Asset Prices, Market Selection and Belief Heterogeneity Arrow-Debreu and Sequential Markets

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The Economy

- There is a single perishable consumption good every period.
- A consumption plan is a sequence $\{c_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ such that $c_0 \in \mathbb{R}_+$ and $c_t : S^{\infty} \to \mathbb{R}_+$ is \mathcal{F}_t -measurable for all $t \ge 1$ and $\sup_{(t,s)} c_t(s) < \infty$.
- Let $c(s^t) \equiv c_t(s)$ for any t and $s^t \in S^t$.
- Given s_0 , $\mathbb{C}(s_0)$ denotes the set of all consumption plans.
- The economy is populated by *I* (types of) infinitely-lived agents where *i* ∈ *I* = {1, ..., *I*} denotes an agent's name.
- Agent *i* is endowed with initial endowment $\omega_i \in \mathbb{C}(s_0)$
- The aggregate endowment $\overline{\omega} \equiv \sum_i \omega_i$.
- An allocation is a collection of plans $\{c_i\}_{i \in I}$.
- An allocation is feasible if $\sum_i c_i(s^t) \leq \overline{\omega}, \forall s^t, \forall t$.

Arrow-Debreu Markets

- There exists a market at the initial date 0 for consumption at date t conditional on event s^t, for every date t and every event s^t.
- Prices are described by a *pricing functional*, that is, a linear functional *P* which is positive and well-defined (finitely valued) on each consumer's initial endowment.
- It follows that a pricing functional is well-defined on the aggregate endowment *w̄* and, therefore, on each feasible allocation. It may or may not be well-defined on the entire consumption set C(s₀)
- The price of one unit of consumption in event s^t under pricing functional P is $p(s^t) \equiv P(e(s^t))$, where $e(s^t)$ denotes the consumption plan equal to 1 in event s^t at date t and zero in all other events and all other dates.
- A pricing functional P is countably additive if and only if $P(c) = \sum_t \sum_{s^t} p(s^t)c(s^t)$ for every c for which P(c) is well-defined.

Arrow Debreu Budget Set

- Trades occur only at date zero.
- Agent *i* can only choose a consumption plan such that the value of consumption does not exceed the value of agent *i*'s endowment.
- The agent chooses a plan on the budget set $B_{AD}(P, \omega_i)$ where:

$$B_{AD}(P,\omega_i) \equiv \{c \in \mathbb{C}(s_0) : P(c) \le P(\omega_i)\} \\ = \left\{c \in \mathbb{C}(s_0) : \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t \in S^t} p(s^t)c(s^t) \le \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \sum_{s^t \in S^t} p(s^t)\omega_i(s^t)\right\}$$

• Consumer i's problem is to choose a consumption plan $c_i \in \mathbb{C}(s_0)$ such that

$$c_i \succeq_i c, \forall c \in B_{AD}(P, \omega_i)$$

Arrow Debreu Equilibrium

• Agents trade at date zero under a single budget constraint.

Definition

An Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is a pricing functional P and a consumption allocation $\{c^i\}_{i=1}^{I}$ such that c^i solves consumer *i*'s problem and markets clear.

- The Arrow-Debreu model of contingent commodity markets is hardly realistic.
- Yet, it serves as an important tool for the analysis of infinite-time security markets.
- This is because one can show that Arrow-Debreu equilibria and equilibria in sequential security markets with debt constraints have the same consumption allocations when markets are dynamically complete and debt bounds are nonbinding.

Sequential Markets

- There are $J \ge S$ infinitely-lived securities traded at every date.
- Each security j is specified by a dividend process d_j which is adapted to {\$\mathcal{F}_t\$}_{t=0}^{\infty}\$ and nonnegative.
- The ex-dividend price of security j in event s^t is denoted by $q_j(s^t)$, and q_j is the price process of security j.
- Portfolio strategy θ specifies a portfolio of J securities θ(s^t) held after trade in each event s^t.
- The payoff of portfolio strategy θ in event s^t at a price process q is $z(q,\theta)(s^t) \equiv \underbrace{\left[q(s^t) + d(s^t)\right]}_{r(s^t)} \theta(s^{t-1}) q(s^t)\theta(s^t)$

Definition

Security price process q is one-period-arbitrage free in event s^t if there does not exist a portfolio $\theta(s^t)$ such that:

$$\left[q(s^t, s_{t+1}) + d(s^t, s_{t+1})\right]\theta(s^t) \geq 0 \text{ for all } s \text{ and } q(s^t)\theta(s^t) \leq 0,$$

with at least one strict inequality.

