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Introduction: The Globalization of Fiction/ the Fiction of Globalization

The idea for this special issue of the *South Atlantic Quarterly* emerged out of a question posed by one of our students: Does it make sense to speak about a literature of globalization? This question seems easy enough to answer, or rather, a whole host of possible answers offer themselves right away, which may not in fact be the same thing as coming up with a simple, satisfactory response. First, one could suggest (as a number of other scholars do) that though we have discussed it almost exclusively in national terms, literature has in fact long been globalized. Writing at one of the key moments of European nationalism, Marx and Engels already pointed to the existence of a world literature produced out of the constant revolutionizing of bourgeois production, and discussed its spread across national and cultural boundaries.¹ Without question, one of the first elites linked globally—materially as much as imaginatively—was a literary elite able to sample exotic narrative confections produced outside of their original national and local contexts.² But glimmers of a “world literature” appeared long before the explicit formulations of Marx and Engels or Goethe in the nineteenth century.

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Forms such as the fabliau, Mennipean satire, and autobiography provide evidence of cultural migrations dating as far back as the medieval period; literature was global, then, before it was ever national.³ And as Stephen Greenblatt points out, “English literature was always an unsteady amalgam of Scottish, Irish, Welsh, Cornish, and other voices of the vanquished, along with the voices of the dominant English regions, and the English language itself, so securely and apparently imperturbably at the center of the field, is revealed, under the pressure of examination, to be a mixed, impure, and constantly shifting medium.”⁴ It seems reasonable to suggest, then, that literature in general, and Anglophone literature in particular, is—and perhaps always has been—globalized.

It should be clear immediately, however, that this response does not take up the real demand posed by our student’s question, which seeks to understand a more fundamental entanglement between literature and the phenomena most commonly associated with globalization—transculturation, the various forms (from cultural to economic) and periods (from the time of Columbus to the present) of imperialism and colonialism, the violent and uneven impact of socio-cultural and economic systems on one another as they come into contact, the eclipse of traditional ways of life, the temporal (modernization) and spatial (nationalism-internationalism-transnationalism) demands of European modernity, the global spread of capitalism and Western liberalism, and so on. How are these processes expressed through, facilitated, and/or inhibited by literature? To ask this question is to think not just about how globalization is reflected thematically in fiction, for example, but also about literature’s role in the narrative construction of the numerous discourses or “fictions” of globalization. One of the first things to realize about globalization is that its significance can only be grasped through its realization in a variety of narrative forms, spanning the range from accounts of the triumphant coming-into-being of global democracy to laments about the end of nature; literature no doubt has a role to play in how we produce these often contradictory narratives about globalization.⁵ Whether one sees globalization as a contemporary phenomenon that defines the character of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, or merely as an extension of a process initiated millennia ago, there can be no doubt that the generation of narratives about globalization has assumed particular urgency over the last few decades.⁶ While the historical purview of our student’s question is open to debate, it is clear that the

question itself could only be asked in the context of contemporary social, political, and cultural conditions and preoccupations.

Thinking about narratives and their determining contexts highlights another, less obvious but equally important part of the question: to ask whether it *makes sense* to talk about a literature of globalization is to raise questions not just about globalization, but also about processes and practices of literary theory and criticism that frame discussions of the literary. For the most part, the institutions of literary study still have not managed to develop a life beyond those sites at which the discourses of national culture and identity are produced and reproduced: the nation has remained the frame (in the last instance) within which the meaning and significance of a text are thought to be spatially located. To ask the question of whether there is a literature of globalization is thus also to ask whether it is possible to think of literature outside the framework of national literatures, and correspondingly, to try to imagine what critical tools might be used to make sense of such literatures, and what in turn might be learned from and about them, in ways that open up new perspectives on the problems and possibilities that we face at the present time. A cursory survey of contemporary literary critical discourses suggests that some of the tools to address these issues are ready-to-hand: the (messy, unwieldy, heterogeneous) critical discourses of postcolonialism and postmodernism each address, more or less explicitly, the relationship between literature and globalization.

Postcolonialism, in particular, has arguably yielded the vocabulary that enables us to ask questions like the one that prompted this collection, while speaking to the globalization of (Anglophone) literature in a more substantial way. When Simon Gikandi suggests in his contribution to this volume that the emergence of postcolonial literature marks the emergence of global culture, he articulates the widely shared if generally unspoken belief that postcolonial novels are “novels of globalization.”⁷ If the postcolonial and the global are not imagined in this way as being one and the same, then the postcolonial often seems to be the name for the critical practice that precedes and provides the foundations for global or transnational cultural studies.⁸ At the same time, globalization denotes what might be described as the “noncultural logic” of late capitalism that has produced the cultural logic hitherto named “postmodernism.” Given the ever-increasing interrelation between the cultural and the economic, it now seems for most critics pointless not to call this cultural logic “globalization,” too, and to see postmod-

ernism as the early name for social and cultural forces whose emergence was only partially grasped two decades ago.⁹ Lawrence Grossberg has suggested that “globalization has replaced ‘postmodernity’ as the preferred concept through which to think the specificity of the contemporary formation, perhaps because it is (wrongly) assumed that the move itself is sufficient to avoid the charge of euro- or ethnocentrism.”¹⁰ This formulation suggests that globalization may be the name for a false conceptual rapprochement between postmodernism and postcolonialism that eliminates all of the worries expressed about the blind Eurocentrism of postmodernism, through a spatio-temporal leveling of the globe that now places the “rest” alongside the “West.”¹¹ That leveling maneuver, which amounts to the flattening of postcolonialism’s critical impulse, reflects the thrust of much of the work on globalization produced within the social sciences, which not only rarely makes reference to the postcolonial, but seems to find one of postcolonialism’s *bêtes noires*—modernity—to be an unproblematic concept that lies at the center of globalization.¹²

