Editors' Introduction Studying the International Relations of the Asia Pacific: What Is the Region, What Are the Issues?

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Introduction

For nearly three decades now, various scholars, analysts and practitioners have been hypothesising about the rise of the 'Pacific' or 'Asian' centuries. Analyses have been driven variously by the agendas of international security, international economic relations and increasingly a combination of the two. Though confidence in Asia's rise was somewhat dented by the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the early years of the 21st century have seen the Pacific Century narrative begin to regain strength once again. The primary driver of this renewed rhetoric is growing American interests (if not outright concerns) about the impact of China (see Shambaugh, in Volume 2). Indeed, the recent flurry of activity by those seeking to establish the correctness of their theoretical starting point for studying the region (covered in Volume 1) is largely concerned with predicting the consequences of China's rise; and trying to influence a policy audience (primarily in Washington) to act now to shape the nature of this rise.

But it's not just about China. As perhaps most forcefully expressed in the writings of Kishore Mahbubani (2007), there is also a growing assertiveness in some parts of Asia itself over the shift in power from the Western to eastern hemisphere. Earlier scholars from the region argued that Asia did not have to accede to the Western way of doing things – the region could 'Say No!' to the imposition of alien political, economic and social structures and do things their own way.[1] But for Mahbubani and others, the region is no longer just a ***recipient*** of the global order seeking to find Asian alternatives for Asians,

but is instead becoming a ***driver*** of a new world order; it is the US and Europe that will have to change to adapt to the new global structure, not Asia. The Asian crisis might have punctuated the Asian miracle, but the West's own economic crisis just over a decade later has probably done even greater damage to the supposed superiority of the occidental world order.

This is all interesting stuff. But fads do come and go. Those who read the literature on the rise of Japan and the threat that this posed to the West will find much of the language and predictions in the current 'China rise' literature rather familiar. Just as Wolf (1983) warned that there was a concerted plot by Japanese politicians and businessmen to dominate the world's industries, so 'China inc' (Fishman, 2005) is now on the verge of becoming the new superpower (if it isn't already). Today, it is hard to recall the extent to which Japan was the focus of international attention and not some fear in the early 1980s. In the phrase most associated with Ralph Cossa, we have relatively quickly moved from a position of concern about Japan's rise leading to it being attacked in the West to Japan's apparent decline resulting in it largely being ignored (particularly in terms of US foreign policy) – from 'Japan bashing' to 'Japan passing'.[2] And the Asian financial crises of the second half of the 1990s put paid to the hyperbole that accompanied the initial narrative of the 'Asian Miracle' of the first half of that decade (World Bank, 1993).

This is not to say that China's rise is a mirage, nor that the world will be unaffected by what China does over the next decades. To be sure, there are myriad domestic problems that might derail the Chinese developmental trajectory. And as we saw when Chinese exports slumped in 2009, what happens in the West and in the global economy is an important component in shaping China's fortunes. But the strong likelihood is that what happens in China will be a significant determinant of global politics in the 21st century – indeed, simply its sheer size means that it is something that cannot be ignored.

So the point of pointing to failed Asian 'miracles' and 'rises' in the past is not to deny potential future rises, but simply to point to the pitfalls of getting carried away by fever, fascination and fear.[3] It's not that Asia is unimportant – on the contrary it is ***more*** important that the periodic outburst of interest suggests. The task for the scholar is to look through (or beyond) the immediate to identify long term trajectories of development and change – a task we have tried to facilitate by bringing together the essays in this collection.

Irrespective of periodic rises and crises, the secular constant here is the growing importance of Asia in both theory and practice in contemporary economics, politics and international relations in the post-World War II era. The region is both home to large and dynamic economies of global significance and the site of great power competition. We do not need recourse to 'centurist' hyperbole to recognise that in combination these two sets of factors make the international relations of the region as, if not more, significant, than any other region of the world in the 21st century; interesting and significant in its own right, and also for what it means for the global order in general.

Hence, we would suggest, we need a sense of perspective on Asia in international relations. It is the aim of this four volume collection of essays to provide exactly that sense of perspective. As such, this is not a collection of the most recent 'state of the art' publications. While it does include recent publications, our intention from the outset was to reflect the evolution of the study of the region over the past 25–30 years. Thus, we have sought to look backwards to gather together what we hope is a representative selection of materials that showcase how scholars have thought about East Asia in global affairs over that period to explain how we got to where we are today, and to allow for a reading of contemporary debates informed by what has gone before. As such it contains essays that may now seem rather dated – indeed, papers containing arguments that might seem to have been disproved by what has happened since their publication. But they are included because they are not only representative of a type but because they also influenced subsequent thinking that responded to earlier waves of scholarship; and perhaps also remind us of the potential pitfalls of futurology.

Any such selection of literature is self-evidently subjective. We could not claim to be otherwise, and the inclusion of a small selection of our own publications means that our own preferred theoretical positions, approaches and understandings are clear for all to read. But we do claim to be pluralist in the selections with respect to the perspectives reflected in our choices, including essays that we fundamentally disagree with, but which are nevertheless representative of strands of literature on the region. A particular strength of the collection we would argue is the wide set of readings we draw on. Materials are drawn from scholarship in North America, Europe and Asia (including Australasia). Mischievously we suggest that such a wide trawl for good scholarship would unlikely to have emerged had the compilers been based in North America!

Which Region (or where is Asia)?

Before going any further, it is important to provide some clarifications. The concept of region, any region, is essentially contested. Definitional judgements are driven by issues of geography, history, economy, identity and culture. How one weights or privileges these variables conditions the circumscription of any region. Moreover, even if we choose just one of these different identifying variables, then understandings of region can (and often do) change. For example, thirty years ago, the attempt to find a nascent region of production, finance and trade in Asia would not have spent long considering the People's Republic of China (PRC); today the PRC is typically central to considerations of economic regionalisation.

