# Childhood conflict exposure and political engagement in Africa

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#### Introduction

How do we find an answer? Why is this a question worth asking? What have others found outside of Africa? What have others found in Africa? What did we find and why?

# Introduction

#### Question

 How does exposure to conflict in childhood affect later-life political attitudes and behaviors?

#### Motivation

- Political knowledge, engagement, and attitudes matter. It is important, then, to understand how Africans political views are formed, and what pressures influence their political participation.
- Studies of conflict-exposed children have, with a few exceptions, focused on health and education, and have neglected politics. Does conflict breed distrust, factionalism, and disengagement? Does violence beget violence?

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# In this lecture

- I discuss the methods used to answer questions like this.
- I show that the economic consequences of conflict are not so predictable.
- I summarize recent papers that have linked individual conflict exposure to attitudes and political outcomes.
- I discuss a recent paper in which Achyuta Adhvaryu and I attempt to generalize these results to the whole of sub-Saharan Africa.

#### Introduction

How do we find an answer? Why is this a question worth asking? What have others found outside of Africa? What have others found in Africa? What did we find and why?

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- 2 How do we find an answer?
- 3 Why is this a question worth asking?
- 4 What have others found outside of Africa?
- 5 What have others found in Africa?
- 6 What did we find and why?

When treatment is discrete When treatment is continuous


#### 1 Introduction

- 2 How do we find an answer?
  - When treatment is discrete
  - When treatment is continuous
- 3 Why is this a question worth asking?
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When treatment is discrete


When treatment is continuous

# A naive comparison




When treatment is discrete When treatment is continuous

# A less naive comparison




When treatment is discrete When treatment is continuous

### A naive comparison



When treatment is discrete When treatment is continuous

# A less naive comparison



Macroeconomic impacts of war

#### 1 Introduction

- 2 How do we find an answer?
- Why is this a question worth asking?
   Macroeconomic impacts of war
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Macroeconomic impacts of war

# No poverty traps in Vietnam




Fig. 1. Map of Vietnam - 10% of districts with the highest total U.S. bombs, missiles, and rockets per km<sup>2</sup> shaded.

Macroeconomic impacts of war

# Recovery in Japan





FIGURE 2. POPULATION GROWTH

Macroeconomic impacts of war


### Reversal in Germany



Macroeconomic impacts of war

# Long-lasting effects on trade

#### Figure 1.—Impact of War on Trade for a Given Country Pair: Contemporaneous Impact and Lags 1 through 10



Macroeconomic impacts of war

#### Terrorism in Spain




FIGURE 1. PER CAPITA GDP FOR THE BASQUE COUNTRY

Violence and attitudes Violence and political outcomes

#### 1 Introduction

2 How do we find an answer?


3) Why is this a question worth asking?

- What have others found outside of Africa?
  - Violence and attitudes
  - Violence and political outcomes
- 5 What have others found in Africa?

6 What did we find and why?

Violence and attitudes Violence and political outcomes

### Civil war and yellow cards



Violence and attitudes Violence and political outcomes

# Violent trauma and risk preference in Afghanistan





Figure 1: Successful Attacks and Failed Attacks in Kabul

Violence and attitudes Violence and political outcomes

# Violent trauma and risk preference in Colombia

#### Figure 3. Lottery Choices by Group



Violence and attitudes Violence and political outcomes

### Violence and trust in Tajikistan





Fig. 2 Trust game and victimization: Amount sent and percentage returned. Notes: Trust game results-no controls included

Violence and attitudes Violence and political outcomes


### Egalitarian motivations and in-group biases

Figure 1. Warfare exposure and relative frequency of egalitarian choices in Sharing and Envy Games.