If globalization theory doesn’t necessarily acknowledge the concerns of postcolonialism, postcolonialism has always, at least implicitly, been concerned with the implications of globalization. Thus, in conceiving this issue, we determined—and most of our contributors seem to agree—that a global cultural studies has to first understand its points of filiation and disagreement with postcolonial studies before it can begin to do its work. Though there is no shortage of criticism of postcolonial studies—even or especially from within its own ranks—no other critical practice has foregrounded the links between cultural forms and geopolitics to the degree that postcolonial studies has over the past four decades. No other materialist practice has considered the modalities of race, nation, gender, and ethnicity, in relationship to the global activity of hegemonic cultural, political, and economic forces, with the degrees of complexity and sophistication that have come to be associated with the best work in the field. Before postcolonial studies, Western scholarship was an embarrassment. Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks’s characterization of postcolonial studies as variously “the critique of the continuing economic, political and linguistic power of Europe and North America over the Third World,” the “critique of national literatures as such,” or, more theoretically, as concerned with a notion of the “margin” that is the “constitutive outside” of every regime of power/knowledge, “an intimate alterity that marks the limit of power” makes it seem like an especially vital practice with a limitless critical horizon.¹³

At the same time, as Seshadri-Crooks acknowledges, postcolonial studies has become a melancholic practice. Its melancholia derives from a growing sense of the *limits* of its politics and its thorough incorporation into the Western academy—both arguably symptomatic of postcolonialism’s failure to address the conditions of globalization that simultaneously enable its production and erode its political purchase. This failure cannot be addressed by simply producing a more nuanced theory of the margin, that privileged territory from which the postcolonial proclaims its critical difference from the postmodern. Seshadri-Crooks rightly draws attention to and criticizes the understanding of the margin as a spatial category where the (always as yet) exotic, unassimilated authentic Other exists, as one of the main sources of theoretical and political problems within postcolonial studies. It is just this understanding of the margin that legitimates the liberalism that animates much of what goes under the banner of postcolonial studies, either in the form of Charles Taylor’s explicit attempt to think about ways of respectfully “recognizing” the margin or in any number of theories that read the margin as a monolithic site of critical, utopian energies existing or persisting outside of capitalist hegemonic formations. It seems to us that the solution isn’t to ontologize the margin as the incommensurable and non-recuperable “residue of representation,” but to read the discourse of the margin as a *symptom* of postcolonialism’s commitment to a geopolitics and an understanding of the global circulation of power (its causal circuits and lines of force) that has been changed wholesale in the era of globalization. *Authenticity, hybridity, margins*—these are all names for antinomies that postcolonial studies has identified but has been unable to resolve because of its commitment to a worldview that understands globalization as simply “neoimperialism”: something new, but not different in kind from earlier moments of global capitalist expansion and exploitation.

Its tendency to see globalization as little more than a form of intensified neoimperialism headquartered in the United States is one reason why it has been possible to see postcolonialism as the study of globalization *avant la lettre*. The entry on globalization in *Key Concepts in Post-Colonial Studies*, for example, makes the claim that “the key to the link between classical imperialism and contemporary globalization in the twentieth century has been the role of the United States,” which is responsible for initiating “those features of social life and social relations that today may be considered to characterize the global: mass production, mass communication and mass consumption.”¹⁴ This is a commonly held view of globalization—a kind of

ground zero that explains everything in terms that find immediate sympathy with critics, scholars, and activists around the world: the United States as global hegemonic bully. What most often seems to be signified by the "United States" here is not so much its citizens, or even some subsection of them, but everything from the U.S. state apparatus (including its military power) to Hollywood and American cultural industries more generally, to that unholy triumvirate of consumerism, capitalism, and modernity. As this list might suggest, this is a narrative of the motivating force of globalization that is fraught with theoretical and empirical difficulties. It reasserts a view of sovereign power and of political causality that, after Foucault, seems difficult to sustain, especially as imagined on a global scale; it depends on the simplest versions of the cultural imperialist thesis, whose problems John Tomlinson has exposed; and it locates power in a specific national space, reasserting the legitimacy of national boundaries and national characteristics, both of which have been forcefully challenged over the past several decades.¹⁵ Finally, characterizing U.S. political and cultural power as a global dominant detracts from a more thorough examination of the sites and modalities of power in the global era—including those sites of institutional power with which the contributors to this issue are associated. That many of those sites are located, intellectually and materially, in the United States (a situation elaborated by Timothy Brennan's piece in this collection) does not obviate the need to understand the networks in which they operate as something more than crude extensions of a national will-to-power.¹⁶

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's recent book, *Empire*, is exceptionally helpful in advancing our capacity to think past the reinscription of globalization as a center/periphery dynamic that produces resistant margins and hegemonic cores. Hardt and Negri take seriously the possibility that globalization is the process by which a new form of political sovereignty is being constituted—a global order (Empire) made up of various forms and levels of political agency that together produce a purely immanent global capitalist order that lacks an outside. It is impossible to easily summarize the conclusions of this long, densely argued book.¹⁷ With reference to the issues we have been discussing here, the significance of the book lies in its mapping of a global political terrain that cannot be adequately conceptualized through an understanding of sovereignty as residing primarily within the nation-state. What Hardt and Negri call "Empire" is therefore not to be confused with imperialism, since imperialism is only possible within the para-

digm of national sovereignty, as nation-states compete for resources and territory. Instructively, Hardt and Negri characterize both postmodern and postcolonial theory as *symptoms* of the end of modern sovereignty — as kinds of critique that can only emerge once modern sovereignty is no longer the framework for control and domination. This modern form of sovereignty, which can be encapsulated as a form of binary (or even dialectical) logic that operates on an ultimately unsustainable separation of inside and outside, transcendent and immanent, has been eclipsed in the transformation of an imperialist capitalism into Empire, which is why it seems as if those theorists “who advocate a politics of difference, fluidity, and hybridity in order to challenge the binaries and essentialism of modern sovereignty have been outflanked by strategies of power.”¹⁸ “Postmodernists continually return to the lingering influence of the Enlightenment as the source of domination; postcolonial theorists combat the remnants of colonialist thinking.”¹⁹ Unfortunately, power has evolved and transformed: the challenge we collectively face today is to make sense of this shift so that critiques engage with the present and the future, and not with the past. That challenge is taken up by each of the essays in this issue.

