

sunt animae. Ubi enim hae sunt, ibi potentia irrationalis rationalem animae nostrae substantiam sequitur velut umbra.

: III :

Animae creantur quotidie.

- 1 Verum cur novae quotidie animae creantur a deo? An non poterat deus, mundo constructo, creare simul animas cunctas, quemadmodum cunctos in mundi exordio angelos procreavit? Non decuit. Nam si diu a vinculis corporum solutae vixissent, sincere iudicavissent quanto pretiosior sit vita soluta quam alia, nec ingredi unquam corpora voluissent. Videlicet quatenus intellectuales sunt, neque deus vel angelus volunt liberam voluntatem animae cogere. Non enim aliter mens quam persuasione movetur. Immo neque etiam singula quaeque corpora anima cognovisset, quae posset eligere, cum desit illi ante sensus cognitio singulorum. Itaque careret divinis sacerdotibus sacrisque hymnis pars haec media templi divini. Oportet tamen in singulis huius templi circulis proprios duci choros sacerdotum deo canentium.
- 2 Consonat praeterea rationi, ut sicut sphaerarum animi sive angeli non fuerant per moras aliquas temporum ante sphaeras proprias procreati, sic neque animae nostrae ante corpora propria. Item anima est forma actusque corporis. Actus autem quamvis in universo secundum naturae ordinem prior quam potentia sit, in eodem tamen subiecto secundum tempus est posterior, quoniam a potentia in actum motus efficitur. Quapropter prius fuit semen quod est potentia vivum quam anima quae vitalis est actus. Ad

souls are not present. For where human souls are the irrational power follows our soul's rational substance like a shadow.

: III :

Souls are created daily.

Why are new souls created daily by God? Could not God, having 1
constructed the world, create all the souls at the same time, just as
He created all the angels at the world's beginning? It was not appropriate. For had the souls lived freed from the chains of bodies for a long time, they would in all honesty have judged how much more precious this freed life was than any other, and would never have wanted to enter bodies. Insofar as souls are intellectual, neither God nor an angel wishes to compel the soul's free will; for the mind is not moved otherwise than by persuasion. Or rather the soul does not even know about the various individual bodies it could choose, since prior to sensation it lacks any knowledge of individuals. Therefore this middle part of the temple divine would lack divine priests and be without divine hymns. And yet the individual circles of this temple deserve to be occupied by their own priestly choirs singing hymns to God.

Moreover, it accords with reason that just as angels or the rational 2
souls of spheres were not created¹⁹ during individual moments of time before their own spheres, so our souls were not created before their own bodies. Again, soul is the form and act of body. But although in the universe and according to the order of nature act is prior to potentiality, yet in one and the same subject and according to time act is posterior to it, since motion is brought about from potentiality into act. Hence the seed that is living in potentiality is prior to the soul that is living act. It is natural to each form, fur-

haec cuique formae naturale hoc est, ut materiae propriae uniat, alioquin quod ex materia formaque componitur esset congeries aliqua praeter naturam. Prius autem rei cuique tribuitur quod ipsi convenit secundum naturam, quam quod praeter naturam. Quod enim secundum naturam convenit, per se inest²² cuique; quod praeter naturam advenit ex aliquo contingente. Animae igitur, quae ratione anima est, prius convenit ut coniuncta corpori sit quam separata. Quomodo igitur vixit ante corpus?

3 Adde quod si superior mens quaelibet, ut quidam putant, et una est in specie una et immortalis, forma vero quaelibet corporalis et multiplex fit in eadem specie et mortalis, hominis anima, quae illis mentibus succedit, praecedit has formas, sic utrarumque particeps erit, ut sit vel unica anima in una hominum specie atque mortalis, vel immortalis et multiplex. Primum fieri nequit. Si enim anima unica totius speciei animarum gerat vicem, innumerabiles animas, quae fieri sub illa specie possunt, suis viribus complectetur. Sic immensae quodammodo virtutis erit et immortalis, praesertim quia rerum species sempiternae sunt, et quod totam capit speciem est sempiternum. Rursus quia nullam haberet cum his corporeis rebus communionem, esset procul admodum ab interitu. Immo si talis esset, meram speciei suae servaret simplicitatem. Ea species est a caduco corpore segregata. Igitur in puritate propria remaneret a corporibus mortalibus aliena, neque praestaret his vitam. Ex iis constat hominis animam non posse esse unicam in cunctis hominibus, rursus non posse esse unicam simul atque mortalem. Itaque erit immortalis et multiplex. Immortalitate imitabitur mentes, multitudine formas penitus corporales.