Regions can overlap, intersect, co-exist and change. Nowhere is this more the case than in the discussion of that part of the world that, in its largest circumscription is called Asia. This circumscribes either (sometimes in part,

sometime in whole) a range of other regional configurations – East Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, an Asia that includes the Indian subcontinent, and as in the title of this collection, a region called Asia Pacific. Focussing on regional institutions doesn't help add that much clarity either. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is 'too small' to cover the major political and economic dynamics of the region as a whole. Conversely APEC – Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation – is 'too big' including Australasia, the USA, Canada, the Pacific states of Central and Latin America and indeed, Russia.

For a time it appeared as if a self defined conception of East Asia was emerging that consisted of the ASEAN states plus the PRC, Japan and South Korea. This occurred through the formalisation of what became known as ASEAN + 3 meetings, and through those Asian states that came together to meet with EU states in ASEM – the Asia Europe Meeting.[4] It is also a definition of region that has something in common with Mohamad Mahathir's earlier attempts to construct an idea of region as 'East Asia' in contrast to the above mentioned conception of region defined by the membership of APEC. This Asia, originally conceived of as an East Asia Economic Group, was a collection of states that contained myriad different 'cultures' (broadly defined). But while agreeing on what East Asia stood for might be difficult, the region might at least agree on what it was against – what it was not. Thus, this definition of region was specifically designed in opposition to the hegemony of Euro-American liberal principles in both economics and politics, and the promotion of economic liberalisation and political human rights agendas by the West (a term that is often simply short-hand for the USA). When the initial vision was moderated and the 'group' became a 'caucus' operating within APEC, the new acronym of the East Asian Economic Caucus – EAEC – was sometimes only partly jokingly used to refer to the idea of East Asia Except Caucasians.

It is notable that like the EAEC before it, a rejection of the dominance of 'Western' liberal paradigms also played a part in cohering the ASEAN + 3 states into a nascent regional grouping. It emerged in response to the Asian financial crisis in 1997 – or perhaps more correctly, in response to the response. In the wake of the crisis, the solutions proposed (and in some cases imposed) by the international financial institutions were perceived by many in Asia to not only be inappropriate, but also to represent the interests of the West and the promotion of a liberal global order. Though proposals to create an Asian Monetary Fund inspired by a sense of Asian 'solidarity' (Lipscy, 2003: 95) floundered – in part at least because of US opposition – it found new expression in a region wide system of currency swaps designed to prevent future speculation dragging the region into another crisis (the Chiang Mai Initiative).

But although the idea of region as ASEAN + 3 has much to commend it, and ASEAN +3 meetings remain real and very important parts of the business of international politics in East Asia, it did not satisfy as a basic starting point for this collection for four reasons. First, on an extremely pragmatic basis, it does not wholly coincide with the region that appears to be the focus

of study on most reading lists, or in research centres/programmes concerned with the international politics of Asia. Whilst our trawl of the available information on teaching and research projects undoubtedly will have not been wholly comprehensive, it was large enough to show a consistent pattern of region defined more widely than the ASEAN + 3 definition.[5] This is partly because of the second factor; ASEAN + 3 as a region is constructed by economic agendas. This does not mean that it only discusses economic issues – economics dominates but security issues have been discussed in ASEAN + 3 forums (typically those that fall under the broad rubric of 'new' or 'non traditional' security). Rather, it means that the membership and parameters of this region have been set by economic considerations. So while it forms ***a*** region, it is not ***the*** region (or the ***only*** region).

Perhaps most clearly, a region defined by common economic issues facing states (including ASEAN as a sub-regional organisation consisting of states) does neatly correspond with a region defined by major security challenges and the potential for war. It does not include Taiwan which by Beijing's insistence is not a 'state' and therefore excluded from international organisations where membership is reserved for states.[6] Nor does it include North Korea which, with the warming of relations between Beijing and Taipei after the Kuomintang won the 2008 Presidential election, is probably at the heart of the biggest threat to regional security (traditionally defined). When the definition of security is expanded beyond 'traditional' concerns (a distinction we will return to shortly), then the argument for including Australasia in the region also develops more force. Thus, if the international politics of the region is defined in more than just political economy terms – as it typically is in departments of politics and international studies/relations – then the region is more than just ASEAN + 3.

Third, we need to address the peculiar position of the USA. This is more than simply a case of the USA having significant relations with the region. It has been a major protagonist in the two major wars that helped shape the security agenda of the region beyond the 'fall' of Saigon in 1975, been the major guarantor of security for many since then (and the major threat for others), and in various ways has been a central component in the developmental strategies of Asian economies. In both a historical and contemporary sense, the USA is clearly central to the international politics of the region – if it is not ***in*** the region, then it is at least ***of*** the region.

Fourth, even the apparent consensus of region as ASEAN + 3 is not as strong as it once appeared. For example, India, Mongolia and Pakistan have been added to the 'Asian' members of ASEM (with Australia and Russia to join in 2010). Perhaps more important, when the first East Asia summit was held in 2005, it did not reflect the ASEAN + 3 idea of region (favoured by China) but instead included India, Australia and New Zealand. It may be that this broader definition of East Asia is a result of attempts to prevent China dominating an Asian Asia by balancing its power with the inclusion of another big emerging economy in India, and the 'Western' liberal democracies of Australasia.

Recognising that no definition of the region is without problems, and with these four considerations in mind, we have chosen an understanding of region as 'Asia Pacific'. However, this is not the same as Asia Pacific as defined by the membership of APEC. At its core is a focus on East Asia defined as the combined sub regions of Northeast and Southeast Asia – in effect, the ten member states of the ASEAN plus Japan, the two Koreas and a wide definition of what constitutes China to include the PRC, Taiwan, Macao and Hong Kong. But beyond this core conception of East Asia, we are also concerned with how relations with the region's littoral partners have influenced the dynamics of change – particularly the USA but also to a lesser extent those of Australasia.

