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**Global Threat Perception:  
Elite Survey results from Canada, China,  
the European Union, France, Germany,  
Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom  
and the United States.**

Edited by Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling

Garnet Working Paper 18/07

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## Introduction

# Global Elite Survey: Methodological Overview

Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling

Garnet Working Paper N° 18.1

## **Introduction. National Elites and Global Security Threats**

**Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling**

The working paper series on Global Threat Perceptions is part of a wider research project, the main aim of which is to establish the extent of convergence or divergence in threat perception, institutional response and interaction patterns among Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the EU. The results of the initial phase of this research project have been recently published in our edited collection, *Global Security Governance: Competing perceptions of security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century* (Routledge 2007). The empirical content of the case studies was derived from official documents (national governments and EU), public opinion surveys, think tank reports, and the academic literature on the security perceptions of the nine countries plus the EU. The results of the research presented in these working papers are based on a three-pronged survey of the perception of Members of Parliament (MPs) or Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), government officials, and security experts in nine countries plus the EU.

The interest in threat perceptions and institutional response derives from a concern over the changing nature of the security agenda and the need for an alternative understanding of security, the instruments identified as best suited to meeting the threats on the broadened security agenda, and the functional challenges of security. Essential to the changing nature of the security agenda is that security threats are no longer limited to the existential questions of national survival or territorial integrity. These changes have affected both the agent (states and non-state actors) and the target (state and society) of security threats. Given these circumstances, we developed a typology of threats that underscored the growing importance of threats posed by non-state actors that are aimed at social rather than state structures (see Figure 1.1).

Changes in the perception of security threats have also affected the ways and means by which states choose to respond to threats instrumentally and institutionally, particularly the reliance upon the 'hard' or 'soft' elements of power and the preference for unilateral as opposed to multilateral solutions. Moreover, the substantial change in the target of threat in combination with relative down-grading of the state as the primary source of threat also calls into question the effectiveness of the traditional instruments of statecraft, particularly military force. In the European context, these changes have yielded a greater recognition of, if not reliance on, the EU as a security provider. The cumulative impact of these changes has also

altered national security cultures, which identify the ‘set of ideas relevant to security policy that is widely shared within a society or by its political elites’ (Duffield 1998: 22). This set of ideas can be captured with reference to four characteristics: the view of the external environment; national identity, instrumental preferences; and interaction preferences (Kirchner 2007). The content of these four variables is outlined in Table 1.1.

### **The Survey: some methodological observations**

To explore changes in security threat perception, we developed a questionnaire and arranged for each author to send the questionnaire to Parliamentarians, top civil servants and academics with a demonstrable interest or experience in security affairs. The Parliamentarians and civil servants were selected according to the following criteria, respectively: Do they serve on parliamentary committees related to security or defence? Do they have responsibility for security affairs within the relevant ministry? The criteria for selecting academics were reputation based in most cases.<sup>1</sup> A questionnaire was developed, translated into the respective languages, adapted to regional conditions where appropriate (primarily in the cases of China and Japan), and technically administered from a central location in Germany. A copy of the questionnaire is attached in the Appendix. The results of a pilot run of the survey were presented at the workshop in October 2006. In light of the ensuing discussions at the workshop, a full-blown survey was undertaken, coupled in some cases with a series of face-to-face interviews where the questionnaire exercise either proved difficult to conduct or failed to produce the targeted number of responses: 20 for Parliamentarians, 15 top civil servants and 25 security experts. An overview of the type and number of respondents by countries and EU is provided in Tables 1.2 and 1.3.

### **Threat Perception**

The first question in the questionnaire asked the respondents to rank-order the five gravest threats for both 2006 and 2010. Those five threats were drawn from a list of thirteen threats compiled from the results of an earlier elite study (Kirchner and Sperling, 2002). These threats included those typically defined as traditional and those typically defined as ‘new’. Traditional security threats include biological/chemical or nuclear/radiological weapons and

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<sup>1</sup> Given the method for selecting members of the attentive and responsible elites as well as the low response rates, none of the samples can be considered free from some form of selection or non-response bias.

conventional war. The ‘new’ security threats include: ethnic conflict; criminalisation of the economy; narcotics trafficking; cyber attacks; macroeconomic destabilisation; migratory pressures; man-made environmental; natural disasters/pandemics; terrorism against critical infrastructure; and terrorism against state or society. As shown in Table 1.4, in most countries and the EU threats to security are perceived to be mainly of a non-traditional nature. Follow-up questions tried to establish the origin(s) of the five gravest security threats identified (e.g., whether specific states, regions or non-state actors are the primary agents of threat) and the target of threats (e.g., economic interests, civilian population, critical infrastructure). As shown in the respective working papers, non-state actors feature prominently as a source of threat, and economic interests as well as civilian populations are considered the primary targets of threat.

Table 1.4 provides a basis for comparing the absence or presence of a consensus on the nature of the critical threats to European security and the correspondence or divergence between the European view and the views of the other major powers. The Europeans rank terrorism against state/society, environmental threats, and terrorism against critical infrastructure as the three most critical threats, while the fourth and fifth gravest threats are macroeconomic instability and migratory pressures, respectively. For the other major powers, the rank ordering is slightly different: the gravest threat (shared by all) is the environment, followed by terrorism against critical infrastructure, terrorism against state/society, and macroeconomic instability. The security threats at the top of the European agenda are generally shared by elites in the other major powers, although there is a greater degree of heterogeneity with respect to the rank-ordering of those threats. With the possible exception of macroeconomic instability, states are not considered as the primary agent or target of threat. Instead, the threats are posed primarily by non-state actors targeting civil societies.

### ***Institutional response and instrumental preferences***

As indicated in Table 1.5, traditional patterns of interaction continue to shape national responses to these threats, even in cases where a multilateral solution is the optimal outcome. Within the European context, those respondents in Italy, Germany, and at the EU level continue a postwar preference for strong multilateralism, while France and the UK, the two states with lingering global responsibilities, have a hedged commitment to multilateral solutions. A similar pattern can be found in Canada, China and Japan. While Chinese foreign policy behaviour may be considered as moderately multilateral in the last decade as it has

sought to increase its influence in Southeast and Central Asia, the moderate multilateralism of Japan and Canada can be traced to the strong bilateral security and economic relationship each state has with the United States. Finally, Russia and the United States still have a reflexive preference for unilateral action and turn to multilateral solutions with a great degree of reticence — an orientation that is consistent with the superpower status held by both over the course of the post-war period.

The interaction preferences of these major powers are largely mirrored in their instrumental preferences. The Europeans rank police cooperation/ intelligence sharing and economic/financial assistance as the two top instruments for ameliorating the threats facing them, while diplomacy and special operations rank third and fourth, respectively. Perhaps surprisingly, the other major powers exhibit a greater degree of consensus than do the Europeans: all five rank police cooperation/intelligence sharing, economic/financial assistance, and diplomacy as important instruments of statecraft. However, there is a divergence about the use of force: Japan is less eager than the others to use military force, traditional military power finds favour with the Chinese, and special operations appeal to the Americans, Russians and Canadians. Thus, there is no clear basis, at least with respect to the responses of these national security elites, for assuming that the EU is a qualitatively different kind of power; that the Europeans have a greater preference for the use of ‘soft’ power than do the Americans and Japanese or even the Chinese and the Russians. Moreover, all states except Japan and China point to special operations as an effective tool for meeting those security threats that pose a direct threat to civilian populations.

Another set of questions presented in the questionnaire were directed towards the emergence of the EU as a security actor. A number of different questions about the EU were posed in order to determine the perception of the EU as a ‘traditional’ or ‘civilian power’ and its centrality to the transatlantic alliance, particularly the interaction between EU efforts to acquire an autonomous force projection capability and the continued utility of NATO for both the US and Europeans. Four questions were posed: How important is the EU for addressing the security threats facing Europe today? Would a more autonomous ESDP weaken NATO? Would a weaker NATO lead to a retrenchment of the American commitment to European security? How important is the American commitment to European security?

As Table 1.6 reveals, EU actions are seen as most relevant in response to the threats constituting the ‘new’ security agenda. The EU is seen as the most effective actor to cope with the threats posed (in descending order) by macroeconomic instability, migratory pressures, environmental threats, the criminalisation of economies, ethnic conflict, and



narcotics trafficking. While the EU is an important actor in meeting each of these threats, it is also important to note that the EU is only important for three of the top five threats facing Europe (the environment, macroeconomic instability, and migratory pressures), while the issue-areas where the EU is seen as a less effective or ineffective actor include those that are rated as particularly grave, with the notable exception of the environment. The other major powers view the EU as an important actor in meeting the following threats: macroeconomic instability, environmental threats, migratory pressures, and criminalisation of the economy. The major powers also see the EU as useful for meeting threats posed by narcotics trafficking, natural disasters/pandemics, and terrorism against critical infrastructures (see Table 1.7). It is remarkable that the non-member states view the EU as having a greater capacity for international cooperation in security affairs than its own members, at least with respect to the breadth of security threats.

There is very little difference between the EU member states as to whether a stronger European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) would weaken NATO: for each set of national respondents, it would appear that the ESDP will only marginally weaken NATO, if at all. The other global powers have a less sanguine view: the Russians and Chinese are divided evenly between those who believe that NATO will be weakened by the ESDP and those who believe that the impact will be marginal. Both Canadians and Americans believe that a stronger ESDP will weaken NATO somewhat. Nonetheless, only Italians believe that a weaker NATO will weaken the US commitment to Europe, while the French and Russians do not believe it will not have any effect at all. The other countries, including China, believe that the American commitment may weaken, but the number of respondents holding that view never exceeds 41% or falls below 29%. These responses tend to reflect a great degree of uncertainty about NATO and the nature of the US commitment, an uncertainty no doubt fed by the Iraqi debacle. However, it is of some interest to consider the French and Russian responses. They could imply one of two things: either these security elites believe that the American commitment is weak in any event and couldn't weaken any further or that the American commitment to Europe serves the American interest and as a consequence the strength or weakness of NATO is secondary to the American commitment. The latter interpretation is consistent with the answers to the third question which explores the importance of the American commitment to Europe. In the French case, 86% describe the US commitment as important or essential to European security, while 76% of Russians do so. Only Germany, the UK and Russia have substantial minorities (26%, 32% and 24%, respectively) that believe the American commitment to be inessential and only China has a

clear majority that do so. Ironically, perhaps, the French and Americans have a similar view of the importance of the United States to European security (see Tables 1.6 and 1.7).

A final question put to the respondents was the national conception of security; viz., where does a state's conception of security fall along a continuum ranging from a narrow agenda (traditional geo-strategic concerns and direct threats from states) where 'hard power' is most effective to a broad agenda (the 'new' security agenda of indirect threats from non-state actors) where 'soft power' is most effective? The German, Italian and EU respondents uniformly identified the definition of security as broad, while the French and British respondents classified their national understanding of security as falling somewhere between medium and narrow. As could be expected from the two erstwhile Superpowers, Russia and the United States still retain a narrow understanding of security — Russia from habit of mind and the US from its current role as the only state capable of guaranteeing (or disrupting) global order. The respondents in Japan, China and Canada defined their national security concerns as falling between medium and broad, although Japan has a relatively narrower conception than China and Canada (see Table 1.8). Despite these categorisations of the national definition of interest, it remains interesting that the choice of foreign policy instruments (and in many cases their rank-ordering) does not vary between these states (excepting the Chinese respondents who identified conventional military force as one of their top five policy instruments) *and* that most of the countries in the Atlantic Community looked to special operations as an effective instrument of statecraft.

The broad understanding of security and the reliance upon the instruments of 'soft power' to meet those threats are not easily reconciled with the assessments of budgetary expenditures on defence. With the exception of France and Germany, majorities of national respondents (ranging from 59% to 87%) agreed that budgetary resources were misaligned with national security needs (see Table 1.9). And with the exception of Germany (35%) and Japan (50%), national elites also agreed by substantial majorities that defence budgets do not meet national defence needs. What is difficult to fathom, however, is whether that dissatisfaction reflects a belief that too much or too little is devoted to defence spending. Clear majorities believed that too little was spent on defence in Italy (61%), Russia (61%) and the UK (80%). The balance of national elites assessed that their national defence budgets hovered around the Goldilocks mean of 'just about right': France (52%), Canada (52%), China (48%), Japan (47%) and the EU (51%). As important a finding, however, is the status of the US as the only state where the substantial majority of the respondents asserted that defence expenditures were either 'just about right' (31%) or 'too much' (54%) (see Table

1.9).<sup>2</sup> In each individual working paper, there is a detailed analysis of the sources of national (dis)satisfaction with the respect to the distribution of expenditures with respect to personnel, R&D, and procurement.

## **Conclusion**

The working papers produced for Garnet JERP 5.3.2 represent the continuation of our project on understanding the perception of threat in the major global powers and the prospects for cooperation and conflict. The survey results demonstrate that the attentive foreign policy elites in the major states of the Atlantic and Pacific security systems share not dissimilar views of the gravest threats to global order and national security, but also share a similar set of preferences with respect to the instruments that best meet those threats. Perhaps more surprising is the consensus that the instruments of ‘soft power’ possess greater utility than the instruments of ‘hard power’ and the recognition that non-state actors pose the greatest threat to national security regardless of geographical location.

A set of important questions emerge in these papers and the earlier book with respect to the conceptual utility of national security cultures for understanding how states perceive the threats posed by the external environment and the best means for addressing them. A second book, which will draw heavily but not exclusively on these working papers, will investigate three questions about national security cultures. First, can states (or the foreign policy elite) be usefully described as possessing a single, monolithic security culture, or are security cultures partially dependent upon domestic partisan coalitions? Second, does the concept of security culture provide an imperfect guide to understanding state behaviour in a period of systemic disequilibrium or uncertainty? Arguably, the post-war security cultures of the major powers provided a good guide to understanding the instruments, origins and nature of the *direct* threats to national security, but those same security cultures do not provide much guidance for understanding or responding to the *indirect* threats to the national security of the major states. Third, does security culture play a causal role by constructing the conceptual lens through which the security elite understands the external environment and defines the nature of threats, or is its causal role limited only to those cases where the definition of threat is not contingent upon the (in)stability of the external environment or domestic political

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<sup>2</sup> Germany may also follow the American lead, but the high number of ‘don’t knows’ makes it impossible to reach any firm conclusion about the elite assessment of defence expenditures.

coalitions? The working papers in this series do not address these questions directly, but provide the foundation for doing so.

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**Figure 1.1: Typology of Threats to European Security Space**

		Target of Threat	
		State	Society
Agency of Threat	State	Cyberwarfare Nuclear attack Conventional war	Macroeconomic instability Man-made environmental threats
	Non-State	Nuclear attack Cyber-warfare Cyber-vandalism Ethnic factionalism	Migratory pressures Biological/chemical attack Criminalisation of economy Narcotics trafficking Environmental Cyber-attack Terrorism, state/society Terrorism, critical infrastructure Natural disasters/pandemics

Adapted from Kirchner and Sperling 2002.

**Table 1.1. Security Culture**

<i>View of environment</i>	<i>external</i>	Ranges from a belief that the institutionalisation of interstate relations leads to a more orderly and peaceful world to the belief that the international system is intractably anarchical, competitive and hostile.
<i>Security identity</i>		Ranges from the perception of self as a <i>contributor</i> to international peace to an <i>actor</i> seeking security from external threats in an anarchic international sphere.
<i>Instrumental preferences</i>		Preference for civilian instruments and soft power (diplomacy, economic aid and development, promotion of human rights, and peacekeeping) versus an emphasis on the use of armed forces (antiterrorism special operations, combat and peace support operations).
<i>Interaction preferences</i>		The balance struck between a preference for multilateralism and a preference for either uni- or bilateralism.

**Table 1.2 Type and number of respondents**

	Members Parliament	of Government Officials	Security Experts	Total
<i>Canada</i>	15	46	28	89
<i>China</i>	4	13	8	26
<i>EU</i>	12	18	20	50
<i>France</i>	13	13	17	43
<i>Germany*</i>	4	1	17	22
<i>Italy</i>	11	5	28	44
<i>Japan</i>	20	16	11	47
<i>Russia</i>	22	4	28	54
<i>UK</i>	15	42	32	89
<i>US**</i>	0	0	113	113
<i>Totals</i>	118	158	302	578

\* The contributing authors collapsed responses of Parliamentarians and non-governmental elites into a single category.

\*\*The contributing authors had a zero response rate for Parliamentarians and government officials.

**Table 1.3: Comparison of Target and Actual Numbers/Percentages of Respondents for the nine countries plus the EU**

	Target number	Actual Number	Percentage of Actual Number
Members of Parliament	200	118	59%
Civil Servants	150	158	105%
Security Experts	500	302	60%
Total	850	578	68%

**Table 1.4: Perception of most important threats (top five)**

<i>Canada</i>	Natural disasters/ pandemics	Environmental	Terrorism, critical infra- structure	Terrorism, State/society	Macroeconomic instability
<i>China</i>	Energy security	Criminalization of economy	Conventional war	environment	Macroeconomic instability
<i>EU</i>	Terrorism: state/ society	Environmental	Terrorism, critical infra- structure	Migratory pressures	Natural disasters & pandemics
<i>France</i>	Macroeconomic instability	Migratory pressures	Environmental	Natural disaster/ pandemics	Terrorism
<i>Germany</i>	Terrorism, critical infrastructure	Terrorism: state/society	Environment	Macroeconomic instability	Cyber-attack
<i>Italy</i>	Terrorism: state/society	Criminalization of economy	Migratory pressures	Terrorism, critical infra-structure	Environmental
<i>Japan</i>	Natural disasters & pandemics	Environment	Cyber-attack	Narcotics trafficking	Terrorism: critical infra-structure
<i>Russia</i>	Criminalisation of economy	Migratory pressures	Narcotics trafficking	Terrorist activities	Ethnic conflicts
<i>UK</i>	Terrorism: state/society	Terrorism: critical infra-structure	Environment	Macroeconomic instability	
<i>US</i>	Terrorism: state/society	Terrorism: critical infra-structure	Biological/ radiological weapons	Environmental	Macroeconomic instability

**Table 1.5: Preferred responses to threats**

	<b>Interaction patterns</b>	<b>Instrumental preferences (rank-ordered)</b>
<i>Canada</i>	Multilateral preference, but importance of bilateral relations with US	a) police cooperation/intelligence sharing b) economic/financial assistance c) diplomacy d) special operations
<i>China</i>	Moderate multilateralism	a) diplomacy b) economic/financial assistance c) police cooperation/intelligence sharing d) military force
<i>EU</i>	Strongly multilateral	a) police cooperation/intelligence sharing b) economic/financial assistance c) diplomacy d) special operations
<i>France</i>	Multilateral, but willing to pursue unilateralism if necessary	a) economic/financial assistance b) police cooperation/intelligence sharing c) special operations d) other
<i>Germany</i>	Strongly multilateral	a) police cooperation/intelligence sharing b) economic/financial assistance c) diplomacy d) other
<i>Italy</i>	Strongly multilateral	a) police cooperation/intelligence sharing b) economic/financial assistance c) diplomacy d) special operations
<i>Japan</i>	Moderately multi-lateral	a) economic/financial assistance b) police cooperation/ intelligence sharing c) diplomacy
<i>Russia</i>	Mixture of multilateralism and unilateralism	a) police cooperation/intelligence sharing b) diplomacy c) economic/financial assistance. d) special operations
<i>UK</i>	Moderate multilateralism	a) economic/financial assistance b) diplomacy c) police cooperation/intelligence sharing d) special operations
<i>US</i>	Bias towards unilateralism	a) police cooperation/ intelligence sharing b) diplomacy c) economic and financial assistance d) special operations



**Table 1.6. Importance and Implications of the EU as a Security Actor:  
Internal Perspective**

	<b>EU importance for specific security threats (rank-ordered)</b>	<b>Autonomous ESDP weaken NATO?</b>	<b>Weaker weaken commitment</b>	<b>NATO US</b>	<b>US commitment to Europe</b>
<i>France</i>	a) macroeconomic instability	Little: 69%	Maybe: 11%		Inessential: 24%
	b) migratory pressures	Some: 31%	Yes: 22%		Important: 64%
	c) ethnic conflict	Very much: 0%	No: 61%		Essential: 24%
	d) narcotics trafficking		Don't know: 6%		
<i>Germany</i>	Not reported	Little: 34%	Maybe: 30%		Inessential: 26%
		Some: 17%	Yes: 22%		Important: 13%
		Very much: 13%	No: 13%		Essential: 26%
<i>Italy</i>	a) macroeconomic instability	Little: 61%	Maybe: 32%		Inessential: 11%
	b) environment	Some: 27%	Yes: 45%		Important: 43%
	c) migratory pressures	Very much: 11%	No: 18%		Essential: 45%
	d) criminalization of economy				
	e) narcotics trafficking				
<i>UK</i>	a) migratory pressures	Little: 42%	Maybe: 40%		Inessential: 32%
	b) macroeconomic instability	Some: 30%	Yes: 25%		Important: 33%
	c) environmental	Very Much: 10%	No: 17%		Essential: 32%
	d) narcotics trafficking				
	e) criminalisation of economy				
<i>EU</i>	a) macroeconomic instability	Little: 68%	Maybe: 38%		Inessential: 5%
	b) migratory pressures	Some: 16%	No: 32%		Important: 32%
	c) environmental	Very Much: 13%	Yes: 24%		Essential: 63%
	d) criminalisation of economy				
	e) ethnic conflict				

**Table 1.7. Importance and Implications of the EU as a Security Actor:  
External Perspective**

	<b>EU importance for specific security threats (rank-ordered)</b>	<b>Autonomous ESDP weaken NATO?</b>	<b>Weaker NATO weaken US commitment</b>	<b>US commitment to Europe</b>
<i>Canada</i>	a) macroeconomic instability b) migratory pressures c) environmental d) criminalisation of economy e) narcotics trafficking	Some: 56% Little: 30% Don't know: 15%	Maybe: 36% Yes: 32% No: 19%	Essential: 42% Important: 42% Inessential: 21%
<i>US</i>	a) Environmental b) Macroeconomic instability c) terrorism, critical infrastructure d) migratory pressures e) criminalisation of the economy	Some: 46% Don't know: 28% Little: 26%	Maybe: 41% No: 28% Yes: 23%	Essential: 55% Important: 30% Inessential: 15%
<i>China</i>	a) macroeconomic instability b) criminalisation of economy c) migratory pressures d) environmental e) natural disasters/ pandemics	Very much: 40% Little: 40% Some: 15%	Yes: 29% Maybe: 29% No: 24%	Inessential: 50% Essential: 33% Important: 17%
<i>Japan</i>	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<i>Russia</i>	a) Macroeconomic instability b) Environmental c) Criminalisation of economy d) Migratory pressures e) Narcotics trafficking	Some: 44% Little: 41% No: 6%	No: 41% Maybe: 9% Yes: 17%	Important: 44% Essential: 32% Inessential: 24%

**Table 1.8: Definition of Security**

	<b>Definition of security</b>
<i>Canada</i>	Medium to broad
<i>China</i>	Medium to broad
<i>EU</i>	Broad
<i>France</i>	Medium to narrow
<i>Germany</i>	Broad
<i>Italy</i>	Broad
<i>Japan</i>	Medium
<i>Russia</i>	Medium to narrow
<i>UK</i>	Medium
<i>US</i>	Narrow

**Table 1.9. Budgetary resources**

	<b>Size of the budget</b>	<b>Defence</b>	<b>Does defence budget meet defence needs?</b>	<b>Alignment between budgetary resources and security threats</b>
<i>Canada</i>	Too little: 40% Just about right: 52%		No: 68%	Misaligned: 65%
<i>China</i>	Too low: 48% Just about right: 48%		n.a.	Misaligned: 59%
<i>EU</i>	Too little: 49% Just about right: 51%		No: 78%	Misaligned: 68%
<i>France</i>	Too little: 28% Just about right: 52% Too much: 20%		No: 75%	Misaligned: 44%
<i>Germany</i>	Too little: 13% Just about right: 30% Too much: 13%		No: 35%	Misaligned: 48%
<i>Italy</i>	Too little: 61% Just about right: 32% Too much: 7%		No: 73%	Misaligned: 82%
<i>Japan</i>	Too little: 29% Just about right: 47% Too large: 25%		No: 50%	Misaligned: 84%
<i>Russia</i>	Too little: 61% Just about right: 20%		No: 99%	Misaligned: 74%
<i>UK</i>	Too little: 80% Too large: 13%		No: 81%	Misaligned: 76%
<i>US</i>	Just about right: 31% Too large: 53%		No: 88%	Misaligned: 87%

## Appendix 1: Questionnaire

1. Please choose from the list no more than 5 of the gravest threats facing the UK today and in 2010 and rank order them (1 the most grave, 5 the least). (Please put the numbers in the appropriate boxes)

Threats	Probability of threat event	
	2006	2010
Biological/Chemical Attack		
Conventional War		
Criminalisation of the Economy		
Cyber Attack		
Ethnic Conflict		
Macroeconomic Instability		
Man-made Environmental Threats		
Migratory Pressures		
Narcotics Trafficking		
Natural disasters and pandemics		
Nuclear/Radiological Attack		
Terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure		
Terrorist attacks against State or society		
Other (Specify)		

2. What are the three most appropriate policy instruments to meet the five security threats identified above for the year 2006 (you can give more than one policy instrument for each threat)? (Please tick the appropriate boxes)

Threats	Diplomatic	Economic and financial assistance	Police cooperation and intelligence sharing	Traditional military	Special operations	Other (please specify)
1.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

3. What is the origin(s) of the five most important security threats identified above? Please specify state/region or non-state actor.

Threats	Origins	
	State or Regions (Please specify)	Non-State Actors (Please specify)
1.		
2.		

3.		
4.		
5.		

4. How important is the EU at present to address the security threats facing Europe today?  
(Please tick the appropriate boxes)

Threats	EU Importance					
	Not important at all			Essential		
	0	1	2	3	4	5
Biological/Chemical Attack	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Conventional War	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Criminalisation of the Economy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Cyber Attack	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Ethnic Conflict	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Macroeconomic Instability	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Man-made Environmental Threats	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Migratory Pressures	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Narcotics Trafficking	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Natural disasters and pandemics	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Nuclear/Radiological Attack	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Terrorist attacks against State or society	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other (Specify)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

5. Are the government's budgetary resources and manpower aligned with the threats facing your country?

Misaligned  Aligned

6. Are national defence budgets of the appropriate size to meet the security threats your country faces today?

Too large  Just about right  Too little

7. Does the existing distribution of budgetary resources within the defence budget meet national security needs?

Yes  No

8. If no, is too much or too little being spent on:

	Too much	Just about right	Too little
Personnel	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Procurement	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
R&D	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

9. Are sufficient funds being devoted to military modernisation?

Too much  Just about right  Too little

10. Could a more autonomous ESDP weaken NATO further?

Not at all  Little  Some  Very much  Don't know

11. Will a weaker NATO lead to a retrenchment of the American commitment to the European security?

Yes  Maybe  No  Don't know

12. Is the American commitment to European security

Essential

Very important


Important

Not very important

Inessential

13. What pattern of interstate interaction best describes how your country is meeting its security challenges? (1: Solely unilateral, 5: strictly bilateral, 9: always multilateral; numbers in between: intermediate stages)

Please mark your country's position on the following line:



14. Does your nation's government conceive of security narrowly (confined primarily to issues where 'hard' power is required) or broadly (where 'soft power' is necessary)? (1: narrow, 5: medium, 9: very broad; numbers in between: intermediate stages)

Please mark your country's position on the following line:



**Please, provide us with the following additional information:**

**For Parliamentarians**

Age:

Gender:

Party Affiliation:

Membership on parliamentary committee(s) charged with any aspect of security policy:

Ministerial or executive positions held (if any):

Do you represent an urban, rural, or suburban constituency?