No arbitrage

• If q is arbitrage free in every event, then there exists a sequence of strictly positive state prices $\{\{\pi_q(s^t)\}_{s^t \in S^t}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ with $\pi_q(s^0) = 1$ such that

$$\pi_q(s^t)q_j(s^t) = \sum_{s_{t+1} \in S} \pi_q(s^t, s_{t+1}) \left[q_j(s^t, s_{t+1}) + d_j(s^t, s_{t+1}) \right] \quad \forall s^t, \forall j$$

Definition

Security markets are one-period complete in event s^t at prices q if the one-period payoff matrix $[q(s^t, s_{t+1}) + d(s^t, s_{t+1})]_{s_{t+1} \in S}$ has rank S. Security markets are complete at q if they are one-period complete at every event.

• Suppose the security prices q are one-period arbitrage free and that markets are complete at q. Then, the fundamental value of security j at s^t is defined using the unique state prices as

$$\frac{1}{\pi_q(s^t)} \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^\tau \in S^\tau} \pi_q(s^t, s^\tau) d_j(s^t, s^\tau)$$
(1)

Sequential Markets

- Each agent *i* has an initial portfolio $\alpha_i \in \Re^J$ at date 0.
- The dividend stream α_id on initial portfolio constitutes one part of consumer i's endowment. The rest is y_i ∈ C(s₀) and becomes available to the consumer at each date in every event. Thus,

$$\omega_i(s_t) = y_i(s^t) + \alpha_i d(s^t), \qquad \forall s^t \in S^t$$

- The supply of securities is $\overline{\alpha} = \sum_i \alpha_i$.
- The adjusted aggregate endowment is $\overline{y} = \sum_i y_i$. Let's assume $\overline{\alpha} \ge 0$.

Sequential Budget Set

• θ_i supports c_i at (q, y_i) if

 $c_{i,0} + q(s^0)\theta(s^0) \leq y_i(s_0) + q(s_0)\alpha_i$

 $c_i(s^t) + q(s^t)\theta(s^t) \leq y_i(s^t) + \left[q(s^t) + d(s^t)\right]\theta(s^{t-1}), \quad \forall s^t \neq s_0$

- Consumers must also face constraints in their portfolio strategies for otherwise they would use Ponzi schemes. There is a set Θ_i of feasible supporting portfolios.
- The sequential budget set is:

$$B(q; y_i) \equiv \left\{ c_i \in \mathbb{C}(s_0) : \exists \theta_i \in \Theta_i \ni c_i(s^t) + q(s^t) \cdot \theta_i(s^t) \le y_i(s^t) + r(s^t) \cdot \theta_i(s^{t-1}), \forall s \in S^{\infty}, \forall t \ge 0. \right\}$$

The Wealth Constraint

• A frequently used portfolio constraint is the so-called wealth constraint. It prohibits a consumer from borrowing more than the present value of his future endowment. Formally,

Definition

Portfolio θ satisfies the wealth constraint if

$$q(s^t)\theta(s^t) \geq -\sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty}\sum_{s^\tau \in S^\tau} \frac{\pi_q(s^t,s^\tau)}{\pi_q(s^t)} y(s^t,s^\tau)$$

- The set of Arrow-Debreu equilibrium allocations is the same as the set of Sequential Markets equilibrium allocations under the wealth constraint with no bubbles.
- There always exist a sequential equilibria with price bubbles under the wealth constraint if some securities are in zero net supply.

Essentially Bounded Portfolios

• A portfolio constraint for which neither price bubbles nor negative security prices arise in equilibrium and AD equilibria can be implemented in sequential markets.

Definition

A portfolio θ is bounded from below if $\min_j \inf_{(t,s^t)} \theta_j(s^t) > -\infty$

Definition

A portfolio strategy θ is essentially bounded from below at q if there is a bounded from below portfolio strategy b s.t. $q(s^t)\theta(s^t) \ge q(s^t)b(s^t) \ \forall s^t$.

Proposition

If security price vector $q(s^t)$ is positive and nonzero for every partial history s^t , then portfolio θ is essentially bounded if and only if $\inf_{s^t} \frac{q(s^t)}{\sum_i q_j(s^t)} \theta(s^t) > -\infty$.