One final issue still needs to be addressed: What role does literature (and the criticism of literature) play in these deliberations? More specifically, what role do *Anglophone* literatures play? In deciding on the theme for this issue, we opted to introduce a limit on what might well have become a far too fragmented and open set of reflections on literature in the era of globalization. Globalization doesn't displace or replace existing institutions and practices once and for all; too much of the discourse on globalization has failed to remember the force and power of the residual at every moment of the dominant. To avoid an overly broad and unfocused sampling of the conditions of literary production and criticism across the globe, we thought that it might be more useful to explore these questions along one particular axis.²⁰ As Nicholas Brown and Peter Hitchcock both point out in their contributions to this issue, the term *Anglophone* is a vexed one. Our aim in invoking it was to put into play a whole range of issues that are too seldom grouped together. *Anglophone literatures* draws attention to the roots of postcolonial literary studies in the study of Commonwealth literature, as well as to the politics of this latter practice that a postcolonial studies dominated by the analysis of English-language texts has never managed to successfully overcome. *Anglophone* seems now like an archaic and vaguely embarrass-

ing term that has long been surpassed in both theoretical rigor and political astuteness; such imagined great leaps forward in our critical capacities should always be treated with some suspicion for what they conceal about our current practices. At the same time, we want to point to the challenges to the purity of the category of *Anglophone* that have been mounted by national and regional cultures and literatures that have made English their own since the beginning of British imperial expansion. *Anglophone* is meant as well to foreground the role of English as a global vernacular—both as an empirical fact (the Internet) but also as one of the last rhetorical vestiges of a vanquished imperialist power (English is not the only global vernacular). Finally, as a way of emphasizing that globalization cannot be reduced to simply the extension and intensification of early imperialisms, *Anglophone* forces us to consider the relationship of the literatures and culture of the United Kingdom and the United States to globalization, and not just those literatures and cultures that could be imagined as emerging out of minority, immigrant, or diasporic groups within these countries. In this way, the apparently retrograde term *Anglophone* seemed to us to have advantages over the “postcolonial.” We felt that a confrontation between “postcolonialism” and “globalization” would result in expected answers framed by expected questions, when precisely what is needed is to think the whole relationship of contemporary culture to power and politics in a more efficacious way.

It does not really make sense to search for a literature of globalization—for texts that explicitly thematize the processes of globalization—any more than it does to search for particularly explicit examples of postcolonial literature. *Postcolonial* is the name for several things at once: it is the name of a reading strategy (in Jameson’s sense, it is the interpretive process through which a text is allegorically rendered into the language of a particular “master code”); a spatiotemporal marker; and the name for literatures and critical practices that highlight certain kinds of commitments, politics, and identities.²¹ These aspects of “postcolonial” have become blurred together over time, such that what are described as postcolonial literatures today are often already written in a master code that hardly needs interpretative energy, as in the case of recent novels such as Zadie Smith’s *White Teeth* or Salman Rushdie’s *The Ground Beneath Her Feet*. *Postcolonial* may in fact have functioned best as a spatiotemporal term that not only produced political analyses of colonial and postcolonial discourses, but also forced a profound reconsideration of those discourses and movements that seemed to exist at a

distance from imperialism; the constitutive role of imperialism in British modernism is highlighted precisely by its general refusal to think or represent this central facet of British experience. In one sense, then, one could say that from the high point of European imperialism to the end of the Cold War *all literature was postcolonial literature*. In a similar way, posing the question of the relationship between literature and globalization should make us realize that *all literature is now global, all literature is a literature of globalization*.²²

At the same time, to come at the question from a different angle, it is worth considering why one would be worried about literature in the era of globalization at all. Notwithstanding literary criticism's arrogation of the field of globalization studies to itself, as observed by Gikandi in this issue, *globalization* and *literature* are concepts that seem to sit uneasily with one another. Discussions of globalization and culture rarely deal with literature, but focus instead on those mediums that transmit culture electronically, which are imagined as having an especially powerful and even determinate impact on social and individual identities: film, television, telecommunications, and the Internet. In the renewed attempts by states around the globe to defend national cultures, a fence is rarely erected at the border to keep foreign literature from contaminating the social body. Like the term *Anglophone, literature*, too, seems archaic in some respects. Is it pointless to worry about literature or literary criticism, as it lacks the broad social effectivity of electronic forms of culture? We would find ourselves uncomfortable with any attempt to defend literature as an especially privileged form of cultural expression that (universally) encodes consciousness and unconscious social imperatives in ways that no (say) Hollywood or Bollywood movie could. Yet, in the efforts that have been made to get past the crippling idealizations of literature's cultural and social function, it is as much of a mistake to no longer think about literature as it is to only think about it. Of all of its many formulations, it seems most productive to see globalization as a moment in which we need to profoundly rethink the ideas of social causality and effectivity that give rise to the relatively unproblematic belief that electronic images have immediate and known effects in ways that words do not. Even if it does not have an obviously dominant role to play in the global imagination, literature remains a significant place in which this imagination is produced and represented, and a site where it is possible to gauge the shifting valences of culture in relationship to those other political, social, and economic reali-

ties that globalization most commonly names. Still, it is probably also provident to remind those of us who have a vested interest in literature that it is fast becoming a vestigial cultural form. Were it not defended ceaselessly by a (relatively speaking) powerful clerisy whose energies emanate from this object, literature and literary studies would have already become an object of study not for politically minded intellectuals interested in tracing the seismic tremors of contemporary culture back to the shifting tectonic plates of the political and the economic, but for cultural historians fascinated with long-forgotten practices whose imaginative grip it is now hard to comprehend. To ponder the conjunction of globalization and fiction is to explore not just those fictions of globalization that have (most evidently) transmuted neoliberal ideology into fate, but the fictions that have been built up around literature itself—fictions that globalization threatens to explode.

The relationship of literature to globalization (and vice versa) is sketched out in different ways in the essays that comprise this issue. Not surprisingly, these essays do not just confirm the importance of the questions we began by asking; in many cases they highlight their insufficiency. The certainty with which we composed the title for the collection, “Anglophone Literature and Global Culture,” rapidly eroded in the face of submissions that radically questioned all its key terms. Consistent with their refusal to take any of these concepts for granted, these essays do not offer a confident response to the question advanced in an essay from another recent issue on globalization and literature: Can English survive the globalization of literary studies, and if so what will it look like?²³ Rather, they think critically about what is at stake in asking these kinds of questions, not just for literary scholars, but for the other subjects of globalization, whose fates are too often forgotten in our anxious exercises of self-interrogation.

