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Weimar Germany

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Political culture

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It is not my intention in this chapter to retread the now familiar ground of the republic's political narrative told through its various parties and organizations. Instead, I want to address its political culture (broadly defined) in terms of the tension between the concept of a state in which representative democracy had primacy, what Hugo Preuß in 1917 referred to as the *Volksstaat* (citizen state), and the argument mostly put forward by conservative intellectuals such as Carl Schmitt, for a strong state with powers concentrated in an executive body or directory, not unlike the wartime dictatorship of General Ludendorff and Field Marshal Hindenburg, but based on popular acclamation.[1] For here, in these two radically different visions, that of the *Volksstaat* and a plebiscitary state, we find the underlying faultline of the Weimar Republic. From its beginning, the ideal of the parliamentary *Volksstaat* was challenged by the contingency of political, social, and economic turmoil, against which government had to find quick and tough measures if it was to maintain the integrity and authority of the republican state. Ultimately this quest for authority flowed into an authoritarian politics that found its culmination in four important events between July 1932 and June 1933: Chancellor Franz von Papen's *Staatsstreich*—the *coup d'état*—against Prussia; the Reichstag Fire Decree at the end of February 1933, establishing legal terror; the Enabling Act of 23 March dismissing parliament; and the series of laws and decrees between March 1933 and February 1934 leading to the so-called *Gleichschaltung* (administrative synchronization) of *Land* governments, which effectively brought about the long-discussed unitary state. These measures together

established the authoritarian plebiscitary state as long sought after by ultra conservatives, before being swiftly overtaken by Hitler to create the Nazi dictatorship.

The republic as contingency

That the Weimar Republic came about by default is well known. As is often the case, events on the ground combined with pressures coming from elsewhere to set the pace for change. The truculence of the Kaiser in the face of Wilson's Third Note finally forced the hand of the Majority Social Democrats to demand his abdication. But Friedrich Ebert and Philipp Scheidemann's petition to Prince Max von Baden on the 7th was also the consequence of rank and file pressure within their own party—from the party newspaper *Vorwärts* ('Forward') and in particular from the crowds on the streets. A general strike called by the Workers' and Soldiers' Council of Berlin for 9 November pushed further the floodgates, already forced open by the overturning of the Wittelsbach monarchy the previous evening when the Independent Socialist Kurt Eisner declared Bavaria a republic.[2]

To bring crowds onto the streets can have unforeseen consequences, as events in Petrograd a year earlier proved, and no doubt this accounts for Ebert's plea to the public to stay off the streets. Meanwhile rumours of an impending putsch, and reports that the Spartacist leader Karl Liebknecht was on his way to the Hohenzollern palace in central Berlin where he intended to declare a socialist state, forced Scheidemann to interrupt his lunch in the Reichstag canteen and to address the crowd gathering in front of the parliament. By all accounts, the situation in front of the Reichstag was confused when Scheidemann uttered the fateful words: 'That old and rotten thing, the monarchy, has collapsed. Long live the new! Long live the German republic!' Scheidemann may have been carried away by the moment, but he was also a shrewd politician. A bolshevik-style revolution, as advocated by the extreme left, would have invited foreign intervention or civil war. As far as the SPD leadership and its liberal allies were

concerned, most political goals—if not all—had been achieved with the constitutional reforms of 28 October that asserted the authority of parliament vis-à-vis the monarchy.

The revolution produced its own institutions, the workers' and soldiers' councils based on the example of the Petrograd Soviet; however, these were ad hoc bodies and by no means coherent in terms of ideology or aims. In practice they sought to maintain order on the ground. For a while the provisional government, the Council of People's Representatives made up of six delegates, three each from the Majority Socialists and the Independent Socialists, led respectively by Ebert and Hugo Haase (who was assassinated a year later), had to coexist alongside a Council of Delegates, representing the Workers' and Soldiers' Council of Greater Berlin, with its own agenda and claim to power (indeed, the Council of Representatives was in theory subordinate to the Workers' and Soldiers' Council). Thus the councils themselves briefly became sites of a power struggle between moderates espousing a '*social* republic' and radicals proclaiming a '*socialist* republic',[3] in which the Majority Socialists triumphed over the Independent Socialists and other radicals. In Hamburg, for example, Walther Lamp'l, a young lawyer and a rising star within Social Democracy, quickly ousted the radical intellectual Heinrich Laufenberg, thereby steering the revolution in Germany's second city into calmer waters.[4] By the time delegates met at the General Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Councils in mid-December, the councils no longer represented a so-called 'third way' between bourgeois parliament and soviet dictatorship. Instead, they became the channels through which Germany would pass to parliamentary democracy.[5]

Dominated by the Majority Socialists, the Congress voted overwhelmingly for elections to a National Assembly to take place at the earliest opportunity. In doing so, Congress effectively declared the revolution ended. Thus a consensus emerged that winter, ranging from the SPD leadership through to the army's quartermaster general, Wilhelm Groener (who had replaced General Ludendorff in October 1918), and Field Marshal Hindenburg, that the best way of curbing revolution was to bring forward the timetable for elections and to channel popular aspirations from the streets into parliament. For conservatives, such as Hindenburg, an SPD-led government and a democratized parliament were the price for

salvaging the remains of the Reich. And judging from the results of that election in January 1919, this is what the majority of Germans wanted too. Over three-quarters of those who voted in the election on 19 January supported those parties that underwrote the republic; this was evidence of an overwhelming desire to return as quickly as possible to something resembling normalcy under a democratic parliamentary system.

The republic's first cabinet formed on 3 February was a centre-left coalition recalling the wartime inter-party Reichstag group and comprised Majority Socialists, liberals, and the Catholic Centre Party (together they had 75 per cent of the vote) led by Scheidemann. And even though the formidable electoral majority of this 'Weimar coalition' was to fade (though not disappear) at the first Reichstag election in June 1920, Germany's future nevertheless pointed towards democratic institutions. Until the onset of the depression, Weimar's democratic institutions, and above all the Reichstag, as we shall see, functioned well. Electoral participation remained high, and support for the two pillars of the so-called 'Weimar coalition' (the Centre Party and the Social Democratic Party) remained by and large firm. Even at the height of the multiple crises in 1932, roughly one-third of electors voted for parties that either explicitly or generally favoured the Constitution, and a further fifth supported parties that, while not explicitly pro-democracy, nonetheless were not openly fighting the republic. To assert that the Weimar Republic was a 'republic without republicans' is simply wrong.

