Forecasting intra-state conflicts

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March 20, 2017

March 20, 2017

1 / 27

Dealing with one of the most complex phenomenon:

Dealing with one of the most complex phenomenon: Social Behavior

- Growth of prediction and forecasting approaches
- Some context to the growth conflict forecasting
- Social science as predictive science
- How to predict a conflict

Predictive turn in conflict studies

- Gurr and Lichbach, 1986
- O'brien, 2002
- Schrodt, 2006
- Goldstone et al., 2010
- Ward, 2010
- Weidmann and Ward, 2010
- Schneider, Gleditsch and Carey, 2011

- De Mesquita, 2011
- Ward et al., 2013
- Gleditsch and Ward, 2013
- Hegre et al., 2013
- Bell et al., 2013
- Brandt, Freeman and Schrodt, 2014
- Muchlinski et al., 2016

Characteristics of predictive approaches

•
$$Y = f(X) + e$$

• Focus on \hat{Y} rather than $\hat{\beta}$

•
$$\hat{Y} = \hat{f}$$

Commercial Break

Peace Research

Special issue on forecasting Edited by Håyard Hegre, Nils W Metternich, Håyard Mokleiv Nygård & Julian Wucherpfennig

Introduction

Håvard Hegre, Nils W Metternich, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård & Julian Wucherpfennig – Introduction: Forecasting in peace research

Research Articles

Nils B Weidmann & Sebastian Schutte – Using night light emissions for the prediction of local wealth

Michael D Ward & Andreas Beger – Lessons from near real-time forecasting of irregular leadership changes

Anita R Gohdes & Sabine C Carey – Canaries in a coal-mine? What the killings of journalists tell us about future repression

Frank DW Witmer, Andrew M Linke, John O'Loughlin, Andrew Gettelman & Arlene Laing – Subnational violent conflict forecasts for sub-Saharan Africa, 2015–65, using climate-sensitive models

Michael Colaresi & Zuhaib Mahmood – Do the robot: Lessons from machine learning to improve conflict forecasting Ursula Daxecker & Brandon C Prins – Financing rebellion: Using piracy to explain and predict conflict intensity in Africa and Southeast Asia

Gerald Schneider, Maya Hadar & Naomi Bosler – The oracle or the crowd? Experts versus the stock market in forecasting ceasefire success in the Levant

Håvard Hegre, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård & Ranveig Flaten Ræder – Evaluating the scope and intensity of the conflict trap: A dynamic simulation approach

Lars-Erik Cederman, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch & Julian Wucherpfennig – Predicting the decline of ethnic civil war: Was Gurr right and for the right reasons?

Daina Chiba & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch – The shape of things to come? Expanding the inequality and grievance model for civil war forecasts with event data

Robert A Blair, Christopher Blattman & Alexandra Hartman – Predicting local violence: Evidence from a panel survey in Liberia

Thomas Chadefaux – Market anticipations of conflict onsets

http://journals.sagepub.com/home/jp



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Forecasting


UCL

Curse or fortune? The increasing demand to explain and predict conflictual behavior




Curse or fortune?

The increasing demand to explain and predict conflictual behavior



Curse or fortune?

The increasing demand to explain and predict conflictual behavior




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Curse or fortune? The increasing ability to explain and predict conflictual behavior



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Curse or fortune? The increasing ability to explain and predict conflictual behavior




Social radar Is it the social science "space race"?



Dr. Mark Maybury (Chief Scientist of the United States Air Force)

"The Air Force and the Navy in this and other countries have a history of developing Sonar to see through the water, Radar to see through the air, and IR [infrared] to see through the night. Well, we also want to see into the hearts and the minds of people" (In Wired.com 01/19/12)

Social radar Is it the social science "space race"?