Largely as a reflection of the existing literature (and not just the literature in this collection) over the last 25 years or so, we do not include Russia or the Indian subcontinent in this definition of region. But recognising that events move on and the literature changes to reflect this, we have included an essay on a potential alternative regional future in Lanteigne's discussion of the emergence and evolution of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Volume 4. While this blurs the edges of our definition of region a little, we think it is justified given the less than clear and sharp delimiters of what the region was and is – let alone what it might be in the future.

Choices and Omissions

As we have seen, then, the logic of our geographical definition is dictated by the selection of the theoretical and analytical themes we address – namely the international politics of the region that includes focuses on both political economy and security; a focus on one alone might generate a different understanding of region. Here too, greater explanation of our choice of themes (and sub-themes) is warranted. The aim of these four volumes is to provide a representative overview of serious scholarship on the international politics/relations of the region over the last several decades. In order to do so we have identified four broad themes which, in turn, are broken down into their own sub-themes. The four broad themes we address are Volume 1: theorising international politics in the region; Volume 2: security; Volume 3: the political economy of development; and Volume 4, regions and regionalism.

The four volumes represent what we think are the four main strands in the study of the overall international politics of the region as reflected in the literature, but it is worth mentioning what we decided to leave out (and why). First, when it comes to papers on individual countries, China and Japan dominate as it is these two countries that have been identified as providing individual challenges to the West and/or becoming the next global power. Papers on other individual countries are included; for example, on North Korea as a security threat. But where possible when we have moved away from the regional 'great powers' we have tried to cover general themes

and trends rather than individual case studies as it is the region as a whole that has tended to dominate the debates. Thus, for example, we do not have papers on the political economy of Malaysia, or Indonesia's security concerns, or South Korea's regional policy, or the state of democratisation in Thailand. What we have chosen instead is more comparative region-wide papers that allow for a greater coverage of the region, and what appears to be a recurring theme in the literature over the years; is Asia 'different'?

Second, in temporal terms, our starting point is when the discourse over the rise of Asia began to have real purchase in academic and policy debates. Thus, our earliest paper in all four volumes being Johnson's classic elucidation of the Japanese model published in 1982. But we faced problems in decided how far back to go to provide historical contextualisation. The point at which history becomes politics is far from clear. If politics is the history that we remember living through, and history is the politics that we read about, then the division between the two changes with the individual. But it is not only the starting point for what is 'contemporary' that varies; the extent to which historical context is provided as the basis for the study of contemporary affairs also fluctuates considerably. For example, some start with the study of the traditional Chinese world order as a form of proto-region and a possible precursor of a future Sinocentric regional order; others see the Cold War context as the key; or perhaps it is the end of the Cold War that creates the structural balance of powers within which contemporary international relations function.

Nevertheless, there is a pattern/consensus of sorts that has informed the choices in this collection that are largely driven by the primary concerns of scholars in each of the three sub-fields. For example, in terms of the study of the political economy of development, a key recurring theme is whether there is a distinct and different Asian model (or models) of development – models that might challenge the dominance of the Western liberal paradigm. As we have already seen, while much of this literature has been driven by the recent rise of China, it builds on earlier studies and conceptions of the Japanese and East Asian 'miracles'. Within these earlier works, there is a common tendency to look back to the structure of the Cold War context that provided a space for first Japan and then other developmental states to develop export led strategies whilst maintaining relatively closed domestic economies. The idea that an Asian model was emerging to challenge the West was most prevalent from the mid-1980s to the financial crisis in 1997 – and this is reflected in the publication date of at least half of the papers in Volume 3.

In the other volumes, research (and teaching) agendas tend to emphasise more contemporary case studies and issues that result in a more recent set of publications in our collection. For example, most academic programmes on regional security do not deal with the major military conflicts from the Sino-Vietnam war of 1979 backwards in any great detail in themselves. When the importance of contemporary security challenges are added to the, by definition, relatively new school of 'new security' writings, Volume 2 is dominated

by works written in this century, rather than in the last. When it comes to regionalism, this was not really a sub-field at all until the early 1990s. More correctly, the study of ASEAN might have been a sub-field, but interest in wider regional projects was largely inspired by the creation of APEC in 1989, and the questions this raised over what the region was or should be (as discussed in more detail above). And not surprisingly, the literature covered in Volume 1 on theorising the study of the region reflects the temporal choices that were made over the individual sub-fields.

This is not to say that the past is ignored; far from it. For example, Charrier's paper on the origins of an idea of a region called Southeast Asia looks backwards to the division of different theatres of operation in World War II. Similarly, Alagappa's attempt to establish an understanding of an 'Asian' way of dealing with security challenges draws from a range of historical examples. So history is important as context. But what we don't have here is papers on case studies from the 1970s and before written and published at the time. Providing a coherent overview of a quarter of a century's scholarship was hard enough – we will leave the task of going even further back to others.

Themes, Sub-Themes and Organisation

The boundaries between the various thematic selections are not rigid, or even particularly discrete. Perhaps most obviously, theoretical discussions and empirical narratives intersect with the choice of empirical evidence utilised to defend a theoretical position often driven by the basic ontology of that theoretical position itself. Specifically, as both scholars and policy makers, our understandings of how security, development and regional dynamics interact and evolve over time, in both theory and practice, are in a process of permanent evolution. This can clearly be seen by a comparative reading of the literature from the 1980s through to the early 21st century. The relative importance of these themes changes over time as events turn attention in one direction or another. Perhaps the most salient juxtaposition in focus is that between the primacy given to economic development issues in one era when compared with that paid to security issues in another. These changes reflect not only Asia's own internal dynamics but also the extra regional influences from the global political and economic environment more generally. This interaction between the global and the regional, and between economics and the security, is particularly apparent, for example, in the security literature presented in Volume 2, with its emphasis on changing balances of power between the major and regional players, notably the US and China, and the political economy literature in Volume 3, with its emphasis on shifting economic balances over time, initially between the USA and Japan and more recently the USA and China.