Euler Equations

• We say that c_i satisfies the Euler equation at the price process q if

 $u_i'(c_{i,t}(s))q_{j,t}(s) = \beta_i \cdot E_{P_i}[r_{j,t+1} \cdot u_i'(c_{i,t+1})|\mathcal{F}_t](s) \ \forall j \in J, \forall s \in S^{\infty}, \forall t \ge 0.$

• ASSUMPTION $\mathcal{U}: u_i : R_{++} \to R$ is (i) strictly increasing, strictly concave, $C^1 \& u_i(0) \equiv \lim_{c \to 0^+} u_i(c)$ (ii) $\beta_i \in (0, 1)$.

Definition

For i, c_i is a maximizer given q if

•
$$c_i \in B(q; y_i)$$
 and

2 there is no
$$\tilde{c}_i \in B(q; y_i)$$
 for which

$$\lim_{T\to+\infty}\sum_{t=0}^{T}\beta_{i}^{t} E_{P_{i}}[u_{i}(\tilde{c}_{i,t})] > \lim_{T\to+\infty}\sum_{t=0}^{T}\beta_{i}^{t} E_{P_{i}}[u_{i}(c_{i,t})].$$

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NECESSARY CONDITION

- Suppose the investor can freely buy or sell as much of asset *j* as she wishes at a price *q_{j,t}*.
- Denote by c_i the optimal consumption plan.
- She can alter her consumption plan as follows:

$$\widetilde{c}_{i,t} = c_t - q_{j,t} \cdot \xi_t$$
 $\widetilde{c}_{i,t+1} = c_{t+1} + r_{j,t+1} \cdot \xi_t$

• If c_i maximises the consumer's utility, then

$$q_{j,t} \cdot u_{i}'(c_{i,t}) = E_{P_{i}} \left[\beta_{i} \cdot u_{i}'(c_{i,t+1}) \cdot r_{j,t+1} \middle| \mathcal{F}_{t} \right],$$

SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS

Theorem

Suppose Assumption U. Given (q, y_i) , let $c_i \in B(q; y_i)$ be such that

- $lim_{T\to+\infty} \sum_{t=0}^{T} \beta_i^t E_{P_i}[u_i(c_{i,t})] > -\infty,$
- *satisfies the Euler equation at the price process q,*
- § for every θ
 _i that supports a c
 _i ∈ B(q; y_i) the transversality condition at date 0 holds,

$$\lim_{T\to+\infty}\beta_i^T E_{P_i}\Big[u_i'(c_{i,T})\cdot q_T\cdot \left(\tilde{\theta}_{i,T}-\theta_{i,T}\right)\Big]\geq 0.$$

where θ_i supports c_i at (q, y_i) . Then c_i is the maximiser on $B(q; y_i)$.

Bubbles

• If the fundamental value (1) is finite, the price bubble $\sigma_{ai}(s^t)$ is

$$\sigma_{qj}(s^t) \equiv q_j(s^t) - \frac{1}{\pi_q(s^t)} \sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \sum_{s^\tau \in S^\tau} \pi_q(s^t, s^\tau) d_j(s^t, s^\tau)$$
(2)

Proposition

If the price of security j is nonnegative in every event, then the fundamental value of security *j* is finite and does not exceed the price of security *j*, *i.e.* $0 \leq \sigma_{ai}(s^t) \leq q_i(s^t)$ for every s^t . If the fundamental value of security i is finite and $\sigma_{ai}(s^t) > 0$ for every s^t , then $q_i(s^t) > 0$ for every s^t .

Note that (1) and (2) implies that

$$\sigma_{qj}(s^{t}) = \frac{1}{\pi_{q}(s^{t})} \sum_{s_{t+1} \in S} \pi_{q}(s^{t}, s_{t+1}) \sigma_{qj}(s^{t}, s_{t+1})$$

$$\sigma_{qj}(s^{t}) = \lim_{T \to \infty} \frac{1}{\pi_{q}(s^{t})} \sum_{s^{T} \in S^{T}} \pi_{q}(s^{t}, s^{T}) q_{j}(s^{t}, s^{T})$$

Bubbles under the Wealth Constraint

- A representative agent economy without uncertainty: $y_t = y$ for all $t \ge 0$.
- A consol pays $d_t = d < y$, is in zero net-supply and trades at price q_t^c .
- In any equilibrium $c_t = y$ and $\theta_t = 0$ for all $t \ge 0$.
- $q_t^c = \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}d + \varepsilon_t$ where $\varepsilon_t = \varepsilon_0 \left(\frac{1}{\beta}\right)^t$. Hence, $\pi_q(s^t) = \beta^t$.
- The wealth constraint: $q^c(s^t)\theta(s^t) \ge -\sum_{\tau=1}^{\infty} \frac{\pi_q(s^t,s^{\tau})}{\pi_q(s^t)} y(s^t,s^{\tau}) = -y \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}$
- c satisfies the Euler equation:

$$q_t^c = \beta \left(\frac{1}{1-\beta} d + \varepsilon_0 \left(\frac{1}{\beta} \right)^{t+1} \right) = \beta \left(\frac{\beta}{1-\beta} d + d + \varepsilon_{t+1} \right) = \beta \left(q_{t+1}^c + d \right)$$