**For Civil servants/members of government**

Age:

Gender:

Party affiliation (if applicable):

Ministry:

Career civil servant or political appointee:



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# National Threat Perception: Survey Results from Canada

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## **ABSTRACT**

This paper explores the perceptions of Canadian political, bureaucratic and academic elites about security threats and the efficacy of various international institutions and proposals to meet those challenges. Based on our analysis of Official documents, elite survey and public opinion data, we found general elite agreement about the type of threats facing Canadians, with terrorism and manmade environmental problems among the most prominent issues. We argue that security concerns went hand in hand with a desire to main distinctiveness from the United States, and that this approach was reflected in the 2004 White Paper on security. Since the government adopted a more proactive approach in the 2005 ‘international policy statement’ after public opinion became increasingly preoccupied with the terrorist threat and receptive towards the adoption of tighter security measures, it appears that previous Liberal governments followed rather than led public opinion.

Elites also tended to agree on the choice of policy instruments to address security threats. Police cooperation/intelligence sharing and economic and financial assistance were more favoured than diplomacy as strategies to deal with terrorism. For what concerns the size and distribution of the defence budget, parliamentarians were much more likely to be satisfied than were civil servants and security experts. A majority of those who expressed an opinion about the ESDP agreed that a more autonomous ESDP would weaken NATO and lead to a retrenchment of the US commitment to European security. We propose that although Canadian elites will continue to support NATO, they regard it more as an arena within which they can, together with the Europeans, exercise some influence on the US, rather than as a direct provider of security.

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

This paper explores Canadian political, bureaucratic and academic elites’ perceptions of security threats. It first briefly outlines the Canadian security environment pre- and post-11 September 2001 (henceforth 9/11), Canadian security culture, and the ‘official’ perception of threat, i.e. that publicly articulated by the Canadian government. The paper then analyses the perceptions of Canadian political, bureaucratic, and academic security elite, and compares them to the ‘official’ ones and, when survey data are available, to those of the public at large. Finally, the paper offers some conclusions.

*The Canadian Security Environment:*<sup>3</sup> Canadian threat perceptions should be seen within the context of the Canadian security environment, the most important feature of which is the country's geographic position. Canada shares the world's longest border with the United States (US): 5,061 kilometres on land and 3,830 on water. Because of its geographic position, Canada could afford not to devote much attention or resources to security during the Cold War. Since the US considered Canadian security as its own, Canadian security needs were easily satisfied through membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and bilateral relationships with the US such as in the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). Canada's security policy could thus afford to emphasize – in public discourse at least - what Harvey (2003) has called 'distinction', namely those aspects perceived to enhance the country's international identity.<sup>4</sup> A central aspect of the policy of 'distinction' was to put the accent more on process than on substance. Canadian foreign policy came thus to be identified with 'multilateralism' understood both as 'the practice of multilateral diplomacy and ... policies supporting the establishment and maintenance of institutions and associations that facilitate and support the practice of multilateral diplomacy' (Keating 2002: 4).

The end of the Cold War did not change this situation. The Canadian government continued to assume that the ample US cloak provided Canada with all the security it needed. Indeed, during the 1990s, rather than re-evaluating threats and security needs as most European countries did (e.g. Croci 2003), Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien between 1996 and 2000, concentrated on promoting the concept of 'human security', which implies a shift in emphasis from state-centric to individual security concerns, and is understood as the general improvement of the quality of life conditions experienced by individuals (Axworthy 2003). Critics have charged that the concept of 'human security' does not provide any guidance to governmental policymaking and is a make-feel-good concept aimed primarily at enhancing Canadian 'distinction' (e.g. Paris 2001: 88; Harvey 2003). Since 9/11, however, Canadian governments have toned down the rhetoric about 'human security' and privileged a state-centric understanding of security as well as the adoption of security policies at the national level or bilaterally, i.e. in cooperation with the US rather than multilaterally. After 9/11, in fact, the heightened concern of the

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<sup>3</sup> This and the following section are based on Croci and Verdun (2007).

<sup>4</sup> The term 'distinction' as used by Harvey and here, refers not only to sovereignty, independence and policy autonomy but also to an effort to distinguish Canada from the US, and hence retaining - some would say acquiring – a distinct identity. In fact, many argue that the Canadian identity is primarily defined in a negative manner, that is to say being Canadian means primarily being other than American.

American government for its own territorial security convinced the Canadian government to adopt a series of measures to reassure the US about the security of its northern border. Failure to act would probably have led Washington to tighten entry into the US from Canada for both people and goods. The consequent trade disruption between the two countries would have created serious economic difficulties for Canada since trade with the US accounts for 87 per cent of Canadian foreign trade in goods and services. The percentage is even bigger for the industrial heartland of Canada. A staggering 94 per cent of Ontario exports, for instance, go to the US. By contrast, trade with Canada accounts for only 16.5 per cent of US foreign trade. This share of trade makes Canada the largest US trading partner but it does not make US economic prosperity as dependent on trade with Canada as Canadian prosperity is on trade with the US. An October 2005 Ipsos Reid poll, however, revealed that process, instead of substance, and ‘distinction’ remain central elements of the image Canadians have of their country’s foreign policy. Thus, 36 per cent of them still believe that one of the top three priorities of the Canadian government should be ‘working actively with the UN to promote international cooperation’; fully 82 percent believe (39 percent strongly) that one of Canada’s most important roles in world affairs should be to act as a mediator in conflicts involving other countries; and 83 per cent agree (56 percent strongly) with the statement that ‘Canada should pursue its own independent policies even if this leads to certain problems in our relations with the US’.<sup>5</sup> The core elements of Canadian ‘security culture’, defined as the ‘set of ideas relevant to security policy that are widely shared within a society or by its political elites’ (Duffield 1998: 22) can be summarised as shown in Table 2.1.

## **II. PERCEIVED SECURITY THREATS: THE OFFICIAL VIEW**

In April 2004, the Canadian government published its first ever White Paper on national security entitled: *Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy* (Privy Council Office 2004). The paper identifies what the government regards as Canada’s ‘three core national security interests’. The first of these interests (protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad) is uncontroversial. The second (ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to its allies) is a signal sent to the US to counter the largely false but nevertheless widespread perception that Canada is the North American point of entry for terrorists intending to strike at the US. The third (contributing to international security) is a reassuring message sent to

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<sup>5</sup> ‘Canadian Views on Canada’s Role in International Affairs’, <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/>

those Canadians who regard ‘multilateralism’ not as one policy instrument among many but as a value in itself and a key component of Canadian identity. The White Paper does not provide clear insights into what the government regards as the most serious threats to Canadian security. It lists a number of threats but does not rank them in order of gravity or immediacy. The list includes terrorism, whether state sponsored or motivated by religious extremism, violent secessionist movements, or domestic extremism. Then it mentions proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed and failing states, foreign espionage, natural disasters, critical infrastructure vulnerability, organized crime and pandemics.

A clearer image of the type of threats perceived by the Canadian government is provided by the 2003 and 2004-2005 Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) public reports. Both rank terrorism as the ‘most serious security threat’ Canada faces. The threat is represented primarily by the activities of various terrorist groups and individuals operating in Canada, whether affiliated with Al Qaeda and like-minded groups or with secessionist groups abroad (e.g. the Tamil Tigers) on whose behalf they recruit and collect funds often through extortion from members of their ethnic communities. The CSIS reports then mention the danger posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which represents an indirect threat to Canada by endangering international peace and stability. Other threats identified by CSIS, but deemed to be of a lower order, are espionage, especially economic espionage, and other foreign influenced activities, and trans-national organized crime (CSIS 2003, 2004).

The difference in the portraits painted by the White Paper and the CSIS reports, the latter being much more precise, can probably be attributed to the fact that the White Paper is a political document which was expected to filter down to the public at large. The CSIS report instead, even if public, was addressed to a very specialized audience and thus was expected to have limited political repercussions. Hence, it could afford to be starker and more precise. The impression given by the White Paper is that its list of threats, much like that of core national interests, has been crafted to reassure everyone and the US in particular. Indeed, as hinted at in the title and stated explicitly in the executive summary, the policy has been ‘crafted to balance the needs for national security and economic prosperity with the protection of core Canadian values of openness, diversity and respect for civil liberties’ (Privy Council Office 2004: vii). On the one hand, the White Paper recognizes the need to take security initiatives that would reassure the US of the safety of its northern border and thus ensure the smooth flow of goods and people across it, which in turn protects the inflow

of direct investments into Canada. On the other hand, it is careful not to characterize its new security measures as the beginning of a process of further integration with the US, as advocated by some business sectors (Barry 2003; Goldfarb 2003), in order not to upset those Canadians who regard the protection of civil liberties, even in the event of security emergencies, as a Canadian core value to be defended at all costs (e.g. Jackson 2003: 26).

Neither the White Paper nor the CSIS reports mention directly the threat that the government regards as the most serious, namely the possibility that Canadian access to the US market might be hampered or diminished. Such a threat is however mentioned explicitly in the so-called 'international policy statement' released in April 2005. The statement devoted to 'commerce' points out that 'a major terrorist incident within one of our continental partners could have direct and potential devastating consequences for the movement of people and commerce within the North American space'. It also warns against the peril of 'complacency' by pointing out that 'while some Canadians may feel relatively immune to such [terrorist] dangers, in truth we are not' (Government of Canada 2005: 7). The statement devoted to 'defence' focuses on three threats: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and what it calls 'hot-points', namely protracted localized conflicts that could however easily spread (e.g. China-Taiwan, Pakistan-India, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, and North-Korea's nuclear brinkmanship). Unlike the White Paper, the statement on defence also devotes considerable attention to the types of operations the Armed Forces might be expected to conduct. These are defined as 'integrated operations', which include not only traditional peacekeeping, observer and humanitarian assistance missions but also combat operations (as in Kosovo or Afghanistan), complex peace support and stabilization missions (as in Bosnia or Afghanistan), and maritime interdiction operations, especially as part of the campaign against terrorism (Government of Canada, 2005: 28). The Canadian government's 'official' perception of threat can thus be summarised as shown in Table 2.2.

### **III. PERCEIVED SECURITY THREATS: ELITE VIEWS**

*Methodology.* The survey of Canadian security elites was administered in two rounds in June and November 2006. Because the goal of our survey was to identify people with specialized knowledge, the sampling strategy was purposive in overall design. For the first round, we composed three separate lists of political (federal), bureaucratic, and academic experts in the security field. The study population consisted of 136 individuals: 77 members of the House of Commons and Senate, including the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the leaders of the

Opposition parties and members of parliamentary committees with security, defence, or foreign affairs remits; 22 senior civil servants from the Departments of Citizenship and Immigration, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, National Defence, and the Canada Border Services Agency; and 37 security experts based at Canadian universities. In June 2006, these individuals received an electronic request to complete an anonymous, online questionnaire. In keeping with recommended social research practises, three follow-up email contacts were made following the initial contact in order to persuade prospective respondents to participate in the survey (Dillman 2000: 177). The four contacts yielded a total of nineteen completed or partially completed questionnaires. In order to boost response rates, follow-up telephone calls were placed to the offices of political and bureaucratic elites in August and September 2006. The follow-up generated an additional six responses to bring the total number of questionnaires available for analysis to 25, for a response rate of 18.4 per cent. However, since nine respondents did not identify their occupation, the number of usable questionnaires was reduced to 16, for a completed response rate of 11.8 per cent.

A second round of the survey was administered in November 2006. The study population was expanded to include: associate members of parliamentary committees with a security remit; other senior and mid-level civil servants from the previously-contacted departments; senior and mid-level civil servants from other departments and agencies with responsibilities for addressing security challenges<sup>6</sup> and university-based academics who specialize in foreign and security policies. Since members of the political and bureaucratic elites likely receive numerous electronic messages each day, and/or some of these messages may have been vetted by ‘gatekeepers’ (administrative or political assistants), we decided to administer the second round of the survey by mail. Although more costly than online distribution methods, mail distribution methods share the advantage of covering many respondents who are distributed across a large geographic area. Mail surveys are also in keeping with a broader societal trend that has seen many activities that once required interaction between people, now being shifted to a self-administration mode (Dillman 2000: 7). The mail-out package included the questionnaire, a letter of introduction explaining the purpose of the study, and a consent form outlining the voluntary nature of participation in the

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<sup>6</sup> Environment Canada, Health Canada, Justice Canada, Fisheries and Oceans, Canadian Air Transport Security Authority, Canadian Environment Assessment Agency, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Canadian Transportation Agency, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Immigration and Refugee Board, National Energy Board, National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, Public Health Agency of Canada, and the Privy Council Office.

study (see Appendix 1). In order to facilitate returns, we included a self-addressed, stamped return envelope in the mail-out package (Dillman 2000: 18). A total of 1,204 packages were mailed to 921 civil servants, 166 politicians, and 117 academics. Due to time and financial constraints, no follow-ups were conducted.<sup>7</sup> An additional 77 valid questionnaires were received (47 civil servants, 20 academics, 10 parliamentarians) for a second round return rate of 6.4 per cent. The overall response rate for both rounds was 6.9 per cent, based on 93 returns out of 1,340 requests for participation. Five questionnaires were received following December 25, 2006, and are not included in this analysis.

Compared to other elite surveys, the response rate for the security expert survey was very low. A November 2005 online survey of American opinion leaders about the state of the world and the US global role yielded response rates of 60 per cent for academic and think tank leaders, and 52 per cent for state and local government politicians. Telephone response rates were 40 and 48 per cent for the academic and state/local opinion leader sub-samples, respectively (Pew Research 2005). In Canada, a 1992 mail survey of Members of Parliament (MPs) in the House of Commons produced a response rate of 37 per cent, and a 1993 survey of non-incumbent candidates running in the 1993 election yielded a response rate of just over 28 per cent (Docherty 1997). Since we do not know whether non-respondents differ from the respondents in a way that is relevant to the study, there is the possibility of non-response error (Dillman 2000: 11; Babbie 2001: 256).

Several factors may account for the low participation rates, particularly the sensitive nature of information about security perceptions (some who declined to participate wrote that their opinions were based on confidential information), a lack of knowledge about some of the specialized questionnaire items (indicated by some respondents), and the overall decline in survey participation rates that has been observed since the early 1990s. Despite the low response rates, the mail distribution method proved to be a more effective way of reaching parliamentarians. While the online survey and email reminders yielded no responses from parliamentarians, the mail-out generated ten responses from parliamentarians, for a 6 per cent response rate. This allowed us to achieve our target minimum of 15 responses from security specialists in the parliamentary ranks. Web-based methods were the most effective way of reaching academics. Their response rate to the online questionnaire was 27 per cent, but just 17.1 per cent for the mail-out. These observations highlight the importance of employing

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<sup>7</sup> Dillman (2000: 177) argues that without follow-up contacts, response rates will usually be 20-40 percentage points lower than those normally attained.

mixed survey distribution modes (web, phone, mail) and tailoring these methods to reach different target groups.

The low response rates for the civil servant and parliamentary sub-samples (see Appendix 1) mean that the results cannot be considered representative of elites from these groups. A comparison of the population and sample descriptives reported in Appendix 1<sup>8</sup> shows that the age distributions of the civil servant and parliamentary sub-samples are similar to the age distributions in their corresponding populations. Females in our security expert and parliamentary sub-samples are also represented in numbers corresponding with their presence in the study population. However, females are underrepresented in the civil servant sub-sample and males are underrepresented in the parliamentary sub-sample. There is also a partisan bias in the parliamentary sub-sample. The Liberals are overrepresented and the Conservatives and Bloc Québécois are underrepresented (Appendix 1). Having raised these cautions about the representativeness of the civil servant and parliamentary sub-samples, purposive sampling designs are primarily designed for comparative purposes (Babbie 2000: 179), and thus, the results can be used to compare the attitudes expressed by members of the different occupational groups.

### **III. SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTIONS**

Canadian elites were asked to rank order five of the gravest threats facing the country in 2006 and 2010, with '1' indicating the most grave and '5' the least. Natural disasters/pandemics (e.g. avian flu, HIV, SARS, influenza), man-made environmental threats (e.g. global warming, over-consumption, air pollution, heavy industry, agriculture) and terrorist strikes against critical infrastructure and state or society were the most frequently-mentioned challenges facing Canada in 2006, and were assigned the highest average rankings (Table 2.3).

The concern with natural disasters/pandemics is probably connected to the lingering memory of an outbreak of SARS in the greater Toronto area in April 2003 and to periodical reports of avian flu cases. Indeed, an Ipsos Reid poll conducted in March 2006 showed that 60 per cent of Canadians were concerned (15per cent very and 45per cent somewhat) about avian flu.<sup>9</sup> The prominence of man-made environmental threats may be attributed to Canada's northern geographic position which makes it a frontline witness to the impact of

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<sup>8</sup> Calculations based on 89 cases i.e. excluding the five responses received after 25 December 2006.

<sup>9</sup> '6 in 10 Canadians concerned with potential bird flu outbreak', <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/>



climate change on the natural world. Retreating glaciers, the collapse of ancient ice shelves into the Arctic Sea, and the reduction and thinning of polar bear stocks, are just a few of the visible outcomes of rapid temperature change in this country. Although Canada was a signatory to the Kyoto protocol which tried to get the industrialized world's big polluters to commit themselves to cutting greenhouse emissions to 1990 levels or below, Canada will not meet its target. The Harper government has said that it intends to pull Canada out of Kyoto, and has chosen instead to introduce legislation that focuses on improving air quality. The proposed Clean Air Act, introduced in the fall of 2006, has generated strong criticism from the opposition parties, the scientific community, and the public, and guarantees that climate change will dominate public discourse in the near-term (Greenspon 2007). Natural or man-made disasters and pandemics were less prominent in the 2004 governmental White Paper, i.e. they were mentioned only towards the end of the list. The position of any given threat on the list, however, did not imply its rank order in terms of either gravity or immediacy and the fact that terrorism was mentioned first reflected the fact that the major reason for the publication of the White Paper was to reassure the US about Canadian awareness of, and preparedness to counter, such a threat. Concern with the environment seems to be widespread also among the Canadian public. Two different Ipsos Reid polls taken in October and November 2006 revealed that 57 per cent of Canadians were either 'extremely' (17per cent) or 'definitely' (40per cent) concerned about climate change. 66 per cent also believed warmer climate to be the result of man-made gasses trapped in the atmosphere and 52 per cent, were in favour (24per cent strongly) of putting a special carbon tax to increase the cost of burning fossil fuels for both consumers and industry'. At 26 per cent, the environment topped the list of issues Canadians felt should receive the greatest attention from the government.<sup>10</sup>

The concern with terrorism of the Canadian bureaucratic, parliamentary and academic elite corresponds with the main threat identified by the 2003 and 2004-2005 CSIS reports and is shared also by the public at large among which it is actually becoming more widespread. In July 2002, according to a Pollara survey, only 14 per cent of Canadians believed that a terrorist attack could happen in Canada and if it did it would be because of Canadian eagerness to cooperate with the US. In August 2005, a *Globe and Mail* and *CTV News* poll revealed that An August 2005 *Globe and Mail* and a CTV poll revealed that 62 per cent of Canadians now believed that a terrorist act was likely to happen in Canada, 67 per cent believed that Canada was not well prepared to deal with a terrorist threat, 62 per cent

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<sup>10</sup> 'Environment tops the list of priorities for Canadians' and 'Canadians concerned about climate change'  
<http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/>

supported giving the US information about Canadian citizens suspected of being terrorists, and 81 per cent favoured deporting or jailing anyone who publicly support terrorists or suicide bombers.<sup>11</sup> Less than one year later (June 2006), the percentage of Canadians who believed that an act of terrorism was likely to occur in Canada had further increased to 71 per cent.<sup>12</sup> Most Canadians, moreover, also disagree with the opinion of a vociferous minority which charges that anti-terrorist measures have gone too far in compromising individual rights. An EKO public opinion poll taken in February 2005, revealed that 50 per cent of Canadians felt the measures taken by the government had struck the right balance, 41 per cent believed that the government should go even further, while only 7 per cent thought the measures taken were excessive.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, according to the results of a November 2006 poll conducted by the Surveillance Project at Queen's University, only 48 per cent of Canadians, against 57 per cent of US citizens, found surveillance laws intrusive.<sup>14</sup>

Such a change in public perception is only in part and only in the beginning attributable to the impact that Canada's geographic proximity to the US has had on the public policy priorities of the former Liberal governments under Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin, and on the current Conservative government. In the wake of 9/11, the Chrétien government undertook a series of initiatives to strengthen Canada's approach to fighting terrorism and ensuring public security. These included: the Smart Border Agreement to increase border security while maintaining the smooth flow of trade and people across the Canada-US frontier; the Anti-Terrorism Act; the Public Safety Act to strengthen civil aviation and marine security and to facilitate the sharing of law enforcement and national security information within the country and with Canada's international partners; and a direct military contribution to the US-led campaign against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. It also modified its immigration and refugee legislation to place more emphasis on identifying and deporting perceived security risks, and set up a new federal department devoted to security, and allocated more financial resources to paying for enhanced policing and intelligence (Croci and Verdun 2007). The bolder approach taken by the Liberal government in the 2005 'international policy statement' to analyse the threats Canada faces and describe the policies

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<sup>11</sup> 'Canadians want strict security, polls finds', *Globe and Mail*, 11 August 2005.

<sup>12</sup> Pollara, 'Canadians lose fear of terrorism' <http://www.pollara.ca/library/news/terrorsubsiding.html>; 'Canadians want strict security, poll finds', *Globe and Mail*, 11 August 2005; 'Majority believe terrorists will hit Canada', *Globe and Mail*, 10 June 2006.

<sup>13</sup> 'Anti-terrorism law effective as it is, McLellan insists', *Globe and Mail*, 15 February 2005.

<sup>14</sup> 'More Americans than Canadians (almost half) find anti-terrorism laws intrusive – Queen's International Surveillance Survey finds', <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/>

necessary to counter them followed rather than preceded the change in public attitude.<sup>15</sup> The election of a new Conservative government in January 2006 has however increased the profile of terrorism as a perceived security threat. In the spring of 2006, Parliament agreed to commit Canadian troops to combat and reconstruction duties in Afghanistan until 2009. The expectation that terrorist attacks against state or society will continue to pose a threat to Canadian security in 2010 possibly also reflects pessimism, exacerbated by the arrests of several alleged Islamic terrorism plotters in the Toronto area in June 2006, the strong resistance that the Taliban supported by elements of Pakistani government and society are posing to Canadian troops based in southern Afghanistan, and by the difficulties faced by the American-led coalition in putting an end to sectarian conflicts and establishing order in Iraq. With respect to home-bred terrorism, for instance, 58 per cent of Canadians felt that the Toronto plotters might have been only ‘the tip of iceberg’ and that many more terrorist groups exist and are ready to strike in Canada.<sup>16</sup>

Conventional war, nuclear/radiological attacks and migratory pressures were the least frequently mentioned issues, with migratory pressures assigned the lowest average ranking (Table 2.3). Canada’s geographic position puts it pretty much beyond the reach of a conventional attack and its proximity to the US is a further deterrent for any would-be nuclear/radiological attacker. Canada has a relatively large and uncontroversial immigration programme hence migratory pressures relate primarily to refugee seekers, which in the 1990s represented only a small percentage (about 15per cent) of all newcomers (Gallagher 2002: 98-9 and 113-15). Canada, moreover, signed a Safe Third Country Agreement with the US at the end of 2004, which means that refugee claimants at a land port of entry along the Canada-U.S. border must ask for protection in whichever of the two countries they entered first. This means, for instance, that most claimants from Central and South America who have travelled through the US cannot now access the Canadian refugee determination process. Citizenship and Immigration Canada estimates the Agreement may have contributed to the 55 per cent decline in the number of ‘in-country refugees’ from 2004 to 2005 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2006). Finally, ten respondents prioritized ‘other’ issues that were not offered as choices in the questionnaire.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> One analyst, moreover, has argued that the innovative character of the ‘international policy statement’ is primarily a reflection of the fact that it was written by external consultants (Michaud 2005).

<sup>16</sup> ‘Canadians react in wake of terror-plot arrests’ <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/>

<sup>17</sup> One individual felt that the violence and instability associated with the Israeli-Palestinian question posed the gravest threat, and that poverty and agricultural protectionism in the developed world were potential sources of instability and migratory pressures. International challenges that were mentioned by other respondents included: US aggression (sic!), US domination of the Canadian economy, Arctic sovereignty, and emerging economies.

When respondents were asked what they felt would constitute the most important threats facing Canada in 2010, natural disasters/pandemics, man-made environmental disasters, and both forms of terrorism were mentioned most frequently (Table 2.3). However, the rank order of threats changed slightly between 2006 and 2010. Natural disasters and man-made environmental threats received the highest average rankings in the 2.27-2.5 range, but criminalisation of the economy received the third highest average ranking (2.67) and macroeconomic instability the fourth highest (2.73). Meanwhile, the average rankings given to both forms of terrorist threats in 2010 slipped slightly. When respondents ranked the same issue area in both 2006 and 2010, they exhibited consistency in their threat perceptions. This is shown by the strong magnitude of many of the Pearson-r correlations, which measure how variables or rank orders are related (Table 2.3).

There was a substantial amount of elite consensus about the gravest security threats facing Canada (Table 2.3). Civil servants, parliamentarians, and bureaucrats assigned very similar rankings to higher profile issues such as terrorism and man-made environmental threats. Statistically significant inter-group differences in threat perceptions were detected for just two issues in 2006 and two issues in 2010. Parliamentarians assigned higher average rankings to biological/chemical attacks and migratory pressures in 2006 than members of the bureaucratic and academic elites (although it should be noted that the parliamentarian average for migratory pressures is based on just one case). Civil servants were more likely than security experts and parliamentarians to forecast that cyber attacks and nuclear/radiological attacks would constitute graver threats to Canadian security in 2010.

#### IV. POLICY INSTRUMENTS

Police cooperation/intelligence sharing and economic and financial assistance were the most frequently-mentioned policy instruments for dealing with security threats (Tables 4a-d). Economic and financial assistance were the most popular choices in five issue areas: ethnic conflict; macroeconomic instability; migratory pressures; man-made environmental threats; and natural disasters/pandemics. Police cooperation and intelligence sharing were the most commonly-cited approaches for dealing with seven issue areas including: biological/chemical attacks; nuclear/radiological attacks; terrorist attacks against state or society; terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure; the criminalisation of the economy; cyber attacks; and narcotics trafficking. While very few identified conventional war as one of the five security threats, diplomacy was the preferred instrument for dealing with this challenge (Table 2.4a).

The preference for police cooperation/intelligence sharing suggests an awareness of the trans-national nature of security challenges and a recognition that the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 9/11 occurred in part as a result of the failure of intelligence agencies in the US to share information with each other (*The 9/11 Commission Report* 2004). Improved police intelligence and a reliance on informants contributed to the break-up of alleged terrorist plots in the United Kingdom and Canada in 2006. These high-profile operations may have contributed to a greater appreciation of this approach. The prominence of economic/financial assistance is most probably linked to the image that Canadians have of their country's role in international affairs. According to an October 2005 Ipsos Reid poll, 54 per cent of Canadians are of the opinion that Canada should give priority to 'helping to reduce hunger and poverty around the world'. Fully 85 per cent of them, moreover, believe (44per cent strongly) that Canada is indeed a very generous country when it comes to giving aid to poorer countries.<sup>18</sup> Our survey respondents rarely identified traditional military solutions as their preferred policy instruments. Instead, there was a tendency to prefer special operations to deal with both forms of terrorism, biological/chemical attacks, and nuclear/radiological attacks. The aversion to traditional military solutions may reflect Canada's conception of itself as 'international mediator' and the inventor and main proponent of international peacekeeping. In the 1970s and 1980s, Canada participated in every UN peacekeeping mission and provided as much as 10 per cent of its military forces, which made it the largest contributor. Although this is no longer the case, the image of Canada as the world peacekeeper endures (Gotlieb 2005: 23), which also explains why a majority of

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<sup>18</sup> 'Canadian Views on Canada's Role in International Affairs', <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/>

Canadians felt and feel that the Chrétien government's decision not to commit Canadian troops to Iraq was the right thing to do.<sup>19</sup> Briefly, all three subsets of Canadian security elites share the same opinions concerning the choice of policy instruments and they seem - we say 'seem' because the data available for the Canadian public provide only indirect evidence - to mirror those of the public at large.