Violence and attitudes Violence and political outcomes

### Crime victimization and political participation



Violence and attitudes Violence and political outcomes

#### War and conservatism

	(A)	ge 4-8)			
		Degr Conserv (0-10, 10 be	t Variable: ree of ativeness ing the most vative)	Dependen (Actual V Conservativ (LHC&	oting for Candidates
Parameter/Variable	Sample Mean	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Age	43.09 [14.07]	0.110*** (0.024)	0.126*** (0.032)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.005)
Age Squared		-0.001*** (0.0003)	-0.001*** (0.0004)	-0.0001*** (0.00004)	-0.0001* (0.00006)
Female	0.51 [0.50]	-0.122 (0.106)	-0.123 (0.106)	-0.002 (0.016)	-0.002 (0.016)
Monthly Household Income (in millions of KRW)	3.93 [2.00]	0.064** (0.029)	0.065** (0.029)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.004)
Early Childhood Exposure to Korean War	0.07 [0.25]	0.687*** (0.029)	0.813*** (0.028)	0.095*** (0.035)	0.082* (0.043)
People Older Than Early Childhood Exposure to War Group	0.07 [0.25]		0.304 (0.391)		-0.033 (0.060)
City Size Dummy		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Religion Dummy		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hometown Dummy		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education Level Dummy		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Degree of Conservativeness	3.47 [3.06]				
Voting for Conservative Candidate	0.37 [0.48]				
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>		0.052	0.052	0.107	0.107
Number of Observations: Note: We absorbed the analysis by ration. Standard	3,415	3,415	3,415	3,415	3,415

Note: We absorbed the analysis by region. Standard deviations are reported in squared bracket and standard errors are reported in parenthesis. \*\*\* indicates significance at 1% level, \*\* indicates significance at 5% level and \* indicates significance at 10% level.

Health and education Violence and attitudes Violence and political outcomes

#### 1 Introduction

- 2 How do we find an answer?
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- (5) What have others found in Africa?
  - Health and education
  - Violence and attitudes
  - Violence and political outcomes



Health and education Violence and attitudes Violence and political outcomes

### War and height in Nigeria

TABLE 1—DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF WAR ON STATURE Duration of Exposure to War × Exposed Ethnicity

	-	
Dependent variable: adult height	(1)	(2)
Months exposure in utero × war ethnicity	$\begin{array}{c} -0.027 \\ (0.030) \end{array}$	-0.047 (0.038)
Months exposure at ages $0-3 \times \text{war}$ ethnicity	$^{-0.028^{\pm\pm\pm}}_{\ (0.009)}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.043^{++} \\ (0.021) \end{array}$
Months exposure at ages $4-6 \times$ war ethnicity	$-0.035^{**}$ (0.014)	-0.061° (0.034)
Months exposure at ages $7-12 \times$ war ethnicity	$\begin{array}{c} -0.054^{***} \\ (0.011) \end{array}$	$-0.094^{\circ}$ (0.050)
Months exposure at ages 13–16 × war ethnicity	$\begin{array}{c} -0.162^{***} \\ (0.033) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} -0.220^{***} \\ (0.076) \end{array}$
Months exposure in utero	-0.087 (0.059)	-0.081 (0.060)
Months exposure at ages 0-3	-0.129*** (0.034)	$\begin{array}{c} -0.125^{***} \\ (0.034) \end{array}$
Months exposure at ages 4-6	$\begin{array}{c} -0.022 \\ (0.070) \end{array}$	-0.015 (0.071)
Months exposure at ages 7-12	-0.014 (0.083)	-0.003 (0.083)
Months exposure at ages 13-16	$egin{array}{c} -0.038 \ (0.138) \end{array}$	$\substack{-0.022\\(0.137)}$
State fixed effects Ethnicity fixed effects Year fixed effects Ethnicity time trends	Yes Yes Yes No	Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of women	13,407	13,407

Health and education Violence and attitudes Violence and political outcomes

# Child soldiers and education in Uganda

Dependent Variable	(1) Dependent Variable ATE		(3) %Δ
Educational and labor market outcomes			
Years of education	-0.75 [0.17]***	7.6	-10%
Indicator for functional literacy	-0.15 [0.04]***	0.80	-19%
Indicator for any employment in the past month	0.03 [0.04]	0.61	5%
Indicator for capital- or skill-intensive work	-0.05 [0.02]**	0.12	-43%
Log (Daily wage)	-0.33 [0.15]**	n.a	n.a
Psychosocial and health outcomes			
Index of psychological distress	0.57 [0.20]***	3.8	15%
Indicator for top quartile of distress	0.11 [0.04]***	0.23	49%
Index of social support	-0.16 [0.14]	5.5	-3%
Indicator for hostile attitudes	0.03 [0.01]**	0.07	40%
Indicator for physical fights	-0.02 [0.02]	0.07	-29%