Simon Gikandi’s essay, “Globalization and the Claims of Postcoloniality,” suggests that the substance of the relationship this issue examines, between Anglophone literature/culture and globalization may be less—or at the very least different—than what it appears. Gikandi asks the provocative question, How did the literary critic become the custodian of a postglobal culture in the academy? In his essay he explores the problems that arise in connection with reading globalization through English literature, beginning with the overly optimistic assumption, bolstered by postcolonial theory, that globalization represents the end of the nation-state and the proliferation of cultural relationships characterized by difference and hybridity. Looking to

English literature as evidence of this shift produces two further complications: first, and most crucially, the problem of privileging literary narratives over (or reading them as representative of) the stories of real people's lives. There is, as Gikandi points out, "no reason to suppose that the global flow in images has a homological connection to transformations in social or cultural relationships." If a connection does exist between the production of "world" literature and contemporary social relations, it is both more complicated and more sobering than enthusiastic proponents of postcolonial hybridity have acknowledged. Behind the confident proclamation of literature as the embodiment of postnational culture, Gikandi suggests that it is possible to detect the voice of F. R. Leavis, whose vision of an English literary culture that transcended both politics and political borders became the template for postcolonial English studies in contexts as distinct as Nigeria, India, and the United States. This seemingly paradoxical translation was enabled by the antipolitical universalism of Leavisite rhetoric, which made it possible at least temporarily to forget its deeply nationalist roots. A similar kind of forgetfulness might be seen to characterize the work of postcolonial intellectuals who, in a concrete embodiment of Leavis's ideal English literary community, homogenized their diverse third world origins through the common currency of British or American academic credentials. As Arif Dirlik has observed in a different context, the mostly celebratory discourse of postcolonialism that community has spawned is predicated on a culturalist refusal to examine the forces of capital that enabled the global migration of elite knowledge workers.²⁴ Those same global forces, Gikandi reminds us, play out with radically different consequences for the vast majority of people in the third world, whose stories of globalization cannot easily be harnessed to the emancipatory narratives of postcolonial hybridity.

Timothy Brennan puts this another way, in his "Cosmo-Theory": "If one means by globalization the creation of new 'world subjects' who are not bound by the laws and territorial limitations of locality—or indeed, are necessarily happy in their uprootedness—one is indulging in a fiction, and is either missing the point or obscuring it by looking at symptoms whose significance is always exaggerated." Brennan interrogates this fiction through the concept of cosmopolitanism, which has become one of the most frequently and fondly deployed concepts in academic discussions of globalization, denoting "the thirst for another knowledge, unprejudiced striving, world travel, supple open-mindedness, broad international norms of civic

equality, [and] a politics of treaty and understanding rather than conquest.” Rejecting the binary opposition of cosmopolitanism and patriotism that is invoked both by cosmopolitanism’s promoters and its detractors, Brennan advocates instead an examination of the economic context in which these terms circulate, a context in which nations and transnational corporations thrive together in a global order that is not as new as it seems. Underlying the failure of cosmo-theorists to examine the contradictions in this system is a more significant reluctance to look at their own role as knowledge workers within it. “Humanist ethics,” Brennan notes, “commands a higher price if its use-value is deliberately blurred.” The blurring of economic implications of cosmopolitanism is achieved in part by the resolute presentism of cosmo-theory that fails to draw connections between contemporary usages of the term and historical formulations, whose imperialist implications were less disguised. Georg Simmel’s (1903) definition of cosmopolitanism, for example, conforms unapologetically “to a kind of law of colonial expansion whereby urban centers (metropolitan regions) justified their encroaching power over geopolitically dispersed, and therefore vulnerable, territories.”²⁵ Antonio Gramsci holds a similar understanding of the term, which informs his hostility to it: cosmopolitanism, for Gramsci and contemporary leftists, was incompatible with the principle of internationalism, which “acknowledges that differences of culture and polity can not be juridically erased before the conditions exist for doing so equitably.” In contemporary cosmopolitanism, Brennan suggests, beneath the explicit desire for such juridical erasure of boundaries lurks an implicit subscription to an updated version of American manifest destiny: “What cosmopolitanism unconsciously strives for is a stasis in which the unique expression of the non-Western is Western reflexively and automatically—the local self exported *as* the world.” Brennan’s comments are a salutary reminder that, however vigilant we might be about problems of critical complicity in a general, cultural sense, without a rigorous examination of the economic stakes in our intellectual positions in the cosmopolis, theoretical pronouncements about our political allegiances with third world subalterns against the forces of transnational capital ring hollow.²⁶

Rosemary Jolly’s essay, “Desiring Good(s) in the Face of Marginalized Subjects: South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission in a Global Context,” takes up the issue of the limits of cosmopolitan thinking by looking at the specific example of the international (mis)understanding of South

Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Numerous factors, including "the waning of access to the local knowledges required to sustain reliable cross-cultural interchange and a lack of imagination about forms of democracy that do not rest on systems with which we are familiar" inhibit the ability of Western commentators in general, and postcolonial scholars in particular, to make sense of alternative democratic institutions such as the TRC. Jolly further notes the limitations of a mode of postcolonialist scholarship characterized by a "Foucauldian emphasis on the aleatory nature of the sources and distribution of power, and . . . adoption (following Lacan) of the desiring subject—rather than the subject-in-need—as the center of its politics."²⁷ She agrees with critics such as Dirlik who have pointed to the strategic silences in postcolonial scholarship about its own implication in networks of global capital. At the same time, she suggests the need to be wary of a too rigidly materialist reading of cultural issues through the lens of global economic forces. In particular, Jolly critically notes the tendency for both Western culturalist *and* materialist readings to dismiss institutions such as the TRC, whose adherence to a model of reconciliation affiliated with Christian rituals of confession does not conform to a secular, rationalist framework. Such dismissals, she suggests, reinscribe Western developmentalist narratives in which South Africa is cast as irrational and backward (narratives that work not only in aid of racist colonial mythology but also of characterizations of apartheid as a form of collective insanity long outgrown by the civilized West). They also misunderstand the purpose of the TRC as a forum not of retributive justice that seeks to redress wrongs committed by and against liberal bourgeois subjects, but rather as an instrument of healing that seeks to overcome the breaches between and within apartheid's victims and perpetrators, through the ritual of bearing witness. Far from bringing about the "closure" that Western notions of justice are increasingly driven toward, the TRC, by "ritualiz[ing] that which can be counted upon to resist closure—narrative," enables its participants to work through, without resolving, the contradictions of their history, including the tension between tradition and modernity. Informed by faith in the possibility of articulating a collective story of the past, in the service of the collective needs of the present, the TRC resists both the "reification of tradition" and the rationalization of suffering in accordance with a globalist formula of human rights that is informed by the discourse of liberal capitalism.