Diplomatic solutions constituted a plurality of responses in the conventional war category only (Table 2.4a). The failure of this instrument to emerge as a preferred policy instrument in other issue areas might seem surprising given Canada's traditional preference for diplomacy within multilateral institutions. Elites, however, seem to recognize that diplomatic means are ineffective when dealing with an enemy that does not negotiate and hence does not respond to sticks and carrots, and is motivated primarily by religious fervour.

Canadian elites frequently proposed other policy instruments to deal with man-made environmental threats and natural disasters/pandemics. For the former issue, these solutions included national environmental laws, policies and regulations, the implementation of the Kyoto accord, environmental cooperation, changing consumption habits/lifestyle changes, public awareness, and for the latter security challenge this included medical aid and cooperation, disaster relief plans, emergency preparedness, research and development, and a national public health program. Although evidence concerning the policy preferences of the public is scarcer and more indirect, what is available indicates that Canadians are ready to take an even more robust approach. For what concerns the environment, a survey conducted in January 2007, shows that a majority of Canadians (62 per cent) would be willing to have the economy grow at a 'significantly slower rate' to reduce global warming.<sup>20</sup> In the case of pandemics, 91 per cent of Canadians support (50per cent strongly and 41per cent somewhat) court-ordered quarantines for those exposed to the flu and 86 per cent support the idea that criminal charges be laid against those violating the quarantine.<sup>21</sup>

Compared to civil servants and security experts, parliamentarians were less enthusiastic about diplomatic and economic/financial solutions to address a majority of security challenges, while academic experts selected police cooperation/intelligence sharing solutions more often than members of other elite groups (Tables 4a-d). Civil servants were relatively more disposed towards using police cooperation/intelligence sharing and special

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<sup>19</sup> According to various Ipsos Reid polls, the percentage of Canadians approving Chrétien's decision has hovered around the 70 per cent mark <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/>

<sup>20</sup> For an analysis of the results of the January 2007 Globe and Mail/CTV News environment poll see *The Globe and Mail*, 27 January 2007, p. A6-A7 and 29 January 2007, p. A4.

<sup>21</sup> '6 in 10 Canadians concerned with potential bird flu outbreak', <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/>

operations instruments to deal with terrorism (Table 2.4d). Overall, just three statistically significant differences between the occupational groups were detected, although this also reflects the small size of many of the cells. Security experts were significantly more likely than parliamentarians and bureaucrats to: identify other solutions to deal with man-made environmental threats (Table 2.4d) and to propose diplomatic solutions to deal with macroeconomic instability (Table 2.4c). Civil servants were significantly more likely than academics and parliamentarians to name special operations as the best instrument to respond to natural disasters/pandemics (Table 2.4d).

## **V. ORIGINS OF SECURITY THREATS**

Canadian elites felt that both state/region and non-state actors were sources of security challenges. Non-state actors were mentioned more often than state actors as the sources of eight threats: biological/chemical attacks, criminalisation of the economy, cyber attacks, ethnic conflicts, man-made environmental disasters, narcotics trafficking, terrorist attacks against state or society, and terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure. States/regions were more frequently blamed for six issue areas: conventional war, macroeconomic instability, migratory pressures, natural disasters/pandemics, nuclear/radiological attacks, and other issues (e.g. US aggression/domination, poverty, Arctic sovereignty, emerging economies, poverty, political instability, and inadequate health care).<sup>22</sup>

Civil servants were more likely than others to identify state/regional actors as the source of eight of 14 security threats (Table 2.5a), and security experts were more likely to pinpoint non-state actors as the source of eight challenges (Table 2.5b). Bearing in mind the initially small sample size of parliamentarians, members of the three occupational groups tended to agree about the origins of security threats. Statistically significant inter-group differences were found in just three instances. Between 46 and 50 per cent of civil servants and security experts identified states/regions as the sources of natural disasters/pandemics, compared to about 13 per cent of parliamentarians (Table 2.5a). Between 20-25 per cent of parliamentarians and academic experts named non-state actors as the source of macroeconomic instability, compared to just 2.2 per cent of civil servants (Table 2.5b). A majority of civil servants (56.5 per cent) identified non-state actors as the origin of terrorist attacks, compared to 13.3 per cent of parliamentarians (Table 2.5b).

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<sup>22</sup> Albeit defined in a variety of ways, Islamic terrorist groups were the non-state actor most mentioned as a source of threat. The Middle East or Arab countries, China, and East Asia, were the states or regions most-often mentioned.

## **VI. IMPORTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Table 2.6 presents data on elite perceptions of the European Union's (EU) importance in addressing the security threats currently facing the continent. On a 0-5 scale where 0 = not important at all and 5 = absolutely essential, they judged the EU to be of moderate importance, with average responses for each issue area ranging from lows of 2.62 and 2.68 for conventional war and nuclear/radiological attacks to highs of 3.59 for macroeconomic instability and 3.43 for migratory pressures. Although each issue area drew a wide range of responses on the 0-5 scale, the standard deviations were not large, suggesting there is an elite consensus that EU involvement was of some importance, but not absolutely essential. The relatively higher score for the ability of the EU to deal with macroeconomic instability most likely reflects the fact that in Canada the EU is perceived primarily as a large market and an economic actor.

Civil servants and security experts expressed the most faith in EU capacity to deal with macroeconomic instability and migratory pressures, while the parliamentarians felt that the institution was best equipped to address narcotics trafficking and terrorism against critical infrastructure. Both forms of terrorist attacks were the only security challenges that resulted in a significant difference of opinion between elite groups. In both cases, civil servants and parliamentarians felt the EU was of moderate importance in addressing these threats, while the security experts felt that its capacity was closer to being nonessential. This might come as a surprise to EU specialists who have followed closely the slow birth and development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and concluded that the EU has gone rather far in this new direction. Although this is undoubtedly true, for Canadian security specialists - who by and large still subscribe to the view that security in the West, Europe included, is a business of NATO - from an operational point of view the EU has still limited competences in the security field, its hard power is at best symbolic of its intention to become a significant actor in this field while its much-touted soft power has yet to prove significant, let alone decisive, in countering terrorist threats.

## **VII. NATIONAL DEFENCE BUDGETS**

Canadian elites were asked to comment on the size and distribution of budgetary and manpower resources devoted to meeting security and national defence needs. The December 2001 budget provided C\$ 7.7 billion over five years to enhance Canadian security. This amount included the money necessary to maintain existing public safety and policing



programmes. Only part of it was designed to respond directly to the increased need for security after 9/11. The new funds were to be spent primarily to upgrade intelligence equipment, deploy more frontline investigative personnel, expand the anti-terrorism capacity of the military, improve critical infrastructure protection, enhance border and marine security, and create a new air security organization. It should be noted, however, that in the case of CSIS, for instance, the new funding simply restores operating budgets and number of employees to the mid-1990s levels (CSIS 2003: Fig. 1 and 2). Table 2.7 provides a summary and breakdown of the special security related budgetary allocations after 9/11. The December 2001 budget disregarded the needs of the Canadian military despite repeated, undeniable demonstrations of its decline (Granatstein 2004). At the end of World War II, Canada had the fourth most powerful military in the world on which it spent 7.3 per cent of GDP (Gotlieb 2005: 23). In the year 2000, Canada ranked last (if one excludes tiny Luxembourg) among NATO countries in terms of defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP (1.2 per cent). As shown in Table 2.8, defence expenditures had basically remained the same (about C\$ 13 billion per year) since the early 1990s. The same was true for the number of armed forces (both military and civilian personnel) as a percentage of national labour force (King 2002). Inevitably, the role played by Canada in international peacekeeping had also become marginal. Having invented it, as it were, peacekeeping soon became part of Canada's international identity. For two decades - in the 1970s and 1980s - Canada participated in every UN peacekeeping mission and provided as much as 10 per cent of its military forces, which made it the largest contributor. Today, Canada provides only about 0.9 per cent of all UN peacekeeping forces, which places it 32<sup>nd</sup> in the ranks of contributors (Gotlieb 2005: 23). As shown in Table 2.8, the Canadian military received a modest new allocation of C\$ 270 million for Operation Apollo in Afghanistan in 2003 and another C\$ 800 million in 2004, but had to wait until 2005 for a much-needed financial injection of C\$ 12.8 billion, which will be spent, however, mainly between 2008 and 2010. At that time, the military budget will amount to C\$ 19 billion. Most of the money is designed to replace ageing equipment and increasing the number of troops from the current level of 62,000 to 67,000.<sup>23</sup>

*Perceptions of the size and distribution of national defence budgets.* As shown in Table 2.9, more than 65 per cent of the respondents felt that the country's budgetary and manpower resources were misaligned with the threats facing Canada, with civil servants and security experts expressing the most dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction with the size and

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<sup>23</sup> 'Ailing Forces get big boost' *National Post*, 24 February 2005.

distribution of national defence budgets was also evident (Table 2.10). A bare majority of respondents indicated the defence budget is too small, and more than 68 per cent said that the distribution of budgetary resources does not meet Canada's needs. In both cases, civil servants and security experts expressed more relative dissatisfaction with the size and distribution of the national defence budget than parliamentarians. Overall, 53.5 per cent of respondents felt that too little had been spent on military modernisation, compared to 40.7 per cent who were satisfied with spending in this area (Table 2.10). A majority of civil servants and academic experts felt the allocation was too little, while a majority of parliamentarians said it was just about right. The fact that parliamentarians were much less likely to express dissatisfaction with the size and distribution of the budget is probably due to the fact that the Liberals – i.e. the governing party responsible for passing the budgets examined here – were overrepresented in our parliamentary sub-sample.

When probed further about their opinions about spending on personnel, procurement and research and development within national defence budgets, between 66 and 76 per cent of respondents said that too little was being spent on personnel, procurement and research and development, with security experts and civil servants again expressing more dissatisfaction with the distribution of defence budget spending (Table 2.11). The responses likely reveal concerns about the age and safety of equipment following a long period of cuts to the military under Liberal governments during the 1990s, and possibly, growing concerns about whether adequate support has been provided to Canadian troops in Afghanistan. Interestingly, the parliamentarians who expressed satisfaction with the size and distribution of defence budgets, and the amount of funds devoted to military modernisation (Table 2.10), were of the opinion that too little has been spent on personnel and research and development (Table 2.11).

### **VIII. ESDP, NATO AND THE US**

Just over 37 per cent of respondents were undecided about whether a more autonomous ESDP would weaken NATO (Table 2.12). When an opinion was provided, a plurality (43.4 per cent) said it would weaken it some or very much. Parliamentarians were most likely to indicate they did not know what the effect of a more autonomous ESDP would be, while security experts were more likely to feel that it could weaken NATO some or very much (Table 2.12). The high percentage of 'don't know' responses among parliamentarians and, to a lesser extent, civil servants might be an indication of the relatively limited knowledge of highly specialised EU policies, such as ESDP, among Canadians in general. Among those

who are familiar with it, perceptions of the ESDP-NATO relationship seem to reflect the split that on this issue exists in Europe itself as well as the US, namely whether ESDP should represent a strengthened European contribution to NATO or become an alternative to it.

Considerable uncertainty also characterized perceptions about whether a weaker NATO would lead to a retrenchment of the US commitment to European security. Almost half of those surveyed responded 'maybe' or 'do not know' (Table 2.12). When a clear opinion was expressed, 31.8 per cent said 'yes' and 19.3 per cent said 'no'. Not surprisingly, security experts were most likely to have an opinion on this matter, with their opinions skewed towards 'yes'. Only about one fifth of respondents, in each of the elite groups and hence also overall, felt that the American commitment to European security was 'inessential' or 'not very important', with the median response being 'important' (Table 2.12). Very similar proportions of civil servants and security experts (about 43-45 per cent) felt that it was 'important' or 'essential/very important', compared to just a third of parliamentarians.

## **IX. CONCEPTIONS OF INTERSTATE ACTIONS AND SECURITY APPROACHES**

When asked to indicate on a scale of 0-10 which pattern of interstate interaction best described how Canada is meeting its security challenges, with 0 = solely unilateral and 10 = always multilateral, the mean overall response of 7.54 indicates that elite opinions tend toward the multilateral approach which is in keeping with Canada's historical self-image (Table 2.13). When asked about whether the government conceives of security narrowly, where hard power is required, or broadly, where soft power is required, the average response of 6.60 was placed closer to the soft power end of the continuum (Table 2.13). While the typical response leans toward soft power, it is not decisively in that camp.

The absence of statistically significant occupational group differences in mean evaluations, and the presence of no unusually large standard deviations, indicates overall consensus about Canada's patterns of interstate actions and security approaches. There was slightly more elite disagreement about Canada's patterns of interaction with other states, possibly reflecting the need acknowledged governmental initiatives after 9/11 to counter security threats bilaterally i.e. through close cooperation with the US.

It should also be pointed out that two respondents questioned the phrasing and relevancy of the points on the unilateral/multilateral continuum in question 13. One respondent crossed out the mid-point 'strictly bilateral' and the endpoint 'always multilateral', and replaced these labels with 'sometimes bilateral' and 'sometimes multilateral', respectively. Another respondent checked both 'strictly bilateral' and 'always

multilateral' for question 13 and added the remarks '[it] depends'. Although for these two questionnaires no response was recorded for question 13, the two comments invite a clarification. Although some Canadians might indeed believe, as official rhetoric would have it, that a 'multilateral' gene is at the heart of the DNA of the Canadian state, things are more complex than that. As pointed out by Canada's experts on the subject (Keating 2002; Harvey 2004), multilateralism does not imply a pursuit of international community-wide interests to the detriment of national interests. More often than not, especially in the case of medium-sized powers, national and multilateral interests simply tend to coincide. If, and when, the two diverge, national interests prevail. And indeed, as Keating (2002: 1) points out, Canadian bilateral relations with the US have always represented a 'noteworthy exception' to Canadian multilateralism, which means that when necessary, as has been the case after 9/11, Canadian governments have paid less attention to action within multilateral organizations and considerably more to bilateral relations with its southern neighbour.

*Continental Security Perimeter:* After 9/11, some Canadian economic and political elites have advocated a foreign policy grounded in a conception of national interest that explicitly recognizes the central role of the US in assuring Canadian national security and economic prosperity. Hence, the proposal of creating what has been defined a 'continental security perimeter' (CSP) or 'area of mutual confidence'. For this reason, we added a question to the November 2006 mail-out of the questionnaire that tapped into respondents' opinions about the controversial proposal. Just five of the 72 individuals who responded to this round of the survey indicated that they did not know. Of the remaining 67 respondents, 55.2 per cent were 'strongly in favour' or 'in favour', and 44.8 per cent were 'opposed' or 'strongly opposed' (Table 2.14). No statistically significant differences were detected between the occupational groups (Table 2.14).

Respondents were invited to elaborate on their answers in an open-ended, follow-up question. Their explanations were varied and detailed, but for the purposes of this paper, they will be described in broad strokes. Support for the CSP was based on four distinct rationales linked to voice, economic prosperity, efficiency, and effectiveness. More specifically, some felt it would be in Canada's interests to have a seat at the table rather than watch the US pursue unilateral action. Some of these respondents pointed to existing examples of cooperation that have given Canada a voice on defence and security matters such as NORAD. Others feel that cooperation with the US would protect against border closures and threats to Canada's prosperity, and improve the bilateral trade relationship by assuaging US concerns about our security efforts. Efficiency was also mentioned as a reason for promoting closer

North American integration, with some mentioning the need to utilize better scarce resources, to address the redundancies of border controls and regulations that inhibit North American competitiveness, to avoid duplication in efforts, and to derive benefits from economies of scale. Finally, respondents argued the CSP would improve the effectiveness of existing efforts because security threats do not respect boundaries and the Canada-US border is too long to protect. Several people felt there was a lack of coordination and information sharing between NAFTA countries, and that a security perimeter could strengthen existing cooperation and bring security benefits to Mexico. One individual mentioned China as a new threat that will require a strong defence.

Opposition to the CSP is anchored around concerns about policy harmonization to US practises, weakened Canadian sovereignty, policy ineffectiveness, and costs. More specifically, many respondents expected that the CSP would lead to a harmonization to US practises (e.g.: 'US policies are misguided and dangerous'), to the domination of American priorities (e.g. 'it would make Canadian participation in the missile defence system necessary', emphasis on 'hard power' approaches), and to a weakening of multilateral options and of Canada's international prestige and interests. The protection of Canadian sovereignty was also a concern as several individuals expressed the need for an independent foreign policy especially in order to protect individual freedoms for Canadian citizens. Several individuals felt that the CSP would be ineffective because it is too difficult to defend extensive borders or the perimeter against non-state actors. A handful of respondents mused that Canada's security interests are best promoted by tackling root causes, underlying misconceptions, and misinformation through diplomacy, investment in development, knowledge and understanding. A few felt that the proposal would be too costly because it would require Canadian participation in a missile defence system, provide no additional security, and fail to address other problems such as poverty and environmental disasters. Overall, the opinions of Canadian security elites on the establishing of a CPS mirror the polarization that exists within Canadian society at large (Crocchi and Verdun 2007: 142-143).

## **X. CONCLUSIONS**

This paper has analysed the threat perceptions of Canadian political, bureaucratic and academic security elite and has compared them with those articulated by the Canadian government and, when data were available, those of the Canadian public at large. Overall, the government, public opinion and security elite seem to agree on the type of threats they perceive as facing Canadians after 9/11. Since then, both Islamic terrorism and the

deterioration of the environment have acquired prominence. The environment, moreover, has also become a hot political issue exploited by both government and opposition in their ongoing competition. For what concerns terrorism, the events of 9/11 led the government to take a more proactive approach to national security, namely to adopt new policies aimed primarily at convincing the US of the security of its northern border. At the same time, however, the government eschewed what perceived to be more potentially controversial choices, such as participating in the ‘coalition of the willing’ in Iraq or joining the ballistic missile defence project. Concern with security, in other words, went hand in hand with desire to maintain ‘distinction’. The 2004 White Paper on security reflected this approach. It was only after it became clear that public opinion was increasingly preoccupied with the terrorist threat and well disposed towards the adoption of tighter security measures that the government adopted a less circumspect approach as reflected in the 2005 ‘international policy statement’. The Liberal governments, in other words, followed rather than led public opinion in its approach to security.

Substantial agreements among security elites exists for what concerns the choice of policy instruments, especially the usage of police cooperation/intelligence sharing and economic and financial assistance and the relative inefficacy of diplomacy to deal with the threat of terrorism. Canadian elite seem also more disposed to regard multilateralism less as part of Canadian international identity and more as a policy tool that might work, and hence be useful, in some cases but not in others. For what concerns the budget, parliamentarians were much more likely to be satisfied with it and its distribution than were civil servants and security experts. This however might be primarily a reflection of the fact that Liberals, i.e. members of the governing party during the period under consideration were overrepresented in our sample.

Civil servants and parliamentarians were much less familiar with ESDP than were security experts. A majority of those who expressed an opinion, however, agreed with security experts that a more autonomous ESDP would weaken NATO and lead to a retrenchment of US commitment to European security, which a great majority of them thought was still essential or important. Interestingly, however, an absolute majority of both civil servants (59.5) and parliamentarians (55.5per cent) were either strongly in favour or in favour of the setting up of a continental security perimeter in North America. The overall split (55 per cent in favour and 45 per cent opposed) seems to reflect the division that exist also among the public at large on this issue. It is safe to conclude, however, that when it comes to security, Canadian elite are more likely to look south than across the Atlantic. These

finding taken together seem to suggest that although Canadian elite will continue to support NATO, they look at it more as an arena within which they can, together with the Europeans exercise some influence on the US than as a direct provider of security.

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*The 9/11 Commission Report* (2004) <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf>

**Table 2.1 Canadian ‘security culture’**

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<i>View of external environment</i>	Basic ‘liberal-internationalist’ view, i.e. belief that ‘multilateralism’ leads to a more orderly and peaceful world
<i>National identity</i>	Defined primarily in opposition to the US Perception of national role as helpful international mediator
<i>Instrumental preferences</i>	Integrated strategy: preference for civilian instruments and soft power (diplomacy, economic aid and development, promotion of human rights, and peacekeeping) but also use of armed forces (antiterrorism special operations, combat and peace support operations)
<i>Interaction preferences</i>	Devotion to multilateral institutions but much attention paid also to bilateral relations with the US given degree of economic dependence

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**Table 2.2 Canadian ‘official’ threat perceptions after 9/11**

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<i>Type of key threats</i>	Closure of US border as a result of a terrorist attack on the US Islamic terrorism Spread of weapons of mass destruction Conflicts spreading from regional ‘hot points’ Secessionists extorting funds from immigrant communities
<i>Agency of threats</i>	US anti-terrorism initiatives which slow down border crossing Activities of non-state actors i.e. terrorist and secessionist groups Failed states
<i>Target of threats</i>	Economic interests Civilian population, some immigrant communities in particular
<i>Geographical source of threats</i>	Regional ‘hot points’ International and domestic Islamic terrorist cells Domestic immigrant secessionist activists (e.g., Tamil)

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**Table 2.3 Mean Perceptions of Security Threats in 2006 and 2010**

	Civil Servant (n=46)	Parliamentarian (n=15)	Security Expert (n=28)	Overall (n=89)	Pearson Corr. 2006/ 2010
<i>Biological/chemical</i>	<b>3.15 (13)</b> 3.18 (11)	<b>2.33 (3)</b> 2.00 (1)	<b>4.44 (9)</b> 4.00 (7)	3.52(25) 3.42 (19)	.81***
<i>Conventional war</i>	3.00(1)		2.67(3) 3.25(4)	2.75 (4) 3.25 (4)	1.00***
<i>Criminalisation of economy</i>	3.17(12) 2.92(12)	3.25 (4) 2.67(3)	2.5 (6) 2.17(6)	3.00 (22) 2.67 (21)	.68***
<i>Cyber attack</i>	3.5(10) <b>2.73(11)</b>	3.5(2) <b>3.75(4)</b>	3.78(9) <b>3.91(11)</b>	3.62 (21) 3.38 (26)	.32
<i>Ethnic conflict</i>	4.14(7) 4.0(7)	2.33(3) 2.0(2)	4.0(7) 4.22(9)	3.76 (17) 3.89 (18)	.80***
<i>Macroeconomic instability</i>	2.91(11) 3.0(10)	3.5(4) 3.0(4)	2.33(12) 2.42(12)	2.74 (27) 2.73 (26)	.81***
<i>Man-made environmental</i>	2.7(27) 2.54(28)	2.14(7) 2.38(8)	2.73(22) 1.84(19)	2.64 (56) 2.27 (55)	.60***
<i>Migratory pressures</i>	<b>4.29(7)</b> 4.0(7)	<b>1.00(1)</b>	<b>4.00(4)</b> 3.33(6)	3.92 (12) 3.69 (13)	.38
<i>Narcotics trafficking</i>	3.19(16) 3.71(14)	3.29(7) 2.60(5)	4.25(8) 4.40(5)	3.48 (31) 3.63 (24)	.59**
<i>Natural disasters/pandemics</i>	2.33(36) 2.47(34)	3.50(8) 3.0(6)	2.64(22) 2.41(22)	2.58 (66) 2.50 (62)	.68***
<i>Nuclear/radiological</i>	3.38(8) <b>2.71(7)</b>	3.00(1) <b>3.00(1)</b>	4.25(4) <b>3.25(4)</b>	3.62 (13) 2.92 (12)	.80**
<i>Terrorism: critical infrastructure</i>	2.79(33) 2.86(28)	2.56(9) 1.80(5)	2.71(14) 3.55(11)	2.73 (56) 2.91 (44)	.64***
<i>Terrorism: state or society</i>	2.81(32) 3.15(26)	3.0(7) 3.33(3)	2.35(17) 2.79(14)	2.70 (56) 3.05 (43)	.70***

Notes: 2006 and 2010 means in first and second rows of each cell, respectively. Bold indicates inter-group differences are statistically significant at .05.