4 Erit forte id rerum ordini consentaneum, ut primum gradum teneant ideales ipsae rerum species, secundum vero quae species

thermore, that it be united to its own matter; otherwise what results from compounding matter and form would be an unnatural clump. But to each thing is first given what naturally agrees with it and then what is unnatural to it. For what naturally accords with it is intrinsic to it per se; but what happens to it unnaturally results from something extrinsic. Therefore, by very reason of its being soul, it is proper that soul be bound to body before being separated from it. How has it lived therefore before body?

Moreover, if any higher mind, as some believe,²⁰ is one in one species and immortal, but any corporeal form is made multiple in the same species and mortal too, [then] man's soul, which succeeds minds [but] precedes forms, will so participate in both that it is either the unique soul in the one human species and yet mortal, or it is immortal and multiple [in that species]. The first option is impossible. For if one soul were to play the role of the whole species of souls, it would embrace with its own powers the innumerable souls that are able to exist under the one species. Thus it would be in a way both of measureless power and immortal, especially since the sundry species of things are everlasting and what contains the whole species is everlasting. Again, because it would have nothing in common with corporeal things here, it would be totally divorced from death; or rather if it were unique it would preserve the pure simplicity of its species. This species is separated from the fallen body. So it would remain in its own purity divorced from mortal bodies; and it would not give them life. It follows then that man's soul cannot be one in all men; and it cannot be one and mortal simultaneously. So man's soul will be immortal and multiple. In its immortality it will imitate minds; in its multiplicity it will imitate wholly corporeal forms.

It will accord perchance with the universal order that the ideal species of things should occupy the first rank, and the things that receive these species, the second. And of the things that receive, the first set belongs to those who, according to the capacity of each

capiunt. Atque ex iis quae capiunt, primum quae totam pro facultate creaturae suam capiunt speciem atque semper; secundum vero quae non totam, sed tamen semper; tertium quae neque totam neque semper. Quemadmodum in summo ponimus exemplar luminum, id est solem, in secundo stellas, quarum quaelibet totum inde suum semperque accipit lumen, in tertio lunam, quae semper quidem accipit, sed non totum (et si pati videtur eclipsim, tamen subito recipit), similiter aerem et aquam; in quarto illa ex elementis composita, quae perspicua quodammodo et nitida sunt: talia capiunt²³ quidem, sed neque semper neque totum, ut opposita praetermittam, quae nullo modo in se lumen admittunt.

5 At una haec animae species unde multiplicem accipit numerum? Forte non ex eo quod imitatur mentes. Ex eo igitur quod formas imitatur corporeas. Quales hae sunt? Incipiunt cum corpore et cum corpore desinunt. Anima nostra si talis sit omnino, ut incipiat simul et desinat, non imitatur eas, sed generis est eiusdem atque illae.²⁴ Si neutrum horum habet,²⁵ non imitatur, non congruit, non haeret illis, non vivificat. Ergo habebit alterutrum: vel incipiet cum corpore tantum, vel tantum cum corpore desinet. Desinere non potest cum corpore mens, quae²⁶ ad immortalem veritatem bonitatemque dirigitur tamquam finem; agit enim omnia huius gratia. Sicut autem de rerum initio habemus ab efficiente causa coniecturam, sic de rerum perseverantia coniecturam sumere solemus a fine. Si igitur mens ad sempiternum finem proprie naturali quadam cognatione dirigitur, sempiternae perseverantiae est capax. Proprius enim finis proprio respondet agenti; perseverantia rei ad finem directae inter utrumque tenet medium. Mens igitur,

creature, receive the whole of their species and receive it forever; but the second set belongs to those who do not receive the whole species but do receive it forever; and the third set, to those who neither receive the whole nor receive it forever. Similarly, we put the exemplar of lights, that is the sun, at the zenith; in second place, the stars, each of which receives from it the whole of its light and receives it forever; and in third place, the moon, which receives light forever indeed but not the whole of it (and even if it seems to endure an eclipse yet it reacquires the light immediately) — and the like goes for air and water. In fourth place we put things compounded from the elements that are in some manner perspicuous and bright: such things desire [the light] but not the whole of it and not forever (and let me leave aside their complete opposites which never admit light into themselves).