Jolly's essay reminds us of the need to counterpoise the necessarily ab-

stract and globalist thrust of much discussion of globalization with a focus on specific, local contexts. Paul Sharrad takes up this challenge in a different way in his essay, "Out of Africa: Literary Globalization in the Winds of Change," which looks at one particular form of globalization that shaped the course of postcolonial cultural development in the South Pacific. In his analysis of literary networks that linked Papua New Guinea and Africa in the 1960s, Sharrad complicates the narrative of postcolonial literary history that posits the colonies "writing back" to the empire, by highlighting a system of cultural exchange that bypassed Europe altogether. His essay traces a strong African influence in the development not just of South Pacific literatures, but also, and ultimately more significantly, in the institutions—spawned by "the twin systems of literacy and missions"—through which those literatures were promulgated. Often, this influence was embodied in writers, teachers, and administrators whose careers ranged intellectually and/or physically across the postcolonial world. In the mid-seventies, for example, the School of Education at the University of the South Pacific (USP) in Suva was headed by L. F. Brissenden, a New Zealander who had taught in Africa. In conjunction with others such as the Samoan Albert Wendt, who had been exposed while studying history in New Zealand to the work of anticolonial activists and writers such as Jomo Kenyatta, Chinua Achebe, and Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Brissenden presided over the creation of an introductory English course that, by 1976, no longer contained any canonical British texts. Thus an educational institution established with the roughly complementary aims of producing good Christians and competent bureaucrats (the potential contradictions between these roles smoothed over by their common devotion to the task of faithfully serving the British Empire), played a significant role in the forging of an international anticolonial solidarity. In the decades that followed, Sharrad notes, these burgeoning forms of literary internationalism declined in the face of other more powerful forms of globalization: the rationalization of postsecondary education in conformity to the requirements of the New Economy, for example, resulted in the attenuation of literary studies at USP and University of Papua New Guinea. Their early cosmopolitan flowering is still worth studying, however, as part of a process that is "neither the contemporary consumerist globalization of multinational corporations, nor the nineteenth-century political-cultural globalization of imperialism . . . [but] a new 'in-between' mode of knowledge dissemination that is part of the decolonizing process leading to pre-globalization-era nation-states."

While the globalization of English may have functioned politically to sustain, and ultimately to dismantle the structure of the British Empire, it also operated on a much more intimate level, as Sneja Gunew shows in her essay, “Technologies of the Self: Corporeal Effects of English.” Focusing on the diffusion of the English language that proceeded in tandem, if not always in connection, with the globalization of English literary studies, Gunew looks at English as a technology of subjectivity (in Foucault’s sense) that works in conjunction with colonial and neocolonial regimes of disciplinarity. The corporeal and affective dimensions of English (language and literature) education emerge in a reading of three “quintessentially globalized exilic subjects”—Edward Said, Shirley Geok-lin Lim, and Eva Hoffman—who each undergo a process of colonial conscription into English in which pedagogical discipline is both undermined and reinforced by the compensatory pleasure of literature. Thus the Anglicized subject is at once bullied and seduced into accepting the corporeal burden of English. Globalization, Gunew notes, has shaped English studies in a number of ways, including the shift in the university’s ideological function away from the nation (public) toward corporate (private) interests, and the proliferation of “discrepant englishes” whose variations are increasingly measured against a presumed American rather than a British norm. Most interestingly, perhaps, Gunew’s argument raises the suggestive possibility that notwithstanding the new and in some ways more insidious reach of the cultural technologies of globalization, bolstered by the “smorgasbord” of ESL packages now available, that English may be losing its power as a technology of subjectification. Citing Said, Gunew notes that the rise of English to the level of a worldwide lingua franca has “all but terminally consigned [it] to the level of a technical language almost totally stripped not only of expressive and aesthetic characteristics but also denuded of any critical or self-conscious dimensions.” Once denuded of the Trojan horse of English literature, which insinuated itself into the hearts of its subjects by dint of its sensuous aesthetic qualities, English language becomes a much cruder—and arguably less effective—tool of interpellation.

In “Decolonizing (the) English,” Peter Hitchcock takes up some of the same questions that Gunew poses about the status of English as a global language and its relationship to contemporary identity construction, but focuses on the problems and pitfalls of overcoming the colonial legacy of both England (as a nation) and English (as a language) through the redefinition of culture alone. Hitchcock notes that on the surface, England (and the “old”

English) seems to have embraced a cosmopolitanism that recognizes the limitations, violence, and exclusions of traditional definitions of “Englishness”: from one vantage point, the imperatives that have driven postcolonial politics, culture, and identity have, in effect, already decolonized English and the English. Hitchcock cautions, however, that a simple negation of Englishness in recognition of the racial and ethnic diversity of contemporary England obscures the ways in which cosmopolitan discourse masks the continuation of the privilege and power of traditional definitions of Englishness. Through a consideration of a wide range of contemporary texts that explore the identities of the postcolony—including Merle Hodge’s *Crick Crack Monkey*, Hanif Kureishi’s autobiographical essay about his journey to Pakistan, the music of Asian Dub Foundation, and Ken Loach’s film *Riff-Raff*—Hitchcock shows how “normative cosmopolitanism in England is parochialism dressed as difference. The otherness defined through language use can be smothered by the mantle of English as the denominator of location.” In order to get past the limits of this form of bourgeois cosmopolitanism, Hitchcock argues for an “abnegative cosmopolitanism” that engages with the abnegation that marks the very possibility of the decolonizing process. One such abnegation is to bring “Anglophone home to England.” Hitchcock recognizes that the adjective *Anglophone* has always negatively reinforced the concreteness of England as a nation and Englishness as cultural identity (Anglophone usually denoting what is outside of England). For Hitchcock, the use of Anglophone to now describe what is *in* England

describes those moments or processes when English as a medium of national cultural exchange is questioned by its own colonial past and is situated in a discourse that is primarily transnational. It does not erase English or toss out the profound allegiance of England to a language and literature that is English but looks to pinpoint cultural negotiations of English as a new reality of postcoloniality in a transnational frame (when the literature of elsewhere becomes the literature of here).