\*\*\*p < .001; \*\* p < .01

**Table 2.4a. Best Policy Instruments to Address Security Threats**

	Civil Servant column (n=46)	%	Parliamentarian column (n=15)	%	Security Expert column (n=28)	%	Overall column (n=89)	%
<b>Biological/chemical attacks</b>								
<i>Diplomatic</i>	10.9	(5)	0	(0)	14.3	(4)	10.1	(9)
<i>Economic/financial assistance<sup>a</sup></i>	4.3	(2)	6.7	(1)	7.1	(2)	5.6	(5)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing</i>	28.3	(13)	13.3	(2)	28.6	(8)	25.8	(23)
<i>Traditional military</i>	8.7	(4)	0	(0)	10.7	(3)	7.9	(7)
<i>Special operations</i>	10.6	(9)	6.7	(1)	14.3	(4)	15.7	(14)
<i>Other<sup>a</sup></i>	4.4	(2)	0	(0)	7.2	(2)	4.5	(4)
<b>Conventional war</b>								
<i>Diplomatic<sup>a</sup></i>	2.2	(1)	0	(0)	7.1	(2)	3.4	(3)
<i>Economic/financial assistance<sup>a</sup></i>	0	(0)	0	(0)	3.6	(1)	1.1	(1)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing<sup>a</sup></i>	0	(0)	0	(0)	3.6	(1)	0	(0)
<i>Traditional military<sup>a</sup></i>	2.2	(1)	0	(0)	0	(0)	1.1	(1)
<i>Special operations<sup>a</sup></i>	0	(0)	0	(0)	0	(0)	0	(0)
<i>Other<sup>a</sup></i>	0	(0)	0	(0)	0	(0)	0	(0)
<b>Nuclear/radiological attacks</b>								
<i>Diplomatic</i>	8.7	(4)	0	(0)	7.1	(2)	6.7	(6)
<i>Economic/financial assistance<sup>a</sup></i>	4.3	(2)	0	(0)	3.6	(1)	3.4	(3)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing</i>	15.2	(7)	0	(0)	14.3	(4)	12.4	(11)
<i>Traditional military<sup>a</sup></i>	6.5	(3)	0	(0)	3.6	(1)	4.5	(4)
<i>Special operations</i>	13	(6)	0	(0)	3.6	(1)	7.9	(7)
<i>Other<sup>a</sup></i>	4.4	(2)	6.7	(1)	3.6	(1)	4.5	(4)

<sup>a</sup> insufficient number of cases for significance test analysis

**Table 2.4b. Best Policy Instruments to Address Security Threats**

	<b>Civil Servant column % (n=46)</b>	<b>Parliamentarian column % (n=15)</b>	<b>Security expert column % (n=28)</b>	<b>Overall column % (n=89)</b>
<b>Criminalisation of economy</b>				
<i>Diplomatic</i>	6.5 (3)	0 (0)	10.7 (3)	6.7 (6)
<i>Economic/financial assistance</i>	6.5 (3)	6.7 (1)	10.7 (3)	7.9 (7)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing</i>	26.1 (12)	26.7 (4)	17.9 (5)	23.6 (21)
<i>Traditional military<sup>a</sup></i>	0 (0)	6.7 (1)	0 (0)	1.1 (1)
<i>Special operations<sup>a</sup></i>	8.7 (4)	6.7 (1)	0 (0)	5.6 (5)
<i>Other</i>	6.6 (3)	6.7 (1)	7.1 (2)	6.7 (6)
<b>Cyber Attack</b>				
<i>Diplomatic<sup>a</sup></i>	2.2 (1)	6.7 (1)	10.7 (3)	5.6 (5)
<i>Economic/financial assistance<sup>a</sup></i>	2.2 (1)	0 (0)	10.7 (3)	4.5 (4)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing</i>	21.7 (10)	0 (0)	28.6 (8)	20.2 (18)
<i>Traditional military<sup>a</sup></i>	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
<i>Special operations</i>	8.7 (4)	13.3 (2)	0 (0)	6.7 (6)
<i>Other<sup>a</sup></i>	0 (0)	0 (0)	14.3 (4)	4.5 (4)
<b>Narcotics Trafficking</b>				
<i>Diplomatic</i>	6.5 (3)	6.7 (1)	17.9 (5)	10.1 (9)
<i>Economic/financial assistance</i>	6.5 (3)	6.7 (1)	17.9 (5)	10.1 (9)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing</i>	34.8 (16)	33.3 (5)	25 (7)	31.5 (28)
<i>Traditional military<sup>a</sup></i>	2.2 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1.1 (1)
<i>Special operations</i>	10.9 (5)	13.3 (2)	3.6 (1)	9 (8)
<i>Other<sup>a</sup></i>	8.7 (4)	0 (0)	0 (0)	4.5 (4)

<sup>a</sup> insufficient number of cases for significance test analysis

**Table 2.4c. Best Policy Instruments to Address Security Threats**

	<b>Civil Servant column % (n=46)</b>	<b>Parliamentarian column % (n=15)</b>	<b>Security expert column % (n=28)</b>	<b>Overall column % (n=89)</b>
<b>Ethnic conflict</b>				
<i>Diplomatic</i>	4.3 (2)	6.7 (1)	14.3 (4)	7.9 (7)
<i>Economic/financial assistance</i>	6.5 (3)	13.3 (2)	17.9 (5)	11.2 (10)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing</i>	6.5 (3)	0 (0)	10.7 (3)	6.7 (6)
<i>Traditional military<sup>a</sup></i>	0 (0)	0 (0)	14.3 (4)	4.5 (4)
<i>Special operations</i>	8.7 (4)	0 (0)	10.7 (3)	7.9 (7)
<i>Other</i>	8.7 (4)	6.7 (1)	7.2 (2)	7.9 (7)
<b>Macroeconomic instability</b>				
<i>Diplomatic**</i>	10.9 (5)	6.7 (1)	35.7 (10)	18 (16)
<i>Economic/financial assistance</i>	19.6 (9)	26.7 (4)	39.3 (11)	27 (24)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing<sup>a</sup></i>	2.2 (1)	6.7 (1)	10.7 (3)	5.6 (5)
<i>Traditional military<sup>a</sup></i>	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
<i>Special operations<sup>a</sup></i>	0 (0)	6.7 (1)	0 (0)	1.1 (1)
<i>Other</i>	4.4 (2)	13.4 (2)	21.4 (6)	11.2 (10)
<b>Migratory pressures</b>				
<i>Diplomatic</i>	13 (6)	0 (0)	10.7 (3)	10.1 (9)
<i>Economic/financial assistance</i>	13 (6)	0 (0)	14.3 (4)	11.2 (10)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing<sup>a</sup></i>	4.3 (2)	0 (0)	10.7 (3)	4.5 (5)
<i>Traditional military<sup>a</sup></i>	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
<i>Special operations<sup>a</sup></i>	2.2 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1.1 (1)
<i>Other<sup>a</sup></i>	2.2 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1.1 (1)

<sup>a</sup>: insufficient number of cases for significance test analysis ; \*\* p < .01

**Table 2.4d. Best Policy Instruments to Address Security Threats**

	<b>Civil Servant column % (n=46)</b>	<b>Parliamentarian column % (n=15)</b>	<b>Security expert column % (n=28)</b>	<b>Overall column % (n=89)</b>
<b>Man-made environmental threats</b>				
<i>Diplomatic</i>	41.3 (19)	20 (3)	39.3 (11)	37.1 (33)
<i>Economic/financial assistance</i>	39.1 (18)	40 (6)	46.5 (13)	41.6 (37)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing</i>	6.5 (3)	0 (0)	10.7 (3)	6.7 (6)
<i>Traditional military<sup>a</sup></i>	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
<i>Special operations</i>	13 (6)	13.3 (2)	3.6 (1)	10.1 (9)
<i>Other**</i>	26.1 (12)	40 (6)	60.7 (17)	39.3 (35)
<b>Natural disasters/pandemics</b>				
<i>Diplomatic</i>	19.6 (9)	6.7 (1)	35.7 (10)	22.5 (20)
<i>Economic/financial assistance</i>	47.8 (22)	40 (6)	57.1 (16)	49.4 (44)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing</i>	17.4 (8)	6.7 (1)	28.6 (8)	19.1 (17)
<i>Traditional military</i>	6.5 (3)	6.7 (1)	3.6 (1)	5.6 (5)
<i>Special operations*</i>	26.1 (12)	0 (0)	7.1 (2)	15.7 (14)
<i>Other</i>	30.4 (14)	40 (6)	42.9 (12)	36 (32)
<b>Terrorist attacks:</b>				
<b>Critical infrastructure</b>				
<i>Diplomatic</i>	28.3 (13)	20 (3)	28.6 (8)	27 (24)
<i>Economic/financial assistance</i>	19.6 (9)	6.7 (1)	14.3 (4)	15.7 (14)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing</i>	71.7 (33)	53.3 (8)	50 (14)	61.8 (55)
<i>Traditional military</i>	21.7 (10)	20 (3)	21.4 (6)	21.3 (19)
<i>Special operations</i>	47.8 (22)	33.3 (5)	35.7 (10)	41.6 (37)
<i>Other<sup>a</sup></i>	8.7 (4)	0 (0)	3.6 (1)	5.6 (5)
<b>Terrorist attacks: state and society</b>				
<i>Diplomatic</i>	39.1 (18)	20 (3)	32.1 (9)	33.7 (30)
<i>Economic/financial assistance</i>	17.4 (8)	6.7 (1)	14.3 (4)	14.6 (13)
<i>Police cooperation/ intelligence sharing</i>	67.4 (31)	40 (6)	60.7 (17)	60.7 (54)
<i>Traditional military</i>	17.4 (8)	20 (3)	10.7 (3)	15.7 (14)
<i>Special operations</i>	45.7 (21)	26.7 (4)	42.9 (12)	41.6 (37)
<i>Other<sup>a</sup></i>	8.7 (4)	0 (0)	3.6 (1)	5.6 (5)

<sup>a</sup> insufficient number of cases for significance test analysis ; p \* < .05; \*\* p < .01

**Table 2.5a. Percent Naming States and Regions  
as Origins of Security Threats**

	<b>Civil Servant column % n=46</b>	<b>Parliamentarian column % N=15</b>	<b>Security Expert column % n=28</b>	<b>Overall column % n=89</b>
<i>Biological/chemical attack</i>	27.8 (10)	0 (0)	17.9 (5)	16.9 (15)
<i>Conventional war</i>	0 (0)	0 (0)	7.1 (2)	2.2 (2)
<i>Criminalisation of economy</i>	15.2 (7)	6.7 (1)	10.7 (3)	12.4 (11)
<i>Cyber attack</i>	8.7 (4)	0 (0)	17.9 (5)	10.1 (9)
<i>Ethnic conflict</i>	6.5 (3)	13.3 (2)	10.7 (3)	9 (8)
<i>Macroeconomic instability</i>	19.6 (9)	26.7 (4)	32.1 (9)	24.7 (22)
<i>Man-made environmental</i>	41.3 (19)	40 (6)	46.4 (13)	42.7 (38)
<i>Migratory pressures</i>	15.2 (7)	0 (0)	10.7 (3)	11.2 (10)
<i>Narcotics trafficking</i>	23.9 (11)	0 (0)	14.3 (4)	16.9 (15)
<i>Natural disaster/pandemics*</i>	50 (23)	13.3 (2)	46.4 (13)	42.7 (38)
<i>Nuclear/radiological attacks</i>	15.2 (7)	0 (0)	7.1 (2)	10.1 (9)
<i>Terrorism: crit. infrastructure</i>	37 (17)	20 (2)	32.1 (8)	30.3 (27)
<i>Terrorism: state or society</i>	43.5 (20)	13.3 (2)	28.6 (8)	33.7 (30)
<i>Other</i>	6.5 (3)	20 (3)	7.1 (2)	9 (8)

Note: p < .05



**Table 2.5b. Percent Naming Non-state Actors as Origins of Security Threats**

	<b>Civil Servant column % n=46</b>	<b>Parliamentarian column % n=15</b>	<b>Security Expert column % n=28</b>	<b>Overall column % n=89</b>
<i>Biological/chemical attack</i>	19.6 (9)	6.7 (1)	25 (7)	19.1 (17)
<i>Conventional war</i>	2.2 (1)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1.1 (1)
<i>Criminalisation of economy</i>	15.2 (11)	20 (3)	7.1 (2)	18 (16)
<i>Cyber attack</i>	17.4 (8)	6.7 (1)	25 (7)	18 (16)
<i>Ethnic conflict</i>	10.9 (5)	6.7 (1)	14.3 (4)	11.2 (10)
<i>Macroeconomic instability**</i>	2.2 (1)	20 (3)	25 (7)	12.4 (11)
<i>Man-made environmental</i>	39.1 (18)	33.3 (5)	57.1 (16)	43.8 (39)
<i>Migratory pressures</i>	13 (6)	0 (0)	10.7 (3)	10.1 (9)
<i>Narcotics trafficking</i>	21.7 (10)	20 (3)	25 (7)	22.5 (20)
<i>Natural disaster/pandemics</i>	28.2 (13)	26.7 (4)	39.3 (11)	31.5 (28)
<i>Nuclear/radiological Attacks</i>	13 (6)	0 (0)	3.6 (1)	7.9 (7)
<i>Terrorism: critical infrastructure**</i>	56.5 (26)	13.3 (2)	42.9 (12)	44.9 (40)
<i>Terrorism: state or society</i>	54.3 (25)	20 (3)	46.4 (13)	46.1 (41)
<i>Other</i>	2.2 (1)	20 (3)	10.7 (3)	7.9 (7)

Notes: p < .01

**Table 2.6. Mean Importance of the European Union**

	<b>Civil Servant</b>	<b>Parliamentarian</b>	<b>Security Expert</b>	<b>Overall</b>
<i>Biological/chemical attack</i>	2.67(1.40)	3.38 (1.54)	2.52(1.23)	2.74(1.39)
<i>Conventional war</i>	2.76(1.38)	2.71(1.80)	2.33(1.40)	2.62(1.45)
<i>Criminalisation of economy</i>	3.26(1.16)	3.58(.90)	3.12(1.31)	3.27(1.17)
<i>Cyber attack</i>	2.74(1.29)	3.31(1.23)	3.17(1.49)	2.96(1.35)
<i>Ethnic conflict</i>	2.94(1.39)	3.53(1.35)	3.04(1.43)	3.07(1.40)
<i>Macroeconomic instability</i>	3.48(1.02)	3.38(1.15)	3.90(1.30)	3.59(1.13)
<i>Man-made environmental</i>	2.16(1.13)	3.54(1.45)	3.52(1.30)	3.33(1.24)
<i>Migratory pressures</i>	3.33(1.07)	3.58(1.38)	3.52(1.18)	3.43(1.15)
<i>Narcotics trafficking</i>	3.03(1.32)	3.73(1.27)	3.29(1.16)	3.23(1.28)
<i>Natural disaster/pandemics</i>	2.86(1.23)	3.11(1.66)	3.12(1.21)	2.98(1.30)
<i>Nuclear/radiological attacks</i>	2.72(1.45)	2.96(1.51)	2.46(1.29)	2.68(1.41)
<i>Terrorism: critical infrastructure**</i>	3.02(1.41)	3.67(1.37)	2.35(1.41)	2.92(1.45)
<i>Terrorism: state or society**</i>	3.08(1.40)	3.58(1.62)	2.40(1.38)	2.95(1.47)
<i>Base n (varies by question)</i>	42-44	12-13	24	79-81

Notes: \*\* Inter-group differences significant at .05; standard deviations in parentheses

**Table 2.7. Special budgetary allocations for security related functions, 2001-2005 (C\$ billion)**

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
<b>Military</b>			0.27	0.8	12.8 (over 5 years)
<b>Peacekeeping</b>				0.3	
<b>Security (of which)</b>	7.7 (over 5 years)			0.6	
<i>Border initiatives</i>	1.3				
<i>Intelligence and policing</i>	1.6				
<i>Screening of entrants</i>	1.0				
<i>Emergency preparedness</i>	1.6				
<i>Air security</i>	2.2				
<i>Coast Guard</i>			0.95 (over 2 years)		
<b>Other allocations</b>					
<i>Trade promotion (in US)</i>			0.11		
<i>International assistance</i>			1.4		3.4 (over 5 years)
<i>Peace/security initiatives</i>					0.5
<i>Diplomatic representation</i>					0.042 (over 5 years)
<i>Embassies security</i>					0.059

Sources: Compiled from data in <http://www.fin.gc.ca/access/budinfoe.html#year>

**Table 2.8. Canadian Military Expenditures 1990 and 2000-2005**

	1990	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
<i>C\$ (billion)</i>	13.4	12.3	13.1	13.3	14.1	14.9	15.5

Source: [http://www.nato.int/issues/defence\\_expenditures/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/defence_expenditures/index.html)

**Table 2.9. Distribution of Budgetary and Manpower Resources**

	Civil column % (n=46)	Servant column %	Parliamentarian column % (n=15)	Security column % (n=28)	Expert	Overall column % (n=89)
<i>Aligned</i>	28.3 (13)		60(9)	32.1(9)		34.8 (31)
<i>Misaligned</i>	71.7 (33)		40(6)	67.9(19)		65.3 (58)

Note: Cramer's V = .24, insig.

**Table 2.10. Evaluations of National Defence Budget and Military Modernisation**

	Civil Servant column % (n)	Parliamentarian Column % (n)	Security Expert column % (n)	Overall column % (n)
<b>Size of budget</b>				
<i>Too large</i>	4.3(2)	21.4(3)	7.4(2)	8 (2)
<i>Just about right</i>	41.3(19)	59(7)	33.3(9)	40.2 (35)
<i>Too little</i>	54.3(25)	28.6(4)	59.3(16)	51.7 (45)
Cramer's V=.19, insig.				
<b>Distribution of defence budget meets needs?</b>				
<i>Yes</i>	33.3(15)	53.8(7)	18.5(5)	31.8 (27)
<i>No</i>	66.7(30)	46.2(6)	81.5(22)	68.2 (58)
Cramer's V=.24, insig.				
<b>Sufficient funds to military modernisation?<sup>a</sup></b>				
<i>Too much</i>	2.2 (1)	14.3 (2)	7.4 (2)	5.8 (5)
<i>Just about right</i>	44.4 (20)	57.1 (8)	25.9 (7)	40.7 (35)
<i>Too little</i>	53.3 (24)	28.6 (4)	66.7 (18)	53.5 (46)

<sup>a</sup> Insufficient number of cases for significance test analysis

**Table 2.11. Satisfaction with Distribution of Defence Budget Spending**

	<b>Civil Servant column % (n)</b>	<b>Parliamentarian column % (n)</b>	<b>Security Expert column % (n)</b>	<b>Overall column % (n)</b>
<b>Personnel<sup>a</sup></b>				
<i>Too much</i>	6.3(2)	11.1(1)	4.5(1)	6.3 (4)
<i>Just about right</i>	34.4(11)	22.2(2)	18.2(4)	27 (17)
<i>Too little</i>	59.4(19)	66.7(6)	77.3(17)	66.7 (42)
<b>Procurement</b>				
<i>Too much</i>	21.9(7)	33.3(3)	13.6(3)	20.6 (13)
<i>Just about right</i>	12.5(4)	33.3(3)	13.6(3)	15.9 (10)
<i>Too little</i>	65.6(21)	33.3(3)	72.7(16)	63.5 (40)
Cramer's V=.19, insig.				
<b>Research and Development<sup>a</sup></b>				
<i>Too much</i>	0(0)	0(0)	5(1)	1.7 (1)
<i>Just about right</i>	20(6)	44.4(4)	15(3)	22 (13)
<i>Too little</i>	80(24)	55.6(5)	80(16)	76.3 (45)

<sup>a</sup> Insufficient number of cases for significance test analysis

**Table 2.12. Perceptions of ESDP and US Commitment to European Security**

	Civil Servant column % (n)	Parliamentarian column % (n)	Security Expert column % (n)	Overall column % (n)
<b>More autonomous ESDP weaken NATO?</b>				
<i>Little/ not at all (write-in)</i>	14.3 (6)	14.3 (2)	29.6 (8)	19.3 (16)
<i>Some/very much</i>	40.5 (17)	28.6 (4)	55.6 (15)	43.4 (36)
<i>Don't know</i>	45.2 (19)	57.1 (8)	14.8 (4)	37.3 (31)
Cramer's V=.24, p < .05				
<b>Weaker NATO leads to retrenchment of US commitment to European security?</b>				
<i>Yes</i>	32.6 (15)	28.6 (4)	32.1 (9)	31.8 (28)
<i>Maybe</i>	37 (17)	21.4 (3)	42.9 (12)	36.4 (32)
<i>No</i>	15.2 (7)	28.6 (4)	21.4 (6)	19.3 (17)
<i>Don't know</i>	15.2 (7)	21.4 (3)	3.6 (1)	12.5 (11)
Cramer's V=.17, insig.				
<b>American commitment to European security...?</b>				
<i>Essential/very important</i>	43.5 (20)	33.3 (5)	44.4 (12)	42 (37)
<i>Important</i>	34.8 (16)	46.7 (7)	37 (10)	37.5 (33)
<i>Inessential/not very important</i>	21.7 (10)	20 (3)	18.5 (5)	20.5 (18)
Cramer's V=.07, insig.				

**Table 2.13. Mean Evaluations of Canada's Interstate Interactions and Security Conceptions**

	Civil Servant	Parliamentarian	Security Expert	Overall
<i>Interstate Interaction</i>				
Mean (s.d.)	7.6 (1.36)	7.21 (2.14)	7.54 (1.43)	7.54 (1.49)
Minimum/Maximum	2.5/10	3.5/10	3/10	2.5/10
N=	46	12	28	86
F-score=.375, insig.				
<i>Security Conceptions</i>				
Mean (s.d.)	6.5(1.82)	6.69 (2.32)	6.71 (2.14)	6.60 (1.99)
Minimum/Maximum	1.5/9.5	3/10	1.5/9.5	1.5/10
N=	46	13	28	87
F-score=.116, insig.				

Notes: standard deviation (s.d.) in parentheses

**Table 2.14. Opinions about the Continental Security Perimeter**

	Civil Servant column % (n)	Parliamentarian column % (n)	Security Expert column % (n)	Overall column % (n)
<i>Strongly in favour</i>	11.9 (5)	11.1 (1)	6.3 (1)	10.4 (7)
<i>In favour</i>	47.6 (20)	44.4 (4)	37.5 (6)	44.8 (30)
<i>Opposed</i>	23.8 (10)	22.2 (2)	37.5 (6)	26.9 (18)
<i>Strongly opposed</i>	16.7 (7)	22.2 (2)	18.8 (3)	17.9 (12)
Cramer's V=.11, insig.				

**Table 2.15: Completed Sample Descriptives, percentage**

	Civil Servants	MPs and Senators	Security Experts
<i>Response rate</i>	3.2	6.2	31.2
<i>Average age/yrs.</i>	46.1	62.6	48.2
<i>Males</i>	65.2	53.3	64.3
<i>Females</i>	19.6	26.7	17.9
<i>Unknown</i>	15.2	20	17.9
<i>Party affiliation:</i>	Not applicable		Not applicable
<i>Conservative</i>		13.3	
<i>Liberal</i>		53.3	
<i>NDP</i>		6.7	
<i>Bloc</i>		0	
<i>Unknown</i>		26.7	
<i>Urban constituency</i>	Not applicable	40	Not applicable
<i>Rural constituency</i>		13.3	
<i>Unknown</i>		46.7	

**Table 2.16: Study Population Descriptives, percentage**

	Civil Servants	MPs and Senators*	Security Experts
<i>Average age/yrs.</i>	All public service: 44 yrs Executive category: 50 yrs.	55 years	Unknown
<i>Males</i>	Executive: 62.8 Administration and Foreign Service: 39.7	76	83.6
<i>Females</i>	Executive: 37.2 Administration and Foreign Service: 60.3	24	16.4
<i>Political Party:</i>	Not applicable		Not applicable
<i>Conservative</i>		36.6	
<i>Liberal</i>		39.7	
<i>Bloc</i>		12.3	
<i>NDP</i>		7.3	
<i>Independent</i>		1.4	
<i>Senate vacancies</i>		2.7	
<i>Urban</i>	Not applicable		Not applicable
<i>Rural</i>			
<i>Unknown</i>			

Sources: Parliament of Canada, 2006; Public Service Human Resources Management Agency, 2006; \*Age (weighted) and party affiliation data based on all members of the House of Commons and Senate.





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# National Threat Perception: Survey Results from China

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## **ABSTRACT**

On the basis of 25 face to face interviews with Chinese parliamentarians, civil servants and security experts, the paper shows that China's security elite has fairly homogenous security perceptions, with a slight tendency for the civil servants to view security in more traditional terms. According to the respondents, China is a major source of non-traditional security threats due to the difficulties of the Chinese government in managing the environmental, economic and socio-political security threats emanating from China's transition from a planned to a market economy. At the same time, conventional war continues to loom large on China's security horizon because of threats from the United States, Japan and Taiwan. The double-sided security perceptions are reflected in the instrumental preferences of China's security elites, which is a mixture of international cooperation and military means. The interaction patterns dominating China's international interaction involve a large measure of multilateralism and soft power while reserving the right to resort to unilateralism and hard power. The paper concludes that Chinese security perceptions are based on China's experience that international security cooperation is to be conducted with reservations due to the continued relevance of conventional war threats, armed force and hard power in Asia.

## **I. SURVEY INFORMATION**

This paper presents the findings collected in a survey conducted in the People's Republic of China as part of the GARNET project. The survey was conducted between 14 and 20 October 2006 with assistance from Renmin University as well as other people who are part of Beijing's security community. Out of 26 respondents approached, 25 agreed to do the interview, and one, a parliamentarian, did not complete the questionnaire. The survey targeted three groups of the Chinese security community: 4 parliamentarians, 13 civil servants and 8 security experts. All 25 respondents have been interviewed in person by the author, who in each case brought a hardcopy of the questionnaire, asking the respondents to answer the prepared questions and to clarify and elaborate on their responses whenever needed. In most cases, the interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. This method has been chosen because the Chinese government does not allow foreigners to carry out online surveys. Some respondents preferred to fill out the questionnaire themselves, whereas in other cases the author asked the questions. The conditions for answering the questions have hence varied with the circumstances, such as the time allowed by the respondents and the

security precautions requested by respondents. Compared to a survey where all respondents fill out questionnaires on their own, the data obtained are less precise and therefore less reliable as a basis for quantitative analysis, but more precise in terms of the meaning of the answers and therefore more reliable as a basis for qualitative analysis. Despite these characteristics of the survey results, this paper presents a quantitative as well as a qualitative analysis of the data, hoping that the reader will bear in mind the caveats mentioned.

An additional caveat must be mentioned with regard to the categorization of respondents. In China, parliamentarians, civil servants and security experts are not easily distinguishable groups. Therefore, most respondents fit into at least two categories. If asking the respondents to categorize themselves, they often choose the more prestigious category or the category that most likely ensures that they will not be met with sanctions from the Chinese government, rather than the category that most adequately describes their position. As a consequence, I have categorized the respondents on the basis of information regarding their work profile and their institutional attachments. The category of parliamentarians is problematic in a Chinese context because the political system is not a parliamentary democracy, which means that although being a parliamentarian is prestigious, the position in itself does not necessarily allow for much influence on decision-making. The National People's Congress (NPC) is China's parliament. However, since initiative in framing policies belongs to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the NPC is usually regarded as a rubber stamp for the CCP (Mackerras *et al.*, 1998: 159-60). In addition, NPC members are not easily accessible because for the most part, they are people in high positions in society. Instead, the interviewees targeted in this survey are considered low-level parliamentarians in a Chinese context. Hence, all four are ordinary members of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), two are members of the standing committee at the national level, and two are members of the standing committee at the municipal level in Beijing. The CPPCC consists of a national conference with authority delegated to a standing committee consisting of a chairman, numerous vice-chairmen and ordinary members. This structure is replicated at the provincial, municipal and county levels. The CPPCC is led and controlled by the CCP, functioning as a platform for legitimacy and influence among leading non-communist parties and non-aligned intellectuals as well as a transmission belt for conveying CCP principles and policies to these same groups. However, in practice many CPPCC members are also members of the CCP (Mackerras *et al.*, 1998: 69-70). Thus, three of the four parliamentarians interviewed are CCP members. The fourth parliamentarian interviewed is a member of the Kuo Min Tang for Revolutionary Commission.

Distinguishing between civil servants and security experts poses its own problems in those cases where the interviewee works for a government think tank. Eight interviewees could be categorized as both. These people have been categorized according to whether their institution is conducting independent research or is controlled by the Chinese government. The remainder of interviewees were either university scholars, in which case they have been categorized as security experts, or civil servants working for ministries or institutions affiliated to ministries, in which case they have been categorized as civil servants.

Two of the parliamentarians were male, while two were female. Eleven of the civil servants were male, while two were female. Six of the security experts were male, while two were female. Their ages range from 28 to 65, with thirteen people below the age of 40 and twelve people above the age of 40. The above information is as much as can be disclosed due to the safety precautions requested by the majority of respondents in view of the sensitivity of security issues.

## **II. THREAT PERCEPTION**

Table 3.1 shows the frequency with which specific types of threats were chosen as well as the reversed average rating (RAR), which shows the score of different types of threats. The table shows that the five threats with the highest average score are, in descending order, energy, criminalization of the economy, conventional war, man-made environmental threats, and macroeconomic instability. Table 3.2 lists the five threats with the highest frequency by respondents. In descending order, they are man-made environmental threats, macroeconomic instability, natural disasters and pandemics, criminalization of the economy and conventional war. The MPs have given the highest score to man-made environmental threats and natural disasters and pandemics, the civil servants have listed man-made environmental threats with the highest frequency, and the security experts have given the highest score to criminalization of the economy. Table 3.3 lists the five threats with the highest frequency for the year 2010. Five years ahead, man-made environmental threats remain the threat that appear with the highest frequency, while conventional war is the second-most mentioned threat due to the higher frequency of this security threat among the group of security experts. This is followed by threats identified with the criminalization of the economy, natural disasters and pandemics, and macroeconomic instability. Except for the group of civil servants, who have prioritized man-made environmental threats and conventional war the highest, the respondents have prioritized the threats equally for 2010. The threats prioritized in 2010 are hence the same as those prioritized in 2006, although in a different order. Table 3.4 focuses

on the traditional threats of nuclear and radiological attacks, biological and chemical attacks, and conventional war and shows that conventional war still looms large on the horizon of Chinese threat perceptions, whereas the two other types of traditional threats are insignificant.

