Growth and Comparative Development - An Overview


Oded Galor

Department of Economics Brown University


Warwick Summer School in Economic Growth - July 8, 2013




Regional Variations in Income Per Capita: 2000




Cross-Country Variations in Income Per Capita: 2000




Evolution of Disparity in Income Per Capita: 1960-2000



World Income Distribution: 1960




World Income Distribution: 1960-1980




World Income Distribution: 1960-2000 - Persistent Inequality




Lack of Convergence across the Globe: 1960-2000



Divergence Across Regions: 1820-2000



Disparity in Income Per capita Across Regions: 1-2000



Disparity in Income per Capita across Countries: 1-2008

	Income per Capita			
	0	1000	1820	2008
Western Offshoots	400	400	1,202	30,152
Western Europe	576	427	1,194	21,672
Latin America	400	400	691	6,973
Asia	456	470	581	5,611
Africa	472	425	420	1,780
Rich/Poor (ratio)	1.4	1.2	2.9	16.9

- What is the origin of the vast inequality in income per capita across countries and regions?
- What accounts for the great divergence in per capita income across countries in the past two centuries?
- What are the factors that prevented the convergence of poor economies toward the richer ones?

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Phases of Development

The Malthusian Epoch

LDCs

Developed Countries Emergence of Homo sapiens - 1750 Emergence of Homo sapiens - 1900

The Post Malthusian Regime

The Modern Growth Regime

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
The Modern Growth Regime

Developed Countries 1870 LDCs

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
present

World Income per Capita: 1-2008 - From Stagnation to Growth





Growth of World Income Per Capita: 1-2000 - From Stagnation to Growth



- Technological progress and land expansion
 - \Longrightarrow Temporary increase in the level of income per capita
 - \Longrightarrow An increase in the size of the population
 - No effect on the level of income per capita in the long run
- Output per capita fluctuates around a subsistence level
- Technological advanced or land rich economies
 - => Higher population density
 - \Longrightarrow Similar level of income per-capita in the long-run



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
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
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
Malthusian Fluctuations in Income Per Capita: England, 1260–1760



Malthusian Adjustments of Income and Population: England, 1250-1750




Land Productivity and Population Density in 1500 CE



Conditional on transition timing, geographical factors, and continental fixed effects



Land Productivity and Income Per Capita in 1500 CE



Conditional on transition timing, geographical factors, and continental fixed effects



The Post-Malthusian Regime

Economies take-off from a Malthusian equilibrium:

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
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
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Regional Variation in the Timing of the Take-off: Early Take-Off




Regional Variation in the Timing of the Take-off: (Levels) Late Take-Off




The Malthusian Epoch **The Post-Malthusian Regime** The Modern Growth Regime Major Puzzles


Growth of GDP Per Capita and Population: Western Offshoots, 1500-2000




Growth of GDP Per Capita and Population: Western Europe, 1500-2000




Growth of GDP Per Capita and Population: Africa 1500-2000




Growth of GDP Per Capita and Population: Latin America 1500-2000



Industrialization: Developed Economies



Industrialization: Less Developed Economies



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
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
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Timing of the Demographic Transition across Regions




Demographic Transition across Regions: Early Transition




Demographic Transition across Regions: Late Transition


Late Demographic Transition




Time Elapsed since the Demographic Transition and Income per Capita, 2000




Variations in the timing of the Transition: Divergence in Income per Capita



Sustained Economic Growth: Western Europe and Western Offshoots, 1870-2001



Growth of Income Per Capita: Africa, Asia and Latin America, 1950-2001



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More Fundamental Causes of Growth

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Colonialism & persistence of institutions / human capital

- Reversal of furtune (Engerman-Sokolof, 1997; Acemoglu et al. AER 2001, QJE 2002)
 - Exclusive (Extractive) institutions in densely populated areas
 - Inclusive (Constructive) institutions in sparsely populated areas
- Persistent effect of the human capital (rather than institutions)
 brought by the colonists (Glaeser et al., JEG 2004)
- Legal origins (Glaeser-Shleifer, QJE 2002)
 - Persistent effect of the legal system imposed by the colonists - Common law is more complementary to a market economy than civil law
- Persistent effect of the scramble of Africa (Papaioanu-Michalopolous, 2012)



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 - Persistent effect of technological head-start associated with an earlier onset of the Neolithic Revolution (Diamond, 1997, Olsson-Hibbs, EER, 2005, Ashraf-Galor, AER 2011, AER 2013)
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Soil quality

- Persistent effect of comparative advantage in agricultural
 - Int't Trade ⇒ specialization in unskilled-intensive good ⇒ inv't in HC↓ fertlity↑ slowing transition to modern growth (Galor-Mountford Restud 2008)
- Land suitable for large plantations
 - \Longrightarrow Inequality:
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Range of soil quality

- ⇒ geographical specific human capital ⇒ reduced mobility
 ⇒ ethnic fractionalization
- Persistent effect of ethnic fractionalization (Michalopoulos, AER 2012)
- Geographical determinants of subsistence consumption
 - Affect fertility & income per capita in the Malthusian epoch and therefore the timing of the take-off (Dalgaard-Strulik, 2012)
- Ecological diversity, storability and the emergence of the state (Fenske 2012, Mayshar-Moav-Neeman, 2013)

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Social Capital

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