The republic between *Volksstaat* and plebiscitary state

In 1919 the challenge from the streets continued unabated, and left-wing unrest, especially in Berlin, forced the National Assembly to convene in the small Thuringian town of Weimar on 6 February, where it elected Friedrich Ebert as the republic's first (provisional) president five days later. As well as pondering Germany's position vis-à-vis the victors at the looming peace talks at Versailles,

the National Assembly also debated the proposals for a new constitution, to be drafted by a committee led by Hugo Preuß, a respected liberal theorist on constitutional issues and a member of Scheidemann's cabinet. Preuß, whose wartime writings had been highly critical of Germany's middle classes, faced a truculent bourgeoisie and an insurgent working class, both of which had been alienated from the state by the war and its aftermath. The six successive constitutional drafts produced by his committee mirrored this specific domestic context, and sought to work around it.[6]

The Constitution that was finally agreed by the Assembly at the end of July after three intensive debates, and which came into being on 11 August, was progressive for its time, but it also represented a compromise between the SPD and the liberal spectrum. It raised popular expectations for the 'social' republic (e.g. Arts. 17, 20–2, 109, 114–18, 123, 124, 163), while at the same time trying to accommodate the vested interests of an advanced capitalist society (e.g. Arts. 151, 153, 154, 164, 165).[7] As such, the constitution determined that the political culture of the republic would be based on class compromise, a sort of refashioned *Burgfrieden* or 'social peace' (in contrast to the failed wartime accommodation).[8] Nonetheless, most scholarly works read the Constitution from a later perspective, emphasizing the 'flaws' that are said to have brought down the republic, notably proportional representation (leading to a fragmented political landscape and parliamentary instability, which allowed Hitler a foot in the door[9]); a plebiscitary presidency (creating a dualist model of authority); Article 48, which arrogated extraordinary powers to the executive at the expense of parliament. I shall concentrate on the latter two aspects.

There were few choices of state form available to Germany in the late autumn of 1918. The attempt at constitutional monarchy, which in effect had been introduced with the reform of late October, had passed into history with the Kaiser's departure on 9 November. The Council of People's Representatives was a provisional body and never envisaged as a permanent institution of government. The idea of a small governing civilian directory, something similar to the Ludendorff–Hindenburg regime and favoured by conservatives, was considered briefly and pushed aside (although it reappeared at intermittent periods, as we shall see below). In 1919 such a directory would have run counter to the moment. There was

broad agreement that the republic needed a new constitutional basis, government founded on a popular franchise, and a president as head of state.

The question in 1918 was: how to balance the powers of parliament and those of the head of state? On the one hand, Scheidemann believed that sovereignty should lie with parliament and the president should be a mere constitutional head without any real powers; Ebert, on the other hand, was keen to see a more active role for the president, and in this he reflected ideas that were current among some of the leading constitutional and political thinkers of the day.[10] Preuß's committee had to steer a course between these two visions, which essentially derived from the French and American experiences. Eventually his committee opted for a compromise between the two: a 'strong' president, but tempered by parliamentary checks. Nevertheless, in practice the president was the stronger element under the constitution.

At the time Preuß and his colleagues Max Weber, Friedrich Naumann, and Friedrich Meinecke did not see any contradiction between a strong executive and parliament: they were the two sides of the same coin.[11] The argument for this was that a strong plebiscitary president (Art. 41 I) would function as a counterweight to the 'tyranny' of a party-dominated parliament. Nonetheless, the fact that the president had a term longer than that of parliament (seven years over four years), and enjoyed a raft of sweeping powers—notably Article 25, the power to dissolve parliament and call new elections; Article 53 empowering the president to appoint and dismiss a chancellor and cabinet ministers; Article 48, enabling government by decree, and the right to remove an elected state government if the security of the Reich was endangered (the so-called *Reichsexekution*)—meant that ultimately the balance was heavily tipped in favour of the executive. Indeed, as the constitutional historian Rudolf Weber-Fas has observed, the president under the democratic republic was, technically speaking, more powerful than the Kaiser.[12]

Nonetheless, in 1919, neither a plebiscitary president nor dictatorial powers (Art. 48) elicited the misgivings that were to be aired later. Indeed, Article 48 was conceived as an instrument that would allow the president to swiftly enact laws or take special measures to safeguard the Reich in times of crisis when the machinery of

the Reichstag would prove too cumbersome and slow.[13] The fact that from 1930 it turned from this to become an alternative to parliament could not have been anticipated in 1919.

Revolution and reaction

Both Scheidemann and Ebert thought of themselves first and foremost as German patriots, not as revolutionaries; for them social democracy was a bulwark against bolshevism and the forces of disorder.[14] Ebert's alleged declaration that he detested revolution like the plague was not mere rhetoric; he meant it. It was from this consideration that in the early days of December Ebert entered into secret negotiations with senior army officers in order to secure the republic against the extreme left and its attempt to initiate a 'second wave' of revolution. Whether or not the pact with the army was one with the devil, Ebert believed he had little choice.[15] In his eyes the country was teetering on anarchy, as radicals loosely gathered under the banner of the Spartacists and led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg fomented insurgency. To be sure, mass protests and strikes couched in political language were almost a daily occurrence, especially among poor rural workers in the east Elbian countryside, on the shop floor in the metal factories and mines of the industrial Ruhr, and, notably, among dock workers in Hamburg, where anarcho-syndicalists and extreme left splinter groups tilled fertile ground. Indeed, until the late autumn of 1923, the republic appeared to be in a permanent state of insurrection. And even though the state was never really in danger of succumbing to this,[16] the government reintroduced the hated *Belagerungszustand*—state of siege—almost as soon as it had been abolished in November 1918; after the Constitution came into effect in August, it added Article 48 to its arsenal. But in order to impose order Weimar's government had to rely on military force.