Environmental concerns also appear to be high on the list of security threats among Chinese security elites. This threat perception reflects the fact that China's surging economic activity levels have not been met by corresponding measures to tackle the environmental hazards accompanying economic development. Problems such as growing pollution and low air quality are therefore seen to lead to growing health problems in the general public and to contribute to global problems such as global warming.

Macroeconomic instability also figures high on the agenda of Chinese security elites, predominantly due to the possibility of macroeconomic instability. China is comfortable with the globalization process, as witnessed by annual growth rates of 7 to 8 per cent and its status as the second largest economy in the world after the United States measured on a purchasing power parity basis. The top priority for the Chinese is to fulfil the aspirations of the Chinese population for expanding economic opportunities and improved living standards. The uprising of the Argentine population following the economic crisis in 2000 has not gone unnoticed. A similar scenario is considered possible in China if the government fails to deliver on the promises of rising living standards as reward for economic entrepreneurship and does not address growing concerns about the asymmetric distribution of wealth. The possibility of economic dissatisfaction in the poor segments of the Chinese population implies that the Chinese government's most immediate security concern is to sustain economic development and prevent macroeconomic instability.

Natural disasters and pandemics as well as criminalization of the economy are also considered grave security threats. According to some of the qualitative answers, these are considered global problems rather than a China-specific problem. However, other people point to the need to look at domestic decision-making structures and call for increased transparency in the sector of China's government that deals with such issues, e.g., to prevent infectious diseases such as SARS from getting out of hand in future. It should be noted that the high frequency of the threat of criminalization of the economy is likely to have been affected by the fact that when the interviews were conducted, this threat was high on the Chinese news agenda due to the ousting from power of the Shanghai Communist Party Chief and Politbureau member Chen Liangyu, who was placed under house arrest in October 2006 on charges of being involved in a US\$404 million social security fund corruption case.

Finally, the threat of conventional war ranks high among the security threats that are considered to face China. The threat of conventional war is considered to be rising over time. This is not surprising considering ongoing US containment of China, the continuous threat of violent conflict in the Taiwan Strait due to the pending sovereignty dispute over the island, the longstanding adversarial relations between mainland China and Japan, and the unresolved 2002 US-Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear standoff on the Korean peninsula. Traditional security threats thus loom large in the Chinese mindset due to the large number of unresolved strategic issues in Asia in general and in Northeast Asia in particular.

### **III. POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND RESPONSE**

Figure 3.1 shows that the instruments of diplomacy and economic and financial assistance are seen as the most useful methods for addressing the security threats faced by China. Figure 3.2 shows no significant differences between the policy instruments prioritized by MPs, civil servants and security experts except for a slight tendency among security experts to prioritize police cooperation and intelligence sharing higher than the other two groups, possibly because criminalization of the economy is considered a more serious security threat by Chinese security experts than by MPs and civil servants.

Figure 3.3 and 3.4 shows that diplomacy and economic and financial assistance are considered useful to meet all the most serious security threats facing China. Economic and financial assistance and police cooperation and intelligence sharing are considered more useful for fighting criminalization of the economy, arguably due to the character of the threat, whereas military instruments as well as diplomacy are seen as useful for preventing the occurrence of conventional war. This is partly due to the character of the threat, but it also demonstrates little faith in the spill-over effect from economic cooperation to politico-strategic relations.

The following lists all categories of participants' specification of their understanding of what 'other' means should be considered to increase the effectiveness of the relevant policies:

- Economic, tax and political reform
- Anti-corruption policies
- Education
- Changed governmental priorities
- Good governance

- Social policy
- Natural resource exploration
- Institutional cooperation
- Cyber regulation
- Governmental disaster alert
- Change in governmental development strategies

The instruments listed in the category ‘other’ reflect the perception of China’s security elite that the political priorities of the Chinese government are unsatisfactory, the call for increased focus on the establishment of a social welfare system and protective measures to address the growing environmental problems, the tendency among government officials to use enhanced economic freedom to enrich themselves, and the growing gap in living standards between well-off and poor segments of society.

The faith in the usefulness of diplomatic instruments to meet traditional as well as non-traditional security threats is, not surprisingly, reflected in the policy priorities of the Chinese government. China increasingly focuses on forging compromises with states that are at least partially supportive of Chinese demands for the preservation of the fundamental principles of the Cold War UN system: respect for the absolute sovereignty of states, recognition of states and governments on the basis of control with a delimited territory and its people, and the authority of the UN Security Council for the management of global security. Beijing’s advocacy of the Cold War UN system is presented as an attempt to pursue a democratization of international politics, allowing all powers – dominant, great, medium and small – a say on security issues on an equal basis, rather than a strategy with the purpose of furthering a Sino-centric order. China’s use of diplomacy is conducive to a diversity of political systems that insulates regional states from US demands for basing their national security solely on the US alliance system, a system for which China has no alternative. China’s use of diplomacy serves to sustain an order that allows for the continuation of communist party rule and as such, it is a fundamental feature of contemporary Chinese foreign policy that can be used to address all kinds of security threats. A firm faith hence prevails in the usefulness of multilateralism and international cooperation to solve major economic, environmental, strategic and social problems.

Economic and financial assistance is, perhaps not surprisingly, seen as an important policy instrument to counter economic, health-related, energy-related and environmental threats. Economic and financial assistance is considered necessary to begin the establishment

of a welfare system to help defeat the growing problems of social inequality and to set aside resources for environmental problems and improvements in living standards, presumably the most effective preventive measure against health problems. Finally, economic and financial assistance is useful for addressing China's energy problems, which are rooted in inefficiency concerning the use of energy resources, predominantly coal, more than in insufficient access to energy resources. Similarly obvious, police cooperation and intelligence sharing is considered essential to fight criminalization of the economy since such problems manifest themselves as breaches of domestic law.

Traditional military means are not considered particularly useful instruments to counter the threat of conventional war; however, this point of view does not mean that a strong national defence is not commendable, as indicated by the general agreement that more resources should be spent on military defence modernization. Instead, military force is seen as a means of last resort to be used if all other options have been attempted to no avail.

#### **IV. ORIGINS OF THREAT**

Figure 3.5 shows that states and regions, non-state actors and inner-Chinese actors are considered roughly equal sources of security threats by MPs as well as civil servants and security experts. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 shows that states and regions are particularly important sources of threats of conventional war. Figure 3.10 shows that ethnic conflict and migratory pressures mainly origin from non-state actors. Figures 3.6 and 3.8 shows that domestic Chinese sources of threats are particularly pertinent with regard to the criminalization of the economy. The main cause of socio-political instability is also domestic Chinese sources, as can be seen from Figure 3.6. Figure 3.9 shows that environmental threats originate from domestic sources, according to all three groups of security personnel; mainly from non-state actors, according to the MPs and civil servants; and mainly from states and regions, according to the civil servants. This, as well as prior results in this survey, indicates that the civil servants think in more conventional traditional terms about security than the MPs and the security experts. Figure 3.10 shows that macroeconomic instability predominantly originates from domestic Chinese sources. States and regions are considered equally important sources of macroeconomic instability according to the civil servants and security experts. Figure 3.11 shows that natural disasters and pandemics originate from states and regions as well as non-state and inner-Chinese actors. The MPs, however, do not consider states and regions to be sources of this type of threat. Table 3.5 specifies in detail the type of states and regions, non-state actors and domestic Chinese factors that give rise to different



types of threats. The table shows that Asian states, areas and regions as well as the US are major sources of threats of conventional war. A host of transnational and domestic non-state actors are pointed to as sources of environmental, economic, social and ethnic threats. China's transition from planned to market economy is an important domestic source of environmental, economic and socio-political security threats.

China's immediate Northeast Asian neighbourhood hosts Taiwan and Japan, both of which are considered willing to use force against the Chinese mainland, should relations with them deteriorate further. Relations between mainland China and Taiwan continue to be marred by mainland China's uncompromising attitude as regards the 'one China' principle and mainland China's sovereignty over Taiwan. Chinese security elites consider the secessionist activities of the so-called 'Taiwan independence' forces to be a grave threat to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Beijing has made it clear that it is unwilling to compromise on the Taiwan issue with the adoption of the anti-secession law of 14 March 2005, which legitimizes the use of non-peaceful means to stop any incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China. The Taiwan issue hence brings the possibility of conventional war to the forefront of Chinese security perceptions.

Japan is similarly seen as a security threat that might give rise to conventional war. Japanese foreign policy is perceived by Chinese security elites as based solely on the pursuit of Japanese national interests, ignoring the common interest in maintaining peace and stability. China is concerned that the gradual relaxation of the constitutional and treaty-based constraints on Japan's Self-Defence Forces will lead to a remilitarization of Japan and a revival in Japanese aspirations for regional dominance that led Japan to pursue a policy of territorial imperialism by military means in Asia in the first half of the twentieth century. China's security elites perceive Japanese prime ministers' repeated visits to the Yasukuni Shrine memorial for Japanese war dead since 1868 as a display of reverence for Japan's militaristic past indicating that this tradition can easily be resurrected, particularly since US calls for a greater Japanese security role in the Asia-Pacific might unintentionally support such a development.

In addition, the 2002 US-DPRK nuclear standoff is also perceived as a conflict that might engender conventional war, principally due to the US unwillingness to compromise on the issue of immediate denuclearization of North Korea's nuclear weapons programme and because of Pyongyang's missile tests that are considered provocative acts allowing the United States and Japan to justify the adoption of increasingly heavy-handed measures in the form of sanctions and a military build-up enabling Japan and US troops stationed in Japan to defend

themselves against a North Korean attack. The impending conflict on the Korean peninsula hence indirectly risks enhancing the Japanese threat against the Chinese mainland.

The US alliance system links Asia together strategically, enabling Taiwan and Japan to sustain the threat of conventional war against China. In addition, the confrontation approach of the US during the US-DPRK nuclear standoff is seen as a main source of the threat of conventional war on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, a large number of respondents from all categories see the US as a main source of the threat of conventional war.

The most interesting observation with regard to sources of threats is probably that China itself stands out as a source of security threats in the environmental, economic and socio-political sectors. In part, this probably reflects the fact that China is a big country that is not easily managed, especially in remote areas such as the north-western part. China is also still a state in economic transition that is struggling with development problems and as such, it is a source of environmental hazards, natural disasters, pandemics, corruption and other economic problems.

Despite surging economic growth rates, estimated at 9.1 per cent of GDP in 2004 (CIA, 2005), China's GDP was US\$ 1,650 billion in 2004 (US Census Bureau, 2004; Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, 25 January 2005), which is only a fraction of the US GDP at US\$ 11,734 billion (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 28 October 2005). China is hence still a country struggling with poverty. China's trade only accounts for 4 per cent of the world's total, and China's commodities production only accounts for 9 per cent of the world's total. Approximately half of China's labour force is working in the agricultural sector (Royal Danish Embassy, 17 November 2005). Hence, China only qualifies as a great power by the skin of its teeth; indeed, its claim to great power status is mainly justified by expectations of becoming a global economic power due to high economic growth rates sustained for more than two decades. This fragile position is also reflected in the area of credit. China's current account balance was US\$ 68,659 million, confirming that China is an exporting state that heavily penetrates foreign markets to earn foreign currency (The World Bank, 9 August 2005). In 2005, Washington pushed for a revaluation of the Chinese currency, the renminbi, to curb China's economic growth. China complied, revaluing the renminbi by 2.1 per cent. Although this was far less than the 27.5 per cent adjustment called for by several US senators, the incident indicates the vast differences in credit power between the US and China (Roach, 25 July 2005). The fact that China has not yet adopted a financial regime of currency flexibility indicates that, in terms of credit, China is a vulnerable state, whose economy can easily be adversely affected by fluctuating

exchange rates. The US is not immune to Chinese currency revaluations since these could lead to devaluations of the US dollar and rising interest rates. However, the risks for the Chinese economy are much greater than the risk run by the United States.

China's continuous economic problems give rise to the perception that it is increasingly urgent to establish a social welfare system that ameliorates the growing social dissatisfaction stemming from relative deprivation and persisting problems of poverty among large segments of the population. China also experiences increasing environmental problems and natural disasters as a consequence of its surging industrial growth. For example, steadily growing electricity needs have prompted the Chinese government to build hydro-electric dams on the Yangtze and Mekong rivers. These projects have caused floods, a loss of aquatic biodiversity, of fisheries, and of the services of downstream floodplains in China as well as in neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, secure energy supplies are the first priority of the Chinese government because insufficient power resources may stall economic growth (Butler, 19 January 2004). China is therefore likely to continue to pose security problems for itself internally and externally, especially in the economic, environmental and socio-political sectors.

## **V. EU IMPORTANCE**

The information about Chinese views on the EU's importance for security threats should be read with some caution. The first thing to note about the responses on these issues is that the majority of Chinese working in the security field are not focusing on European security, implying that their views are not based on thorough considerations and analyses. The question on the EU's importance posed particular problems, first, in distinguishing between the EU's importance for countering different types of threats. Second, there was a tendency among the respondents to think in terms of the EU's importance for countering Chinese security threats rather than European security threats. Third, the responses tend to be coloured by the respondents' estimate of the relative importance of various security threats. For example, the majority of Chinese respondents do not consider Europe to be threatened by conventional war, and they discount the EU's importance for countering military threats to European security on that basis rather than the EU's capacity in that area *per se*. Bearing in mind these qualifications of the reliability of the responses, Figure 3.12 indicates that Chinese security personnel have considerable faith in the EU's importance for European security. This is less pronounced with respect to so-called traditional security threats such as biological and chemical attacks, conventional war and nuclear and radiological attacks, and more

pronounced with respect to non-traditional and non-military security threats such as criminalization of the economy, macroeconomic instability, cyber attacks, ethnic conflict, environmental threats, migratory pressures, narcotics trafficking, natural disasters and pandemics, and terrorist attacks. Civil servants tend to be a little less confident in the EU's importance for addressing non-traditional and non-military security threats than the MPs and the security experts.

## **VI. BUDGETARY RESOURCES AND MANPOWER**

When assessing the survey results concerning the questions on budgetary alignment, the national defence budget, distribution of resources, manpower, equipment and research and development, and military modernization funds, it must be remembered that China does not have a defence budget comparable to those we find in countries such as the United States, but rather a brief defence plan that reveals little about government spending on defence and the distribution of resources within the budget. The respondents in the survey are thus likely to know very little about the actual extent and content of Chinese defence spending.

Fifty-nine per cent of the respondents (75 per cent of MPs, 50 per cent of civil servants, and 38 per cent of security experts) insist that the government's budgetary resources and manpower are misaligned with the threats facing the country. Most likely, these figures reflect the fact that a modest majority of the respondents is of the opinion that too few resources are allocated to meet non-traditional security threats in the environmental, economic and socio-political sectors.

Figure 3.13 shows that the majority of respondents believe that China spends too little or just about enough on national defence to meet the security threats facing China. According to the majority of respondents, too many or just about enough resources are spent on personnel, whereas spending on weapons procurement is just about right or too little according to the majority of respondents. Spending on research and development is too little according to the majority of respondents. In general, the majority of respondents believe that too few resources are allocated for purposes of military modernization.

The survey results reflect the fact that, according to China's security elites, additional resources are needed in the area of national defence, in particular for the purposes of military modernization so as to ensure that China is adequately prepared for conventional war. Furthermore, there is room for improvement with regard to the distribution of budgetary resources within the defence budget since too much is spent on personnel. By contrast,

insufficient funds are allocated for the purpose of weapons procurement and especially for purposes of research and development.

The views of China's security elite on the allocation of resources for China's national defence reflect the fact that, although Beijing's military capabilities are considerable, they do not match those of the US by any standards. Since Taiwan's and Japan's defence is based to a large extent on US defence technology, which is much more advanced than that of China, military modernization on the basis of so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is considered urgent. The RMA, which became a central element in the objectives of US defence strategy from the late 1990s, involve the use of technologically advanced systems and concepts such as stealth aircraft, precision-guided munitions, standoff robotic weapons and advanced sensors, allowing US military forces to perform at levels of effectiveness many times greater than forces equipped with previous generation equipment such as those of China (IISS, 2005a: 19-37).

Beijing's military capabilities include a nuclear capability weaker than that of the United States and Russia, including approximately 30 intercontinental ballistic missiles and approximately 110 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, as well as a certain space capacity. In 2003, China became the third country after the US and Russia to achieve a manned space mission. Furthermore, China pursues advanced defensive and power projection capabilities. China's defence modernization priorities include reforms driven by the American-led Revolution in Military Affairs, having fewer but better troops, and stepping up its military force posture across the Taiwan Strait. China's defence budget is estimated to be surpassed only by US defence budgets (IISS, 2005b: 270). Substantial amounts of the People's Liberation Army's budget allocated to the procurement of weaponry are used to buy arms and defence-related technology from Russia. By 2004, China was expected to have received fighter aircraft, amphibious assault ships, fast-attack aircraft, missile destroyers and submarines (IISS, 2005b: 260). China also spends heavily on military communication satellites. So far, China's military pretensions depend on access to Russian arms and know-how, but its military modernization programme aims consciously at decreasing its dependency on external sources of military arms and technology (IISS, 2004: 161-2, 170-1). China uses considerable resources on transforming its armed forces from self-sufficiency in manpower to self-sufficiency in military technology to be able to adopt swift and flexible defence responses to security threats. In terms of manpower, China ranks number one in the world, commanding 2,255,000 active troops (IISS, 2005b: 270). However, due to the Revolution in Military Affairs, manpower is not very significant to the military capacity of

states nowadays. Beijing's political-strategic reach encompasses Northeast, Southeast, Central and South Asia; in contrast Moscow's reach does not go beyond Central Asia. However, its dependency on Russian arms deliveries leaves China at approximately the level of Russia's military technology and defence. Its arduous efforts to catch up with the Revolution in Military Affairs, however, reveal that China is far from the level of military power commanded by the US.

## **VII. ESDP/NATO/US**

The part of the survey focusing on European security and the role of the US in maintaining European security should be read with some caution since Chinese working in the security field are often not focusing on European security, implying that their answers are not based on detailed knowledge of the field.

The first thing to note about the responses on these issues is that with the exception of the MPs, who expect that a more autonomous European security and defence policy could weaken NATO further, Chinese security personnel have diverse views on this question, as can be seen from Figure 3.14. More than anything, this is probably due to the fact that a more autonomous European security and defence policy is on the distant horizon and its form or implications cannot be easily judged at this stage. Similarly, with the exception of the MPs, who do not believe that a weaker NATO will lead to a retrenchment of the American commitment to European security, Figure 3.15 shows a diversity of opinion on this issue. Finally, Figure 3.16 shows a diversity of views on the issue of the importance of the American commitment for European security, with a slight tendency for security experts to consider it more important than civil servants. These results may reflect that the EU is considered well-equipped to manage the security problems that Europe is facing compared to NATO, which is seen as a less useful Cold War relic according to some respondents. Although the EU may be able to handle European security problems on its own in the eyes of many Chinese security specialists, the diverse views on a continued US commitment to European security and the relative importance of this commitment most likely reflects a combination of factors. Traditionally, US foreign policy has been marked by fluctuations between isolationism involving a retrenchment of US overseas security commitments and internationalism involving an expansion in US overseas security commitments, and this pattern is expected by many to continue to mark the extent of US engagement in European security. At the same time, the US is a global power with global interests and is aiming to preserve this status for the foreseeable future. The US can therefore be expected to remain

committed to European security irrespective of the politico-strategic framework defining its presence. These two factors combined leave a large measure of uncertainty as regards the future of transatlantic security relations.

The Chinese perception of the external environment beyond Asia is, not surprisingly, marked by more diffuse views due to a lack of interest and knowledge about security issues beyond its own region. However, insofar as such views are based in knowledge and analysis, China sees global security as a diverse phenomenon marked by region-specific concerns that are not necessarily relevant beyond the region in question, with the exception of the global impact of US security policies. In contrast to Asia, Europe is hence by and large free from the threat of conventional war and is therefore in less need of traditional alliance structures for addressing European security concerns.

### **VIII. INTERSTATE INTERACTION**

Figure 3.17 shows that the interaction pattern which, according to China's security elite, is seen to best describe how China is meeting its security challenges is moderately multilateral. The MPs shows a tendency to see the means by which contemporary China meets security challenges as predominantly multilateral. This description reflects the double-sided Chinese security strategy in the post-Cold War era. In the 1990s, China began experimenting with multilateral security dialogue and institutionalization of security cooperation (Odgaard, 2007a). The main payoff for this policy has been that China has established links with US allies and strategic partners, making inroads into the US alliance system by offering alternative benefits such as countering US calls for the spread of liberal democracy and the rule of law. In a sense, China overtook the US policy of persuasion of the 1990s, presumably out of necessity, since China's economic and military capabilities remain far too modest to pursue a policy of imposition. In China's home region, Northeast Asia, the usefulness of multilateralism is less pronounced due to the security threats stemming from Taiwan, Japan and the Korean peninsula. In addition, the consolidation and expansion of the US alliance system prompts China to continue to focus on unilateralism in relation to Taiwan and Japan.

### **IX. BROAD VERSUS NARROW SECURITY CONCEPTION**

Figure 3.18 shows that China's security elite considers the Chinese government to be considering security both in narrow terms, confined primarily to issues where hard power is required, and in broad terms, where soft power is necessary, with somewhat more emphasis on soft power issues. The MPs shows a tendency to conceive of security mainly in terms of

soft power. The results reflect that while military responses to security threats continue to be important, soft power such as economic, diplomatic and cultural instruments will become more important in future. The relative importance of hard and soft power depends on the issue. In the event of a war in the Taiwan Strait, hard power is necessary, but its usefulness for reaching political goals and for countering non-geographical threats is decreasing. Contemporary Chinese foreign policy is based on the principle that if you have the moral high ground, you have the support of the majority; this is how soft power can work. Since China is a much weaker military power than the United States, non-military instruments are also imperative to keep US power in check. China has to rely on soft power to convince the international community that it is a responsible power, but it is prepared to use force and even fight a limited war in the Taiwan Strait. Beijing is also of the opinion that if it wants Washington to continue to take into account Chinese security interests and to discourage Taiwanese independence, Beijing cannot afford to rely solely on soft power. The importance China attaches to soft power is reflected in China's activist approach to cooperation in international organizations and in its determination to enhance cultural and educational exchanges as a confidence-building measure at the popular level and as a means of strengthening the educational level of the Chinese people.

## **X. CONCLUSIONS**

China's security elite has a fairly homogenous perception of security threats, whether they are MPs, civil servants or security experts, except that the civil servants have a tendency to view security in more traditional terms than the other groups. This homogenous view emerges from the overlap between these groups in a Chinese context, meaning that one person usually has at least two identities, being for example both a civil servant and a security expert.

China's security elite views the external environment as a complex blend of non-traditional and traditional security threats: a world made up of regions with divergent as well as similar security problems and conflict resolution mechanisms. Europe is considered a region predominantly facing non-traditional security problems such as environmental threats without much use for armed force for its protection, a security environment that the European Union is reasonably well-equipped to manage. However, the US and its alliance system are considered the dominant global influences that contribute to shaping the security environment of all the world's regions, even where this influence is seen to enhance rather than ameliorate security threats. The historic tendency of the US to oscillate between isolationism and internationalism is therefore likely to be an important determinant in the character of the



future global security environment in general and specifically influence whether the world's security dynamics will continue to be based on alliances and armed force.

China's security identity as seen by its security elite is based on an uncompromising attitude towards the legitimacy of its claim to territory defined as its motherland. Loyalty is directed towards the Chinese nation and its territorial rights, sustaining the focus on traditional threats such as conventional war. Such threats are seen as being enhanced by the US and the consolidation and expansion of its alliance system in Asia, sustaining the ability of Taiwan and Japan to threaten the Chinese mainland and contributing to instability on the Korean peninsula. China itself is a major source of non-traditional security threats due to the difficulties of the Chinese government in managing the environmental, economic and socio-political security threats emanating from China's transition from a planned to a market economy. The combination of traditional and non-traditional security threats facing China from within and without implies that China cannot merely rely on military means to address the security threats the country is facing. In addition, China takes a proactive attitude towards international cooperation in the form of diplomacy which concerns the art of political compromise between states, and economic and financial assistance which concerns the need to provide more funding to deal with growing problems of air pollution, socio-economic inequality, etc. Chinese security identity is thus a complex mixture of traditional and non-traditional understandings of threats from foreign nations attempting to encroach on China's rights and threats from within, which encourages the security elites to think in terms of cooperative security and the common interests of neighbouring nations.

In line with this view, the instrumental preferences of China's security elites are double-sided: On the one hand, considerable resources should go towards meeting non-traditional security threats in the environmental, economic and socio-political sectors. On the other hand, Chinese spending on national defence is insufficient, especially in the areas of weapons procurement and research and development. The assessment that the threat of conventional war will grow in coming years serves to enhance the problem. These instrumental preferences reveal that although China supports international cooperation, it does not trade in its right to use force.

The interaction patterns that China's security elite sees as dominant is one that supports China's foreign policy principle of coexistence, entailing that states' pursuance of national interests should be a combination of individual foreign policy choices and extensive multilateral dialogue to prevent violent conflict. Interaction patterns involving a large measure of multilateralism and soft power without neglecting unilateralism and hard power

are hence seen as a means to tolerate that states concentrate on fulfilling their individual goals rather than an end in itself.


Compared to the 2004 analysis of China's security (Odgaard, 2007b), the survey conducted in 2006 reveals that environmental threats are considered much more important than threats stemming from ethnic conflict and migratory pressures. Other than that, the conclusions that can be drawn are largely the same. Chinese security perceptions are hence based on security cooperation with reservations due to the continued relevance of conventional war threats, armed force and hard power in Asia.