Each entry represents a separate WLS regression. All variables defined and described in table 1. "Significant at 10", "metaginificant at 10", Teatment is binary and equals 1 if ever ablaced and 0 otherwise." The percentrage change ("Ab) is calculated as the ATE relative to the men value for non-baddeted youth. Roberts standard errors in brackets, distared by sampling unit (location at ablaction status). Controls in the WLS regression include age and location durmises, age and location interactions, and pertreatment individual and household characteristics. Weighted by inverse sampling probability, inverse attriction probability, and increase program of the status of

Source: Blattman and Annan (2010) RESTAT

Health and education Violence and attitudes Violence and political outcomes

# War and expenditure in Uganda

Figure 1: The Effect of Risk on Expenditure



Health and education Violence and attitudes Violence and political outcomes

### War and preferences in Burundi

		Depen	dent variabl	e: degree of al	truism scale (	)-100.	
Percentage dead in attacks	1.073 [0.489]**	0.875 [0.460]*	1.688 [0.464]***	1.686 [0.523]***		2.892 [0.958]***	0.486
Individual victimization inde	x				2.940 [1.745]*		
	D	ependent vari	iable ranges	from 0 (risk	averse) to 3	(risk loving).	
Percentage dead in attacks	0.078 0.06 [0.024]*** [0.02	01000	27 0.063 6]** [0.026		0.0196 [0.0204]	0.0729 [0.0376]*	0.258
Individual victim- ization index				0.165 [0.114			
			Depende	nt variable: di	scount rate.		
Percentage dead in attacks	0.543 [0.519]	0.666 [0.467]	1.197 [0.624]*	1.188 [0.575]**		2.337 [1.058]**	0.265
Individual victimiza index	tion				2.826 [3.294]		
Dependent variable	Social capital	Share of cash crops in total production	s Expend on fa	rm			
Percentage dead in attacks	0.033 [0.016]**	0.008 [0.005]*	-23.75				

Health and education Violence and attitudes Violence and political outcomes

#### War and trust in Uganda




Fig. 3 The scatter plots display the distance from Sudan (*horizontal axis*), and the county-level average of generalized trust filtered by the set of control variables (*vertical axis*). The *left panel* displays counties characterized by a positive number of fighting episodes, while the *right panel* displays counties with no fighting episodes

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### Persistence of conflict





Conflicts, Colonialism and Kingdoms in Africa

Health and education Violence and attitudes Violence and political outcomes

#### From violence to voting

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent Variable	Nonabducted Mean (from Table 1)	Marginal Impact of Abduction <sup>†</sup>	% Change
Voted in 2005	.40	.110 [.036]***	27%
Community mobilizer	.03	.034 [.012]***	106%
Political employment	.003	.006	190%
Any community group member	.41	007 [.045]	-2%
Peace group member	.05	.043	92%
Water committee member	.02	009	-43%
Cultural group member	.15	021	-14%
Sporting group/team member	.13	060 [.033]*	-44%
Farmer's cooperative member	.10	.002	2%
School club/committee member	.05	.024	49%
Church or bible study group member	.18	.032	18%
Attends church	.79	014	-2%
Volunteer	.04	[.041] .004	10%
Disobeys elders	.06	[.015] .035	63%
Bottom quartile of prosocial distribution	.27	[.023] 075	-28%
Physical fight	.07	[.046] 024	-35%
Ever quarrelsome	.06	[.021] .005	8%
Ever threatens to hurt others	.01	[.008] .019 [.012]	168%

#### TABLE 3. Impact of Abduction on Social and Political Participation

Health and education Violence and attitudes Violence and political outcomes

#### Violence and collective action

#### Table 3

Community meetings and conflict victimization.