In an ironic twist of fate, the security of the republic was handed by the army minister Gustav Noske, a Social Democrat, to the army under General Hans von Seeckt and to the so-called 'regiments of students and lieutenants', NCOs, and assorted adventurers who made up the various paramilitary formations. Between 1919 and

1923, the army declared a state of emergency in different parts of the Reich at least thirty-seven times; in 1923 it was declared throughout the Reich.[17] Under the guise of countering revolution, the army broke up strikes and dispersed demonstrators protesting over lack of food and other material shortages, in spite of the growing concern in the Reichstag over its use internally.[18] Ministers were divided on this issue as too were government advisers. On the one hand, Friedrich Freund and Hermann Pünder, respectively from the Prussian and Reich finance ministries, were convinced that Article 48 and military force were the only means to save the republic from bolshevism, whilst on the other hand, the Social Democrats Carl Severing and Arnold Brecht warned against over-exaggerating the threat and thereby drawing the army too one-sidedly into domestic politics, with the consequence that the republic would lose popular support.[19]

There was a marked contrast in the brutal way the army dealt with the left and its soft-glove approach to the right, which (as Chancellor Wirth declared after Rathenau's murder in 1922) posed the greater threat to the republic. Its inertia during the Kapp–Lüttwitz Putsch in 1920 exposed its superficial adherence to democracy and contrasted radically with its behaviour against workers in the Ruhr who had mobilized against the putsch. Its ambivalence towards republican democracy had not lessened three years later during Hitler and Ludendorff's so-called Beer Hall Putsch in Munich. A month before this the government of Saxony reported how regular army units were liaising with illegal right-wing paramilitary organizations, notably the Roßbach Free Corps, while other members of Army Group IV were attending meetings with the NSDAP.[20] In marked contrast to events in Bavaria where the army leadership under General von Lossow and the civilian administration under von Kahr's commissarial authority were themselves implicated, Thuringia's left-wing coalition government faced the threat of a *Reichsexekution* as a result of General Reinhardt's exaggerated claims of a 'red terror'. Using powers under the 'state of siege', Reinhardt carried out mass arrests of well-known activists, councillors, and politicians and dispersed striking miners. On 8 November troops occupied Weimar and stationed themselves in front of the Landtag in a blatant show of force that was replete with anti-parliamentary symbolism.[21]

Republican Germany was facing multiple crises in the autumn of 1923, and Stresemann's cabinet was barely able to meet the challenges. With de facto power entrusted to him and the army through Article 48, Seeckt briefly saw an opportunity to enact a 'silent coup' after the expected demission of Stresemann's second cabinet. His military confidant Major-General Otto Hasse was convinced that 'the cry for a strong man must come' within weeks. In this scenario, with the army behind him and with the support of Oskar Hergt and Count Kuno von Westarp from the German Nationalist People's Party (DNVP), Seeckt would step forward to lead a directory as 'military chancellor': that is, govern without parliament.[22] Even though the plan came to nought, it nevertheless illustrates not only the right's contempt for parliamentary democracy but also the allure of the 'strong leader' in times of crisis.

The reliance on Article 48 and the *Belagerungszustand* both offered a quick route to internal security and 'won' over the army to the government (or at least that is what republican politicians thought), but it was also a lazy convenience in that it allowed a challenged cabinet to assert authority without having to rely on parliament.[23] Throughout the crisis in October, Stresemann used Article 48 not only to restore political authority, but to carry out everyday business 'in the interests of the Reich'. Between mid-October and the middle of the following February, sixty-three emergency decrees were passed, none of them dealing with the political crisis, but instead with economic, financial, and labour market issues. The complaint by Hugo Preuß shortly after the reintroduction of the *Belagerungszustand* in late 1918 might equally have applied in 1923.

> In the former authoritarian state the citizen had hardly a voice, in the present one he has absolutely nothing to say whatsoever. Now, more than ever before, the people in its entirety is simply an object of a government that swathes it with unfathomable pieces of advice, only that these are not based on divine right (*Gottesgnadentum*), but on a just as intangible popular right. Legal title is with the one as with the other, based on power, or more accurately, the belief in a superior force backing it. In brief, it is in essence the mirror image of the authoritarian state.[24]

And as Gustav Schmoller dryly noted in 1922, 'Even in the red republic, the people as such have never and nowhere governed.'[25]

In these early years, Weimar's new governing class opted for presidential power over parliament to avert crises that would have undermined the authority of the state. It also accepted the use of force (including the excesses of rogue *Freikorps* units and exceptional courts) to suppress political challenges (but selectively, as the inaction over the Kapp and Munich putsches shows). However, these extraordinary measures using Article 48 were deployed within the constitutional framework and were not intended to overturn it This is the paradox that Alexander Rüstow in 1929 referred to as 'dictatorship within the parameters of democracy'.[26] For Ebert and others at the time, this was not so much a paradox as a necessity to avoid what they believed would otherwise be a national catastrophe.[27] The suspension of the *Volksstaat* was precisely that: a postponement until the multiple crises confronting Germany had been overcome. But the combination of Article 48 and the *Belagerungszustand*, together with the Law for the Protection of the Republic (1922), with its wide-ranging and ill-defined enemies, in effect created a template for the 'extra-legal' state (*Ausnahmestaat*) that anticipated the Nazi exceptional state after the passing of the Emergency Decree for the Protection of the People and the State in February 1933.

The *Volksstaat*

Under Article 54 a chancellor and his ministers had to have the confidence of the Reichstag in order to govern. This clause was Preuß's attempt to subject the executive to democratic controls; but it inadvertently created a tension at the highest level in Weimar's political culture, for by passing a vote of no confidence the Reichstag could cause a government to fall. Here the tension between parliament and the executive was brought to a head. Writing in 1926, Martin Schiele (DNVP), who had been a minister in Hans Luther's first cabinet (January–October the previous year), argued that Article 54 was 'totally unacceptable' because 'As long as this situation exists, it prevents the German Reich from having strong leadership.'[28] Indeed, during the life of the republic there were over thirty such motions, but on only two occasions,

both in the years of so-called relative stability, did a cabinet fall as the consequence of such a vote. Less often cited is the fact that over the same period the Reichstag voted its confidence in government twenty-four times.[29]

Nonetheless Weimar cabinets managed for the most part to work consensually, and when they did break up it was usually because ministers faced pressure from within their own party, forcing them to adopt positions that they might otherwise have avoided. Thus conflict leading to the break-up of a cabinet was often not between ministers, but between party machines and cabinet.[30] This is how both Stresemann's administration in October 1923 and Heinrich Müller's coalition in March 1930 came to grief. The constitutional theorist Carl Schmitt, like many of his fellow conservatives, saw in this the symptom of Weimar's inability to forge national unity.[31]

To be sure, cabinets appeared to come and go with alarming frequency—twenty times between 1919 and 1932 (half of these between the elections of January 1919 and May 1924). But not all contemporaries were necessarily disturbed by this. For Gustav Schmoller such changes were par for the course in coalition politics and more often than not ministers were forced to seek compromise; a positive factor of German democracy.[32] And no less a figure than the eminent legal expert Hermann Heller noted in 1931 that Weimar's parliamentary democracy *per se* was perfectly stable; what was destabilizing 'Above all . . . [was] the politically naive German thinking that was enthral to any sort of mass hypnotic or dictatorial superstitious miracle'.[33] Heller was certainly taking a side swipe at Carl Schmitt and the increasingly loud calls for a 'strong man'. Moreover, when viewed in a wider European context, frequent cabinet changes were not a peculiarly German phenomenon, as the case of France shows.