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
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
**Figure 3.1:** Policy instruments relevance (all respondents, %)




**Figure 3.2:** Policy instruments (MPs, civil servants and experts, %)



**Figure 3.3:** Policy instruments to address the threats of man-made environmental threats, macroeconomic instability, and natural disasters and pandemics (all respondents, %)




**Figure 3.4:** Policy instruments to address criminalization of the economy, conventional war, and energy issues (all respondents, %)




%

**Figure 3.5: Origins of threats (all respondents, %)**




**Figure 3.6: Individual threats origins (all respondents, %)**







**Figure 3.7:** Conventional war origins (MPs, civil servants and experts %)




**Figure 3.8:** Criminalization of the economy origins (MPs, civil servants and experts, %)




**Figure 3.9:** Environmental threats origins (MPs, civil servants and experts, %)




**Figure 3.10:** Macroeconomic instability origins (MPs, civil servants and experts (%))




**Figure 3.11:** Natural disasters and pandemics origins (MPs, civil servants and experts %)




**Figure 3.12:** EU importance (all respondents average)




**Figure 3.13:** Defence appropriation sufficiency (all respondents, %)




**Figure 3.14:** Could a more autonomous ESDP weaken NATO further? (%)




**Figure 3.15:** Will a weaker NATO lead to a retrenchment of the American commitment to European security? (%)




**Figure 3.16:** Is the American commitment to European security ... (%)



**Figure 3.17:** Unilateral versus multilateral security policy (%)



**Figure 3.18:** Narrow or broad security definition (%)



**Table 3.1: Threat assessment 2006**

Threats descending	Total	Rank 1	Rank 2	Rank 3	Rank 4	Rank 5	RAR
Criminalization of the economy	14	5	3	4	1	1	2.7
Migratory pressures	5		1		1	3	0.8
Narcotics trafficking	5		2		1	2	1.4
Ethnic conflict	4		1	1	1	1	1.5
Terrorist attacks, state and society	7	1	1	2	1	2	1.7
Terrorist attacks, infrastructure	1					1	0
Macroeconomic instability	14	4	4	3		3	2.1
Man-made environmental threats	17	5	4	3	3	2	2.4
Natural disasters and pandemics	14	1	3	4	5	1	1.9
Nuclear/radiological attack	2				1	1	0.5
Conventional war	12	4	2	1	2	3	2.7
Biological and chemical attack	1					1	0
Cyber attack	3		1	1	1		2
Socio-political instability	7	2		1	3	1	1.9
Energy	7	2	3	2			3



**Table 2: Threat assessment by MPs, civil servants and experts, 2006**

All respondents	MPs	Civil servants	Exps
1) Man-made environmental threats	1) Man-made environmental threats	1) Man-made environmental threats	1) Criminalization of the economy
2) Macroeconomic instability	1) Natural disasters and pandemics	2) Conventional war	2) Natural disasters and pandemics
2) Natural disasters and pandemics	2) Criminalization of the economy	3) Macroeconomic instability	3) Macroeconomic instability
2) Criminalization of the economy	2) Ethnic conflict	4) Energy	4) Man-made environmental threats
3) Conventional War			

**Table 3: Threat assessment by MPs, civil servants and experts, 2010**

All respondents	MPs	Civil servants	Exps
1) Man-made environmental threats	1) Criminalization of the economy	1) Man-made environmental threats	1) Criminalization of the economy
2) Conventional war	1) Man-made environmental threats	2) Conventional war	1) Macroeconomic instability
3) Criminalization of the economy	1) Natural disasters and pandemics	3) Criminalization of the economy	1) Man-made environmental threats
4) Natural disasters and pandemics		3) Energy	1) Natural disasters and pandemics
5) Macroeconomic instability			1) Conventional war

**Table 4: Threat assessment by MPs, civil servants and experts; traditional threats, 2006 and 2010**

		<b>Nuclear/radiological</b>	<b>Biological/chemical</b>	<b>Conventional war</b>
All	2006	2	1	12
	2010	1	2	11
MPs	2006			1
	2010			1
Civil servants	2006			8
	2010			5
Experts	2006	2	1	3
	2010	1	2	5

**Table 5: Threat origins (all, MPs, civil servants, experts, threats)**

Threat origins	All	MPs	Civil servants	Experts	Threats
Respondents	25	4	13	8	
<b>State or region unspecified</b>	3		2	1	Criminalization of the economy
	3		2	1	Environmental threats
	2		1	1	Conventional war
	4		2	2	Macroeconomic instability
	2		1	1	Natural disasters and pandemics
	2			2	Cyber attacks
<b>Asia</b>	1		1		Conventional war
	1		1		Migratory pressures
	1			1	Narcotics trafficking
China	6	1	3	2	Environmental threats
	8	1	2	5	Criminalization of the economy
	6		2	4	Natural disasters and pandemics
	7		3	4	Macroeconomic instability
	2			2	Socio-political instability
	1			1	Cyber attacks
South China Sea	1	1			Conventional war
North Korea	4		4		Conventional war
	1			1	Nuclear/radiological attack
Taiwan	10	2	7	1	Conventional war
Japan	6	1	5		Conventional war
	1		1		Environmental threats
Northeast Asia	1		1		Conventional war
Southeast Asia	2		2		Conventional war
Central Asia	1		1		Terrorist attacks against state or society
South Asia	1			1	Narcotics trafficking
Vietnam	1			1	Natural disasters and pandemics
<b>The West</b>	1		1		Energy
	1		1		Environmental threats
	1		1		Natural disasters and pandemics
	1		1		Socio-political instability
	1		1		Macroeconomic instability
USA	7	2	4	1	Conventional war
	2		1	1	Macroeconomic instability
	1		1		Energy
	1		1		Environmental threats
	1			1	Socio-political instability
Europe	1		1		Environmental threats
<b>Non-state actors</b>					



Garnet Project JERP 5.3.2

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# Supranational Threat Perceptions: Survey Results from the EU

Emil J. Kirchner and Maximilian B. Rasch

Garnet Working Paper No. 18.4

## ABSTRACT

The survey of EU-level actors suggests that similar threat perceptions and institutional response preferences prevail as with those of the elites of France, Germany, Italy and the UK. As with these countries, ‘new’ security threats dominate, multilateralism is the chosen form of state interaction, and civilian or ‘soft power’ aspects are singled out as the preferred instruments in dealing with security threats. Convergence is also evident on the perception that national defence budgets are insufficiently equipped to meet security requirements of the current external environment. Unsurprisingly, EU-level actors do not perceive a more autonomous ESDP as detrimental to NATO. While different perceptions emerge among the EU-level actors as to whether a weaker NATO would reduce US commitments to European security, there is consensus on the importance of continued US commitment to European security. Overall, the survey points to the gradual development of a shared European strategic culture among EU-level actors and the elites of the four member states.

## I. INTRODUCTION

The findings of the EU survey supplement the results of the studies looking at the EU member states France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. A next step will be to contrast and compare the findings made within the four EU member states studies and this EU survey.

## II. SURVEY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

In view of difficulties to achieve the envisaged response rates, the first round of the survey was conducted over a relatively long period, namely between June 2006 and February 2007. More interviews are to follow in a second round. Whereas in the beginning an online questionnaire was used to generate responses, direct contacts by telephone and face-to-face interviews complemented the approach from October 2006.

Three different target groups have been contacted for the survey: Civil servants, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and academic security experts. The response ratios differ significantly between the three groups (see Table 4.1). It was particularly difficult to obtain responses from MEPs (response ratio 9.5 per cent), while academic security experts generally proved to be quite cooperative (response ratio 65.4 per cent). In total, 43 completed questionnaires have been received.

The group of civil servants (14 completed questionnaires) comprised people with quite different institutional affiliations, whose common denominator is considerable working experience in EU security matters. Almost half of the civil servants participating in the survey (6) were Ambassadors of EU member states in the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC). The other civil servants work in senior positions for different security-related units within the Council of the EU and the European Commission.

The MEPs participating in the survey (12 completed questionnaires) have also been carefully selected. The majority of them (7) are members of the Security and Defence Committee of the European Parliament (SEDE). Among the respondents is the chair of the Committee and three vice-chairs. The remaining MEPs are members of the European Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) and include one AFET vice-chair. In terms of nationality the sample is evenly distributed, with eleven nationalities.<sup>24</sup> The same is true for party affiliations, reaching from the far left to the mid-right wing in the European Parliament.

All academic security experts who took part in the evaluation (17 completed questionnaires) are specialists on EU security matters. They work mostly in universities and think tanks in Europe. All participants in this part of the survey were asked to complete the questionnaire from an EU perspective rather than a national one.

### **III. THREAT PERCEPTIONS**

Respondents were asked to choose the five gravest threats the EU is facing today from a list of thirteen given threats. Within those five threats identified they rank-ordered from '1' (gravest threat) to '5' (least grave threat). This classification was done for both 2006 and 2010. Only a very few respondents made use of the possibility to mention other threats than the ones listed.

The top three gravest security threats of the three target groups are quite similar for both 2006 and 2010 (see Tables 4.2 and 4.3). For 2006, MEPs and academic experts identified 'terrorist attacks against state or society' as the gravest threat (with a mean of 1.60 and 2.13 respectively). For the civil servants, this category ranked only fourth. They regarded 'macro-economic instability' as the gravest threat for the EU (mean of 1.86). Only minor differences occur between the three groups when looking at the second and third gravest

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<sup>24</sup> One MEP each came from Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, and the UK respectively. Two MEPs had their constituencies in Germany.

threats, as in all three cases ‘migratory pressures’ and ‘terrorism against critical infrastructure’ come up, though not in the same order. Civil servants and academic experts assign the second highest rankings for 2006 to ‘terrorism against critical infrastructure’ (with a mean of 2.00 and 2.27 respectively), MEPs rank this threat as third highest (mean of 2.86). For MEPs the second highest average ranking is attributed to ‘migratory pressures’ (mean of 2.67), a threat ranked third by civil servants and academic experts (with a mean of 2.29 and 2.70 respectively).

The three target groups agree that terrorism is expected to remain a key threat in 2010 (see Tables 4.2 and 4.4): Concerning ‘terrorist attacks against state or society’, MEPs assign the top rank to this category (mean of 1.78), while civil servants and academic experts both put it in third position (mean of 2.50 and 2.93 respectively). ‘Terrorism against critical infrastructure’ ranks first in 2010 for academic experts and is placed second by MEPs (mean of 2.27 and 2.57 respectively). An issue not among the top three in 2006 gains considerable prominence in 2010: ‘man-made environmental threats’. Civil servants assumed that this thematic complex would pose the gravest threat to the EU in 2010 (mean of 2.00) and academic experts rank it second highest (mean of 2.58). Besides both categories of terrorism and ‘man-made environmental threats’ two other categories were ranked within the top three security threats: Civil servants assign ‘natural disasters and pandemics’ second position (mean of 2.00),<sup>25</sup> whereas MEPs ranked ‘migratory pressures’ third (mean of 2.71).

Only gradual differences are ascertainable between PSC Ambassadors and the other civil servants interviewed (see Tables 4.5 - 4.7). However, there was a slight tendency on the part of PSC Ambassadors to give more importance to soft threats. Accordingly, ‘man-made environmental threats’, ‘macroeconomic instability’ and ‘natural disasters and pandemics’ ranked highest for 2006. For 2010, the threat perceptions of PSC Ambassadors and the other civil servants are even more congruent.

When looking at the overall mean perceptions of security threats it is notable that the two categories on terrorism are the ones most salient in 2006 and 2010, while ‘migratory pressures’ (2006) and ‘man-made environmental threats’ (2010) rank third. This reflects the fact that European elites remain very much influenced by the direct impact that terrorism has on strategy, decision-making and action-taking since 11 September 2001.

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<sup>25</sup> The mean has the same value as the one for ‘man-made environmental threats’, but only nine chose the ‘natural disasters and pandemics’ category (three less than for ‘man-made environmental threats’). With that it seems to be appropriate to put ‘natural disasters and pandemics’ on second rank.

#### **IV. THREAT RESPONSE**

Which policy instruments are most suitable to address current security threats? This question has been answered by the survey participants for the five gravest threats they had chosen out of the list of thirteen threats in the previous question. They were able to choose among five policy instruments, namely ‘diplomacy’, ‘economic and financial assistance’, ‘police cooperation and intelligence sharing’, ‘traditional military’ and ‘special operations’. In addition, respondents could name other policy instruments they deemed important, and select as many instruments as they wished.

A full overview of the results of this part of the survey is given in Tables 4.8a - 4.8c. The values in brackets behind the percentages show how many individuals have chosen a specific policy instrument for each of the thirteen threats. Boxes remain empty, if none of the participants selected the policy instrument.

When looking at the overall frequency at which individual policy instruments have been selected, it becomes clear that there is a preference for ‘police cooperation and intelligence sharing’ (see Table 4.9 and Figure 4.1). 26.5 per cent of all entries fell into this category. ‘Economic and financial assistance’ and ‘diplomatic’ policy instruments obtained about a fifth each of all selections.

The hard security instruments ‘traditional military’ and ‘special operations’ rank only in fourth and fifth position. The low output for military instruments implicates a shift in thinking towards a wider definition of security and reflects both the multi-faceted dimension of current threats and the fact that threats come from distant places in the world, for which reason defence in traditional terms is ineffective.

For seven of the thirteen security threats ‘police cooperation and intelligence sharing’ is given as the best policy instrument when looking at the overall results. The threats are biological and chemical attacks, criminalisation of the economy, cyber attacks, narcotics trafficking, nuclear and radiological attacks, as well as the two categories of terrorist attacks. ‘Economic and financial assistance’ was seen as the best instrument to address four security threats, namely macroeconomic instability, man-made environmental threats, migratory pressures and natural disasters and pandemics. And finally, conventional war and ethnic conflict was regarded as to be tackled most suitably via ‘diplomatic’ means.

The analysis of group-internal preferences for policy instruments displays interesting differences between civil servants, MEPs and academic experts (see Table 4.10 and Figure 4.2). Civil servants have the lowest preference for soft security instruments, i.e. ‘diplomacy’



and ‘economic and financial assistance’. On the other hand they selected most often the hard security instruments available, namely ‘military’, ‘police cooperation’ and ‘special operations’. This is even more surprising as the majority of these civil servants work at the soft end of EU power. In contrast, academic experts tended to choose most often soft security instruments. The MEPs participating in the survey took a middle course between civil servants and academic experts in all categories and suggested most often alternative policy instruments as being important.

Differences also occurred within the target group of civil servants (see Table 4.10). While PSC Ambassadors and the other civil servants shared the view that ‘police cooperation’ is the most important policy instrument, PSC Ambassadors thought that ‘economic and financial assistance’ and ‘traditional military’ rank second (both with the same percentages). The other civil servants, however, believed that ‘diplomacy’ would be the second most important policy instrument, followed by ‘special operations’.

## **V. ORIGINS OF THREATS**

Respondents were asked to state the origins of the five gravest threats they had selected previously from the list of thirteen threats. They could do so by naming specific cases in two categories: ‘states and regions’ and ‘non-state actors’.

The overall impression is that no clear preference prevails for one of the two categories (see Tables 4.11a and 4.11b). Even though ‘non-state actors’ have been chosen 124 times and ‘states or regions’ only 108 times, the difference between these results does not seem to be large enough to be significant.

Man-made environmental threats, migratory pressures and terrorism against state or society are ranked as the top three threats having their origins in states and regions (see Table 4.11a). A closer look at the completed questionnaires provides information on the concrete actors seen as being relevant: Industrialised regions and countries, especially the US, China and India are listed as responsible for man-made environmental threats. Particularly Africa, but also Asia and in general failed states, are seen as the origins of migratory pressures. Terrorism against state or society rooting in specific states or regions is regarded as originating in the Middle East, Iran, Pakistan and also Afghanistan.

Non-state actors of origins of threats were most often mentioned in connection with the two categories of terrorism (see Table 11b); third came man-made environmental threats. Not surprisingly, terrorists and fundamentalists, most often with Islamist or generally religious motivations, are regarded as the main actors involved in terrorism directed against

state, society or critical infrastructure. Man-made environmental threats are seen by the survey participants to be caused above all by industry and corporations. But also militant activists and globalisation is mentioned.

## **VI. IMPORTANCE OF THE EU**

How important is the EU at present to address the security threats facing Europe today? This question was addressed by the respondents by giving their impression for each of the thirteen threats listed in Table 4.12. This time higher mean values imply higher importance, as the participants in the survey could choose between ‘0’ (‘not important at all’) and ‘5’ (‘absolutely essential’). When looking at the overall results, the EU is seen as having the most important role to play in tackling macroeconomic instability, migratory pressures, and man-made environmental threats. That very much reflects the notion of the EU as a ‘soft power’. This impression is underpinned by the choices of the three threats the EU is regarded as being least important to address: cyber attack, conventional war, and biological or chemical attacks. In terms of hard security the Union is apparently seen as a comparably weak actor.

It is interesting that the average importance of the EU for all threats combined is rated the lowest by civil servants, and the highest by academic experts. Apparently the people who are the most closely involved in EU policy-making judge the impact of the organisation in terms of concrete threat response less positively than the observers in academic circles (see also Table 4.13).

It is again worthwhile to compare elite and public views on the putative importance of the EU in addressing key threats. According to the latest Eurobarometer survey, the public perception of the most positive role of the EU is that of fighting terrorism, as well as defence and foreign affairs (European Commission, 2007: 117). Only concerning the third rank within the Eurobarometer survey is the public in agreement with elite security experts about the Union’s role by naming the protection of the environment. Nevertheless, these and other Eurobarometer figures suggest that the public in the 27 EU member states perceives the EU much more as a hard security actor than do the experts.

## **VII. SPENDING ON THREAT RESPONSE**

Appropriate and effective threat response to a large extent depends on adequate investment in capacities, instruments and resources. It is therefore important to analyse

whether the overall funding used for hard security, and the way the money is spent, are appropriate to the security situation.

The majority of experts in all three target groups share the view that budgetary resources and manpower are misaligned with the threats Europe faces today (see Table 4.14 and Figure 4.3). It is noteworthy, however, that three-quarters of civil servants and academic experts see a misalignment, while only half of the MEPs share this sentiment.

However, it is not simply the size of national defence budgets which cause the misalignment. When looking at the overall results of the survey, more than half of the respondents believe that the budgets are of just the right size (see Table 4.15 and Figure 4.4). Only the majority of academic experts regard the budgets as too small.

The key to why there is a perceived misalignment of resources while the resources are largely of appropriate size can be found in resource distribution and military modernisation. On average, 78.4 per cent of all respondents believe that the distribution of defence budgets does not meet the needs resulting from the current security environment (see Table 4.16 and Figure 4.5). The highest proportion of people within the three target groups which regard the distribution as appropriate can be found among academic experts (35.7 per cent). On the other hand, 91.7 per cent of MEPs think that the distribution is unsuitable to address the security threats.

Table 4.16 and Figure 4.6 allow conclusions to be drawn as to where the problems within budget distribution are located. The overall results show that too much or enough money is being spent on personnel, but too little on procurement and Research and Development. R&D particularly is seen by all three-target groups as a sector in which funding is inappropriate. 96.6 per cent of all respondents share this view.

An effective and operational military also needs to experience constant modernisation. But are European armies seen as receiving enough funding for modernisation efforts? The majority of civil servants, MEPs and academic experts (70.3 per cent) think that too little money is made available to that end (see Table 4.17 and Figure 4.7). Only a third (27 per cent) of all survey participants believe that just enough funds are being devoted to military modernisation. It is noteworthy that the civil servants have the most positive impression in this question, while academic experts see the situation most negatively.

Notably, on all budgetary questions PSC Ambassadors assess the situation slightly more negatively than the other civil servants. In all following examinations the views of both subgroups are almost identical.

## **VIII. ESDP, US COMMITMENT AND NATO**

Security policies of the EU and the US on the one hand, and the EU and NATO on the other, are linked and often complementary. However, with the emergence of an ever more institutionalised, effective and resourceful European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), tensions over power and influence have emerged between the US-dominated NATO and the European security framework ESDP, also with repercussions on trans-Atlantic relations.

According to the results of the survey, a prospering ESDP does not significantly impair NATO's status. Almost 70 per cent of all respondents believed that a more autonomous ESDP would not, or only to a limited extent, weaken NATO further (see Table 4.18 and Figure 4.8). Only around 15 per cent of all participants attributed some or very much weakening impact by the ESDP. Interestingly, civil servants saw the least likelihood of such a negative impact.

The three target groups are divided on the question whether a weaker NATO would lead to a retrenchment of US commitment to European security (see Table 4.18 and Figure 4.9). The majority of civil servants surveyed (41.7 per cent) believes that such a scenario is not likely. Most MEPs (45.5 per cent), however, think exactly the opposite and see the possibility of a retrenchment of US commitment to European security as a consequence of a weaker NATO. Half of the academic experts then opt for a 'maybe', followed by 35.7 per cent of those who disregard such an outcome. The discord between the groups is reflected in the overall results on this question, showing no clear preference.

Nevertheless, the majority of respondents believe that the US commitment to European security is important (see Table 4.18 and Figure 4.10): 36.8 per cent regard the US commitment as essential. A staggering 94.7 per cent of all the participants can be found in the top-three categories 'essential', 'very important' and 'important'. Only two academic experts saw the US commitment as being 'not very important' and not a single respondent as 'inessential'.

## **IX. INTERSTATE INTERACTIONS AND SECURITY CONCEPTIONS**

At the end of the survey respondents were asked to state the pattern of interaction best describing how their home country is meeting the security threats it is facing. As EU policy-making by definition is multilateral, this was the only question in which participants were asked to take a national perspective rather than an EU one. They were asked to choose a position on a continuum ranging from '1' (solely unilateral) over '5' (strictly bilateral) to '9' (always multilateral), with intermediary stages between the three categories. As Table 4.19

illustrates, the means of the three target groups are remarkably similar, with around '7' suggesting an interstate interaction pattern just between bilateral and multilateral. The lowest values obtained in the individual groups were '4', i.e. between unilateral and bilateral interaction. Interestingly MEPs had only '6' as the lowest value. Those respondents scoring '8' and '9', at the extreme end of the spectrum, signalled the multilateral behaviour of their governments.

When asked to assess the EU security conception, the range of response was broader (see Table 4.19). The idea was to find out if the EU was seen as conceiving of security narrowly (i.e. focusing on issues where hard power is required) or broadly (i.e. concentrating on issues where soft power is necessary). The position had to be marked on a continuum ranging from 'narrow' (1) over 'medium' (5) to 'very broad' (9). The means of the three target groups were again located around '7', i.e. 'broad'. The fact that the range between the answers was between '1', '2' and '3' respectively on one end, and '9' on the other end of the line, shows how different the perceptions of the EU are. But it is also possible that some of the participants referred to their home countries rather than to the EU. For the soft power EU at least, all answers below '6' seem to be difficult to understand. In a second round of interviews it would therefore be essential to clarify particularly the thematic complex of EU security conception, as this is crucial to understand the views of security experts on a specifically European security culture.

## **X. CONCLUSION**

While this EU paper reaches the same conclusions on threat perceptions and institutional response as the country studies, it also offers a kind of 'self appraisal' in terms of autonomous ESDP actions and their perceived impact on NATO. In terms of threat perceptions, EU results differ little from those presented for the four EU member states. As with these countries, 'new' security threats dominate. MEPs and security experts identified 'terrorist attacks against state and society as the gravest threat. However, civil servants ranked them fourth. Migratory pressures and 'terrorism against critical infrastructure' come second and third for all three categories of respondent. While the picture for 2010 again has terrorism as a main threat for MEPs and security experts, civil servants see environmental threats and pandemics in first and second place.

The EU findings are also not very different from those of the four EU member states on appropriate responses to threats, with civilian or 'soft power' aspects being singled out as the preferred instruments in dealing with security threats. Specifically, there is a preference

for police cooperation and intelligence sharing, economic and financial assistance, and diplomatic instruments. The ‘hard’ security instruments ‘traditional military’ and ‘special operation’ rank only fourth and fifth. The particularly low ranking for military instruments is in line with the adoption by MEPs, civil servants and security experts of a broad definition of security, and may also reflect that MEPs and civil servants work at the ‘soft end’ of EU power. In a similar vein, MEPs, civil servants and security experts see EU actions as most relevant in response to threats constituting the ‘new’ security agenda, i.e., in tackling macro-economic instability, migratory pressures, and man-made environmental threats.

In contrast to the results for the four EU member states, the EU respondents felt that the national defence budgets were ‘just about right’. They agree however with their national counterparts that the distribution of defence budgets does not meet the security requirements of the current external environment, with too little being spent on procurement, research and development, and modernisation efforts.

Judging from the survey, the EU-level actors perceive a more autonomous ESDP as not significantly impairing NATO. A more differentiated picture emerges on the question of whether a weaker NATO would lead to a retrenchment of US commitment to European security. Whereas civil servants see such a development as unlikely, MEPs see it as likely, and security experts are split on this issue. Nevertheless, all three categories place a very high premium on the US commitment to European security. In a broader sense, this also connects with the high value the EU respondents have placed on multilateralism as the preferred means of interstate interaction.

## REFERENCES

European Commission (2007), *Eurobarometer 65, Public Opinion in the European Union, Spring 2006*, Brussels: requested and coordinated by the Directorate General Press and Communication.

## Tables and Figures

**Table 4.1. Overview of responses**

	<i>Individuals contacted</i>	<i>Completed questionnaires</i>	<i>Response ratio (in %)</i>
Civil servants	58	14	24.1
MEPs	127	12	9.5
Academic experts	26	17	65.4

**Table 4.2. Mean perceptions of security threats in 2006 and 2010**

		Civil Servants (n=14)	MEPs (n=12)	Academic Experts (n=17)	Overall (n=43)
Biological/chemical	2006	3.33 (6)	0.00 (0)	3.00 (7)	3.15 (13)
	2010	3.50 (6)	3.00 (1)	3.29 (7)	3.36 (14)
Conventional war	2006	3.00 (2)	3.00 (1)	3.00 (1)	3.00 (4)
	2010	3.00 (2)	1.00 (1)	3.00 (1)	2.50 (4)
Criminalisation of economy	2006	3.57 (7)	3.00 (5)	2.33 (3)	3.13 (15)
	2010	3.43 (7)	4.00 (5)	2.00 (3)	3.33 (15)
Cyber attack	2006	3.25 (4)	3.50 (2)	4.00 (2)	3.50 (8)
	2010	3.67 (6)	4.50 (4)	3.33 (3)	3.85 (13)
Ethnic conflict	2006	4.00 (3)	3.67 (6)	2.86 (7)	3.38 (16)
	2010	3.33 (6)	3.25 (4)	2.80 (5)	3.13 (15)
Macroeconomic instability	2006	1.86 (7)	3.33 (3)	2.33 (6)	2.31 (16)
	2010	2.20 (5)	4.00 (2)	3.14 (7)	2.93 (14)
Man-made environmental	2006	2.36 (11)	3.57 (7)	2.83 (12)	2.83 (30)
	2010	2.00 (12)	3.13 (8)	2.58 (12)	2.50 (32)
Migratory pressures	2006	2.29 (7)	2.67 (6)	2.70 (10)	2.57 (23)
	2010	2.91 (11)	2.71 (7)	3.46 (13)	3.10 (31)
Narcotics trafficking	2006	3.00 (8)	2.50 (2)	4.00 (5)	3.27 (15)
	2010	3.00 (5)	3.00 (1)	4.20 (5)	3.55 (11)
Natural disasters/pandemics	2006	2.56 (9)	3.67 (3)	3.63 (8)	3.15 (20)
	2010	2.00 (9)	4.00 (1)	3.00 (7)	2.53 (17)
Nuclear/radiological	2006	3.00 (4)	0.00 (0)	3.33 (3)	3.14 (7)
	2010	3.20 (5)	0.00 (0)	2.00 (4)	2.67 (9)
Terrorism: critical infrastructure	2006	2.00 (9)	2.86 (7)	2.27 (11)	2.33 (27)
	2010	2.63 (8)	2.57 (7)	2.27 (11)	2.46 (26)
Terrorism: state or society	2006	2.70 (10)	1.60 (10)	2.13 (15)	2.14 (35)
	2010	2.50 (8)	1.78 (9)	2.93 (14)	2.48 (31)

Note: Numbers in brackets indicate how many respondents have chosen each threat. Only when this number represents at least 50 per cent of the respondents in each target group, the results were used later on in the evaluation



**Table 4.3. Top three security threats in 2006**

	Civil servants (n=14)	MEPs (n=12)	Academic experts (n=17)	Overall (n=43)
Rank 1	Macroeconomic instability	Terrorism: state & society	Terrorism: state & society	Terrorism: state & society
Rank 2	Terrorism: infrastructure	Migratory pressures	Terrorism: infrastructure	Terrorism: infrastructure
Rank 3	Migratory pressures	Terrorism: infrastructure	Migratory pressures	Migratory pressures

**Table 4.4 Top three security threats in 2010**

	Civil servants (n=14)	MEPs (n=12)	Academic experts (n=17)	Overall (n=43)
Rank 1	Environmental threats	Terrorism: State & Society	Terrorism: infrastructure	Terrorism: infrastructure
Rank 2	Disasters and pandemics	Terrorism: infrastructure	Environmental threats	Terrorism: State & Society
Rank 3	Terrorism: State & Society	Migratory pressures	Terrorism: State & Society	Environmental threats

**Table 4.5. Civil servants: mean perceptions of security threats in 2006 and 2010**

		PSC Ambassadors	Other Civil Servants	Overall Civil Servants
Biological/chemical	2006	3.50 (2)	3.25 (4)	3.33 (6)
	2010	4.00 (2)	3.25 (4)	3.50 (6)
Conventional war	2006	1.00 (1)	5.00 (1)	3.00 (2)
	2010	1.00 (1)	5.00 (1)	3.00 (2)
Criminalisation of economy	2006	3.50 (2)	3.60 (5)	3.57 (7)
	2010	3.00 (2)	3.60 (5)	3.43 (7)
Cyber attack	2006	3.50 (2)	3.00 (2)	3.25 (4)
	2010	3.33 (3)	4.00 (3)	3.67 (6)
Ethnic conflict	2006	3.50 (2)	5.00 (1)	4.00 (3)
	2010	3.50 (2)	3.25 (4)	3.33 (6)
Macroeconomic instability	2006	1.75 (4)	2.00 (3)	1.86 (7)
	2010	3.00 (2)	1.67 (3)	2.20 (5)
Man-made environmental	2006	1.50 (4)	2.86 (7)	2.36 (11)
	2010	1.60 (5)	2.29 (7)	2.00 (12)
Migratory pressures	2006	2.50 (2)	2.20 (5)	2.29 (7)
	2010	3.20 (5)	2.67 (6)	2.91 (11)
Narcotics trafficking	2006	2.67 (3)	3.20 (5)	3.00 (8)
	2010	3.50 (2)	2.67 (3)	3.00 (5)
Natural disasters/pandemics	2006	2.60 (5)	2.50 (4)	2.56 (9)
	2010	1.80 (5)	2.25 (4)	2.00 (9)
Nuclear/radiological	2006	2.50 (2)	3.50 (2)	3.00 (4)
	2010	2.00 (2)	4.00 (3)	3.20 (5)
Terrorism: critical infrastructure	2006	2.50 (2)	1.86 (7)	2.00 (9)
	2010	3.00 (2)	2.50 (6)	2.63 (8)
Terrorism: state or society	2006	2.67 (3)	2.71 (7)	2.70 (10)
	2010	3.34 (3)	2.00 (5)	2.50 (8)

Note: Numbers in brackets indicate how many respondents have chosen each threat. Only when this number represents at least 50 per cent of the respondents in each target group, the results were used later on in the evaluation.