• *c* satisfies the TC:

$$\lim_{T \to \infty} \beta^T q_T^c \left(\tilde{\theta}_T - \theta_T \right) = \lim_{T \to \infty} \beta^T q_T^c \tilde{\theta}_T \geq \lim_{T \to \infty} \beta^T \left(-y \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} \right) = 0.$$

Bubbles under the Wealth Constraint

- Suppose there is a risk-free bond with price q_t^b . Clearly, $q_t^b = \beta$.
- Let $q_t = (q_t^c, q_t^b)$.
- Suppose the agent shorts the consol in one unit and invest $\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}d$ units of the bond at zero to meet the consol payments?

•
$$\tilde{\theta}_t = \left(-1, \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\frac{d}{\beta}\right)$$
 for all $t \ge 0$.
• $q_0\tilde{\theta}_0 = -q_0^c + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}d = \varepsilon_0 > 0$.
• $\left[\left(q_t^c + d\right)\tilde{\theta}_{t-1}^c + \tilde{\theta}_{t-1}^b\right] - \left[q_t^c\tilde{\theta}_t^c + q_t^b\tilde{\theta}_t^b\right] = -d + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}d + \beta\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}\frac{d}{\beta} = 0$
• $\tilde{\theta}_t$ supports $\tilde{c}_0 = c_0 + \varepsilon$, $\tilde{c}_t = c_t$.

- How is this compatible with *c* being optimal?
- The key is that $\tilde{\theta}$ violates the wealth constraint and so $\tilde{c} \notin \mathcal{B}(q, y)$.

•
$$q_t \tilde{\theta_t} = -q_t^c + q_t^b \frac{\beta}{1-\beta} \frac{d}{\beta} = -\left(\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}d + \varepsilon_t\right) + \frac{\beta}{1-\beta}d = -\varepsilon_0\left(\frac{1}{\beta}\right)^t \to -\infty.$$

No Bubbles with Essentially Bounded Portfolios

Theorem

If q is an equilibrium price process such that θ is essentially bounded and security markets are complete at q, then $q(s^t) \ge 0$ and $\sigma_{qj}(s^t) = 0$ for every s^t .

Equivalence I

Theorem

Let allocation $\{c_i\}_{i=1}^{I}$ and pricing functional P be an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. If P is countably additive, $P(d_j) < \infty$ for each j, security markets are complete at prices q given by

$$q_j(s^t) = \frac{1}{p(s^t)} \sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty} p(s^{\tau}) d_j(s^{\tau}) \qquad \forall s^t, \forall j$$
(3)

and there exists an essentially bounded portfolio strategy $\boldsymbol{\eta}$ such that

$$-\frac{1}{p(s^{t})}\sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty}\sum_{s^{\tau}\in S^{\tau}}p(s^{\tau})\overline{y}(s^{\tau}) \ge q(s^{t})\eta(s^{t}) \qquad \forall s^{t}, \forall j \qquad (4)$$

then there exists a portfolio allocation $\{\theta_i\}_{i=1}^{l}$ such that q and the allocation $\{c_i, \theta_i\}_{i=1}^{l}$ are a sequential equilibrium with essentially bounded portfolios.

Equivalence II

Theorem

Let security prices q and $\{c_i, \theta_i\}_{i=1}^{l}$ be a sequential equilibrium with essentially bounded portfoilios. If security markets are complete at q and there exists an essentially bounded portfolio strategy η such that

$$-\frac{1}{\pi_q(s^t)}\sum_{\tau=t+1}^{\infty}\sum_{s^\tau\in S^\tau}\pi_q(s^\tau)\overline{y}(s^\tau) \ge q(s^t)\eta(s^t) \qquad \forall s^t, \qquad (5)$$

then $\{c_i, \theta_i\}_{i=1}^{I}$ and pricing functional P given by

$$P(c) = \sum_{t} \sum_{s^t \in S^t} \pi_q(s^t) c(s^t)$$
(6)

are an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.