Indeed, for the most part the members of Weimar's political class worked reasonably well together in spite of ideological differences. This consensus was founded upon social and cultural factors, as Thomas Megerl recently demonstrated in his important study of the Reichstag. A cursory look at the social data of the deputies in the Reichstag, and of the cabinet members in particular, shows a fairly cohesive political class, similar in age, education, social

and political experience. Indeed, Gustav Schmoller noted as early as 1922:

> A certain common mental-moral atmosphere permeates our ministers and deputies. This understanding is by and large possible despite the frequently large differences in [their] convictions. The common training, the common understanding for the necessities of state connects conservatives and liberals, Catholic as well as Protestant officials, National Liberals and Progressives [*sic*], and now also, more and more, the Social Democrats, who for 20 years have been cooperating in self-government with the representatives of bourgeois parties.[34]

Until the summer of 1932, there appeared to be almost a game of musical chairs where cabinet posts were concerned, so much so that the popular Munich caricaturist Thomas Theodor Heine was moved to comment ironically, 'The new cabinet?! Its physiognomy appears familiar to me' (while depicting a row of ministers' bottoms). The pool of ministers sharing 223 ministerial posts in the republic's nineteen cabinets, serving ten chancellors, stood at 79, of which 40.5 per cent held office just once; the same proportion held office between two and four times; importantly, 19 per cent, or nearly a fifth, held office five times or more.[35]

A good illustration of this ministerial stability can be found with the liberal deputy Otto Geßler, first appointed in late March 1920 as minister for reconstruction in Gustav Bauer's cabinet and who then remained in government as army minister until June 1928, serving thirteen different cabinets. Another example is the Centre Party politician Heinrich Brauns, who joined Konstantin Fehrenbach's cabinet in June 1920 and served under various chancellors for eight years, leaving government at the same time as Geßler. Another, and more prominent, cabinet member was, of course, Gustav Stresemann, who led two ill-starred administrations in 1923, before successfully serving as foreign minister in seven cabinets until his death in 1929. Neither Geßler nor Brauns nor Stresemann was unusual, and this should caution us against accepting too easily the idea that government under the republic was unstable simply because of cabinet changes.

Finally, continuity of chancellors and ministers meant that policy seldom changed in any fundamental way before the crisis of 1930–2. The six cabinets led by Wilhelm Marx and Hans Luther,

for example, pursued an almost seamless domestic and foreign policy in the mid-years from June 1924 to June 1928. As Lindsay Rogers and his colleagues at Columbia University observed at the time, 'Cabinet changes mean a new deal of the same cards rather than a different deck.' Arguably, Weimar's parliamentary system was quite stable in spite of the superficial changes signalled by cabinet reshuffles and the odd spat in the Reichstag; even under Chancellor Brüning, whose dismissal in May 1932 spelt the 'death knell of responsible cabinet government'.[36]

Towards the plebiscitary state

As we have already noted, there were precedents for using Article 48 to govern without parliamentary approval, and not just in the crises-ridden years before 1924. During the minority cabinets of Wilhelm Marx and Hans Luther between 1926 and 1927, for example, the executive resorted to government by decree after the SPD (by this time in opposition) withdrew its 'quiet' support for the cabinet. In spite of Hindenburg's belief that the socialists were incapable of forming a stable government, they did so after the elections of May 1928, and governed under Hermann Müller at the head of a grand coalition for the next two years. But after its collapse in early 1930, and Heinrich Brüning's appointment as chancellor, the dynamics of Weimar's political culture changed drastically.

As we know, Brüning had little support for his policies in an increasingly fractious Reichstag. His situation worsened after the landslide election of September 1930 when the NSDAP increased its number of deputies from 12 to 107. After this date, he became dependent on the toleration of the SPD in order to push through his policies, and in October the following year owed his survival to their support in a motion of 'no confidence' tabled by the NSDAP.[37] Without a majority in parliament, and dependent on the SPD and assorted liberal factions, Brüning was vulnerable to the political vagaries of the Reichstag—he was in effect its prisoner. As long as parliament was sitting, his entire political and economic programme was at risk because of the Damocles sword of Article 54.

On the other hand, resorting to Article 48 to force through policies also weakened Brüning by making him dependent on the president rather than responsible to the Reichstag. Increasingly, Brüning relied on Hindenburg to support him by signing off emergency decrees.[38] There is little to suggest that Brüning was intent on destroying Weimar's parliamentary democracy, but he had taken the first step on the path towards the dissolution of the republic as a parliamentary system.[39]

In the early months of Brüning's chancellorship, few liberal commentators were overly concerned, remembering the earlier usage of Article 48 (by Ebert and Hindenburg) which had not boded ill for the republic.[40] Indeed, a number of factors spoke in favour of a presidential cabinet, not least the continuing economic crisis and a Reichstag dominated by Nazis and Communists, and worsening political conditions on the streets. In this context, Brüning, Hindenburg, and Article 48 were seen as the 'lesser evil' and for this reason tolerated.[41] Thus government by decree was based on a 'silent' consensus of the middle and the democratic left. Under Brüning's first cabinet parliamentary democracy was not so much abandoned as laid to one side, as Article 48 was invoked to overcome crisis as in 1923; its usage fell within the model analysed by Rüstow in 1929.[42] However, from October 1931, when Brüning formed his second cabinet, Weimar's wider political culture was swiftly shifting to the right, signalled by the establishment of the Harzburg Front, and a changed attitude from Hindenburg. In this climate Article 48 in Brüning's hands was no longer a safeguard of republican democracy; the Reichstag, which had been already reduced to an awkward irrelevance—up to that point it had sat forty-one times, less than half compared to the previous year, while the number of emergency decrees signed off by Hindenburg had risen from five to forty-four—was suspended until the following February. Thus by the time Brüning was dismissed from office at the end of May 1932, 'just one hundred metres from his goal' as he later claimed in his memoirs (but in reality a spent force), parliament had become a mere spectator rather than an actor; Weimar's political culture was now being shaped by a court camarilla of intriguers—not least among them General Kurt von Schleicher (described by Wilhelm Abegg, the former state secretary in the Prussian Interior Ministry, as a 'duplicitous fox' and an

'incorrigible intriguer'[43]) and the ubiquitous and Machiavellian cabinet secretary Otto Meissner—and by violent political gangs on the streets. Within the higher echelons of the ministerial bureaucracy and in industrial circles there were renewed calls for a radical reform of the republic's constitutional arrangements that would favour a more authoritarian state.