But this one species of soul receives its multiplicity from where? 5 Not perchance from the fact that it imitates minds. From the fact then that it imitates corporeal forms. What are these like? They commence with body and they end with body. If our soul is entirely such that it begins and ends likewise, it does not imitate these forms, but it is of the same class as them. But if it has neither [beginning nor end], it does not imitate the forms, and it does not accord with, does not adhere to, and does not vivify them. Therefore our soul will have one of two alternatives: either it will only begin with the body, or it will only end with the body. The mind, which is directed towards immortal truth and goodness as its end, cannot end with the body; for it does all for truth's sake. But just as we arrive at a conjecture concerning the beginning of things from the efficient cause, so we customarily derive a conjecture about the lasting nature of things from the end [cause]. So if the mind is properly directed to an everlasting end by a natural affinity with it, it is capable of lasting everlastingly. For the appropriate end corresponds to the appropriate agent [i.e. the mind]. The lasting of something directed to an end is the mean between

cum proprium finem habeat sempiternum, habet quoque agens proprium sempiternum atque idcirco utrinque vitam perseverantiamque perpetuam. Si non desinit cum corpore, incipit saltem cum corpore.

6 Multiplex profecto fit anima hominis in multis corporibus. Quod quidem significatur ex opinionibus hominum affectibusque contrariis. Talis vero non fit ex specie sua, per quam est una, sed, ut quidam putant, quodammodo ex corporibus, immo ex deo animarum corporumque conciliatore. Non quia in corpore sit divisa; non quia ex materia sit ut corpus; non quia nascatur ex corpore. Unde igitur, nisi quia divina voluntate comes fit corporis? Quando deus simul initium praebet utrisque, non tamen praebet principium idem; igitur neque naturam eandem, neque exitum similem, sed initium, ut diximus, idem, unde et numerum tradit eundem.

7 Hinc affectus animae ad naturam corporis augetur, quia corporis initium comitatur, atque in huius creatione mutatio, quae una videtur, est triplex. Mutatio quidem animae ex nihilo ad esse per deum solum facta creatio est; mutatio vero corporis non viventis ad vitam ipsam ab anima capiendam formatio quidem corporis; animalis autem generatio nuncupatur. Creationis terminus ad quem dirigitur anima in se ipsa est, divinae solum aeternitati respondens, quae terminus est a quo creatio provenit. Formationis autem terminus ad quem fit est anima, non tam in se ipsa perma-

them both. So the mind, since it has its own everlasting end, also has its own everlasting agent, and therefore on both accounts has perpetual and lasting life. If it does not cease with the body, at least it begins with the body.

Certainly, man's soul is made multiple in many bodies; the contrary opinions and emotional dispositions of men testify to this. 6 But such a multiple condition does not derive from its species through which it is one: it comes in a way, so some suppose, from bodies, or rather from God (the reconciler of souls and bodies). It does not come because the soul is divided in the body, nor because it is from matter like the body, nor because it is born from the body. Whence then if not because it is made by the divine will the companion of the body? When God gives a beginning to both soul and body at the same time, nevertheless He does not give them the same principle [of being], nor accordingly the same nature, nor a like end, but just the same beginning, as we said, whence He bestows the same number [or principle of individuation].

Hence the soul's desire for the nature of the body is increased 7 because it accompanies the body's beginning; and in the creation of this [new entity] the mutation, which appears to be single, is in fact triple. The mutation of the soul from nothing into being (a changing effected through God alone) is creation; but the mutation of a non-living body in order to receive life itself from the soul is that body's formation; with an animate being, however, the mutation is called generation. Creation's terminus towards which it is directed is the soul in itself, the soul responding only to the divine eternity, which is the terminus from which creation issues. But formation's terminus towards which it is directed is the soul abiding not so much in itself as in the body; while the terminus from which it issues seems to be nature. Finally generation's terminus towards which it is directed is an ensouled being compounded from soul and body; while the terminus from which it issues is