For Hitchcock as for the other contributors to this issue, understanding globalization and culture is predicated on recognizing the material conditions that are both masked and expressed through discourse. In her essay, “Literature As Proleptic Globalization, or the Pre-History of the New Intellectual Property,” Caren Irr pursues the relationship between culture and economics more literally. In fact, not only is Irr’s discussion of the evolution

of intellectual property law more rigorously attentive to the material conditions of literary production than most accounts, it is also more focused on literature. For all the worries that literary theorists may have hijacked debates about globalization, literature itself, as Irr notes, rates little mention. Her account establishes the centrality of literature to the narrative of globalization, in terms not so much of its structure or thematics as of its status as intellectual property. She argues that while in earlier phases of capitalist development the evolution of literature as intellectual property was synchronized relatively closely with the prevailing economic structures of mercantilism and, later, industrial expansion, in the present context of globalization, it operates proleptically; in other words “intellectual property disputes leap ahead of (or are ‘prolepses’ for) conflicts over the dynamics of contemporary global capitalism.” The historical narrative Irr traces is predicated on the location of globalization in *la longue durée* as merely the latest phase in planetary capitalist expansion, and cultural forms as part of that process to the extent that they are “always a part of their social totality and especially . . . implicated in international and interregional relations of domination.” In the eighteenth century, Irr suggests, the establishment of intellectual property laws in England, in response to an anxiety about piracy, was homologous to the consolidation of the English mercantilist economy as a whole. The spatial organization of this economic system, which may be crudely described as a dominant center connected to a series of peripheral nodes, is replicated in the copyright law that emerged in the eighteenth century, establishing London as the center of networks of text distribution, and guarding against the production of “pirated” books. In the nineteenth century, concern for the rights of the author or bookseller was balanced against acknowledging rights of public access or “fair use” in a way that conformed synecdochically to the reorganization of production along standardized industrial lines. In the twentieth century, by contrast, the evolution of intellectual property law in some ways anticipated the movement of the economy as a whole in its increasingly atomistic fixation on “the text (or writing or invention) alone rather than on its interaction with other elements of the literary process—the author/producer or user/reader, for instance—that were the foci of mercantilist and industrial attention respectively.” This move paved the way for the intensification of capitalism under globalization, which operates to translate an increasing range of cultural and natural resources into versions of textual property. The global “harmonization” of intellectual prop-

erty legislation is “the symptom of a phase of expansion at the core reaching its saturation point, and it may well be the harbinger of a different style of expansion on a global scale, reorganizing once again the global geography of core and periphery.” As the prototype of intellectual property, literature is “intimate with globalization—perhaps even to the point of paving the way for further capitalist expansion in societies that have previously employed other models of ownership (or nonownership) over what Americans call ‘literary’ writing.” It is in this intimacy with globalization, paradoxically, that literature might have the potential to counter some of its more oppressive aspects. In other words, it is not in its themes or in its “eidaesthetic” function, discussed by Nicholas Brown in his essay in this issue, but rather “in the use and practice of an alternative conception of property . . . that literature offers at least some utopian potential.”

One of the most common articulations of globalization is the narrative that sees its arrival as inaugurating the “end of history.” If reports of this end have, by some accounts, been greatly exaggerated, commentators on both the left and the right have associated globalization with the diminishment of utopian possibilities. In a related move, literature has been seriously discredited as a vehicle for imagining our way into a different, better future. Hovering over these casualties of postmodernity is the specter of Marxism, which many critics still hold up as a credible narrative of present cultural and material conditions and future change. Foremost among these critics in the field of culture is Fredric Jameson, whose work is the subject of Imre Szeman’s essay, “Who’s Afraid of National Allegory? Jameson, Literary Criticism, Globalization.” In a reconsideration of Jameson’s oft-criticized account of third world literature as national allegory, Szeman sketches some of the limits of Jameson’s interpretive politics while drawing out those aspects of it that remain productive and provocative, especially with respect to the interpretation of third world literature in the context of globalization. While acknowledging the various aspects of Jameson’s theory that have drawn the ire of postcolonial critics, including its implicit developmentalism and its mostly uncritical deployment of three-worlds theory, Szeman suggests that much of the criticism directed at Jameson stems from a misreading of its central premises, “allegory” and “nation.” Allegory, Szeman points out, denotes in Jameson’s work not the naïve one-to-one mapping of text and pretext associated with Bunyan, but rather a mode of interpretation that highlights the implication of the personal in the political, the pri-

vate in the public—a mode of interpretation that has been all but lost in the developed world. If culture in general is that realm that mediates between the political and the psychological, allegory is the operation of reading that makes that relationship manifest. It assumes a particularly pointed form in the context of the cultural revolution through which a once-subjected people attempts to throw off the legacy of subalternity. Culture is the vehicle through which “the ‘baleful and crippling’ habits that are the residue of colonialism can be addressed and potentially overcome,” at the same time as it is itself born from, and its shape determined by, that residue: cultural structures and attitudes must be understood “as having been themselves, in the beginning, vital responses to infrastructural realities (economic and geographic, for example), as attempts to resolve more fundamental contradictions—attempts which then outlive the situations for which they were devised, and survive, in reified forms, as “cultural patterns.” Those patterns themselves then become part of the objective situation confronted by later generations.’”²⁸

To think about culture this way is to ask not only what infrastructural realities produce—and are thereby illuminated by—national allegory, but also, more generally, what kind of conditions enable the production of *literature*, an imported and now largely outmoded technology that nevertheless plays a vital role in the process of postcolonial cultural revolution. The question of belatedness returns to the idea of the nation, whose place in Jameson’s theory at first seems inexplicable in the context of a global system in which its political power seems largely to have been superseded. It survives, even in Jameson’s most recent work, Szeman suggests, not as a naïve or nostalgic gesture toward an actual space outside the postmodern, but rather as a name for, among other things, “a frankly utopic space that designates ‘whatever programmes and representations express, in however distorted or unconscious a fashion, the demands of a collective life to come, and identify social collectivity as the crucial centre of any truly progressive and innovative political response to globalization.’”