Plebiscitary dictatorship

If, as Hans Boldt has remarked, Germany under Brüning slipped into legislative dictatorship,[44] under von Papen's brief and fatal administration from 1 June to 3 December, it was consciously steered towards plebiscitary dictatorship. Appointed as Brüning's successor, von Papen was not the charming if somewhat dilettante politician that some, and not least his mentor, Schleicher, believed. The aristocratic von Papen was a shrewd, calculating, and ruthless political operator who was prepared to utilize the law in order to break with the Constitution, and who had few qualms in ditching his erstwhile 'mentor' (Schleicher) when the occasion arose.

According to the historian Friedrich Meinecke, Papen's agenda was to restore the status quo ante October 1918.[45] But this oversimplifies von Papen's aims. True, as *Paris Soir* noted on his appointment, von Papen was an out and out monarchist, but his conservatism dovetailed with more modern conceptions of the state, too. Ever since the crisis year of 1923, Papen had favoured government by a small executive body untrammelled by the machinery of parliament, and conditions in the early summer of 1932 seemed to favour this option. Germany was facing ruin and von Papen believed only exceptional powers would allow him to tackle the multiple crises facing the country. His authoritarian views chimed with many conservatives who urged the final break with democratic institutions. Addressing the influential Langnamverein, the industrialist association in the Ruhr, in the summer of 1932, the constitutional theorist Carl Schmitt also spoke of the need for 'strong government' freed from parliamentary controls.

> I believe that today a legal government, if it decides to make use of all constitutional means [at its disposal], can accomplish substantial reforms and programs. A government dependent on parliament, however, has not even the possibility of accomplishing even a five year plan.[46]

Schmitt's views were by now common currency among broad circles in Germany, and ultimately pointed towards a 'plebiscitary dictatorship' based on popular acclamation.

In early October 1931, during a speech in the town of Dülmen, von Papen had called for a *rassemblement* of the right to seize the opportunity for power.[47] The problem for von Papen and his 'cabinet of barons' was that they were too far removed from the broad mass of the people needed to achieve this *fronde*; and even though it was severely hamstrung, the Reichstag was still breathing; on 12 September a resounding 90 per cent of deputies voted 'no confidence' in his regime (it was duly dissolved for a second time under von Papen and new elections set for 6 November). The only party on the right that commanded broad support was, of course, the NSDAP, but a large section of the traditional right, not least Hindenburg himself, was still sceptical about Hitler's intentions. Moreover, attempts to bring the NSDAP into government had foundered on Hitler's 'all or nothing' demands.[48]

Using Article 48 von Papen's cabinet had forced through highly unpopular policies that only exacerbated material distress and furthered political radicalization, now sweeping the country. By the summer of 1932 political violence had become an everyday occurrence, so much so that talk of 'civil war' conditions on Germany's streets and in the countryside was commonplace.[49] As in the earlier period, the spectre of Communist insurgency was used as an excuse for taking draconian measures, the most notorious of which was the illegal suspension of Prussia's caretaker administration on 20 July, after ostensibly failing to adequately deal with political violence and for alleged secret negotiations with the Communist Party.[50] This action transferred powers from Prussia to the Reich, much to the consternation of the other regional governments, not least Bavaria. Unlike the Kapp Putsch in 1920, Papen's coup against Prussia met with little resistance on the ground. The Prussian administration supported by other *Land* governments took the Reich to court—and won its case, but to little effect.[51] Von Papen's attack upon Prussia was in effect the first step towards a much-vaunted constitutional and administrative

reform of the Reich, which had been under discussion for several years and which only found its completion after 1933.[52]

It was observed that von Papen's usage of Article 48 was more extensive (nearly a quarter of the 232 emergency acts passed between October 1919 and September 1932) and more draconian than the hated emergency legislation under Ludendorff and Hindenburg during the war.[53] Indeed, while many of these decrees addressed Germany's economic problems, increasingly their political purpose was unmistakable. Decree after decree gave the police and judicial authorities sweeping powers, while the army hovered in the background preparing itself for the eventuality of martial law.[54] The American political scientist Lindsay Rogers asked whether von Papen's cabinet dictatorship was going to be merely an interregnum until the crisis was over or a permanent form of government.[55] At the beginning of December, Papen was thinking the latter.

The sources show that Hindenburg became increasingly uneasy with von Papen's actions and not least with the threat of further legal action over the continuing use of Article 48. Cabinet dictatorship—even with the army in reserve—was simply not working, and brought with it a genuine fear of civil war. Von Papen's cabinet had already resigned on 17 November but continued in a caretaking function until a new cabinet could be formed. In his final cabinet meeting on 3 December von Papen expressed his satisfaction to have led an administration that had governed 'in the spirit of conservative state-leadership that spelled the end of the liberal era', and expressed his confidence that the new cabinet led by von Schleicher would continue in this vein.[56] This wish was to be disappointed. Hardly a democrat of the first degree, von Schleicher instead sought a broad consensus that steered him away from plebiscitary dictatorship and apparently towards parliamentary politics, based on a rapprochement with the trade unions, the Centre Party, and the so-called left wing of the NSDAP gathered around Gregor Strasser. In other words he appeared to be returning to a form of *Volksstaat* extremely unpalatable to some sections of the right. And this was his undoing, for it alienated him from the bedrock of Germany's elite; not even his own generals supported him. Within weeks of his appointment, he found himself politically isolated from all sides and without the support of Hindenburg. On