Volume 1: Theorising International Politics

At first glance, theorising in international relations scholarship seems largely to be a Trans-Atlantic pastime; or put another way, IR theory has not only been largely written by scholars in North America and Europe, but also heavily based on the history of the broadly defined 'West'. Nevertheless, there is large body of theoretical work that is embedded in explaining the international politics of Asia either from 'Asianist' positions, or by applying existing theoretical understandings to Asian cases studies. This volume provides a selection of some of that literature. It does so without being explicitly wedded to the development of a specific 'theoretical approach' – indeed, the aspirations of the volume are more modest. Rather, it offers up a series of essays that are representative of the scholarship in this area – essays which in our judgment either locate Asia in a theoretical context or tradition on the one hand, or that say something theoretically interesting about Asia on the other. In combination, they should help elucidate not only the different positions on how we should study the region, but also how these different positions generate very different conclusions over how events will unfold; perhaps most clearly (and importantly) of all, whether we are heading for a more or less stable and peaceful global order.

In so doing we provide literature that addresses four key sub-themes of theorising about Asia. After Haggard's overview of the key issues that are addressed in theory building, the essays in the first section address the at times prickly relationship between the study of Asia as 'area studies' and the study of Asia through disciplinary and theoretical lenses. At the risk of providing an over-stark exaggeration of the dichotomy, on one side there is an argument that to understand a country in the region, you need to have a deep knowledge of it; to know its history, its language, its literature, its culture, its society and so on. Only through this deep engagement with the country (or region if you have the time and ability to master the knowledge of more than one of the constituent countries – which most don't) is it possible to understand how it has become what it is today, which in turn will dictate how it acts today and in the future. As noted in Cumings' essay, this can at an extreme lead to a 'mystification' of the country/region as being obscure and impenetrable, with only the area studies experts able to penetrate it and bring clarity.

On the other side – at the other extreme – is the argument that all you need is theory; as long as that theory is scientific. Within the study of the international relations of the region, this debate between area and theory has often revolved around the 'science' of realism and the understanding that states act in certain ways irrespective of geography, regime type and so on. To a lesser extent, it has also entailed debating the ontological expectations of liberal international relations theory as well. But the dichotomy is shown in perhaps its starkest form in the investigation by Chalmers Johnson and Barry Keehn of the limits of rational choice theory as a suitable approach; an approach that at the time was

becoming every more dominant in American political science departments, and which in its extreme manifestation, was promoted as able to explain and predict without knowing anything at all about the country being investigated.

As Katzenstein shows, there balance between area and discipline has changed over the years, and a synthesis has tended to emerge (particularly in the study of Asian regionalism). Mitchell Barnard's (essentially Gramscian) historical materialist understanding of the political economy of East Asia is included here partly because it is an interesting paper in its own right, but also because it is an example of an attempt to move existing understandings forward by re-reading a relatively well established literature on regional economic relations in a different theoretical light.

The papers by Cumings and Katzensten (and partly the paper by Johnson and Keehn) show how dominant scholarship in the USA was in first establishing the primacy of area studies, and then by challenging this primacy through the introduction of new 'scientific' theoretical approaches. This might partly reflect the way in which scholarship in Europe and elsewhere has often been overlooked in North America, but nevertheless is an accurate reflection of where much of the world looks for its scholarship on Asia – including where much of Asia looks for its scholarship on Asia. It also draws us to the importance of the debate on universalism and exceptionalism.

At first sight, this might appear to be the same as talking in terms of area studies versus discipline; and indeed 'exceptionalists' share some of the doubts about the fundamental understandings and expectations of what motivates states and/or individuals to behave in certain ways in the realist and liberal approaches outlined above. But this debate is different in that it is not so much rejecting the scientific pretensions of theories as arguing that they need changing or indeed that new theories need to be developed. In brief, the key argument is that the major theories of international relations/international politics have all emerged as a result of the study of Europe and other Western societies. For example, despite the attempts of some realist thinkers to find historical justification for their ontology in ancient Greece and China, it largely emerged to explain the bankruptcy of liberal idealism in Europe as a result of the first and second world wars. Similarly, basic liberal assumptions about the political aspirations and behaviour of individuals were a result of what had happened in a very small set of countries.

As such, theories built on the observation of Europe/the West cannot wholly explain the region because Asian societies are constructed around different sets of cultural and political norms and expectations, and different modes of international interactions have thus emerged over centuries. So using theories built on observing the European interwar period to explain the implication of rising powers for the regional order, for example, won't help explain what will happen in Asia. Both the practice of international relations and the basis of domestic political systems in the region are different, and thus we need different theories based on Asia's experience to explain them.

To illustrate this claim, we include a seminal article by the Japanese Journalist Yoichi Funabashi written in 1993 that outlines the idea of the 'exceptionalism' of Asian thinking in international politics – perhaps best captured by what Mahbubani called the idea of a 'Pacific Way'. The timing of these papers, written in the first part of the 1990s, is significant here. They appeared at the height of that first wave of thinking about Asian exceptionalism or the 'Asian Miracle' wave of development. For Kang, the solution is not to throw away existing theoretical positions, but instead to modify them to take into account the experiences of the vast majority of the world that has largely been ignored in theory building. The other papers in this section written a decade on, long after the wave of 'miracle thinking' had peaked, take more universalist approaches to theorising in Asian international relations.

Readings in section 3 look at the relationship between economics and politics in theorising about Asian international relations focussing on how to understand the role of major powers in the region through studies of American hegemony (Donald Crone) and the relationship between economic interdependence and institutional balancing at the sub regional level in Southeast Asia (Kai He). The complexity of explaining the role of China as an emerging economic and political power in the region returns is to the debate over the need for area studies or theoretical expertise by arguing that we need both (Shaun Breslin).

