx and Williams) and (for pastoral as a transhemispheric formation) Buell, *The Environmental Imagination* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 53–77; and Terry Gifford, *Pastoral* (London: Routledge, 1999).

9. The classic study is Henry Nash Smith, *Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950). Revisionist scholars, including to some extent Smith himself in a retrospective essay, have tended to dismantle the myth as self-justifying ideology. See in particular Myra Jehlen, *American Incarnation:*

The Individual, the Nation, and the Continent (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).

10. On ideology, see Philip Fisher, "Democratic Social Space: Whitman, Melville, and the Promise of American Transparency," *Representations* 24 (Fall 1988): 60–101. For the gridwork as lived experience, see Curt Meine, "Inherit the Grid," in *Placing Nature: Culture and Landscape Ecology*, ed. Joan Iverson Nassauer (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1997), 45–62.

11. On suburbanization as postage-stamp pastoral, see Kenneth T. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Peter Rowe, *Making a Middle Landscape* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991); and Virginia Scott Jenkins, *The Lawn: A History of an American Obsession* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994). See Adam Ward Rome, *The Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American Environmentalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), for a history of suburbanization as an incentive to (certain forms of) environmentalist activism and regulation.

12. Timothy Dwight, *Travels; in New-England and New-York*, ed. Barbara Miller Solomon (1821; reprint, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 1:6.

13. "Ecological footprint" is a term coined by environmental reformers and sympathetic environmental scholars to refer to "the land area necessary to sustain current levels of resource consumption and waste discharge by that population" (Mathis Wackernagel and William E. Rees, *Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact on the Earth* [Gabriola Island, B.C.: New Society Publishers, 1996], 5).

14. John C. Ryan and Alan Thein During, *Stuff: The Secret Lives of Everyday Things* (Seattle: Northwest Environment Watch, 1997).

15. On environmental polling, see Deborah Lynn Gubar, *The Grassroots of a Green Revolution: Polling America on the Environment* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003). On American attitudes toward environment(alism) as amenity, see Samuel Hays, *Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955–1985* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

16. I rely especially here on Maarten A. Hajer, *The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); and Arthur P. J. Mol, *Globalization and Environmental Reform: The Ecological Modernization of the Global Economy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001). Mol views sustainable development and ecological modernization as equivalent (111); Hajer, more elegantly and plausibly, sees sustainable development as one strand in a braided rope of heterogeneous and sometimes conflicting "story-lines" comprising the discourse of ecological modernization. For a bottom-line, but relatively detailed, summary of its premises relative to "traditional pragmatism," see Hajer, *The Politics of Environmental Discourse*, 164–65.

17. Mol, *Globalization and Environmental Reform*, 101.

18. Wendell Berry, "To a Siberian Woodsman," *Collected Poems, 1957–1982* (San Francisco: North Point, 1985), 97–98; Leslie Marmon Silko, *Ceremony* (New York: Penguin, 1977), 246; Karen Tei Yamashita, *Through the Arc of the Rain Forest* (Minneapolis: Coffee House Press, 1990), 202.

19. Val Plumwood, *Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason* (London: Routledge, 2002), 196–217—a critique of deep ecology's emphasis on "identification" with nature that seems to anticipate the respectful distance Berry's persona tries to strike here ("Such an ethic cannot address the other as a communicative or potentially communicative subject").

20. Doreen Massey, "A Global Sense of Place," in *Space, Place, and Gender* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 146–56.

21. "Nuclear sublime" is Rob Wilson's term for "the terror of a technological determination within the Cold War period." Wilson, *American Sublime: The Genealogy of a Poetic Genre* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 231, 228–63.

22. Rachel C. Lee, *The Americas of Asian American Literature: Gendered Fictions of Nation and Transnation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 106–38, frames the problem thoughtfully, seeing Yamashita's two Brazilian books as a kind of limit case in what might count as Asian American writing, although I'm not convinced by Lee's solution of decoding *Rain Forest*'s hero, Kasumasa, as a proxy for the traditional Chinese American railroad worker. Yamashita herself has demurred from the classification of this novel as either "an Asian-American book" pure and simple or as an environmental(ist) text pure and simple (Jean Vengue Gier and Carla Alicia Tejada, "An Interview with Karen Tei Yamashita" [1998], http://social.chass.ncsu.edu/jouvert/v2i2/yamishi.htm).

23. John Winthrop, *Reasons to Be Considered for . . . the Intended Plantation in New England* (1629), in Alan Heimert and Andrew Delbanco, eds., *The Puritans in America: A Narrative Anthology* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 72; William Becket, "Fragment from an Ancient Poet . . . ," quoted in David Shields, *Oracles of Empire: Poetry, Politics, and Commerce in British America, 1690–1750* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 45; Philip Freneau, "On the Emigration to America and Peopling the Western Country," *Poems of Freneau*, ed. Harry Hayden Clark (1929; reprint, New York: Harper, 1960), 92–93. Regarding Winthrop, note that Heimert and Delbanco plausibly surmise that he was arguing to some extent against his own doubts as well as others'.