28 January, von Schleicher laid out the alternatives to the president: a majority cabinet under Hitler, a minority cabinet under himself, or the continuation of the presidial regime. Hindenburg did not want to continue with the latter; a minority cabinet under the isolated chancellor also did not come into consideration; that left Hitler.[57]

The turn to Hitler was the final attempt to find a consensus based on the unity of an invigorated national body. The presidential and Reichstag elections in the spring and summer had shown that Hitler was able to cut across class, gender, and generational lines; his personal vote in the second round of the presidential elections, for instance, had topped a third of the electorate; and even though his party had lost votes in November, it still garnered the greatest number of votes in the country. While it would be overstating the case to say that Hitler's appointment in January 1933 was predetermined, there was an air of inevitability that his time had come, especially among influential industrialists from the Langnamverein, including the magnate Fritz Thyssen and Paul Reusch, who, by late November 1932, universally favoured a Hitler cabinet.[58] But as Franz Bracht (a minister in both the Papen and Schleicher cabinets) noted in private correspondence,

> It seems to do less with a change in favour of Hitler than with the belief that a Hitler government cannot be avoided any longer. Under these circumstances one must accelerate Hitler's entry into government, even if he does not prove himself satisfactorily, and his government, as sceptics in industrial circles assume, only lasts a few weeks.[59]

When von Papen was appointed chancellor *Paris Soir* commented that 'Germany has a feudal government today, and will have a Hitler government to-morrow . . . Soon the Hohenzollerns will be back.' While the newspaper erred on the latter point, it was prescient on the former. Papen more than any other politician worked towards Hitler's inclusion into government, and, in the final analysis, manoeuvred him into power. The gamble was that a Hitler cabinet would finally break the impasse that had developed in conservative politics, thereby facilitating the restoration of Germany's fortunes through a strengthened plebiscitary state.[60] After touch and go negotiations between 27 and 30 January, brokered by Papen, Hitler was appointed by Hindenburg to lead a government of 'national

unity' and 'renewal'. This was to be the republic's twenty-first and last cabinet.

Among the items for discussion at Hitler's first cabinet meeting at 5 p.m. on 30 January was a proposal by von Papen to introduce an Enabling Act that would allow cabinet to govern without the inconvenience of the Reichstag. The following day, during the discussion of Göring's earlier proposal to dissolve the Reichstag and call new elections, von Papen went further, stating that 'it is for the best to fix now that the coming elections to the Reichstag shall be the last, and that a return to a parliamentary system is to be avoided for ever'.[61] This time von Papen got his way. The (heavily compromised) Reichstag dismissed itself on 23 March, initially for four years (to be recalled only on those occasions when Hitler needed it for acclamatory purposes). Meanwhile the idea of cabinet dictatorship was taken a step further by Hitler who, as *Führer* from 1934, came to embody the state as its plebiscitary dictator.

Notes

1. Hugo Preuß, *Staat, Recht und Freiheit aus 40 Jahren deutscher Politik und Geschichte* (Tübingen, 1926); Carl Schmitt, 'Diktator und Belagerungszustand: Eine staatsrechtliche Studie', in *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechts* (1917), 138–62.
2. Herbert Michaelis and Ernst Schraepler (eds.), *Ursachen und Folgen: Vom deutschen Zusammenbruch 1918 und 1945 bis zur staatlichen Neuordnung Deutschlands in der Gegenwart*, 26 vols. (Berlin, 1958–79, hereafter *Ursachen und Folgen* followed by volume), iii. 104–5. See the accounts in Philipp Scheidemann, *Das historische Versagen der SPD: Schriften aus dem Exil* (Lüneburg, 2002), 98; and former state secretary and chief of staff of the chancellery 1926–32 Hermann Pünder, *Der Reichspräsident in der Weimarer Republik* (Frankfurt am Main, 1961), 12, who refers to the Kaiser's (forced) abdication as 'revolution from above'.
3. Friedrich Stampfer, *Der 9. November: Gedenkblätter zu seiner Wiederkehr* (Berlin, 1919), 17 ff. *Ursachen und Folgen*, iii. 9–10, proclamation of the Berlin Arbeiter- und Soldatenrat, 10 Nov. 1918; Pünder, *Der Reichspräsident*, 13.
4. Walther Lamp'l, *Die Revolution in Groß-Hamburg* (Hamburg, 1921); Richard Comfort, *Revolutionary Hamburg: Labor Politics in the Early Weimar Republic* (Stanford, Calif., 1966); Völker Ullrich, *Die Hamburger Arbeiterbewegung vom Vorabend des ersten Weltkrieges bis zur Revolution 1918/19*, 2 vols. (Hamburg, 1976).
5. Friedrich Meinecke, 'Die Revolution: Ursachen und Tatsachen', *Handbuch des Deutschen Staatsrechts*, 1 (1931), 115–19; *Ursachen und Folgen*, ii. 574–5 and iii. 23, 38–47; Harry Graf Kessler, *Tagebücher, 1918–1937* (Frankfurt am Main, 1961), 22. Overviews in Reinhard Rurüp, 'Problems of the German revolution 1918–19', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 3/4 (Oct. 1968), 109–35; Eckehard Jesse and Henning Köhler, 'Die deutsche Revolution 1918/19 im Wandel der historischen Forschung: Forschungsüberblick und Kritik der "herrschenden Lehre" ', in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* (1978), B45, 2–232; Ulrich Kluge, *Die deutsche Revolution 1918/19* (Frankfurt am Main, 1985).
6. Ludwig Richter, 'Reichspräsident und Ausnahmegewalt: Die Genese des Artikels 48 in den Beratungen der Weimarer Nationalversammlung', *Der Staat*, 37 (1998), 221–47.
7. Elmar M. Hucko (ed.), *The Democratic Tradition: Four German Constitutions* (Oxford, 1987), 147–90; Hans Boldt, 'Die Weimarer Verfassung', in Karl Dietrich Bracher, Manfred Funke, and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (eds.), *Die Weimarer Republik 1918–1933: Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft* (Düsseldorf, 1987), 59.
8. Friedrich Meinecke, *Republik, Bürgertum, Jugend: Vortrag gehalten im Demokratischen Studentenbund zu Berlin am 16. Januar 1925* (Frankfurt am Main, 1925), 17; Waldemar Besson, 'Friedrich Meinecke und die Weimarer Republik', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 7/2 (Apr. 1959), 119.
9. In the case of proportional representation, the German historian Eberhard Jäckel believes that had there been a 5% threshold (as later in the Bonn Republic) the NSDAP (which entered the Reichstag for the first time in May 1924) would have been banished to the political wilderness after the election in May 1928 on the basis of its 2.6% share of the vote (which saw the number of deputies halved from 32 to 14). But this has little bearing on its performance from 1929 in the Prussian local elections where it made strong gains, and, particularly, in the Reichstag election in September 1930 when it took over 18.3% of the vote, spurred on by the state's looming fiscal crisis and deteriorating material conditions. The NSDAP's successes were due to a groundswell in support fanned by its extra-parliamentary activities and by the disintegration of the conservative 'middle' to provide adequate representation. There is, in fact, no causality between proportional representation and the Nazis' coming to power