The final section deals briefly with three alternative constructivist analyses of cooperation and conflict resolution in Southeast Asia (Sorpong Peou and Timo Kivimaki) and East Asia more broadly defined (Thomas Berger). These papers are in part included as representative examples of a school of thought that has become increasingly important in theorising the region in recent years – and in particular, have become an increasingly significant challenge to the dominance of realist approaches. These papers also provide a link to the second section with Berger's paper in particular showing how different theoretical approaches generate very different understandings of the prospects for peace and security in the region.

Volume 2: Security

Clearly, there are cross-over or continuity issues in the security literature discussed in Volume 2 arising from the theoretical observations advanced in Volume 1. For example, how one conceives the nature of the post-World War II and subsequently post-Cold War regional alliance system on the one hand, or the security implications of the recent economic rise of China on the other will clearly be determined by the theoretical lenses through which one observes the region. The selection of readings in Volume 2 both assumes and reflects such theoretical distinctions. The readings in Volume 2 also reflect real empirical changes in the regional security environment over the last several decades with all the attendant implications on how one understands

the concept of security as an overall 'hosting metaphor' for a whole range of actors, processes and activities covered by such a broad term.

As such, understandings of security in Asia have clearly undergone radical transformations over the last 30 years. Not surprisingly, very simple conceptions of security defined as an absence of war long dominated the literature. This was, after all, a region where wars of independence and decolonisation had continued into the 1970s – into this century if East Timor is included. This was also a region where the Cold War turned hot with 'proxy wars' between the US and allies of the Soviet Union in Korea and Vietnam; where China fought a short but bloody conflict with its former Vietnamese comrades and came close to all out war with the Soviet Union. This is also a region where nuclear weapons were and still are very much part of the security agenda, and where the legacy of incomplete decolonisation collided with the Cold War to result in the continued division of China and Korea; divisions that have (on and off) threatened to ignite regional conflicts that would necessarily draw in the USA.

Much of the security literature in the closing stages of the last century, especially when viewed through realist lenses, was lacking what Ross in his paper in this volume calls the 'Kantian sources of peace'. Scholars do still identify the sources of potential conflict between the major actors (especially China with Japan and/or the USA) but there is also a growing body of literature of both liberal and constructivist persuasions that resist the inevitability of conflict. Indeed, Ross's paper forms part of a wider debate in the pages of the journal *International Security* that debated whether the region was, as Friedberg (1993) had argued, 'ripe for rivalry', and all but inevitably set on a path of at best instability and more likely, conflict and war. It is thus included here partly because of its own insights, but also because in combination with the papers by Shambaugh and Berger in Volume 1 and Christensen in this volume, we provide a representative discussion of a thirteen years debate.[7]

We commence this volume with two broad overviews of security in East Asia by two senior and respected analysts (Mutiah Alagappa and Robert Ross). Alagappa identifies the key features in the practice of Asian security while Ross looks at the importance of the interplay between the geography of region and global and regional balances of power on the prospects for peace in East Asia in the 21st century. Section two of the volume examines the key actors and alliance structures in the region; notably Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye take a forward look at the US-Japan Alliance; David Shambaugh assesses the way in which China's engagement with the region over the last two decades is reshaping the regional political and economic order while Christopher Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein in an important comparative paper ask why the development of a NATO like organisation is an unlikely prospect for the region.

The last section of Volume 2 identifies what we consider to be the most intransigent 'legacy' issues areas in the region and the most significant emerging policy challenges in the security domain in East Asia. The prospects for conflict with North Korea, not only on the Korean Peninsula but within the

wider regional context, has been, and remains, a key security issue in East Asia. Affirming the importance we place on the US as a major actor in East Asian international relations Gilbert Rozman, in his contribution to this volume, looks at this issue through the lens of US strategy in the region. In a similar methodological fashion, Donald Zagoria looks at the question of Taiwan also through the lens of US policy. China's relations with Southeast Asia (both ASEAN as an organisation and individual Southeast Asian states) are arguably better now than at any time since the establishment of the PRC. And the concern in the 1980s that competing claims in the South China Sea might provide the source of a region-wide military conflict have largely subsided and been replaced by a focus on building confidence and cooperation. Nevertheless, the fundamental issue of who owns what in the South China Sea remains unresolved, and Odegaard's paper outlines the residual concerns that could provide the basis of uneasy relations (if not armed conflict) in the future.

Addressing the issue of China as an increasingly important regional actor, Zheng Bijian represents the view of 'official China' stressing China's 'peaceful rise' to great power status in the region while Thomas Christiansen looks at US regional policy as a response to the rise of China. In so doing, he identifies the competing (benign or malign) interpretations that can be placed on China's growing regional role. In contrast, Chris Hughes' study of Japan on the other hand looks at the adjustments in Japan's security trajectory and policy system after more than a decade of decline.

But despite these continuing challenges, many of the 'certainties' of the Cold War era are long past. This does not just mean that how we theorise the security agenda has changed, but the prior question of how we define security in the first place has also changed. Crucially, a fundamental characteristic of the changing security environment has been the widening of the security agenda. Challenges to security are no longer simply identified in a directly causal way with states and armed forces. Military organisations (actors) no longer focus solely on the traditional concern with the 'defence of the realm' from other external military challenges and the development of alliance structures to address these concerns (dealt with in the first section of Volume 2). Other items also infuse the security agenda; that is the unconventional security challenges of a 'new security agenda', arising from globalisation such as counter-terrorism, disaster relief operations (e.g. the 2004 tsunami), climate change, infectious diseases (e.g. SARS) and a range of other 'non-traditional security' issues. For some scholars, understandings of what or who should be 'secure' has changed from states to individual human beings.

