

# Optimizing trial designs for targeted therapies - A decision theoretic approach comparing sponsor and public health perspectives<sup>†</sup>

Thomas Ondra


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- Overall treatment effect

$$\delta_F = \lambda\delta_S + (1 - \lambda)\delta_{S'}$$

where  $\lambda$  is the prevalence of subgroup  $S$ .

- We assume  $\delta_{S'} \leq \delta_S$ .
- Allows for investigating the hypotheses  $H_F : \delta_F \leq 0$  and  $H_S : \delta_S \leq 0$ .

**Classical Design:** Recruit from the full population  $F$ . No Biomarker is determined.

**Stratification Design:** Include patients of subgroup  $S$  (say Biomarker +) and patients from  $S'$  (Biomarker -). Stratify randomization by biomarker status.

**Enrichment Design:** Randomize only patients of subgroup  $S$ . Patients of the complement  $S'$  are excluded from the trial.

- With the classical design one can test  $H_F$ .
- With the stratification design one can test  $H_S$  and  $H_F$ .
- With the enrichment design one can test  $H_S$ , i.e., for a treatment effect in the subpopulation.

# The Testing Procedures

Parallel group comparison of the means of normal distributions.

**Classical Design:** Test  $H_F$  with a z-test.

**Stratification Design:** Test  $H_S$  and  $H_F$  with closed Spiessens-Debois test at levels  $\alpha_S, \alpha_F$  (see Spiessens and Debois (2010)).

- If one hypothesis is rejected the other is tested at full level  $\alpha$ .
- To reject  $H_F$  in addition to the multiple test we require for fixed **consistency parameters**  $\tau_S, \tau_{S'}$  that  $p_S \leq \tau_S$  and  $p_{S'} \leq \tau_{S'}$ .

**Enrichment Design:** Test  $H_S$  with a z-test.

- When is it beneficial to include the biomarker into the clinical trial, i.e. which **type of design** (Classical Design/Stratified Design/Enrichment Design) to choose?
- Which **sample size**?
- Which **significance levels**  $\alpha_F$  and  $\alpha_S$  for  $H_F$  and  $H_S$  in the weighted multiple test for the stratified design are optimal?

We apply a utility based approach, see e.g. Graf et al. (2015); Beckman et al. (2011), to model the expected utilities of a particular trial design from a **sponsor's** and a **public health** view.

# The utility function

The choice of the trial design is determined by a utility function:

$$U(d) = -C(d) + \begin{cases} \varphi_{F,d} & \text{if } \psi_{F,d} = 1 \\ \varphi_{S,d} & \text{if } \psi_{F,d} = 0 \text{ and } \psi_{S,d} = 1 . \\ 0 & \text{if } \psi_{F,d} = 0 \text{ and } \psi_{S,d} = 0 \end{cases}$$

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- $C(d)$  cost for the trial.

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- $C(d)$  cost for the trial.
- $\varphi_{F,d}$  reward if drug is licensed in  $F$ .
- $\varphi_{S,d}$  reward if drug is licensed in  $S$  only.



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  - For Enrichment designs  $\psi_{F,d} = 0$ .
  - For Classical designs  $\psi_{S,d} = 0$ .

# The rewards

## Sponsor view

$$\varphi_{F,d} = N \cdot r_F \cdot (\hat{\delta}_{F,d} - \mu_F)^+$$

$$\varphi_{S,d} = \lambda \cdot N \cdot r_S \cdot (\hat{\delta}_{S,d} - \mu_S)^+$$

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## Public health view

$$\varphi_{F,d} = N \cdot r_F \cdot (\delta_F - \mu_F)$$

$$\varphi_{S,d} = \lambda \cdot N \cdot r_S \cdot (\delta_S - \mu_S)$$

## Sponsor view

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- $\hat{\delta}_{F,d}$  and  $\hat{\delta}_{S,d}$  are the observed efficacy estimates.

## Public health view

$$\varphi_{F,d} = N \cdot r_F \cdot (\delta_F - \mu_F)$$

$$\varphi_{S,d} = \lambda \cdot N \cdot r_S \cdot (\delta_S - \mu_S)$$

- $\delta_S, \delta_F$  denote true effect sizes.

- Classical Trial

$$C(d) = c_{\text{setup}} + 2nc_{\text{per-patient}}.$$

# The costs of a trial

- Classical Trial

$$C(d) = c_{\text{setup}} + 2nc_{\text{per-patient}}.$$

- Stratified Trial

$$C(d) = c_{\text{setup}} + c_{\text{Biomarker development}} + 2n(c_{\text{per-patient}} + c_{\text{screening}}).$$

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- Classical Trial

$$C(d) = c_{\text{setup}} + 2nc_{\text{per-patient}}.$$

- Stratified Trial

$$C(d) = c_{\text{setup}} + c_{\text{Biomarker development}} + 2n(c_{\text{per-patient}} + c_{\text{screening}}).$$

- Enrichment Trial

$$C(d) = c_{\text{setup}} + c_{\text{Biomarker development}} + 2n\left(c_{\text{per-patient}} + \frac{c_{\text{screening}}}{\lambda}\right).$$

# Optimizing the expected utility

$\pi$ ...prior on the effect sizes  $\Delta = (\delta_S, \delta_{S'})$  in  $S$  and  $S'$ .


The optimal design is given by

$$d^* \in \operatorname{argmax}_{d \in D} E_{\pi} [E_{\Delta}[U(d)]]$$

# A numerical example

Prior:

- Point prior on  $\delta_S$ :  $P_\pi(\delta_S = 0.3) = 1$
- Discrete prior on  $\delta_{S'}$



We choose the following **parameter configuration**:

$$c_{\text{setup}} = 1\text{MUSD}, c_{\text{per-patient}} = 0.05\text{MUSD}, \mu_F = \mu_S = 0.1$$



$$Nr_F = Nr_S = 1000\text{MUSD}, c_{\text{Biomarker development}} = c_{\text{screening}} = 0.$$

For the public health view we use the same reward and cost parameters.

## Consistency parameters



- We set  $\tau_S = \tau_{S'} = 0.3$  in the sponsor view.
- We set  $\tau_S = 0.3$  and optimize  $\tau_{S'}$  in the public health view.







- For both views the classical design is optimal for low prevalences and the stratified design is optimal for large prevalences.
- The enrichment design is never optimal.

# Per group sample size



- In the public health view it is optimal to conduct larger trials.



- For low prevalences more weight is put on  $H_F$ , for large prevalences  $H_S$  is more important.
- As the subgroup gets larger, the optimal consistency parameter  $\tau_{S'}$  gets larger.

# What happens if we add biomarker costs?



We change the biomarker related costs from

$$c_{\text{Biomarker development}} = c_{\text{screening}} = 0$$

to



$$c_{\text{Biomarker development}} = 1\text{MUSD}, c_{\text{screening}} = 5000\text{USD}$$

# Changes in the sponsor view



- Cutpoint is shifted to the right.
- Classical designs is not affected.

# Changes in the public health view



- Cutpoint is shifted to the right
- In addition, the classical design is also optimal for very large prevalences.

# Conclusions

- In general, the decision theoretic approach gives guidance regarding the choice of the trial design (including the type of the trial, the choice of the sample size and the weights in the multiple test)
- The analysis of the example shows that the optimal sponsor decision depends strongly on the particulars of the situation. Subgroup prevalence, trial costs and initial beliefs are all important to consider when making the design choice.
- Allows for comparing optimal designs from sponsor's and public health perspective.
- The model can be extended in several directions.
  - Allow for partial enrichment.
  - Include adaptive enrichment designs.

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