in 1933. Moreover, had such a threshold operated, neither the liberal DDP in 1928, nor the right of centre DVP—Stresemann's party—in 1919, 1930, and 1932, nor the Bavarian People's Party (BVP), for all nine elections, would have entered the Reichstag. Eberhard Jäckel, *Das deutsche Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt am Main, 1999), 100.

10. Martin Needler, 'The theory of the Weimar presidency', *Review of Politics*, 21/4 (Oct. 1959), 692–8.
11. Max Weber, *Deutschlands Künftige Staatsform* (Frankfurt am Main, 1919; 1st pub. in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Nov. 1918); Besson, 'Meinecke', 125.
12. R. Weber-Fas, *Deutschlands Verfassung vom Wiener Kongreß bis zur Gegenwart* (Tübingen, 2001; 1st edn. 1997), 122. See also Heinrich Pohl, 'Der Reichspräsident und die Reichsregierung', *Handbuch des Deutschen Staatsrechts*, 1 (1931), 467, 482; Pünder, *Der Reichspräsident*, 15; Needler, 'Theory', 695–6.
13. Carl Schmitt, 'Die Diktator des Reichspräsidenten nach Art. 48 der Reichsverfassung', in Karl Bilfinger (ed.), *Der deutsche Föderalismus: Referate [der] Verhandlungen der Tagung der deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer zu Jena am 14. und 15. April 1924* (Jena, 1924). Pünder, *Der Reichspräsident*, 17.
14. Scheidemann, *Das historische Versagen*, 48–51, 99, 104, 110. August Winnig, 'Die Reich als Republik 1918–1928' (Stuttgart, 1928), 127; Wilhelm von Schramm, *Radikale Politik: Die Welt diesseits und jenseits des Bolschewismus* (Munich, 1932), 55; Meinecke, *Republik*, 27.
15. Scheidemann, *Das historische Versagen*, 108; Stampfer, *Der 9. November*, 25, 31. See the debate between Reinhard Rürup and Eckehard Jesse, 'Friedrich Ebert und das Problem der Handlungsspielraüme in der deutschen Revolution 1918/19', in Rudolf König, Hartmut Soell, and Hermann Weber (eds.), *Friedrich Ebert und seine Zeit: Bilanz und Perspektiven der Forschung* (Munich, 1990), 69–110.
16. Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (hereafter BArch), R3001/22069, Bl. 200–4, RMdI, June 1921.
17. BArch R3001/22071 Bl. 160–80, Zusammenstellung 1919–23. Ibid., R3001/6623, Bl. 325; R3001/6626 Bl. 183; R3001/6627, Bl. 35.
18. BArch R3001/6668, Bl. 114–15.
19. BArch R3001/22069, Bl 35, 99, 204–5; *Akten der Reichskanzlei Weimarer Republik:* Das Kabinett Scheidemann: 13. Februar bis 20. Juni 1919 prepared by Hagen Schulze (Boppard am Rhein, 1971), 142, 157: nn. 17, 18; Pünder, *Der Reichspräsident*, 18.
20. *Akten der Reichskanzlei Weimarer Republik*. Die Kabinette Stresemann I u. II 13. August bis 6 Oktober 1923 and 6. Oktober bis 30. November 1923 prepared by Karl Dietrich Erdmann (Boppard am Rhein, 1978), ii. 496, Doc 117, Cabinet meeting 6 Oct. 1923.
21. Ibid. 995 n. 3 (report 6 Nov. 1923).
22. Ibid., Anhang 1, 1176–203; Hasse quote is on 1184.
23. Lindsay Rogers, Freda Forester, and Sanford Schwarz, 'Aspects of German Political Institutions', Part I, *Political Science Quarterly*, 47/3 (Sept. 1932), 347, for the contrary argument.
24. Hugo Preuss, *Staat Recht und* Freiheit: *Aus 40 Jahren Deutscher Politik und Geschichte* (Tübingen, 1926), 365.
25. Gustav Schmoller, *Walther Rathenau und Hugo Preuss: Die Staatsmänner des neuen Deutschlands* (Munich, 1922), 28–9.
26. 'Dokumentation: Zur Frage der Staatsführung in der Weimarer Republik', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 7/1 (Jan. 1959), 85–111. For Pünder, *Der Reichspräsident*, this exercise of 'healthy authority' did not pose a threat to democratic authority.
27. Jesse, 'Problem', in König et al., *Friedrich Ebert und seine Zeit*, 108; Dieter Rebentisch, 'Verpaßte Chancen und verhinderte Katastrophen: Friedrich Ebert und sein Platz in der deutschen Geschichte', in König et al., *Friedrich Ebert*, 161–73.
28. Martin Schiele, 'Innere Politik', in Walther Lambach (ed.), *Politische Praxis 1926* (Hamburg, 1926), 53. Pünder, *Der Reichspräsident*, 24, speaks of proportional representation as the 'basic evil' (*Grundübel*) besetting the republic.
29. Rogers et al., 'Aspects', Part I, 344. Ernst Rudolf Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789*, vi: *Die Weimarer Reichsverfassung* (Stuttgart, 1981), 875.
30. Rogers et al., 'Aspects', Part I, 349.
31. Carl Schmitt, 'Der Begriff der modernen Demokratie in seinem Verhältnis zum Staatsbegriff', *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, 51 (Tübingen, 1924), 821.
32. Schmoller, *Walther Rathenau und Hugo Preuss*, 33.
33. Hermann Heller, 'Genie und Funktionär in der Politik', in *Probleme der Demokratie = Politische Wissenschaft Schriftenreihe der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik in Berlin und des Instituts für Auswärtige Politik in Hamburg*, 10 (Berlin, 1931), 68.
34. Schmoller, *Walther Rathenau und Hugo Preuss*, 42–3; Thomas Mergel, *Parlamentarische Kultur in der Weimar Republik* (Düsseldorf, 2005), chapter 2, *passim*; Rogers et al., 'Aspects', Part I, 347; Martin Schumacher, *M.d.R.: Die Reichstagsabgeordneten der Weimarer Republik in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus* (Düsseldorf, 1994), 'Forschungsbericht', 28; G. Best, 'Elite structure and regime (dis)continuity in

Germany 1867–1933: the case of the parliamentary leadership groups', *German History*, 7 (1990).