While there is a growing consensus among governments on the importance of the new security agenda, we are sensitive to the fact that many realist scholars still regard non-military issues as 'low politics' and not really security issues. Hence the paper in section 3 of Volume 2 reflect on the new security agenda with the aim of identifying what is substantive about this agenda and what is rhetorical. In a robust response to the traditional realist

position, Mely Caballero Anthony, a scholar at the forefront of what we might call the 'security wideners' who recognise the way in which states can become vulnerable to non-military threat, looks at how a range of non traditional security issues have become 'securitised'. For example, Natasha Hamilton Hart brings a critical facility to bear on terrorism as a security issue in Southeast Asia. Hart, while not denying the salience of the issue, provides a particularly excoriating critique of what passes for expert evidence in the field of terrorism scholarship in Southeast Asia. David Capie provides an important insight into the difficulties for regional actors in Southeast Asia trying to develop a strategy to manage terrorism at the same time as they must manage their most important extra-regional relationships (with the Unites States).

Volume 3: The Political Economy of Development

In Volume 3 we consider the international dimensions of the development process in the region. We are more interested in models, and especially the so-called 'Asian model', rather than detailed case studies. There are good reasons for this we would argue. A variety of explanations have been put forward in the literature to explain the Asian economic miracle since the 1970s. Richard Stubbs would identify four broad categories of explanation: neoclassical economic approaches; 'statist' approaches; Japan centred approaches and American hegemony centred approaches (Stubbs, 2005:1–34). These variously pick out one facet of Asia's dramatic economic evolution.

It is also through the adoption of alternative models of development with a strong role for the state that much of the 'fear' of Asia has arisen. Starting with Japan in the 1970s through the rapid development of the Tiger Economies on to China today, it is not just the growing wealth of Asian countries that seems to have aroused concern, but the way in which this growth has been generated. The dominance of the Washington Consensus is seen as being under threat (largely from those who want to protect and defend it) – perhaps the entire Western global order is being challenged.

The papers we have chosen are, with three exceptions, generic studies of development models rather than country specific case studies. The first exception is from Chalmers Johnson's seminal work on the Japanese development model; arguable a paradigm changing interpretation of Japan that cracked open the Western orthodox understanding of capitalist development and as such set the agenda for comparative analysis in the political economy of development for a generation. Indeed, not until the Asian financial crisis of the closing years of the 20th century was the watershed for the primacy of this model of regional economic development in Asia effectively reached. We return to the Japanese case with Ulrike Schaede's retrospective on what happened to this Japanese model. The other exception is Ramo's promotion of the idea of a 'Beijing Consensus' which has done so much to promote the idea of a

new Chinese development model that will challenge the 'Western' status quo (including influencing thought and debate within China itself). It is selected here not because we agree, but because it has been influential and is representative of a type of literature about China that has overlaps with the recurring theme of the implications of China's rise considered in Volumes 1 and 2.

In terms of region-wide/generic studies, the papers selected here to greater or lesser extents revolve around the key theme of the role of the (Asian) state in promoting economic growth and development. In particular, the literature reveals a dichotomy between two main approaches. In brief, neoclassical approaches, as is well understood, stress the primacy of markets and prices mechanism but suffer from a lack of understanding of history and the role of the state as an agent of change in economic development. Conversely, statist approaches overplay the role of the state and industrial policy, at the expense of markets, in the development of internationally competitive industries. These approaches gave rise to our understanding of the 'developmental state', captured initially in a Japanese context in Chalmers Johnson's study of the role of MITI in Japan in the 1970s and reflected in the selection of the piece by Johnson presented as the first paper in Volume 3. Johnson's model in effect became a rough template for other similar studies in the 1980s of South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. An attempt to bring these two approaches together was to be found in the World Bank's 1993 report *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy*.

The other papers in section 1 of Volume 3 represent elaborations and refinements to these major political economy studies of East Asia in the 1980s. In so doing, they reflect one of the key themes in the international politics of East Asia that we identified at the outset in this introduction. That is a cyclical shift in emphasis over time between the primacy of economic and security issues in the understanding of the regions international dynamics. The 1980s were, in the wake of the Korean and Vietnam wars of the 1960s and the lowering of the temperature of the first era of the Cold War, very much a time when, to misuse a phrase 'economics was in command'. Johnson's seminal understanding of the initial dramatic growth of Japan inspired the study of other East Asian states that subsequently 'took off' using, in theory and rhetoric if not always exact practice, the principal elements of the Japanese model. The selections by Mitchell Barnard and John Ravenhill and by Pekka Korhonen take the study further and embed the 1980s interest in the developmental state in its wider global contexts with their analyses of the 'flying geese model'. The essays in section two (an extract from the World Bank Report and papers by Paul Krugman and Paul Burkett and Martin Hart-Landsberg) provide us with critical, but not paradigm rejecting, insights into this model.

Paradigmatic challenge to the developmental state model only really arrived with the advent of the Asian financial crisis of 1996–7. Section 3 provides four discussions of the crisis. From political economy perspectives, the papers look at the relationship of the crisis to the wider global economy in general and

the international financial architecture in particular. Francois Godement looks at the manner in which the crisis checked the 'miracle' by, as he puts it, 'downsizing Asia'. Andrew MacIntyre investigates the relationship between investors and the national politics and domestic political institutions in Southeast Asia as a source of the crisis in Southeast Asia. By way of contrast, Robert Wade and Frank Veneroso examine the role of the international institutions and especially the IMF in the process. Particularly, they identify the commonality of interest and policy position of the IMF and what they call the 'Wall Street Complex'. James Crotty and Le Kang-Kook examine the nexus between IMF policy prescriptions and policy choice in the wake of the crisis in South Korea.