**Table 4.6. Civil servants: top three security threats in 2006**

	PSC Ambassadors	Other Civil Servants	Overall Civil Servants
Rank 1	Man-made environmental	Terrorism: critical infrastructure	Macroeconomic instability
Rank 2	Macroeconomic instability	Migratory pressures	Terrorism: infrastructure
Rank 3	Natural disasters/pandemics	Natural disasters/pandemics	Migratory pressures

**Table 4.7. Civil servants: top three security threats in 2010**

	PSC Ambassadors	Other Civil Servants	Overall Civil Servants
Rank 1	Man-made environmental	Terrorism: state or society	Environmental threats
Rank 2	Natural disasters/pandemics	Natural disasters/pandemics	Disasters and pandemics
Rank 3	Migratory pressures	Man-made environmental	Terrorism: State & Society

**Table 4.8a. Best policy instruments to address security threats**

	Civil Servants, in % (n=14)	MEPs, in % (n=12)	Academic Experts, in % (n=17)	Overall, in % (n=43)
<b>Biological/chemical attacks</b>				
Diplomatic			11.8 (2)	4.7 (2)
Economic/financial assistance			11.8 (2)	4.7 (2)
Police coop./intelligence sharing	28.6 (4)		35.3 (6)	23.3(10)
Traditional military	14.3 (2)		5.9 (1)	7.0 (3)
Special operations	21.4 (3)		29.4 (5)	18.6 (8)
Other				
<b>Conventional war</b>				
Diplomatic	14.3 (2)	8.3 (1)	5.9 (1)	9.3 (4)
Economic/financial assistance			5.9 (1)	2.3 (1)
Police coop. /intelligence sharing			5.9 (1)	2.3 (1)
Traditional military	7.1 (1)			2.3 (1)
Special operations	7.1 (1)			2.3 (1)
Other				
<b>Criminalisation of economy</b>				
Diplomatic	7.1 (1)	8.3 (1)	11.8 (2)	9.3 (4)
Economic/financial assistance	35.7 (5)	8.3 (1)	17.7 (3)	20.9 (9)
Police coop./intelligence sharing	35.7 (5)	41.7 (5)	11.8 (2)	27.9(12)
Traditional military				
Special operations	7.1 (1)	8.3 (1)	5.9 (1)	7.0 (3)
Other		8.3 (1)		2.3 (1)
<b>Cyber Attack</b>				
Diplomatic			5.9 (1)	2.3 (1)
Economic/financial assistance	7.1 (1)		5.9 (1)	4.7 (2)
Police coop./intelligence sharing	28.6 (4)	16.7 (2)	11.8 (2)	18.6 (8)
Traditional military				
Special operations		8.3 (1)		2.3 (1)
Other	7.1 (1)			2.3 (1)

**Table 4.8b. Best policy instruments to address security threats**

	Civil Servants, in % (n=14)	MEPs, in % (n=12)	Academic Experts, in % (n=17)	Overall, in % (n=43)
<b>Ethnic conflict</b>				
Diplomatic	14.3 (2)	25.0 (3)	23.5 (4)	20.9 (9)
Economic/financial assistance	14.3 (2)	8.3 (1)	29.4 (5)	18.6 (8)
Police coop./intelligence sharing	7.1 (1)	16.7 (2)	17.7 (3)	14.0 (6)
Traditional military	14.3 (2)	8.3 (1)	5.9 (1)	9.3 (4)
Special operations	14.3 (2)	8.3 (1)		7.0 (3)
Other		16.7 (2)	11.8 (2)	9.3 (4)
<b>Macroeconomic instability</b>				
Diplomatic	14.3 (2)	16.7 (2)	11.8 (2)	14.0 (6)
Economic/financial assistance	35.7 (5)	25.0 (3)	29.4 (5)	30.2 (13)
Police coop./intelligence sharing			5.9 (1)	2.3 (1)
Traditional military				
Special operations				
Other	7.1 (1)	8.3 (1)	11.8 (2)	9.3 (4)
<b>Man-made environmental threats</b>				
Diplomatic	57.1 (8)	33.3 (4)	41.2 (7)	44.2 (19)
Economic/financial assistance	42.9 (6)	41.7 (5)	52.9 (9)	46.5 (20)
Police coop./intelligence sharing	21.4 (3)	8.3 (1)	5.9 (1)	11.6 (5)
Traditional military	7.1 (1)			2.3 (1)
Special operations		16.7 (2)		4.7 (2)
Other	28.6 (4)	16.7 (2)	41.2 (7)	30.2 (13)
<b>Migratory pressures</b>				
Diplomatic	35.7 (5)	33.3 (4)	47.1 (8)	39.5 (17)
Economic/financial assistance	42.9 (6)	25.0 (3)	58.8 (10)	44.2 (19)
Police coop./intelligence sharing	28.6 (4)	25.0 (3)	23.5 (4)	25.6 (11)
Traditional military				
Special operations	7.1 (1)			2.3 (1)
Other		16.7 (2)	5.9 (1)	7.0 (3)
<b>Narcotics trafficking</b>				
Diplomatic		8.3 (1)	23.5 (4)	11.6 (5)
Economic/financial assistance	14.3 (2)	8.3 (1)	17.7 (3)	14.0 (6)
Police coop./intelligence sharing	57.1 (8)	16.7 (2)	23.5 (4)	32.6 (14)
Traditional military				
Special operations	42.9 (6)	16.7 (2)	11.8 (2)	23.3 (10)
Other	7.1 (1)	8.3 (1)		4.7 (2)

**Table 4.8c. Best policy instruments to address security threats**

	Civil Servants, in % (n=14)	MEPs, in % (n=12)	Academic Experts, in % (n=17)	Overall, in % (n=43)
<b>Natural disasters/pandemics</b>				
Diplomatic	14.3 (2)		11.8 (2)	9.3 (4)
Economic/financial assistance	28.6 (4)	16.7 (2)	29.4 (5)	25.6 (11)
Police coop./intelligence sharing	7.1 (1)		11.8 (2)	7.0 (3)
Traditional military	14.3 (2)			4.7 (2)
Special operations	7.1 (1)	8.3 (1)	17.7 (3)	11.6 (5)
Other	42.9 (6)	8.3 (1)	5.9 (1)	18.6 (8)
<b>Nuclear/radiological attacks</b>				
Diplomatic	7.1 (1)		11.8 (2)	7.0 (3)
Economic/financial assistance			5.9 (1)	2.3 (1)
Police coop./intelligence sharing	21.4 (3)		17.7 (3)	14.0 (6)
Traditional military	21.4 (3)			7.0 (3)
Special operations	21.4 (3)		11.8 (2)	11.6 (5)
Other				
<i><u>Terrorist attacks:</u></i>				
<i><u>critical infrastructure</u></i>				
Diplomatic	21.4 (3)	25.0 (3)	17.7 (3)	20.9 (9)
Economic/financial assistance	7.1 (1)	16.7 (2)	17.7 (3)	14.0 (6)
Police coop./intelligence sharing	57.1 (8)	50.0 (6)	52.9 (9)	53.5 (23)
Traditional military	42.9 (6)	16.7 (2)		18.6 (8)
Special operations	50.0 (7)	33.3 (4)	47.1 (8)	44.2 (19)
Other		8.3 (1)	11.8 (2)	7.0 (3)
<b>Terrorist attacks: state and society</b>				
Diplomatic	28.6 (4)	50.0 (6)	47.1 (8)	41.9 (18)
Economic/financial assistance	7.1 (1)	33.3 (4)	29.4 (5)	23.3 (10)
Police coop./intelligence sharing	64.3 (9)	75.0 (9)	76.5 (13)	72.1 (31)
Traditional military	35.7 (5)	16.7 (2)	11.8 (2)	20.9 (9)
Special operations	42.9 (6)	33.3 (4)	64.7 (11)	48.8 (21)
Other		25.0 (3)	11.8 (2)	11.6 (5)

**Table 4.9. Analysis: preferences for policy instruments**

<u>Policy instruments</u>	<b>Civil Servants</b>		<u>MEPs</u>		<b>Academic Experts</b>		<b>Overall</b>	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Diplomatic	30	16.8	25	22.3	46	22.7	101	20.4
Economic/financial assistance	33	18.4	22	19.6	53	26.1	108	21.9
Police coop./intelligence sharing	50	27.9	30	26.8	51	25.1	131	26.5
Traditional military	22	12.3	5	4.5	4	2.0	31	6.3
Special operations	31	17.3	16	14.3	32	15.8	79	16.0
Other	13	7.3	14	12.5	17	8.4	44	8.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>203</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>494</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Note: This table shows how often the individual policy instruments have been selected within each target group. For instance, all civil servants taken together have selected ‘diplomacy’ thirty times as one of the most appropriate policy instruments to address the gravest security threats.

**Table 4.10. Analysis: civil servants’ preferences for policy instruments**

<u>Policy instruments</u>	<b>PSC Ambassadors</b>		<b>Other Civil Servants</b>		<b>Overall CS</b>	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Diplomatic	7	10.6	23	20.4	30	16.8
Economic/financial assistance	13	19.7	20	17.7	33	18.4
Police coop./intelligence sharing	16	24.2	34	30.1	50	27.9
Traditional military	13	19.7	9	8.00	22	12.3
Special operations	10	15.2	21	18.6	31	17.3
Other	7	10.6	6	5.3	13	7.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table 4.11a. Percentage naming states and regions as origins of security threats**

	Civil Servants, in % (n=12)	MEPs, in % (n=12)	Security experts, in % (n=14)	Overall, in % (n=38)
Biological/chemical attack			21.4 (3)	7.9 (3)
Conventional war	8.3 (1)	8.3 (1)		5.3 (2)
Criminalisation of economy	33.3 (4)	16.7 (2)		15.8 (6)
Cyber attack	8.3 (1)	8.3 (1)		5.3 (2)
Ethnic conflict	8.3 (1)	33.3 (4)	28.6 (4)	23.7 (9)
Macroeconomic instability	33.3 (4)	25.0 (3)	21.4 (3)	26.3 (10)
Man-made environmental	58.3 (7)	41.7 (5)	50.0 (7)	50.0 (19)
Migratory pressures	33.3 (4)	41.7 (5)	50.0 (7)	42.1 (16)
Narcotics trafficking	33.3 (4)	16.7 (2)	14.3 (2)	21.1 (8)
Natural disaster/pandemics	33.3 (4)	16.7 (2)	35.7 (5)	29.0 (11)
Nuclear/radiological attacks	16.7 (2)		7.1 (1)	7.9 (3)
Terrorism: crit. infrastructure	8.3 (1)	33.3 (4)	14.3 (2)	18.4 (7)
Terrorism: state or society	16.7 (2)	50.0 (6)	28.6 (4)	31.6 (12)



**Table 4.11b. Percentage naming non-state actors as origins of security threats**

	Civil Servants, in % (n=12)	MEPs, in % (n=12)	Academic Experts, in % (n=14)	Overall, in % (n=38)
Biological/chemical attack	33.3 (4)		28.6 (4)	21.1 (8)
Conventional war		8.3 (1)		2.6 (1)
Criminalisation of economy	41.7 (5)	41.7 (5)	14.3 (2)	31.6 (12)
Cyber attack	16.7 (2)	16.7 (2)		10.5 (4)
Ethnic conflict	16.7 (2)	41.7 (5)	21.4 (3)	26.3 (10)
Macroeconomic instability	25.0 (3)	8.3 (1)	14.3 (2)	15.8 (6)
Man-made environmental	50.0 (6)	41.7 (5)	28.6 (4)	39.5 (15)
Migratory pressures	8.3 (1)	25.0 (3)	21.4 (3)	18.4 (7)
Narcotics trafficking	41.7 (5)	8.3 (1)	14.3 (2)	21.1 (8)
Natural disaster/pandemics	33.3 (4)	8.3 (1)	14.3 (2)	18.4 (7)
Nuclear/radiological attacks	16.7 (2)			5.3 (2)
Terrorism: crit. infrastructure	58.3 (7)	33.3 (4)	57.1 (8)	50.0 (19)
Terrorism: state or society	66.7 (8)	58.3 (7)	71.4 (10)	65.8 (25)

**Table 4.12. Mean importance of the European Union**

	Civil Servants (n= 8-12; may vary by question)	MEPs (n= 11-12; may vary by question)	Academic Experts (n= 13-14; may vary by question)	Overall (n= 33-38; may vary by question)
Biological/chemical attack	2.92	2.50	2.79	2.74
Conventional war	2.33	2.67	3.00	2.68
Criminalisation of economy	3.08	4.00	3.36	3.47
Cyber attack	2.17	2.73	2.64	2.51
Ethnic conflict	3.08	3.27	3.71	3.38
Macroeconomic instability	3.83	4.25	4.57	4.24
Man-made environmental	3.50	3.75	4.36	3.90
Migratory pressures	3.88	3.83	4.08	3.94
Narcotics trafficking	3.25	3.00	3.64	3.32
Natural disaster/pandemics	3.08	3.42	3.43	3.32
Nuclear/radiological attacks	2.67	2.50	3.07	2.76
Terrorism: critical infrastructure	2.67	3.08	3.00	2.92
Terrorism: state or society	2.92	3.25	3.14	3.11

**Table 4.13. Civil servants: mean importance of the European Union**

	PSC	Civil Servants	Overall CS
Biological/chemical attack	3.17	2.67	2.92
Conventional war	2.50	2.17	2.33
Criminalisation of economy	3.00	3.17	3.08
Cyber attack	2.33	2.00	2.17
Ethnic conflict	3.50	2.67	3.08
Macroeconomic instability	3.67	4.00	3.83
Man-made environmental	3.33	3.67	3.50
Migratory pressures	3.00	4.17	3.88
Narcotics trafficking	3.33	3.17	3.25
Natural disaster/pandemics	3.17	3.00	3.08
Nuclear/radiological attacks	3.33	2.00	2.67
Terrorism: critical infrastructure	2.50	2.83	2.67
Terrorism: state or society	3.00	2.83	2.92
Base n (may vary by question)	2-6	6	8-12

**Table 4.14. Alignment of budgetary and manpower resources with threats**

	Civil Servants, in % (n=12)	MEPs, in % (n=11)	Academic Experts, in % (n=14)	Overall, in % (n=37)
Aligned	25.0 (3)	45.5 (5)	28.6 (4)	32.4 (12)
Misaligned	75.0 (9)	54.6 (6)	71.4 (10)	67.6 (25)

**Table 4.15. Evaluations of EU member states' National Defence Budgets and military modernisation**

	Civil Servants, in % (n=12)	MEPs, in % (n=11)	Academic Experts, in % (n=14)	Overall, in % (n=37)
<b>Size of budget</b>				
Too large	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)
Just about right	50.0 (6)	63.6 (7)	42.9 (6)	51.4 (19)
Too little	50.0 (6)	36.4 (4)	57.1 (8)	48.7 (18)

**Table 4.16. Satisfaction with distribution of Defence Budget spending**

	Civil Servants, in % (n= 9-11; varies by question)	MEPs, in % (n= 10-12; varies by question)	Academic Experts, in % (n= 9-14; varies by question)	Overall, in % (n= 28-37; varies by question)	by
<i><u>Distribution of defence budget meets needs?</u></i>					
Yes	18.2 (2)	8.3 (1)	35.7 (5)	21.6 (8)	
No	81.8 (9)	91.7 (11)	64.3 (9)	78.4 (29)	
<b>Personnel</b>					
<i><b>Too much</b></i>	44.5 (4)	45.5 (5)	44.5 (4)	44.8 (13)	
Just about right	11.1 (1)	27.3 (3)	33.3 (3)	24.1 (7)	
Too little	44.5 (4)	27.3 (3)	22.2 (2)	31.0 (9)	
<b>Procurement</b>					
<i><b>Too much</b></i>	11.1 (1)	10.0 (1)	0.0 (0)	7.1 (2)	
Just about right	0.0 (0)	10.0 (1)	11.1 (1)	7.1 (2)	
Too little	88.9 (8)	80.0 (8)	88.9 (8)	85.7 (24)	
<i><u>Research and Development</u></i>					
Too much	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	
Just about right	11.1 (1)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	3.5 (1)	
Too little	88.9 (8)	100.0 (11)	100.0(9)	96.6 (28)	

**Table 4.17. Funding for military modernisation**

	Civil Servants, in % (n=11)	MEPs, in % (n=12)	Academic Experts, in % (n=14)	Overall, in % (n=37)
<i>Sufficient funds to military modernisation?</i>				
Too much	9.1 (1)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	2.7 (1)
Just about right	36.4 (4)	33.3 (4)	14.3 (2)	27.0 (10)
Too little	54.6 (6)	66.7 (8)	85.7 (12)	70.3 (26)

**Table 4.18. Perceptions of ESDP and US Commitment to European security**


	Civil Servants, in % (n=12)	MEPs, in % (n= 11-12; varies by question)	Academic Experts, in % (n=14)	Overall, in % (n= 37-38; varies by question)
<u><i>More autonomous ESDP weaken NATO?</i></u>				
Not at all	33.3 (4)	41.7 (5)	28.6 (4)	34.2 (13)
Little	41.7 (5)	25.0 (3)	35.7 (5)	34.2 (13)
Some	16.7 (2)	8.3 (1)	21.4 (3)	15.8 (6)
Very much	8.3 (1)	16.7 (2)	14.3 (2)	13.2 (5)
Don't know	0.0 (0)	8.3 (1)	0.0 (0)	2.6 (1)
<u><i>Weaker NATO leads to retrenchment of US commitment to European security?</i></u>				
Yes	25.0 (3)	45.5 (5)	7.1 (1)	24.3 (9)
Maybe	33.3 (4)	27.3 (3)	50.0 (7)	37.8 (14)
No	41.7 (5)	18.2 (2)	35.7 (5)	32.4 (12)
Don't know	0.0 (0)	9.1 (1)	7.1 (1)	5.4 (2)
<u><i>American commitment to European security...?</i></u>				
Essential	58.3 (7)	41.7 (5)	14.3 (2)	36.8 (14)
Very important	16.7 (2)	33.3 (4)	28.6 (4)	26.3 (10)
Important	25.0 (3)	25.0 (3)	42.9 (6)	31.6 (12)
Not very important	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	14.3 (2)	5.3 (2)
Inessential	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)

**Table 4.19. Mean evaluations of interstate interactions and security conceptions**


	Civil Servants (n=12)	MEPs (n=12)	Academic Experts (n=14)	Overall (n=38)
<b>Interstate Interaction</b> (‘1’= <i>solely unilateral</i> ; ‘5’= <i>strictly bilateral</i> ; ‘9’= <i>always multilateral</i> ; <i>with intermediary stages</i> )				
Mean	7.42	7.58	7.14	7.37
Minimum/Maximum	4/9	6/9	4/8	4/9
<b>Security Conceptions</b> (‘1’= narrow; ‘5’= medium; ‘9’= very broad’, with intermediary stages)				
Mean	7.08	6.42	6.93	6.82
Minimum/Maximum	2/9	1/9	3/9	1/9




**Figure 4.1. Overall preferences for policy instruments**




**Figure 4.2. Preferences for policy instruments by target groups**




**Figure 4.3. Alignment of budgetary and manpower resources with threats**




**Figure 4.4. Size of budget**




**Figure 4.5. Adequacy of defence budget distribution**




**Figure 4.6. Adequacy of defence budget distribution by sectors (overall results)**



**Figure 4.7. Military modernisation**




**Figure 4.8. Does a more autonomous ESDP weaken NATO?**






**Figure 4.9. Will a weaker NATO lead to a retrenchment of US commitment to European security?**



**Figure 4.10. Importance of US commitment to European security**





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# National Threat Perception: Survey Results from France

Thierry Tardy<sup>26</sup>

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## **ABSTRACT**

The 2006 survey was conducted through the administration of a questionnaire, completed by a total of 49 French civil servants, security experts and members of parliament.

The survey confirms the main conclusions of the 2004/05 survey. There is a large consensus among French civil servants, security experts, and parliamentarians that security is no longer only about defence/military issues and threats emanating from states. It follows that the military instrument is not seen as being the only one in the management of security threats.

By the same token, the extent to which the shift from defence to security has been translated at policy level is still under question. Some efforts have been made to broaden the approach to security management, as is shown in the recently published White Paper on Terrorism, but much remains to be done. In particular, the involvement of agencies beyond the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Interior in the management of threats is still difficult.

The survey also clearly indicates that France favours the pattern of multilateralism rather than unilateralism, although it cannot be said that multilateralism would always be chosen.

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

### **Context of the Survey and Methodological Limits**

The 2006 Survey on 'French Threat Perceptions' is part of a broader GARNET project aimed at analysing the way states, elites and public opinion perceive the evolution of the threats to their security in a post-Cold War context.

In the first phase of the French survey on threat perceptions and institutional response, conducted in 2004–2005, three main conclusions were drawn.<sup>27</sup> First, the type of threat assessment that was made in France in the early 1990s by both policy-makers and public opinion by and large accurately reflected the evolution of the international scene and the shift from a state-based threat to a diversification of threats emanating from state and non-state actors. Second, the specificity of the French approach was stressed, as France, in a post Cold War and in a post 9/11 world, is still driven by a certain propensity to cultivate independence and non-alignment vis-à-vis the United States. Third, while threat assessment was by and

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<sup>27</sup> Thierry Tardy, 'France between Exceptionalism and Orthodoxy', in Emil Kirchner and James Sperling (eds.), *Global Security Governance: Competing perceptions of security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century*, Routledge, 2007, pp. 25-45.

large accurate, it was not certain that such an assessment had been translated into policy. The point was made that despite the evolutions, France continues to think in Westphalian terms about its security and the way it should be addressed. Equally, the shift from defence to security has not been fully digested.

The survey conducted in 2006 was partly aimed at further exploring some hypotheses put forward in the 2004/05 survey. It took the form of a questionnaire administered in two phases to three groups of people: civil servants; security experts; members of the French Parliament. In the first phase, the questionnaire was sent electronically to a target group of 79 persons: 22 Members of Parliament<sup>28</sup>, 15 civil servants from the French Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and 42 security experts (scholars/researchers). Twenty-four responses were obtained (30.4 per cent), but none of the Parliamentarians responded. The response rate was significantly improved through a second phase of interviews, (either by phone or face-to-face).<sup>29</sup> This approach proved to be relatively more successful, especially with Parliamentarians. The distribution of interviewees is presented in Table 5.1.

It is likely that the electronic handling of the questionnaire might have introduced a certain bias, in that a higher respondent rate might have come from a younger than an older age group, given younger members are more familiar with information technology. Beyond the fact that a category of people (the older age group) is consequently set aside from the survey, this may also affect the results as one may contend that the younger generations – who have not lived during the Cold War – are the most likely to have a wide vision of the concept of security and threats. Conversely, one may argue that the older generations (well represented in the French Parliament), have a more traditional approach to security, but are not necessarily at ease with questionnaires dispatched by e-mail. These limits were partly addressed in the second phase, when questionnaires were administered on the phone and through face-to-face interviews.

Analysis of the responses, combined with opinion polls conducted in parallel by polling organisations and qualitative interviews conducted by the author in Paris,<sup>30</sup> Brussels<sup>31</sup> and Geneva,<sup>32</sup> allow for some trends to be identified.

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<sup>28</sup> Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly; Defence Committee of the French National Assembly; and Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the French Senate.

<sup>29</sup> Interviews were carried out by Thierry Tardy and Miriam Fugfugosh in November and December 2006.

<sup>30</sup> Interview with a Civil servant of the French MOD, Paris, 14 September 2006; interview with a Professor at Sciences Po, Paris, 15 September 2006.

<sup>31</sup> Interview with a French diplomat seconded to the EU General Secretariat, Brussels, 22 September 2006.

<sup>32</sup> Interview with a French diplomat seconded to international institutions in Geneva, Geneva, 18 Sept. 2006.

## II. ANALYSIS OF SURVEY

### A General Confirmation of the 2004/05 Conclusions

The different data gathered in 2006 seem to confirm the main conclusions of the 2004/05 survey. There is a large consensus among the respondents and the public at large that security is no longer only about defence/military issues and threats emanating from states. The best example is provided by the terrorist threat, which remains at the top of the list of potential threats identified by public opinion,<sup>33</sup> and which is explicitly associated with non-state actors (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3). This shift is also observed in the nature of the response to threats, which should combine military means but also other instruments of a non-military nature.

The specificity of the French foreign and defence policy, namely the so-called French exceptionalism, was not particularly studied in that survey, but this long-term trend of the French posture still prevails. One question here is the extent to which such a specificity will remain when Jacques Chirac leaves office in May 2007. In particular, recent declarations by one of Chirac's possible successors, Nicolas Sarkozy, on the French-American relationship and the French policy vis-à-vis the US may lead, if Sarkozy is elected, to a more pragmatic approach to French-American relations<sup>34</sup>, as opposed to an irresistible temptation to oppose what Hubert Védrine called the 'hyper-power'.<sup>35</sup>

Finally, the extent to which the shift from defence to security has been translated at policy level and in the way the French administration tackles the threats to its security is still under question. Some efforts have been made to broaden the approach to security management, as is shown in the recently published White Paper on Terrorism,<sup>36</sup> but a lot remains to be done. In particular, the involvement of agencies beyond the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Interior in the management of threats, is still difficult.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> See 'Les Français et la défense', Annual Opinion Poll, BVA, Paris, July 2005; and 'Les Français et la défense', Annual Opinion Poll, BVA, Paris, July 2006.

<sup>34</sup> See Interview of Nicolas Sarkozy, 'J'aime l'énergie et la fluidité de l'Amérique', *Le Monde*, 10-11 September 2006.

<sup>35</sup> See Hubert Védrine, *Face à l'hyperpuissance: textes et discours, 1995-2003* (Paris: Fayard, 2003); Hubert Védrine (interviews by Dominique Moïsi), *Les Cartes de la France à l'heure de la mondialisation* (Paris: Fayard, 2000), p. 9.