35. Rogers et al., 'Aspects', Part I, 344–6.
36. Rogers et al., 'Aspects', Part I, 322–3, and 344 for the quote.
37. Huber, *Verfassungsgeschichte*, vii. 883; Helmut Heiber, *The Weimar Republic*, trans. W. E. Yuill (Oxford, 1993), 180; Jäckel, *Das deutsche Jahrhundert*, 101.
38. Ernst Rudolf Huber, *Dokumente zur deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte*, 3 vols. (2nd edn. Stuttgart, 1961–66), iii. 160–2, for a list of these.
39. Highly critical of Brüning, Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik: Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie* (Düsseldorf, 1984), 151; and in his defence: William J. Patch, *Heinrich Brüning and the Dissolution of the Weimar Republic* (Cambridge, 1998).
40. Pünder, *Der Reichspräsident*, 24.
41. Heinrich August Winkler, 'Choosing the lesser evil: the German Social Democrats and the fall of the Weimar Republic', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 25/2–3 (May–June 1990), 205–27; idem, *Weimar 1918–1933: Die Geschichte der ersten deutschen Demokratie* (Munich, 1994), 444–76.
42. For damning assessment of Brüning, see Arthur Rosenberg, *A History of the German Republic* (New York, 1965); Hans Mommsen, *Die verspielte Freiheit: Der Weg der Republik von Weimar in den Untergang 1918 bis 1933* (Berlin, 1989).
43. BArch N2001/113, Nachlaß Wilhelm Abegg, Bl. 36
44. Hans Boldt, 'Der Artikel 48 der Weimarer Verfassung: Sein historischer Hintergrund und seine politische Funktion', in Michael Stürmer (ed.), *Die Weimarer Republik: Belagerte Civitas* (Königstein, 1980), 298.
45. Meinecke, *Katastrophe*, 104 f.
46. Carl Schmitt, 'Gesunde Wirtschaft im Starken Staat', unidentified newspaper cutting (1932), BArch N2035/2 Nachlaß Bracht, Bl. 132.
47. Theodor Eschenburg, 'Franz von Papen', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 2/5 (1954), 161, 163. Manfred Funke, 'Republik im Untergang: Die Zerstörung des Parlamentarismus als Vorbereitung der Diktatur', in Bracher, Funke, and Jacobsen (eds.), *Die Weimarer Republik*, 512.
48. Huber, *Verfassungsgeschichte*, vii. 907, 909.
49. Dirk Blasius, *Weimars Ende: Bürgerkrieg und Politik 1930–1933* (Frankfurt am Main, 2008).
50. *Ursachen und Folgen*, viii. 557 ff. See the astute commentary in the *Cape Times*, 22 July 1932.

51. *Preußen contra Reich vor dem Staatsgerichtshof* (Berlin, 1933); Dr Schwalb, 'Die Einwendungen gegen das Staatsgerichts-Urteil vom 25 Oktober 1932 in der Preußensache', *Die Justiz*, 8/5–6 (1933), 217–39; *Akten der Reichskanzlei Weimarer Republik*, Das Kabinett von Papen, prepared by Karl-Heinz Minuth, ii (Boppard am Rhein, 1989), Doc. 215, 960. BArch N2001/128, Bl. 30 on secret discussions in June/July (1932?) regarding the possible detention of von Papen and Hitler.
52. *Akten*, Kab. v. Papen, Doc. 96, 353 (von Leyden); see the pamphlet by Bavaria's Social Democrat prime minister Dr Heinrich Held, *Das preußische-deutsche Problem* (Berlin, 1929).
53. Dr F. Friedensburg, 'Fünfzehn Notverordnungen in zwei Jahren', *Die Justiz*, 8/7 (1933), 314–22; Boldt, 'Der Artikel 48', 293–4, 301; Funke, 'Republik im Untergang', 530; Heiber, *Weimar Republic*, 180, has slightly differing figures.
54. BArch R3001/6670 (22087), Bl. 6, 79, 85; *Akten*, Kab. v. Papen, Doc. 239b, 1037 f.n. 10; Wolfram Pyta, 'Vorbereitungen für den militärischen Ausnahmezustand unter Papen/Schleicher', *Militärgechichtliche Mitteilungen*, 51 (1992), 385–428. Eberhard Kolb and Wolfram Pyta, 'Die Staatsnotstandsplanung unter den Regierungen Papen und Schleicher', in Heinrich August Winkler (ed.), *Handlungsspielräume und Alternativen in der deutschen Staatskrise 1930–1933* (Munich, 1992), 153–79.
55. Rogers et al., 'Aspects', Part II, 577–82.
56. *Akten*, Kab. v. Papen 2, Docs. 215 f., 240.
57. *Akten der Reichskanzlei, Weimarer Republik*, Das Kabinett von Schleicher 3 Dezember 1932 bis 30 Januar 1933, prepared by Anton Golecki (Boppard am Rhein, 1986), LXV–LXX; Funke, 'Republik im Untergang', 516–17.
58. *Akten*, Kab. Schleicher, Docs. 71, 77, and 79 *passim*.
59. BArch N2035/2, Nachlaß Bracht, Bl. 169.
60. BArch N2001/126, Nachlaß Abegg, Archiv-Auszug. Still useful is David Abraham, *The Collapse of the Weimar Republic: Political Economy and Crisis*, 2nd edn. (Princeton, 1986).
61. *Akten der Reichskanzlei Regierung Hitler 1933–1938*, vol. i, 30. Januar bis 31 August 1933, part 1, prepared by Konrad Repgen and Hans Günter Hockerts (Boppard am Rhein, 1983), Docs. 1 and 2, p. 6 for the quote. Bracher, *Auflösung*, 465 ff.