	Dependent variable: did you attend any community meetings in the past year?								
	IRCBP								
	2005 and 2	007	2007						
Explanatory variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)					
Conflict victimization index	0.0704***	0.0652***	0.0775***	0.0686***					
Respondent is female	(0.0164)	(0.0165) - 0.1300*** (0.0084)	(0.0253)	(0.0246) - 0.1276*** (0.0126)					
Respondent age		0.0003		0.0002					
Respondent has any education		(0.0003) 0.0590*** (0.0108)		(0.0005) 0.0466** (0.0194)					
Traditional authority household		0.0928*** (0.0128)		0.0647*** (0.0194)					
1990 Household head had		(0.0128)		0.0205					
any education 1990 Household had a				(0.0199) 0.1054***					
traditional leader 1990 Household had a				(0.0217) -0.0067					
community leader R-squared	0.361	0.391	0.267	(0.0169) 0.298					
Observations	10,471	10,471	5193	5193					
Enumeration area/Year fixed effects	Х	Х	Х	х					


Data Main Result Explanations

#### 1 Introduction

- 2 How do we find an answer?
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- 6 What did we find and why?
  - Data
  - Main Result
  - Explanations

Data Main Result Explanations

### Conflict exposure: Children born in 1965



Data Main Result Explanations

#### Table 2. Main Results: Effects of Early-life Conflict Exposure on Political Attitudes and Behaviors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Voting	Collective action	Contact	Refusal of bribes	Interest	Deference	Democracy	Equality	Rule of law	Trust
Mean Effects:										
Battle Deaths	0.00611	-0.0126	-0.000315	0.0236*	0.0143	0.0498***	0.00991	0.00892	0.00261	0.0138
(0-14)	(0.0109)	(0.0117)	(0.0134)	(0.0128)	(0.0131)	(0.0138)	(0.0143)	(0.0139)	(0.0150)	(0.0171)
N	17,780	16,950	16,621	17,372	14,287	14,914	12,470	16,638	15,573	7,847
Battle Deaths	-0.0155	0.0332	0.0207	0.0372	0.0236	0.0283	-0.0133	0.0109	0.0223	-0.00406
(0-14) per 1000	(0.0177)	(0.0254)	(0.0259)	(0.0238)	(0.0216)	(0.0218)	(0.0238)	(0.0241)	(0.0232)	(0.0236)
N	11,933	11,371	11,095	11,667	9,600	9,940	8,406	11,127	10,436	5,111
Battle Deaths	-0.00297	0.0323	0.0289	0.0149	0.0130	0.0492**	-0.0368*	0.0103	0.0211	-0.0272
(0-14) per area	(0.0155)	(0.0244)	(0.0272)	(0.0240)	(0.0205)	(0.0228)	(0.0211)	(0.0261)	(0.0255)	(0.0254)
N	11,933	11,371	11,095	11,667	9,600	9,940	8,406	11,127	10,436	5,111
Exposure dummy	-0.0576***	-0.0116	0.0378	-0.000932	-0.0261	0.0275	0.0126	0.00917	0.00258	-0.0494*
(0-14)	(0.0206)	(0.0222)	(0.0240)	(0.0216)	(0.0221)	(0.0230)	(0.0254)	(0.0211)	(0.0220)	(0.0261)
Ν	17,780	16,950	16,621	17,372	14,287	14,914	12,470	16,638	15,573	7,847
Years of exposure	-0.00852***	-0.00501*	-0.00326	0.00779***	0.00110	0.00617**	-0.000354	0.000590	0.00142	-0.00440
(0-14)	(0.00260)	(0.00266)	(0.00282)	(0.00292)	(0.00266)	(0.00307)	(0.00296)	(0.00281)	(0.00304)	(0.00344)
Ν	17,780	16,950	16,621	17,372	14,287	14,914	12,470	16,638	15,573	7,847
IV Battle Deaths	-0.055	-0.018	-0.026	0.042	0.062*	0.077**	-0.056	-0.024	0.090**	0.118***
(0-14)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.048)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.035)
First stage F-stat	103.59	102.21	104.71	101.84	101.18	105.73	89.06	110.36	104.71	109.28
N	14,094	13,484	13,352	13,777	11,910	12,008	9,938	13,384	12,455	6,227
Factors:										
Battle Deaths	0.006	0.002	-0.002	0.022*	-0.005	0.017	0.009	-0.013	0.012	0.018
(0-14)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.018)
N	17,780	16,950	16,621	17,372	14,287	14,914	12,470	16,638	15,573	7,847

Notes: \*\*\*Significant at 1%, \*\*Significant at 5%, \*Significant at 10%. Each cell represents a regression of a political attitude/behavior (column headers) on a conflict measure (row headers). All regressions include dummies for region of residence, year of birth, female, responses to "current living standards", level of education,