nens quam in corpore; terminus vero a quo fit videtur esse natura. Denique generationis terminus ad quem est animal ex anima corporeque compositum; terminus autem a quo ferme similiter est natura — natura, inquam, non particularis tantum, sed etiam universalis, in cuius virtute particularis corpus ad animam praeparat. Universalis vero natura virtus quaedam dicitur sive instrumentum animae mundi. Ideo Plato in *Philebo* dixit: 'Si mundus anima caret, undenam nos haberemus?' Non quia ab anima mundi sit anima in se ipsa, sed quia per eius operam sit in corpore. Animas enim nostras ab eodem deo et ex eodem fonte, quo et superiores omnes fieri Timaeus ostendit. Hinc illud quoque ostenditur quod Timaeus inquit, rationalem videlicet animam a solo deo esse, irrationalem vero vitam sub ea corpori mancipatam a diis caelestibus, deo iubente, pendere, quia scilicet et corpus ad ipsam praeparant, et animam nostram ad eam corpori infundendam corroborant. Sed haec tamquam hic supervacua dimittamus.

- 8 Sint igitur, dicit aliquis, animae multae, incipiant etiam cum corporibus. Hoc aures non offendit, hic tamen unus restat scrupulus. Quonam pacto conveniat deo singulis momentis ad libidinem concumbentium animas singulas procreare? Non malum est concubitus, quoniam ad bonum est naturaliter institutus, sed defectus moderationis in animis concumbentium. Non fit ex privatione moderationis, sed ex concubitu corporis generatio. Huic generationi deus distribuit animas, non ad libidinem coeuntium, sed ad praescriptam providentiae legem, quae et numerum et tempora concumbentium ab initio rerum videt in aevo.
- 9 In aevo iam dudum concipit animas. Cur ergo deus animas parit quotidie? Quia non simul, sed per successionem erant cor-

likewise nature, or almost so, nature meaning here not only a particular nature but also universal nature in whose power a particular nature prepares a body for a soul. But universal nature is called a particular power or instrument of the World-Soul. Thus in the *Philebus* Plato declared, "If the world were to lack a soul, whence would we have [souls] ourselves?"²¹ It is not because the soul in itself is from the World-Soul, but because it is in the body through the work of the Soul. For Timaeus shows that our souls come from the same God and the same fountain whence all higher things derive.²² Hence the evidence too, as Timaeus says, that while the rational soul comes from God alone, the irrational life, which is chained to the body under it, depends on the celestial gods under God's command: they prepare the body for this life and strengthen our soul for the purpose of pouring it into the body. But let us dismiss these matters here as being beside the point.

So let there be many souls, someone will say, and let them even 8 begin with bodies. This does not sound objectionable, yet one scruple remains here. How is it proper for God in single moments to create single souls according to the desire of the partners coupling? What is evil is not sexual union, since it was naturally instituted for the good, but rather the defect of moderation in the souls of those coupling. The generation of the body comes, not from the absence of moderation, but from [sexual] union. For this generation, God distributes souls not according to the desire of those uniting but according to the prescribed law of providence, which from the very beginning of things sees in eternity both the frequency and the times of sexual union.

In eternity long ago God conceives souls. So why does God 9 produce souls day by day? It is because bodies had to be generated successively, not together. Moreover, God continually illuminates

pora generanda. Adde quod continue illuminat angelos, et sicut numquam desistit mentes superiores formare, ita numquam cessat mentes infimas procreare. Perpetua illic formatio fit, hic perpetua procreatio. Procreatio, inquam, tamdiu assidua quamdiu sol, dei vicarius, continue superiora illuminat corpora et continue generat infima.

10 Decet immensam dei potentiam ita semper sese potentem ostendere mentium oculis, ut videant deum in infimo gradu mentium propter ultimum mundi locum continue aliquid ex nihilo procreantem; ut hoc effectu continuo infinitam²⁷ omnino dei potentiam clarius agnoscant in infinitum creationis actum infinite, si placuerit, peragentem; venerentur eam illuminantem in caelis; admirentur, ut ita loquar, in terra creantem. Excellentior sane operatio est creatio quam illustratio; illa igitur magis quam haec convenit deo. Haec continua fit a deo; illa igitur pro dei arbitrio fit continua. Caelos movent ministri dei. Hoc motu sequentia generantur, dum species quaelibet rerum in terris aliquid agit et in agendo ministra fit caeli. An deus ipse solus agit nihil, quamdiu cetera omnia aliquid operantur? Absit ut primus actus agat nihil, agentibus aliis.