24. Both images are reprinted in (at least) two works of revisionist art history: *The West as America: Reinterpreting Images of the Frontier, 1820–1920*, ed. William H. Truettner (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 118, 135; and Albert Boime, *The Magisterial Gaze: Manifest Destiny and American Landscape Painting c. 1830–1865* (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), 44, 132.

25. The analyses of Truettner and Boime both point that way. In literary studies, probably the most significant of the many revisionist interventions during the past several decades that have established the plot of "from genocidal conquest to new imperium" as the new and regnant grand narrative of U.S. settlement culture history have been Myra Jehlen, *American Incarnation*; and *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, ed. Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1993). (See especially the opening essays by each coeditor.) These books were defining expressions of new historicist and new Americanist revisionisms, respectively.

26. Richard N. L. Andrews, "Land in America: A Brief History," in *Land in America: Commodity or Natural* Resource, ed. Andrews (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979), 27–40.

27. Stephen Fender, "American Landscape and the Figure of Anticipation," in *Views of American Landscapes*, ed. Mick Gidley and Robert Lawson-Peebles (Cam-

bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 57. Fender takes the term from a British traveler's account of 1817—expressing disappointment that the Pittsburgh he beheld did not, in fact, measure up to "the Birmingham of America."

28. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. Henry Reeve, rev. Francis Bowen, ed. Phillips Bradley (New York: Vintage, 1945), 2:78.

29. Ibid., 59–60. The exemplary text here is the denouement of Crèvecoeur's *Letters from an American Farmer*, which produces, Fender argues, "the first characteristic dislocation at the end of American fiction, in which a disenchanted hero lights out for the Territory, at the same time as his author 'lights in' back to the metropolis."

30. William Bradford, *Of Plymouth Plantation, 1620–1647*, ed. Francis Murphy (New York: Modern Library, 1981), 69–71. Bradford was also probably mourning the loss of Plymouth, which had been absorbed into the Massachusetts Bay colony.

31. David Laurence, "William Bradford's American Sublime," *PMLA* 102 (January 1987): 55–65.

32. "G. Mourt," *Mourt's Relation* (1622), in Heimert and Delbanco, *The Puritans in America*, 46.

33. Mary Rowlandson, *A Narrative of the Captivity and Restoration of Mrs. Mary Rowlandson*, in *Norton Anthology of American Literature: Literature to 1820*, ed. Wayne Franklin, 6th ed. (New York: Norton), 324.

34. This term, coined by art critic Harold Rosenberg, is adapted by Robert Lawson-Peebles, *Landscape and Written Expression in Revolutionary America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 22–62 and passim. Lawson-Peebles cogently applies to colonial and early national British-American art and literature Rosenberg's example of the ill-fated British General Braddock during the French and Indian War, who tried with disastrous result to march his army of redcoats through the woods of western Pennsylvania as if it were a conventional European battleground. "The more that American writers struggled to assert a unique American culture," as Lawson-Peebles tellingly puts it, "the more they were trapped in the hallucination of displaced terrain" (45).

35. Mary Austin, "The Pocket-Hunter," in *Land of Little Rain* (1903), *Stories from the Country of Lost Borders*, ed. Marjorie Pryse (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1987), 49, 43.

36. Technically the novel starts in 1883, just six years after "Custer's last stand," but of tangible marks of Plains Indians in the vicinity the novel admits only to "feeble scratches on stone left by prehistoric races, so indeterminate that they may, after all, be only the markings of glaciers, and not a record of human strivings" (Willa Cather, *O Pioneers!* [1913; reprint, New York: Vintage, 1992], 3, 11). This is a notorious problem with Cather's Nebraska novels. All are similarly insouciant of the aboriginal dispensation.

37. Cather, *O Pioneers!* 33; Walt Whitman, "Pioneers! O Pioneers" (1865), in *Leaves of Grass: Comprehensive Reader's Edition*, ed. Harold W. Blodgett and Sculley Bradley (New York: New York University Press, 1965), 230; Robert Frost, "The Gift Outright" (1941), in *The Poetry of Robert Frost*, ed. Edward Connery Lathem (New York: Holt, 1975), 348. Frost intended to declaim his new poem "For John F. Kennedy: His Inauguration" (ibid., 422–24), but the weather kept him from reading his notes.

38. As Tom Lutz bemusedly sums up the novel's cross-currents, "*O Pioneers!* is antimodern in its rejection of mass culture, promodern in its respect for agricultural science

and psychology, antimodern in its respect for old Ivar, promodern in its rejection of social convention" (*Cosmopolitan Vistas: American Regionalism and Literary Value* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004], 114).

39. Henry David Thoreau, *Walden*, ed. J. Lyndon Shanley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

40. John Christie, *Thoreau as World Traveler* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965); and Robert Sattelmeyer, *Thoreau's Reading: A Study in Intellectual History with Bibliographical Catalogue* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), document Thoreau's interest in travel writing.

41. Thoreau, *Walden*, 298. On Thoreau and the ice merchant, see Lewis Simpson, "The Tudor Brothers: Boston Ice and Boston Letters," in *The Man of Letters in New England and the South: Essays on the History of the Literary Vocation in America* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), 32–61.