The question remains how or whether literature in general, and Anglophone literature in particular, serves as a vehicle for utopian imaginings in the age of globalization. In taking up this question in his essay, “The Eidaesthetic Itinerary: Notes on the Geopolitical Movement of the Literary Absolute,” Nicholas Brown pulls apart the confident claims to self-evidence of the subject of this issue, Anglophone literature, tracing its evolution

through overlapping economic, political, and cultural movements to its contemporary significance as a form that has in some ways outlived its relevance. The relevance of literature may be defined by what Brown, following Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, refers to as its “eidaesthetic” function, its capacity to overcome—or to represent the possibility of overcoming—the contradictions of capitalism, by gesturing toward the connection between the part and the whole, and “salvag[ing] the contents of life from the deadening effects of reification.”²⁹ Formulated in nineteenth-century Germany, in the work of Friedrich von Schlegel in particular, this “romantico-modern” conception of literature locates it in a place between philosophy and theory; it is at once a “living, vibrant work of art,” an embodiment of romantic organicity “*and* a distinct discourse that would be able to recover that organicity from the necessarily fragmentary nature of any particularly literary work.” This bifurcation anticipates the contemporary development of theory as a separate discourse, and one that would ultimately replace literature in its capacity to signify Totality, but this could only happen in the wake of two historical/cultural movements: modernism and—more importantly—postcolonialism. While modernism revises Romantic conceptions of literature by transferring the location of transcendent meaning from the infinite to the object, or “thing-in-itself,” it retains a utopian impulse. Crucially, however, the Utopia it gestures toward “comes into being only at the expense of aestheticizing the problems it resolves.” Postcolonial literature represents the confrontation of the problem addressed by Romanticism and Modernism—the schism between subject and object, and between the promise of organic totality and the material reality of division and reification—from the perspective of those who occupy a very different position within the economic order. We therefore witness in postcolonial literature, if we read it in the right way (and generally, Brown suggests, we do not), a recasting of the problem from a philosophical to a political one: in place of the Absolute, postcolonial literature seeks to signify the social totality. If the utopian impulse in postcolonial literature is ultimately mitigated by the diversion of the postcolonial project to neocolonial ends, its energies are not entirely mitigated; instead they are reconstituted by theory. Countering suggestions that theory is Eurocentric, Brown offers the argument that “*all theory is postcolonial theory*: it owes its very existence to the struggle against colonial domination and its echo in the political urgency of the First-World-60s.” This reversal of the usual representation of a dynamic

of a third world always struggling to define itself out from under first world cultural hegemony mirrors the argument advanced by Hardt and Negri in *Empire*. Instead of seeing resistance generated in response to capitalism, they suggest that capitalism must constantly scramble to reorganize in response to labor; in other words, “resistance precedes power.” Thus, “the current reorganization of capital called globalization is an essentially reactive regrouping after the disintegration of classical imperialism at the hands of the anticolonial movements.” Its reactive nature does not finally mitigate the power of globalization that, through its subsumption of labor by capital and elimination of “even hypothetical space external to ‘our’ world system” heralds, not just incidentally, the obsolescence of literature. As the realm of transcendence gives way to the field of immanence such that “every activity resonates *immediately* with the Totality itself,” the eidaesthetic function of literature, which works to bridge the gap between the fragment and the Totality loses its significance. However, the withering away of the sphere of mediation need not mean the end of utopian cultural forms: Brown suggests that music, in its capacity to engage the mind and body and to synchronize individual bodies into a social totality may be “better able to carry Literature’s eidaesthetic project into a fully globalized world.”

Collectively, these essays suggest that while it might still be too soon for eulogies, the institution of English has been rocked by global changes for which prevailing models of cultural criticism have not quite prepared us. No matter in what form Anglophone literatures survive in the twenty-first century, these essays provide a valuable anatomy of their current state and future possibilities.

Notes

We would like to thank Latham Hunter and Christopher Snook for their invaluable editorial assistance in compiling this collection.

- 1 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York, 1978), 469–500.
- 2 As Bruce Robbins reminds us, print-capitalism produced transnational connections as much as the national ones that Benedict Anderson detailed in his now canonical book on the subject. Timothy Brennan’s discussion of the “cosmopolitan” function of the novel as a technology of communication between national elites—and only a small sliver of those, too—should also be kept in mind whenever discussing the globalization of literature. See Bruce Robbins, “Part 1: Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism,” in *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation*, ed. Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (Minneapo-

- lis, 1998), 1–19; and Timothy Brennan, *Salman Rushdie and the Third World* (Houndmills, UK, 1989), 56.
- 3 Giles Gunn, "Introduction: Globalizing Literary Studies," *PMLA* 116.1 (2001): 16–31; quotation from 17.
 - 4 Stephen Greenblatt, "Racial Memory and Literary History," *PMLA* 116.1 (2001): 48–63; quotation from 52.
 - 5 On the fictional or discursive character of globalization, see J. K. Graham-Gibson, "Querying Globalization," *Rethinking Marxism* 9.1 (1996–97): 1–27; Arif Dirlik, "Globalization As the End and the Beginning of History," *Rethinking Marxism* 12.4 (Fall 2000); Thomas Peyser, "How Global Is It: Walter Abish and the Fiction of Globalization," *Contemporary Literature* 40.2 (1999): 240–62; and Anna Tsing, "Inside the Economy of Appearances," *Public Culture* 12.1 (Spring 2000): 115–44. In reference to the particular situation of the United States, Frederick Buell has described the discourse of globalization as "a macronarrative at a time when these have been theoretically invalidated," which functions in the United States as a form of "cultural nationalism for post-national circumstances." Like many other U.S.-based commentators', Buell's account still places the United States at the center of globalization and grants it (the state?) unexpected powers and abilities to manage the production of identity within its own boundaries. This vision of the place of the United States in and with reference to globalization must itself be seen as a problematic macronarrative of globalization, though perhaps the most difficult one to see for what it is. See Frederick Buell, "Nationalist Postnationalism: Globalist Discourse in Contemporary American Culture," *American Quarterly* 50.3 (1998): 548–91; quotations from 583 n.3, 550.
 - 6 Among those who take the long view of the processes that have come to be defined as "globalization" are Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, who note that economic integration is less extensive today than it was in the late nineteenth century; Roland Robertson, who links the beginning of globalization to the decline of religious empires and the development of maps and maritime travel; William McNeill, who traces practices of economic and cultural exchange back to premodern Afro-Eurasian trade routes; and Armand Mattelart, who argues that the world was already networked by the late eighteenth century. See Hirst and Thompson, *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance* (London, 1995); Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London, 1992); McNeill, *Plagues and People* (New York, 1998); and Mattelart, *Networking the World, 1794–2000*, trans. Liz Carey-Libbrecht and James A. Cohen (Minneapolis, 2000).
 - 7 Simon Gikandi, "Globalization and the Claims of Postcoloniality," in this issue.
 - 8 Ien Eng and Jon Stratton, "Asianing Australia: Notes Toward a Critical Transnationalism in Cultural Studies," *Cultural Studies* 10.1 (1996): 16–36.
 - 9 The connection is made on the first page of Malcolm Waters's study of globalization: "Just as postmodernism was the concept of the 1980s, globalization may be the concept of the 1990s." Waters, *Globalization* (New York, 1995), 1. Jameson's recent emphasis on the intensified interrelation of culture and economics as a sign of globalization is already prefigured in his 1979 essay, "Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture": "Culture, far from being an occasional matter of the reading of a monthly good book or a trip to the drive-in, seems