11 At inquires eum agere satis, dum agentia non deserit reliqua, sed vim illis operandi suppeditat. Non satis est istud. Nempe hinc propria causarum aliarum sequuntur opera, atque imagines illarum fiunt in mundo, non dei. Cur nolit et deus assidue opera propria propriasque imagines facere, plurima semper sine medio procreando? Igitur cum creatio propria dei operatio sit, generatio

the angels, and just as He never stops forming the higher minds, so He never stops creating the lowest minds. With the higher minds His forming is perpetual, with the lowest His creating is perpetual. His creating is as constant as the sun, the vicar of God, which continually illuminates the higher bodies and continually generates the lowest.

10 Properly, God's measureless power always reveals itself to the eyes of minds as being so potent: a) that they may see God continually creating something out of nothing in the lowest rank of minds on account of its being the world's lowest place; b) that they may recognize more clearly in this continual creating God's utterly infinite power engaging infinitely—if He so wills—in the infinite act of creation; c) that they may venerate this power in the heavens as the illuminating power; and d) that they may marvel at it so to speak on earth as the creating power. Creation is undoubtedly a more excellent activity than illumination; and thus the former befits God more than the latter. Continual illumination proceeds from God; hence creation is continuous too if God so decides. God's ministers move the heavens; and by this motion subsequent things are generated while each species of things on earth does something and in so doing becomes a minister of heaven. Does God Himself alone do nothing when all other things do something? When other things act, it is inappropriate for the first act to enact nothing.

11 You will say that He does enough, however, when He does not abandon all the other agents but supplies them with the power to operate. But that is not enough. From Him follow certainly the proper works of other causes; and the images of them, not of God, are made in the world. Why doesn't God too wish to make His own works and their appropriate images continually, the majority always by creating without an intermediary? Therefore, since creation is the proper work of God, but external generation is the

autem externa operatio propria aliorum, non cessabit deus creare aliquid, quamdiu alia non cessabunt aliquid generare.

12 Centrum mundi verum deus est, ut in libro *De amore* disseruimus, quia unus, simplex, stabilis est et in omnibus, atque alia quaelibet omnino plura, composita, mobilia, circa ipsum per naturalem ipsius appetitum perpetuo revolvuntur. Ita centrum deus est omnium, quia sic est in omnibus, ut cuique rei interior sit, quam ipsamet sibi. Est etiam circumferentia mundi, quia extra cuncta existens ita supereminet universa, ut cuiusque rei summum apicem dignitate excellat immensa. Item quanto est omnium, si dictu fas est, minimus quantitate, tanto virtute est maximus omnium. Ut est centrum quidem, est in omnibus; ut circumferentia vero, est extra omnia. In omnibus, inquam, non inclusus, quia est et²⁸ circumferentia; extra omnia quoque non exclusus, quia est et centrum. Quid ergo deus est? Ut ita dixerim, circulus spiritualis, cuius centrum est ubique circumferentia nusquam. At enim si centrum id divinum in aliqua mundi parte imaginariam aliquam aut perspicuam operationis sedem habeat, potissimum in rerum medio dominatur, tamquam rex in medio civitatis, cor ferme in medio corporis, sol in medio planetarum. In sole igitur, id est in tertia mediaque rerum essentia deus posuit tabernaculum suum—tabernaculum, inquam, virtutis suae frequentius demonstrandae. Quae sedes familiaris est deo, non tam quod species animae est quam quod divinae civitatis est medium, aerarium publicum et consona urbanarum partium moderatio.

13 Animam hominis esse rerum medium saepe iam declaravimus. In hac igitur regione praecipua dei operatio frequentius praevaleret. Talis creatio est. Creat igitur assidue animas hominum. Profecto quia stabile centrum est, creat continue. Quia circumferentia

proper work of others, God is not going to stop creating something as long as others are not going to stop generating something.