Data Main Result Explanations

#### Table 3. Heterogeneous Effects of Early-life Conflict Exposure by Time Since Exposure, Minority Status, and Gender

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Voting	Collective action	Contact	Refusal of bribes	Interest	Deference	Democracy	Equality	Rule of law	Trust
Time Since Exposure:										
Battle Deaths	-0.021	0.003	0.012	-0.030*	0.034**	-0.010	-0.019	-0.031*	0.021	0.011
(0-14) x Age	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)
Battle Deaths	0.032	-0.017	-0.015	0.061***	-0.028	0.062**	0.034	0.047*	-0.023	0.000
(0-14)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.031)
Ν	17,780	16,950	16,621	17,372	14,287	14,914	12,470	16,638	15,573	7,847
Minority Status:										
Battle Deaths	-0.000	0.012	-0.013	-0.021**	0.002	-0.010	-0.020*	-0.020**	-0.017	0.012
(0-14) x Ethnic	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Share in District										
Battle Deaths	0.006	-0.014	-0.001	0.026**	0.015	0.049***	0.011	0.007	0.004	0.015
(0-14)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Ν	17,780	16,950	16,621	17,372	14,287	14,914	12,470	16,638	15,573	7,847
Gender:										
Battle Deaths	0.021	0.038**	0.001	-0.014	-0.024*	-0.034**	-0.005	-0.034**	0.010	-0.016
(0-14) x Female	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)
Battle Deaths	-0.005	-0.032**	-0.001	0.031**	0.027*	0.067***	0.012	0.026	-0.002	0.021
(0-14)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.019)
N	17,780	16,950	16,621	17,372	14,287	14,914	12,470	16,638	15,573	7,847

Notes: \*\*\*Significant at 1%, \*\*Significant at 5%, \*Significant at 10%. Each column by pair of rows above represents a regression of a political attitude/behavior (column headers) on battle deaths interacted with either age, ethnic share in district, or a female dummy (see row headers). All regressions include dummies for region of residence, year of birth, female, responses to "current living standards", level of education, occupation, and urban. The share of the respondent's ethnicity in the district population is also used as a control. Standards edeclicities are reported.

Data Main Result Explanations

#### Table 4. Heterogeneous Effects of Early-life Conflict Exposure by Conflict Type

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Voting	Collective action	Contact	Refusal of bribes	Interest	Deference	Democracy	Equality	Rule of law	Trust
	0.261	-0.196	-0.595	0.0405	-0.123	0.571*	0.543	0.320	0.104	-0.229
War of Independence	(0.300)	(0.345)	(0.363)	(0.348)	(0.282)	(0.335)	(0.366)	(0.317)	(0.352)	(0.548)
International Conflict	-0.0546*** (0.0160)	-0.0190 (0.0155)	-0.00628 (0.0152)	0.0266 (0.0164)	-0.0139 (0.0151)	-0.00530 (0.0180)	-0.0400** (0.0185)	-0.0202 (0.0168)	0.0114 (0.0165)	0.00394 (0.0166)
Civil Conflict	0.0458* (0.0265)	0.0194 (0.0270)	0.0201 (0.0246)	-0.0122 (0.0301)	0.0493** (0.0237)	0.0307 (0.0273)	-0.0553* (0.0298)	0.0150 (0.0289)	0.0360 (0.0297)	0.0776*** (0.0280)
Ethnic Conflict	0.0514*** (0.0186)	0.0422** (0.0209)	0.0766*** (0.0199)	-0.0649*** (0.0208)	0.0587*** (0.0195)	-0.00936 (0.0226)	0.0134 (0.0229)	0.0320 (0.0220)	-0.00992 (0.0227)	-0.0511 (0.0356)
Ν	14,182	13,567	13,438	13,864	11,988	12,076	10,007	13,467	12,530	6,227

Notes: \*\*\*Significant at 1%, \*\*Significant at 5%, \*Significant at 10%. Each column above represents a regression of a political attitude/behavior (column headers) on a conflict measure (row headers). All regressions include dummies for region of residence, year of birth, female, responses to "current living standards", level of education, occupation, and urban. The share of the respondent schrictly polyability is also used as a control. Standardized celficients are reported.