42. The first figurative use of "Brahmin" in this sense is usually credited (*v.* OED) to Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr.'s preface to *Elsie Venner* (1859), though Byron's *Don Juan* (1823) uses "Brahmin" in a similar sense as a nickname for English gentry.

43. I refer of course to Melville's several weeks in Taipivai, Nukuheva, in the Marquesas Islands, at the very moment of the island's French imperial appropriation (1842) and a quarter century after the Taipi community had been laid waste by Captain David Porter of the U.S. Navy, often called "the first imperialist" for having briefly conquered Nukuheva, renaming it "Madison Island" and claiming the Marquesas as U.S. territory—a claim the U.S. administration refused to acknowledge. T. Walter Herbert, Jr., *Marquesan Encounters: Melville and the Meaning of Civilization* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), provides an admirably scrupulous comparative portrayal of Porter's and Melville's sorties, as both antithetical and complementary instances of Yankee encounters with Polynesian indigenes in the contact zone.

44. Cesare Casarino, *Modernity at Sea: Melville, Marx, Conrad in Crisis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 75–83. The modern tradition of envisaging Ahab as a warped captain of industry entered American literary studies most influentially with F. O. Matthiessen's *American Renaissance* (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), 459; and Matthiessen's student Leo Marx, *The Machine in the Garden*, 278–319. But see also C.L.R. James, *Mariners, Renegades and Castaways: The Story of Herman Melville and the World We Live In* (1953; reprint, London: Allison & Busby, 1985).

45. William Spanos, *The Errant Art of "Moby-Dick": The Canon, the Cold War, and the Struggle for American Studies* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995), 191–92; Samuel Otter, *Melville's Anatomies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 132–49.

46. Herman Melville, *Moby-Dick*, ed. Hershel Parker and Harrison Hayford (1851; reprint, New York: Norton, 2002), 349.

47. Ibid., 167.

48. Lawrence Buell, *Writing for an Endangered World: Literature, Culture, and Environment in the United States and Beyond* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 205–23.

49. Ironically, the most authoritative history of nineteenth-century American whaling sides with the novelist's surmise that hot pursuit has made whales warier, not with Marsh's inference that whale elusiveness signified species depletion. See Lance E.

Davis, Robert E. Gallman, and Karin Gleiter, *In Pursuit of Leviathan: Technology, Institutions, Productivity, and Profits in American Whaling, 1816–1906* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 131–49.

50. George Perkins Marsh, *Man and Nature: Or, Physical Geography as Modified by Human Action*, ed. David Lowenthal (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 70, 46, 201.

51. See for example Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind*, 3rd ed. (New Haven: Yale Unversity Press, 1982), 104–5.

52. Marsh, *Man and Nature*, 282–83, 439, 65, 36.

53. To Charles Eliot Norton, May 24, 1871, quoted in Lowenthal's "Introduction" to Marsh, *Man and Nature*, xi.

54. Marsh, *Man and Nature*, 441–42.

CHAPTER 10

At the Borders of American Crime Fiction

Rachel Adams

A CASE INVOLVING WOMEN, MONEY, AND MURDER. A darkened room where two men confront one another. A disillusioned investigator. The friend who betrayed him by "going Mexican." The intimacies of male bonding sundered. Forty years after the publication of Raymond Chandler's *The Long Goodbye* (1951), Michael Connelly revives these plot elements for his best-selling crime novel, *The Black Ice* (1993).[1] Both novels are set in Los Angeles, where their detective-protagonists struggle to preserve the reputations of men who appear to have committed suicide under suspicious circumstances. Both crimes have ties to Mexico that require the detective to cross the border during the course of his investigation. In the end, the alleged victims are found alive, having faked their own deaths to get away with murder. Each man's slide into degeneracy is indicated by his increasing identification with Mexico, and the transformation of his physical features from white to "Mexican." His passage across the border signals the surrender of his values, relationships, and core aspects of his identity.

This is where the similarities between Connelly and Chandler come to an end. Published in the same year as the signing of NAFTA, *The Black Ice* reflects the extent to which relations between the United States and Mexico have changed in the decades since the publication of *The Long Goodbye*. Although Connelly's protagonist Harry Bosch is as tough-minded and individualistic as Chandler's Philip Marlowe, he operates in a world where the professional private eye is obsolete. A lone detective is no match for the transnational crime rings that plague contemporary Los Angeles. The files, computer databases, and institutional resources needed to track their movements are available only to those working within a law enforcement agency. Bosch is a member of the Los Angeles Police Department, where his breaches of protocol cause constant friction with his superiors. Whereas Marlowe's case concerns interpersonal, domestic matters—a bad marriage leads to conflicts over love, money, and, ultimately, murder—Bosch's concerns rivalry among powerful international drug cartels. And whereas Marlowe perceives the border as a sparsely populated, liminal wasteland, Bosch's borderlands are teeming with vehicular traffic, commerce, and industrial activity. In order to continue his investigation on the other side, he must contend with a foreign system of law