- to me the very element of consumer society itself. . . everything is mediated by culture, to the point where even the political and ideological 'levels' have initially to be disentangled from their primary mode of representation which is cultural" (*Social Text* 1 [1979]: 139). It is interesting to note the eclipse of the word *postmodernism* in Jameson's own work, and the globalized inflections given the postmodern in Perry Anderson's recent book on Jameson, *The Origins of Postmodernity* (New York, 1998).
- 10 Lawrence Grossberg, "Speculations and Articulations of Globalization," *Polygraph* 11 (1999): 11–48; quotation from 11.
 - 11 For discussions of the time(s) and space(s) of globalization, see Paul Smith, *Millennial Dreams: Contemporary Culture and Capital in the North* (New York, 1997); Neil Smith, "Homeless/Global: Scaling Places," in *Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures Global Change*, ed. John Bird, et al. (New York, 1993), 87–119; and Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe* (Princeton, 2000), among others.
 - 12 See, for example, Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization* (Cambridge, UK, 1994); Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson, eds., *Global Modernities* (London, 1995); and Anthony Giddens, *Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge, UK, 1990).
 - 13 Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks, "At the Margins of Postcolonial Studies: Part 1," in *The Pre-Occupation of Postcolonial Studies*, ed. Fawzia Afzal-Khan and Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks (Durham, 2000), 3–23; quotations from 4, 13.
 - 14 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, *Key Concepts in Post-Colonial Studies* (New York, 1998), 112–13.
 - 15 John Tomlinson, *Cultural Imperialism* (Baltimore, 1991).
 - 16 One is reminded here of Raymond Williams's warnings against the too-simple equation of the dominant culture with that of the dominant classes. It is not just that such an equation gets culture wrong; it also grants power over culture to the dominant classes: if culture is always an expression of "their" culture, then it makes sense that they would have the right to define it as they wish against the desires of the lower classes. See Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society 1780–1950* (New York, 1983).
 - 17 For an overview of the main themes of *Empire*, see Nicholas Brown and Imre Szeman, "The Global Coliseum: On *Empire*: An Interview with Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri," *Cultural Studies* 16.2 (2002), forthcoming.
 - 18 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, MA, 2000), 138.
 - 19 *Ibid.*, 137.
 - 20 In any case, such volumes of comparative case studies of globalization already exist. See Fredric Jameson and Masao Miyoshi, eds., *The Cultures of Globalization* (Durham, 1998); Rob Wilson and Wimal Dissanayake, eds., *Global/Local: Cultural Production and the Transnational Imaginary* (Durham, 1996); Richard Dienst and Henry Schwarz, eds., *Reading the Shape of the World: Toward an International Cultural Studies* (Boulder, CO, 1996); and Ann Cvetkovich and Douglas Kellner, eds., *Articulating the Global and the Local* (Boulder, CO, 1997).
 - 21 All too often these interpretive strategies have unintentionally reimposed Western concerns and thematics. As Dipesh Chakrabarty has pointed out, "An unself-conscious but nevertheless blatant example of this 'inequality of ignorance' in literary studies, for ex-

- ample, is the following sentence on Salman Rushdie from a recent text on postmodernism: "Though Saleem Sinai [of *Midnight's Children*] narrates in English . . . his intertexts for both writing history and writing fiction are doubled: they are, on the one hand, from Indian legends, films and literature and, on the other, from the West—*The Tin Drum*, *Tristram Shandy*, *One Hundred Years of Solitude* and so on.' It is interesting to note how this sentence teases out only those references that are from 'the West.' The author is under no obligation here to be able to name with any authority and specificity the Indian allusions that make Rushdie's intertextuality 'doubled.' This ignorance, shared and unstated, is part of the assumed compact that makes it 'easy' to include Rushdie in English Department offerings on postcolonialism" (Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 28).
- 22 Looking for the global to actually appear in one text or another in something like a undisguised form is to place theory well before practice. One can always find just what one is looking for. As Thomas Peyser points out, "We should be wary of the idea, sometimes present in discussions of globalization without being articulated, that there exists a set of authors (that is, a subset of authors) to whose work one applies globalization—authors like, say, Bharati Mukherjee—just as one applies theories of postmodernism to the works of certain others" (Peyser, "How Global Is It," 244).
 - 23 Paul Jay, "Beyond Discipline? Globalization and the Future of English," *PMLA* 116.1 (2001): 32.
 - 24 Arif Dirlik, "The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism," *Critical Inquiry* 20 (Winter 1994): 328–56.
 - 25 David Frisby and Mike Featherstone, eds., *Simmel on Culture* (London, 1997), 181–82.
 - 26 His comments have particular significance in the context of a collection of essays written mostly by contributors based in North America.
 - 27 Jolly bases her critique in part on similar arguments directed by critics such as Teresa Ebert at postmodernist feminism.
 - 28 Fredric Jameson, "Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism," *Social Text* 15 (1986): 65–88; 78.
 - 29 Georg Lukács, "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat," in *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics* (Cambridge, MA, 1971), 139.