The world's true center is God as we discussed in the book *On Love*, because He is one, simple, unchanging, and in all things, whereas all other things are wholly many, composite, mobile, and through their natural desire for Him they revolve around Him perpetually.²³ Thus God is the center of all, because He is so in all things that He is more internal to each thing than it is to itself. He is also the world's circumference because, in existing outside all things, He so transcends all things that His dignity immeasurably excels the highest summit of each thing. Again, He is greatest of all in power to the extent He is least of all in quantity, if this is a permissible way of putting it. As He is the center, He is in all, but as the circumference, He is outside all: in all, but not included because He is also the circumference; outside all too but not excluded because He is also the center. So what is God? One might call Him a spiritual circle whose center is everywhere, whose circumference is nowhere.²⁴ But if this divine center were to have some imaginary or clearly evident seat of operation in some part of the world, it would chiefly reign in the midst of things as a king in the midst of a city, the heart in the midst almost of the body, the sun in the midst of the planets. So in the sun, that is, in the third and middle essence of things, God has placed His tabernacle,²⁵ a tabernacle for manifesting His power more often. This seat is home to God not so much because the soul's species [or beauty] is there as because the center of the divine city is there, its public treasury, the harmonious government of its civic parts.

We have already declared and repeatedly too that man's soul is the universal mean. So in this [mean] region God's principal activity will prevail more often. This activity is creation. Hence God continually creates men's souls. Certainly because He is the unmoving center, He creates [them] continually; and because He is the circumference that encircles the world's circumference, He creates

est quae mundi ambit circumferentiam, creat eas, ut Platonici dicerent, quodammodo in circumferentia mundi. Rursus quia centrum, ideo est summa rerum. Quia summa, ideo singula fundit, tum sigillatim singula semel ab initio rerum, tum cuncta summam quotidie, prout creando animam, quae rerum medium est, effundit e sinu proprio universa quae summam confunduntur in medio.

: IV :

Unde anima descendit in corpus?

- 1 Undenam descendit in corpus anima? Revera cum deus extra locum adsit omni loco, et anima non claudatur loco momentoque²⁹ et creetur et adsit, neque dicendum proprie est³⁰ eam descendere, neque unde descendat est quaerendum. Sic enim ab ipso deo manans adest corpori, ut ita dixerim, sicut a solis lumine radius oculo. Sed delectat interdum una cum priscis confabulari. Igitur si Zoroastri et Mercurio credimus, ex amplo demittitur ambitu mundi atque, ut illorum sententiam ordine referam, infima mens supremo corpori primum adhaeret, neque haeret solummodo, sed infunditur, quo tamquam medio crassioribus corporibus copulatur. Spiritus simplex immortalisque non aliter composito mortali corpore quam per corpus simplex et immortale coniungitur. Neque id quidem iniuria, quoniam anima per suam essentiam corpori praestat vitam. Essentia eius vita est sempiterna. Sempiterna vita, cui primum haeret, haeret in sempiternum, praesertim quoniam essentia animae immutabilis est, quo fit ut immutabiliter

them, as the Platonists would say, in a way in the world's circumference. Again, because He is the center, He is the sum of all things; and because the sum, He produces individuals in abundance, both individuals individually just once at the very beginning of things, and all things collectively day by day, just as in creating the soul, which is the universal mean, He brings forth from His own bosom the universe of things which are collectively mingled in that mean.

: IV :

From where does the soul descend into the body?

From where does the soul descend into the body? Truly, since God is present in every place but is outside place, and the soul is not enclosed by place and is created and appears in a moment, properly we should neither say that it descends nor inquire whence it descends. For emanating from God Himself the soul is present to the body, so to speak, as a ray is present to the eye from the sun's light. Now and then, however, it is pleasant to converse with the ancients. Thus, if we believe Zoroaster and Mercurius [Trismegistus],²⁶ the lowest mind is sent down from the vast circumference of the world and—if I may relate their view in the right order—clings first to the highest body; and not only does it cling to it, it is poured into it; and with this highest body as a mean it is then joined to grosser bodies. The only way a simple and immortal spirit is joined to a composite and mortal body is through a simple and immortal body; not unjustly so, since through its own essence a soul gives life to a body. Its essence is everlasting life. Everlasting life clings for eternity to the thing it clings to first, especially since the soul's essence itself is immutable.