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12 / 27

March 20, 2017

Pentagon 125 000 000 USD

NSF (Total Political Science Funding) 33 000 000 USD

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
Everyday forecasts and conditional behavior Everyone of us is making predictions and conditions their behavior





General forecasts and conditional policies







Forecasting

March 20, 2017 15 / 27

- A study tries to understand the link between democratization and civil war
 - Democracy measured on a 20 point scale (0=fully autocratic; 20=fully democratic)
 - Civil war measured binary (0=no civil war; 1=civil war)
- The study finds that an increase in democracy by one point, decreases the risk of conflict by 5 percent.
 - Imagine the risk of war in the Dem. Rep. Congo is 25 percent and we suddenly see a strong autocratic shift from 15 on the democracy scale to 10.
 - What is the updated risk of war in the DRC?

- Increasing skepticism of whether we can predict accurately
- Oftentimes the argument is: "We can explain, but not predict."
- But what does that mean if we at the same time believe in generalizable explanations?
- Doesn't generalizability imply predictability?


Prediction tool	Example			
Subject matter experts	CIA			
Prediction markets	Iowa Market			
Actor-based/game theoretical models	Bueno de Mesquita			
Statistical models	CRISP			

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How are they are generated

- Input data
 - Dynamic indicators (News wires, newspapers, media)
 - Structural indicators (political, economic, geographic, ethnic)
- Estimation
 - Statistical models
- Predictions
 - In-Sample
 - Out-Sample
 - Forecasting

ICEWS




Forecasting

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
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Approaches and tradeoffs



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\hat{eta}	$\sigma_{\hat{eta}}$	Z-score
0.48	1.09	0.44
1.94	0.13	14.45
1.01	0.19	5.43
7.01	1.12	6.27
-7.79	1.40	-5.57
-0.62	0.15	-4.11
-0.26	0.05	-5.13
-0.12	0.06	-2.14
-0.68	0.46	-1.48
-	1.94 1.01 7.01 -7.79 -0.62 -0.26 -0.12	0.48 1.09 1.94 0.13 1.01 0.19 7.01 1.12 -7.79 1.40 -0.62 0.15 -0.26 0.05 -0.12 0.06

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In- and Outsample predictions Separation plots for CRISP Model Prediction of UCDP Data

In-Sample: January 2001-December 2010



Out-of-Sample: January 2011-December 2011



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Predictions for 2012

10 Countries with Highest Average Probability of Continuing Conflict and 5 With Highest Average Probability of New Conflict

	01/2012	02/2012	03/2012	04/2012	05/2012	06/2012	07/2012	08/2012	09/2012	Forecast 10/2012 - 03/2013
Sudan	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99
India	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.94	0.99
Ethiopia	0.98	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.97	0.96	0.99	0.99	0.97	0.99
Russia	0.99	0.96	0.96	0.99	0.99	0.96	0.99	0.99	0.96	0.99
Israel	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.97	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.99
Turkey	0.99	0.97	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.92	0.99
Algeria	0.99	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.99
Philippines	0.98	0.99	0.99	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.98	0.89	0.99
Colombia	0.99	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.98	0.97	0.98	0.99	0.88	0.99
Uganda	0.93	0.95	0.95	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.95	0.94	0.96	0.99
Chad	0.67	0.64	0.64	0.60	0.66	0.66	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.99
DR Congo	0.29	0.33	0.37	0.33	0.35	0.38	0.36	0.35	0.41	0.91
Nepal	0.30	0.33	0.32	0.32	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.34	0.37	0.90
Mali	0.27	0.26	0.71	0.86	0.89	0.24	0.28	0.28	0.27	0.83
Sri Lanka	0.16	0.14	0.13	0.51	0.14	0.56	0.55	0.54	0.16	0.64

Image: Image:

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Predictions for 2012

Map for CRISP Model Predictions of Civil War (October 2012-March 2013), with darker colors presenting higher probabilities



- Predicting is becoming the "gold standard" in social science
- Big data and new methods allow for improved prediction of conflict
- However, the money allocation does favor a particular branch of social science. Does this lead to less scientific freedom?
- How are scientific insights used?
- Curse or fortune?