Data Main Result Explanations

#### Table 5. Heterogeneous Effects of Ethnic Conflict Exposure by Ethnic Share in District

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Voting	Collective action	Contact	Refusal of bribes	Interest	Deference	Democracy	Equality	Rule of law	Trust
Ethnic War	-0.0216**	-0.0237**	-0.0199*	-0.00900	0.0229**	0.0138	-0.0133	0.00551	0.0295***	-0.00619
(0-14) x Ethnic Share in	(0.00976)	(0.0103)	(0.0104)	(0.0118)	(0.00965)	(0.0111)	(0.0114)	(0.0101)	(0.0108)	(0.0119)
District										
File Contract	0.0239	0.0338*	0.0688***	-0.0511***	0.0431**	-0.0176	0.0105	0.0221	-0.0156	-0.0819***
Ethnic War	(0.0175)	(0.0190)	(0.0191)	(0.0191)	(0.0182)	(0.0215)	(0.0209)	(0.0213)	(0.0212)	(0.0291)
	0.0350***	-0.00459	0.0236**	-0.0233*	0.0121	0.00868	-0.00648	0.00599	-0.00139	0.0187
Ethnic Share in District										
	(0.0117)	(0.0122)	(0.0108)	(0.0119)	(0.0107)	(0.0131)	(0.0138)	(0.0116)	(0.0123)	(0.0141)
Ν	14,182	13,567	13,438	13,864	11,988	12,076	10,007	13,467	12,530	6,227

Notes: \*\*\*Significant at 1%, \*\*Significant at 5%, \*Significant at 10%. Each column by pair of rows above represents a regression of a political attitude/behavior (column headers) on battle deaths interacted with either age, ethnic share in district, or a female dummy (see row headers). All regressions include dummies for region of residence, year of birth, female, responses to "current living standards", level of education, occupation, and urban. The share of the respondent's ethnicity in the district propulation is also used as a control. Standards ethceflicients are reported.

Data Main Result Explanations

#### Table 6. Results in the literature

Author(s)	Paper	Outcome of Interest	RHS Variable of Interest	Coefficient of Interest	SD(LHS variable)	SD(RHS variable)	Standardized Coefficient
Annan, Jeannie, Christopher Blattman, Dyan	Civil War, Reintegration, and Gender in Northern Uganda	Member of at least one group (women) (Table 2)	Abduction as a child	-0.04	0.5	0.44	-0.035
Mazurana and Khristopher Carlson	Gender in Northern Oganda	Member of at least one group (men) (Table 2)	3010161	0.01	0.5	0.5	0.010
Bellows, John and Edward Miguel	War and Local Collective Action in Sierra Leone	Did you attend any community meetings in the past year? (Table 3)	Conflict Victimization Index	0.0775	0.49	0.34	0.054
Blattman, Christopher	From Violence to Voting: War and Political Participation in Uganda	Voted in 2005 (Table 5)	Violent acts witnessed	0.04	0.5	1.7	0.136
Blattman, Christopher and Jeannie Annan	The Consequences of Child Soldiering	Index of psychological distress (Table 7)	Index of violence experienced	0.15	2.4	3.1	0.194
De Luca, Giacomo and Marijke Verpoorten	From vice to virtue? Civil war and social capital in Uganda	Generalized Trust (Table 5)	Battle days	-0.005	0.37	45.94	-0.621
Miguel, Edward, Sebastian Saiegh, and Shankar Satyanath	Civil War Exposure and Violence	Yellow cards (Table 2)	Years of civil war (country level)	0.0076	2.73	4.74	0.013
Rohner, Dominic, Mathias Thoenig, and Fabrizio Zilibotti	Seeds of Distrust: Conflict in Uganda	Generalized Trust (Table 1)	All fighting	-0.00206	0.466	45.96	-0.203

Notes: This review is limited to studies that estimate the association between conflict exposure and beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors related to politics. Studies estimating associations between war exposure and other outcomes are omitted, as are studies focusing on other determinants of political beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors. Studies in which standard deviations of the LHS or RHS variables of interest are not reported, and for which we could not obtain these numbers from the authors, are also omitted.