Implicit in much of this analysis is the idea that a new and different form of capitalism emerged in Asia that threatened to replace the dominant 'Western' form of free-market neoliberalism. These alternative forms were largely allowed to develop in the Cold War era because they served the geostrategic agenda of successive US administrations eager to support non-communist states and non-communist modes of development (even if they were non-market non-communist modes of development). The emergence today of a 'Beijing Consensus' that in some ways threatens the liberal global order also focuses our attention on the idea that the study of the political economy of the region is in part a study in (in)security rather than just a pure analysis of development on its own.

In the final section of Volume 3 we present a selection of papers that attempt to rethink the Asian development model in the contemporary era. A common question to be found in all papers is the impact of the onset of globalisation and the traumas of the financial crisis, on the understanding of the developmental state in East Asia. Notwithstanding the dramatic nature of these events, Richard Stubbs finds the developmental state to be surprisingly 'durable'. Its central neo-mercantialist ideas, deeply embedded in the fabric of the formal institutions and informal practices of government, have not been swept away. In a straight state-market trade off, the belief in the state's ability to deliver prosperity appears to have been less damaged in the eyes of the populations of East Asia than their faith in markets and globalisation. While Stubbs paper has an East Asia wide focus a similar line of argument is developed in Richard Higgott and Helen Nesadurai's analysis of governance questions in a specifically Southeast Asian context. It identifies the increasing importance policy makers attach to the equity and social justice dimensions of the model in order to legitimate it an era of globalisation.

Volume 4: Regions and Regionalism

As we have already indicated at the start of this introduction, perhaps nothing is more contested in the theory and practice of the international relations of East Asian than the issue of regionalism. Much of the theoretical literature on the 1980s and 1990s posited the deepening and widening of integration in Europe

with the limited abilities of the states of East Asia to create formal regional institutions. Ironically, if the depth of regional integration was reflected by the amount that has been written on it, then the level of regional integration in East Asia would fast be approaching that of Europe. But the scope, character and depth of all regional projects varies over time and tends to web and flow in a wave like manner. East Asia is no different to other parts of the world in this respect. The essays in Volume 4 demonstrate this tendency.

In so doing they focus on three generic sets of questions about the theory and practice of regionalism in East Asia. In section 1 it asks what is a region? That is, how are regions defined and how do they evolve historically over time. These questions are addressed through the lenses of a political economist, by Mark Beeson in his examination of what he calls the 'weight of history' coming to bear on the development of regionalism in East Asia; though the lenses of an historian in Philip Charrier's analysis of the historical antecedents of ASEAN as a regional project; and from the perspective of a cultural anthropologist in Arif Dirlik's reading of the relationship between global modernity and the identification of the 'Asia Pacific' as a region.

We have already noted that the spaces occupied by regions are neither constant nor mutually exclusive, and this is apparent in the respective geographical focus of the first three essays in Volume 4, Thus definitions of region need also to be explained in other ways too. Hence the second section of Volume 4 addresses the dynamics of contemporary regionalism. Papers by Peter Katzenstein and Breslin and Higgott locate these dynamics in wider debates over the sources of regional formation, integration and coherence in the 'comparative regionalism' literature – a literature that remains heavily influenced by the European experiences of regional integration in the post-World War II era. The dominant characteristic of the modern dynamics identified in these papers are the competing, sometimes creative, sometimes destructive, tensions in the interplay between economics and politics. Traditional economic explanations tend to privilege market led informal processes of integration while political interpretations invariably place greater emphasis on in a more formal, state-led process of institutional cooperation. The papers by Vinod Aggarwal and Gyo Min Koo on the one hand and Samuel Kim on the other respectively privilege the economic approach and the political approach in the process of increased regional integration in North East Asia.

Case studies by Christopher Dent and Mely Caballero Anthony also reflect differing economic and political perspectives as well as different levels of analysis in the evolution of the regional project in East Asia. Dent, developing his theory of 'lattice regionalism' traces the proliferating and over-lapping bilateral free trade agreements at the level of the Asia Pacific. Caballero-Anthony, looks at the emerging ASEAN Peoples Assembly in which she shows the manner in which non-state-led, governance processes are developing in the region. The bottom up initiative of the ASEAN People's Assembly can also be contrasted with the state-led push for regional free trade agreements seen in Dent's paper.

The essays in final section of Volume 4 return us to the starting point of this introduction – indeed, the starting point of the entire project – and the problem of identifying what the region is (or should be). We have chosen papers that outline the range of sometimes competing and sometimes overlapping (and sometimes both) regional forms/organisations, and the different regional preferences of key actors. ASEAN (Nesadurai) is a firmly established organisation and is likely to persist irrespective of other initiatives and innovations in regionalism. To be sure its membership and roles may change, and ASEAN has already become a sub-region in a broader regional body of sorts in both ASEAN + 3 and ASEM, but at present its existence is not fundamentally challenged.

By contrast the other papers in this final section focus on the competing visions and understandings of region. Although Higgott and Stubbs focus on the conflict between region defined as EAEC on one side and APEC on the other is the oldest of the papers in this volume, it retains contemporary relevance in establishing the basic for studying the conflicting definitions of region today. This is reflected in the papers by Breslin, Hundt and Pempel which collectively explore how the preferences of key regional actors is generating conflicting demands for diverse forms of region with different sets of membership. The problem, it seems, in Asia is not a lack of regional forms and initiative, but an over-supply of them.

But despite this proliferation of initiatives, Hundt's and Pempel's papers both raise question marks over whether Asia can or will move forward towards a new form of pan-regional integration at all. And in the final paper in the entire collection, Lanteigne focuses on the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation which brings the PRC together with Russia and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. As such, we conclude with papers that collectively question not only the understanding of region, but whether the future of regional cooperation is an Asian one at all (for China at least).

Conclusions

Given the number of papers in this collection – a total of 60 excluding this introduction – and our objective of providing a representative overview of different approaches and outlooks in four key areas, it is not easy to generate overarching conclusions. Indeed, while our own views are clearly represented in our publications included in this collection, our overall intention is not to impose our own biases, but instead to provide enough material for the reader to come to their own conclusions.

However, there are some things to be said by way of conclusion – primarily observations relating to the process of scoping the literature to collect the material together for this collection. First, and this comment does reflect our epistemological starting point, we were a little surprised to find that the divisions between the study of Asian security on one had and Asia's political

economy on the other remain relatively well entrenched in a number of institutions. To be sure, there are a number of teaching programmes and research agendas that cover the international politics of the region in totality, as we have attempted to do in this volume. But the walls that divide security studies and international relations from (international) political economy as separate fields of enquiry are still relatively strong.

Second, we found that there is still some ghettoisation of the study of the international politics of the region. By this we mean that the region is typically taught in course on the region itself, rather than forming large elements of broader and more generic courses on international relations/politics/security/political economy. To be fair, Asia seems to occupy a greater role in such generic courses than twenty years ago. But, we argue, the region is often still under-represented relative to its importance and North American and European experiences still tend to dominate. Even in parts of the region itself, the home country's international politics is at times considered as a separate part of the curriculum with broader courses on IR theory and world politics paying less attention to the rest of Asia relative to the West than one might expect.

This is also the case in the when it comes to the publication of scholarship on Asia. There has been if not a proliferation of academic journals dealing with the international politics of the region, then at least a steady growth. These journals have collectively provided an expansion of the literature in the field and allowed for an increasing plurality of opinions, and an increasing diversity of contributors to the debates. In addition, some generic disciplinary journals have played an important role in carrying debates over Asia forwards. The publications in this collection of a number of papers from *International Security* and *Foreign Affairs* are two cases in point. But in general, when it comes to the major disciplinary journals, Asia remains under-represented relative to its importance to global affairs, and also relative to the number of scholars researching the region across the world. This is even more evident when writings on China's rise are taken out of the equation. Ole Waever's (1998) conclusion that the international relations discipline was in fact 'a not so international discipline' dominated by publication from scholars in North America (and to a lesser extent Europe) about North America (and again to a lesser extent Europe) over a decade ago still remains largely valid today.

But while still relatively under-represented in the leading academic journals in international politics/relations, our third concluding observation is that when considering the literature as a whole over the last three decades – disciplinary journals, area specific journals, authored books, edited collections, working papers and policy reports – we noted a clear increase in the number of scholars from the region itself making important contributions to the literature. Of course, it's important to point out that the hegemony of the English language as the medium of international scholarship means that much Asian scholarship written and published in other languages is simply not read by many scholars of the region.[8] But the increasing number of good works published in English by Asian scholars based in Asian institutions is notable and important.

While these first three conclusions are based on the origin, organisation and categorisation of scholarship, our final observation is based on what is actually in the literature. Although we noted above the difficulty in drawing overall conclusions from a large and diverse set of writings, one theme keeps re-emerging over the years and across the different themes in the four volumes. Is Asia 'different'? – which of course means 'different' from dominant/hegemonic Western norms and understandings about the nature of politics and international relations. Thus we see writers from within the region and without considering whether international relations theories are appropriate and/or applicable to Asia; whether there are different modes of interactions and expectations that shape the nature and consequences of international relations; whether there is a distinct and different understanding of Asian forms of regionalism; whether there is a different Asian model of development and so on. And the secondary question in some of this literature is what does this difference mean for us? The answer, of course, depends on who are the 'us'. In some of the work from within the region, it means at best a misreading in the West of the region's future. At worst it results in the promotion of supposedly 'universal' norms on Asia by the West – either through a misguided misunderstanding of Asia, or through the deliberate promotion of Western preferences to maintain the West's global dominance.

When the 'us' is the West, however, the implications are somewhat different. From the onset of the literature covered in this collection, the idea that the East might be rising to challenge the occidental world order has come up time and again. Indeed, had we wanted to, we could have filled an entire volume with literature on how China's rise challenges the global dominance of the United States and the Western way. We started this introduction noting the continued fascination – in some cases fear – with the emergence of an Asian or Pacific Century. Despite our argument that such a 'centurist' focus can actually hinder the study of the real substance of the importance of the region, we nevertheless accept that searching for the region's rise to global predominance is likely to be as important in the next three decades as it has been in the last three.

Notes

1. These included books that argued that Japan can say no (Ishihara, 1991), China can say no (Song, Zhang and Qiao, 1996), and the region as a whole can say no (Mohamad and Ishihara, 1995).
2. Which has now been replaced by a new phase where Japan's support for US security concerns has gone beyond what was widely expected – 'Japan surpassing'. See Cossa and Glosserman (2005).
3. A term adapted from the title of Fang's (2007) analysis of the current interest in China.
4. Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar/Burma were not members of ASEAN at the time of the first summit in 1996 and participated for the first time in London in 1998.
5. Or occasionally more narrowly when ASEAN was the focus of teaching and research, in which case ASEAN + 3 tended to be studied as part of the 'region's' external

relations. We would like to thank Owen Parker for his assistance in identifying and collecting much of this information.

6. As opposed to those where economic entities can be members without this inferring statehood or sovereignty. Thus, Taiwan is a member of the WTO (as too are Hong Kong and Macao as parts of sovereign Chinese territory in control of their own customs regimes) and can participate in APEC – but Taiwan can only send a representative in charge of APEC related economic activity to summits.
7. In addition to these cited papers this debate included contributions from Roy (1994) and Johnston (2003). Berger's paper was published in the *Review of International Studies* rather but was influenced by Friedberg's piece and can be viewed as part of this debate. Breslin provides a more detailed overview of this debate in his article in Volume 4.
8. We should also acknowledge here that there is also a considerable body of work in Europe in non-English languages that we did not consult in preparing this collection and also has trouble penetrating the English language dominated 'mainstream'.

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