<sup>36</sup> *La France face au terrorisme. Livre blanc du Gouvernement sur la sécurité intérieure face au terrorisme*, La Documentation française, Paris, 2006. In the same logic, there is a debate on a possible merger of the French internal intelligence agencies (*Renseignements généraux* (RG), *Direction de la surveillance du territoire* (DST)). These two agencies and the *Division nationale antiterroriste* (DNAT), are to move to the same building. See 'La création d'un service unique pour le renseignement intérieur se précise', *Le Monde*, 18 May 2006.

<sup>37</sup> As an example, a report of the French National Assembly released in 2004 states that in the field of nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical risks, the 'civilian means, human resources and equipment are still very low', and questions the capacity of France to tackle in an efficient way this kind of threats through a civilian-military response. It also stresses that consciousness-raising campaigns of populations remain to be done. See

### ***Threat Assessment***

The 2006 Survey shows in a quite explicit way that threats to French security are perceived to be mainly of a non traditional nature. ‘Macroeconomic instability’, ‘migratory pressures’, ‘environmental threats’, ‘natural disasters and pandemics’, ‘cyber attacks’ and ‘terrorist attacks’ are almost always mentioned by interviewees. Conversely, threats such as ‘conventional war’ or ‘ethnic conflict’ are more rarely mentioned, and most often described as likely to become less important in 2010 than in 2006. This is a confirmation of the general evolution of threat perceptions. It also corresponds to the French policy documents defining security threats, such as the 1994 White Paper on Defence or the 2003-2008 ‘military programme law’.

What needs to be stressed here is the fact that although terrorist attacks are almost always mentioned as security threats, they do not appear as the main threat either today or in 2010 for the interviewees. Only a few persons saw the terrorist attack against state and society as the gravest threat facing France in 2006 and in 2010. This contradicts what opinion polls have constantly shown since 1990, i.e. the fact that the principal form of aggression feared by the French public is a terrorist attack. This has been the case for 48% of the French in April 2001; 61% in 2002; 59% in 2003; 64% in 2004; 59% in June 2005 (before the London attacks); 62% in 2006.<sup>38</sup> A 2006 German Marshall Fund poll also says that ‘International Terrorism’ is an ‘Extremely important’ or ‘Important’ threat for 95% of the French (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3).<sup>39</sup> This difference between public opinion and experts – be they civil servants, security experts or Parliamentarians –, may find an explanation in the fact that French policy-makers have always insisted that terrorism as a threat should be taken extremely seriously, but not overestimated. Other existing threats do not disappear with the growing importance of terrorism.<sup>40</sup> This in turn may also reflect the sense, often expressed among French elites, that the terrorist threat is overestimated in general (in the US and in Europe) and that it should not shape the French security policy excessively. This concern was well reflected in the High-Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, released in December 2004 and aimed at analysing the international security context and the role of the

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*Avis présenté au nom de la Commission de la Défense nationale et des forces armées, sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2005 (n°1800), Jean-Claude Viollet, October 2004, p. 29.*

<sup>38</sup> ‘Les Français et la défense’, Annual Opinion Poll, BVA, Paris, July 2005; and ‘Les Français et la défense’, Annual Opinion Poll, BVA, Paris, July 2006.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> See Chirac’s speech, Conference of the Ambassadors, Elysée Palace, Paris, 29 August 2002. More recently, in his speech on nuclear deterrence on 19 January 2006, Jacques Chirac said that ‘it is not because a new threat appears that the others disappear’.

UN in the face of the so-called ‘new threats’.<sup>41</sup> While recognizing that terrorism was one of the major threats to international security, the report also insisted on the linkage between security and development, and on the fact that for many states, poverty and under-development were the major security concerns, and were also ‘fertile breeding-ground for other threats’.<sup>42</sup> This observation is by and large accepted by French policy-makers, who tend to increasingly see security threats in broad and inter-related terms.

Yet, this observation is to be nuanced by the importance given to terrorism at the governmental level, through the release in 2006 of the White Paper on Terrorism for example.<sup>43</sup> Indeed, at a time when some Parliamentarians and researchers are calling for a new White Paper on Security and Defence,<sup>44</sup> the release of a document dedicated to terrorism seems to demonstrate that France pays particular attention to the issue of terrorism, at the expense of other issues.

The White Paper on Terrorism is the first attempt to define a comprehensive doctrine to fight terrorism. ‘Global Terrorism’ is presented as a ‘strategic threat’ that has never been as important as in 2006. It is explicitly associated with ‘fundamentalist Islam’,<sup>45</sup> while the document insists that the fight against terrorism should in no way be understood as a fight against Islam.<sup>46</sup>

The White Paper is a quite ambitious document, which looks at the issue of terrorism in a comprehensive manner, addressing short-term and longer-term issues, and embracing a wide range of policy responses, involving different national and international organs. It also stresses the need to define a communication strategy on terrorism and to get public support for governmental action. While the document talks about terrorism in strong terms, it refuses to use expressions such as ‘war on terror’, thus avoiding any reference to American policy.

### **Nature of the Responses to Threats**

The responses given by the questionnaires on the appropriate ways to meet the security threats are consistent with threat perceptions insofar as they combine traditional military

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<sup>41</sup> ‘A More Secure World. Our Shared Responsibility’, Report of the Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations, December 2004.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p.viii.

<sup>43</sup> *La France face au terrorisme. Livre blanc du Gouvernement sur la sécurité intérieure face au terrorisme*, La Documentation française, Paris, 2006.

<sup>44</sup> See Pierre Lellouche, National Assembly, report n°384, 20 November 2002, p.44. The idea of a new White Paper is also promoted by General Loup Francart in *Livre gris sur la Sécurité et la Défense*, Economica, Paris, 2006.

<sup>45</sup> *La France face au terrorisme. Livre blanc du Gouvernement sur la sécurité intérieure face au terrorisme*, La Documentation française, Paris, 2006, p.15.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p.118-119.



instruments and other types of response (see Table 5.4). ‘Economic and financial assistance’ and ‘police cooperation and intelligence sharing’ are the two most often mentioned policy instruments, and almost systematically cited when dealing with threats such as ‘migratory pressure’ or ‘terrorist attacks’. Though rarely cited, ‘special operations’ is also most often cited to tackle terrorist attacks. There is, by and large, a sense that any threat can be tackled only through the variety of policy instruments that is suggested in the questionnaire. Unsurprisingly, it is not suggested that threats such as ‘macroeconomic instability’ or ‘criminalisation of the economy’ be tackled by ‘traditional military’ instruments. Overall, ‘traditional military’ instruments and ‘special operations’ are largely mentioned to tackle the two threats of ‘terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure’ and ‘terrorist attacks against state or society’, but are otherwise rarely cited (one could expect them to be mentioned as a response to ‘conventional war’, but as this threat is not often cited by interviewees, ‘traditional military instruments’ are equally not often cited in the responses to threats).

Beyond the questionnaire, it is interesting to note that 61% of the French see the role of the French Ministry of Defence as important in the fight against terrorism,<sup>47</sup> which gives an indication on the military nature of the fight against terrorism for the majority of French public opinion. Furthermore, 83% of the French declare that they ‘trust the French armed forces to identify and prevent terrorist threats that target France’.<sup>48</sup> The White Paper on Terrorism looks at the issue in a broader way and shows a real effort to involve all official bodies concerned, especially when it comes to define long-term policies and to get public support. In practice though, as said in different Parliamentary reports, the ability of France to manage the consequences of possible terrorist attacks (biological or chemical for example) is still largely criticized.

Finally, the way France sees the responses to threats to its own security must be analyzed in light of President Chirac’s latest speech on nuclear deterrence on 19 January 2005. In his speech Chirac clearly redefines French ‘vital interests’ that nuclear deterrence is supposed to protect.<sup>49</sup> Beyond the three traditional vital interests defined in the 1994 Defence White Paper (integrity of national territory, the free exercise of sovereignty and the protection of the population), Jacques Chirac states that ‘securing strategic supplies and the defence of allies’ could become, depending on the context, part of the French vital interests,<sup>50</sup> and

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<sup>47</sup> See ‘Les Français face au terrorisme’, intervention by Jean-François Bureau, Spokesperson of the French MOD, 17 November 2005.

<sup>48</sup> ‘Les Français et la défense’, annual opinion poll, BVA, Paris, July 2006.

<sup>49</sup> See ‘Dissuasion: M. Chirac élargit la notion d’intérêts vitaux’, *Le Monde*, 20 January 2006.

<sup>50</sup> Speech by Jacques Chirac on nuclear deterrence at l’île Longue, 19 January 2006.

therefore be covered by nuclear deterrence. In the same speech, Chirac reiterates that ‘nuclear deterrence is not aimed at deterring fanatical terrorists’, but adds that ‘heads of states who would resort to terrorist means against [France], as well as the ones who would contemplate the use of weapons of mass destruction, must understand that they would be exposed to a firm and appropriate response’<sup>51</sup> from France. This wording may not have any impact at the policy level and can be seen as a way to justify nuclear deterrence in a post Cold War and post-9/11 world, but it is also a strong signal to states that would support terrorism that France has not renounced the use of the most deadly weapons. In 2006, 61% of the French declared that France ‘could not ensure its defence without nuclear deterrence’.<sup>52</sup>

### **Origin of the Threat**

The 2004/05 survey found that security experts and doctrine as well as public opinion were then looking southward rather than eastward when analysing the geographical origin of the threats to French security. The Middle East and Mediterranean seemed to have replaced the Soviet Union. This general trend is confirmed by the 2006 survey, which mentions the Middle East and Africa (without naming particular countries) as the main sources of threat. However, Russia, Eastern Europe and the Balkans are also mentioned in the context of non traditional security threats such as ‘criminalisation of the economy’.

By the same token, the responses confirm the perception of a certain de-territorialisation of the threat, in the sense that security threats are largely seen as emanating from other actors than states. The multi-centric nature of the international system is here largely reflected since non state actors are mentioned as sources of security threats as often as state actors. ‘Terrorist groups or networks’ are the most often cited; ‘mafia-type groups’ are also mentioned. Interestingly enough, ‘fundamentalist Islam’ is mentioned in one questionnaire response as a source of threats,<sup>53</sup> which could in a way reflect a French effort to make the distinction between terrorism and Islam (although the White Paper on Terrorism makes the link between terrorism and ‘fundamentalist Islam’) (see Table 5.5).

### **Role of the European Union**

The responses to the question on the importance of the EU in addressing security threats to Europe oscillate between 2 and 3, with 0 meaning ‘not important at all’ and 5 meaning

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<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> ‘Les Français et la défense’, annual opinion poll, BVA, Paris, July 2006.

<sup>53</sup> The question was open and did not propose any sources of threats to choose from to the interviewee.

‘absolutely essential’. This can be interpreted in two contrasting ways. The optimistic interpretation is to say that the EU is starting to be seen as a security actor that can play a relatively important role in tackling a variety of threats, and is even seen as playing a significant role in dealing with threats such as ‘macroeconomic instability’ or ‘migratory pressures’ (where a ‘4’ was often given). This comes as a consequence of the development of a European Security and Defence Policy, and would probably not have been observed ten years ago. The role of the EU in tackling ‘ethnic conflict’ is also recognized, probably in reference to the current or recent involvement of the EU in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Again, this would not have been the case ten years ago. The less optimistic interpretation is that the EU is almost never seen as an actor playing an essential role in threat management, while through ESDP, the EU aspires to play a key role at different levels. In the end, the responses may just reflect reality, i.e. that the EU is playing some kind of a role, but still fails to have the characteristics that would make it a fully-fledged threat management actor. The EU is certainly considered as playing an important role in economic matters and issues dealing with governance or where strong cooperation among European states is needed on non traditional threats (migration and drug trafficking among others), but when it comes to hard security issues, the EU is still not seen as the most appropriate and best-equipped actor. It should also be noted that the question was on the role that the EU is currently playing, and not on the role it should play, which, in France, may have been slightly different. Finally, one should note the gap often observed between elites and public opinion on the role of the EU, in the sense that public opinions are generally more eager to see the EU playing an essential role in security management.<sup>54</sup> According to the 2006 annual opinion poll on the French and Defence, 91% of the French population said that European defence was a ‘good thing’.<sup>55</sup>

## **Resources**

Survey questions about resources seem to reveal that French Defence resources are, by and large, seen as sufficient, but that the balance between personnel, equipment and research and development is not necessarily adequate (see Table 5.6). Unsurprisingly, all interviewees declared that too little is spent on research and development. By the same token, a majority of interviewees declared that too little was devoted to military modernisation. The responses on personnel and equipment do not allow for any generalisation. Beyond the questionnaire, one debate in France is about the way the defence budget is spent, more than on the amount itself

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<sup>54</sup> See on this the semi-annual Eurobarometer Polls.

<sup>55</sup> ‘Les Français et la défense’, Annual Opinion Poll, BVA, Paris, July 2006.

(€47.8 billion in 2005). An opinion poll of June 2006 showed that for 72% of the French, the defence budget should stay as it is or be increased.<sup>56</sup> The debate is more on the share taken by personnel expenditures (€28 billion out of 48 in 2005) and the need to have 434,000 personnel by 2015 with 50,000 deployable troops, or about the rationale for some heavy equipment programmes, such as the second aircraft carrier or the 300 combat aircraft.<sup>57</sup>

### **Linkage between ESDP and NATO, and the American Commitment**

The question on the extent to which a more autonomous ESDP would weaken NATO meets a consensus around a negative answer (see Table 5.7). This in a way reflects the official French position by which the ESDP is compatible with the centrality of NATO and should therefore not be seen as a threat for NATO. The above-mentioned 2006 opinion poll on the French and Defence also confirms the absence of any contradiction for the French between ESDP and NATO. The challenge for France, when the ESDP project was defined at the Franco-British Saint-Malo summit in December 1998, was precisely to convince the UK, and then the US and other EU member states, that the two projects were compatible, or even mutually reinforcing. Beyond this official position, it should also be mentioned, however, that ESDP is seen by many within the French administration as a way to weaken NATO, a view that is not reflected in the questionnaires.

In the same vein, the questionnaires largely indicate that the American commitment to European security is seen as important, which is not surprising. The French posture summarized by the sentence ‘Allies but not aligned’ is really a two-edge position and shall not be confined to its conflictual dimension. In the period following the Iraq crisis, several opinion polls showed that the French were more anti-Bush than anti-American<sup>58</sup>. Besides, whatever the French may think about the United States as a power, they also accept the fact that the role the US has played in Europe since the Second World War has been important in stabilizing the continent and allowing for its peaceful reconstruction. The Survey just confirms this position. Recent declarations by French candidate to Presidency Nicolas Sarkozy<sup>59</sup> also show a certain willingness to downplay existing divergences between the two countries, which in electoral terms, might not be the best tactical move. Besides, all commentators in France concur in saying that despite discrepancies between Chirac and Bush

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<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>57</sup> See ‘La défense est menacée de servir de ‘variable d’ajustement’ budgétaire’, *Le Monde*, 14 July 2006.

<sup>58</sup> See ‘Global Opinion. The Spread of Anti-Americanism’, Trends 2005, A Review of Pew Global Attitudes Project findings, Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, January 2005.

<sup>59</sup> See Interview of Nicolas Sarkozy, ‘J’aime l’énergie et la fluidité de l’Amérique’, *Le Monde*, 10-11 September 2006.

over Iraq, cooperation in the fight against terrorism has been particularly good since 2001. What is interesting here is that a recent survey by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press shows that the importance of France as an ally is perceived to be in decline for the US in the coming years.<sup>60</sup>

### **Conception of Interstate Interaction and Security**

The questions about interstate interaction and conception of security seem to confirm a conclusion that was made as a result of the 2004/05 survey. On interstate interaction, the responses confirm the multilateral route that France seems to favour to meet its security challenges. This has been a constant feature of French foreign and defence policies in the post Cold War era, even if France would not hesitate to go unilateral if need be (see Table 5.4 on interaction patterns). At the same time, the responses on the conception of security offer a more balanced picture, with quite a few interviewees indicating that the French conception is still relatively narrow (3 or 4 on the proposed scale). This may reflect the fact that France has still not operated the shift from defence to security, and is still, to a certain extent, thinking and acting with a traditional conception of the notion of security.

## **III. FRENCH NATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE**

### **Making the link with the 2004/05 conclusions**

With regard to developments in French national security culture, (views on the external environment, identity, instrumental preferences and interaction patterns), Table 5.8 provides an update of the 2004/05 findings.

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<sup>60</sup> ‘America’s Place in the World 2005’, Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, November 2005, p.4, p.26, p.66-67.

**Table 5.1: Number of respondents**

Persons interviewed	Number of responses
Civil Servants / Members of government	13
Security Experts	17
Members of Parliament	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>49*</b>

\* The total is higher than the addition of preceding rows because six people responded to the electronic questionnaire without giving their background.

**Table 5.2: French Threat Perceptions in 2002\***

Question: 'In the current international context, what is, according to you, the first danger for France?'	%
Mass terrorism, such as the 11 September attacks	41
Social, demographic inequalities or inter-ethnic tensions in France and in Europe	27
Opposition between civilizations or between systems (West <i>versus</i> Islam, or poor <i>versus</i> rich countries)	15
Spill-over of regional conflicts (India/Pakistan or Israel/Palestine)	10
Development of mafias	4
Other / Don't know	3
	100

'Les Français et les questions de défense, sécurité, civisme et forces armées', Opinion Poll conducted by the Institut BVA in May 2002, and published in *Ouest France*, 16 June 2002.

**Table 5.3: French Threat Perceptions in 2006\***

<b>Question:</b> ‘I am going to read you a list of possible international threats to Europe in the next 10 years. Please tell me if you think each one is an extremely important threat, an important threat or not an important threat at all.’	Extremely important threat	Important threat	Not an important threat at all	Don’t know / Refusal
International terrorism	60	35	5	-
Large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into Europe	22	51	26	1
Iran acquiring nuclear weapons	53	37	9	1
The global spread of a disease such as the avian bird flu	26	50	25	-
A major economic downturn	36	52	11	1
The effects of global warming	60	33	6	-
The growing power of China	28	53	19	1
Violence and instability in Iraq	36	51	13	1
Islamic fundamentalism	54	37	8	1

TNS Opinion, *Transatlantic Trends – Topline Report 2006*, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2006, pp. 20-28.

**Table 5.4. France’s preferred responses to threats**

<i>Interaction patterns</i>	Multilateral in principle, but unilateral response
	never ruled out
	Bilateral on intelligence sharing
<i>Institutional preferences</i>	European Union
	United Nations
	NATO
	OSCE
<i>Instrumental preferences</i>	All options possible
	Combination of civilian and military tools
	Crisis management/Peace operations
	Diplomacy
	Development aid
	Human intelligence
	Police
	Military intervention/use of force

**Table 5.5. French threat perceptions in the post-11 September era**

<i>Type of key threats</i>	Nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical and ballistic
	Proliferation
	Terrorism
	Religious extremisms and nationalisms
	Organized crime/drug trafficking
	Regional and intra-state conflicts
	Failed states
<i>Agency of threats</i>	States and non-state actors
	Extremist groups
<i>Target of threat</i>	Population
	Military/Officials in France and abroad
	State structure
	Economic assets
	Official premises
<i>Geographical source of threat</i>	Global
	Balkans
	Eastern Europe
	Mediterranean
	Middle East

**Table 5.6: Budgetary resources**

<b>Size of the defence budget</b>	<b>Does defence budget meet defence needs?</b>	<b>Alignment between budgetary resources and security threats</b>
Too large: 20%	No: 75%	Misaligned: 44%
Too little: 28%		
Just about right: 52%		

**Table 5.7: Perceptions of ESDP, NATO and US Commitment to European Security**

<b>EU importance for specific security threats (rank-ordered)</b>	<b>Autonomous ESDP weaken NATO?</b>	<b>Weaker NATO weaken US commitment</b>	<b>US commitment to Europe</b>
	Not at all: 69%	No: 61%	Essential: 12%
	A little: 31%	Yes: 22%	Important: 64%
	Very much: 0	No: 11%	Inessential: 24%
		Don't know: 6%	



**Table 5.8: French National Security Culture\***

<b>Elements of Security Culture</b>	<b>Content of Culture</b>	<b>Conclusion of the 2006 Survey</b>
World view of external environment	Most important factor shaping interstate relations are the distribution of power among states; considerably less attention is paid to non-state or transnational actors. Transnational and non-state actors have not been integrated into the French understanding of security.	The Survey clearly indicates that non traditional dimensions of security are now shaping the French security agenda (although it is silent on whether this is really translated at policy level).
Identity	Though identity remains strongly national and Westphalian, it coexists with a 'European' identity and, to a lesser extent, with a Western identity. The European identity does shape security threat perception and response.	The issue of 'Identity' is not addressed in the Survey. As for the EU, it is described in the Survey as an actor that can play a role at different levels of threat management, beyond the economic sphere, but not yet in an essential role.
Instrumental preferences	Emphasis placed on military instrument as well as on the political power that France draws from its status; 'civilian' instruments of statecraft are not yet fully integrated into French security policy.	The Survey does not directly address this point but indicates that the military instrument is far from being the only one in the management of security threats.
Interaction patterns	Primary approach shaped by requirements of interstate diplomacy. The EU rather than NATO is the preferred forum for fashioning a collective response to a common security threat. The United Nations is also an institution of strategic importance. Yet, unilateral response remains a politically and instrumentally viable option.	The Survey clearly indicates that France favours the pattern of multilateralism rather than unilateralism, although it cannot be said that multilateralism would always be chosen.

Table taken from Thierry Tardy, 'France: Between Exceptionalism and Orthodoxy', in Emil Kirchner and James Sperling (eds.), *Global Security Governance: Competing perceptions of security in the 21st century*, Routledge, 2007, p. 43.



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# National Threat Perception: Survey Results from Germany

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## **ABSTRACT**

This paper explores the German elite perceptions on security threats and institutional response. This will involve a rank ordering of security threats in terms of their perceived priority and an assessment of the preferred major methods for ameliorating or preventing security threats. A further issue of examination will be to establish what balance Germany intends to strike between its deeply rooted exceptionalism (some would say anti-militarism) and the claims imposed by international partners to fulfil its responsibilities in contributing to a safer and more stable world.

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

The purpose of this paper is to identify the present perceptions and future expectations of the German ‘security elite’ with respect to major security threats for their country in relation to the major methods to prevent or minimise those threats. The paper mainly refers to primary data collected in a survey during summer 2006 among German parliamentarians, civil servants and experts dealing with security related policies. It analyses the findings of this survey and sets them into a broader context for further discussion and comparison with the results of similarly compiled surveys held simultaneously in eight other EU member states.

## **II. DATA & METHODOLOGY**

The paper is organised as follows: First, the outcomes of the survey are presented graphically. Although required by the editors’ guidelines for data interpretation, we did not split the data into the categories ‘parliamentarians’ on the one hand and ‘security experts’ on the other, considering the survey’s low rate of return. With only 22 duly completed and returned questionnaires, the significance of the outcomes and hence the explanatory power of interpretations is very limited. Therefore we present the issues in a broader context by putting emphasis on current developments. The graphical analysis and the extended discussion of the survey’s outcomes are guided by three perspectives: firstly, the perception of threats by the German security elite; secondly, the preferred responses to those threats; and thirdly, the effectiveness of the measures and policies taken as well as the appropriateness of allocated resources. This also includes the survey’s findings on transatlantic relations and puts them in relation to common patterns of behaviour in Germany’s foreign and security policy. Finally

they draw conclusions on Germany's 'exceptionalism' and possible future developments in German security governance.

### **III. SURVEY ANALYSIS**

#### ***a. Perception of Threats***

Germany's security elite exhibits a wide understanding of security as they assess the present threats deriving from various sources (see Figure 6.1).

Unsurprisingly, the threat from terrorist attacks is rated highest, whereas attacks against critical infrastructure are considered slightly more grave than attacks aimed against state or society directly. Interestingly, the risks of man-made environmental threats are top-rated, stressing the ecological component of security, followed by macro-economic instability and cyber attacks. Thus, non-classical sources of threats are at the top of the list, from societal and ecological security to economic security. This ranking corresponds to a concept based upon a 'broad' definition of security, as traditional threats like conventional war or nuclear attacks are weighted quite low. Transnational-crime related threats in contrast, such as narcotics trafficking and criminalisation of the economy, are regarded more alarming than classical war-and-peace issues. Germany's security experts thus tend to gradually abandon a classical viewpoint of security.

The survey also tried to reveal the mid-term predictions of the participating experts and politicians. Asked to rank the five gravest threats Germany will likely to face in 2010, the given answers did not significantly differ from the assessments of the present situation (see Figure 6.2).

While most of the rankings do not differ too much from those presented in Figure 6.1, the threat of biological/chemical attacks is expected to rise. This leaves questions about the effectiveness of current measures encountering this kind of threat.

#### ***b. Preferred Measures***

As mentioned above, the respondents assume the threat of biological/chemical attacks will rise within the next few years. Asked for the proper means to reduce this risk, an overwhelming proportion (more than 40 per cent) of the respondents mention intensified police cooperation and enhanced sharing of intelligence. In the perception of the majority of

the survey's participants, terrorists from the broader Middle East are the prime agents for the argumentation of such threats (see Figure 6.3).

The preferred recommendation (about 30 per cent of responses) is the use of instruments which rely on soft-power components to the greatest extent, putting emphasis on diplomatic efforts and economic/financial assistance. The German security elite obviously does not pin much further hope on the enhancement of multilateral legal frameworks as was recommended by the Blix Commission in June 2006.<sup>61</sup> Instead, police and intelligence dominated measures are preferred, including executive mechanisms to control already existing treaties against the use, production and proliferation of biological and chemical weapons.

Asked about the best measures against the threat of conventional military war, 30 per cent of the respondents call for diplomatic initiatives. More than 20 per cent see traditional military policies as an appropriate response to the classical threat of war. These data indicate that the perceived best response to this threat category rests on the principle of 'sticks and carrots', underpinned by a credible potential of military deterrence. But as 'conventional war' was not ranked as a major threat to Germany (see Figure 6.1), the countermeasures proposed by the respondents should not be seen as representative of the overall security policies advocated by Germany's security elite (see Figures 6.4 and 6.5).

The threat of a criminalisation of the economy is ranked relatively high by the respondents (Figure 6.5). Unsurprisingly, the absolute majority again regard enhanced police cooperation and intelligence sharing as the most appropriate policy instrument to meet this kind of threat. However, 35 per cent of the respondents regard diplomatic efforts and economic/financial assistance as proper measures to control international crime.

Police cooperation and intelligence sharing is also assessed as the best policy to respond to several other major threats. The vast majority of the experts interviewed propose the use of these instruments in order to meet the threat of cyber attacks. The findings for the threat of narcotic trafficking are similar. More than 40 per cent take cooperation in the sectors of police and intelligence to be the most important countermeasure, whereas 21 per cent underline the importance of economic and financial assistance, and 17 per cent see special

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<sup>61</sup> Blix, Hans: Weapons of Terror – Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms, Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, June 2006, online: <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/Abroestung/Blix-Bericht-0606.pdf>, 12 September 2006.

operations as an appropriate measure. A large part of the respondents assume that the threat derives from of three different sources: hackers, secret services and terrorists.

Asked about the most appropriate policy instruments regarding the management and settlement of ethnic conflicts, the respondents answer in favour of diplomatic initiatives as well as economic and financial assistance. About 70 per cent of all replies fall into these two categories (see Figure 6.8). In contrast, the use of traditional military concepts is completely absent although robust military interventions are often seen as the last resort in case of ethnic violence and ethnic cleansing (see Figures 6.8 and 6.9).

Another issue is economic security. Macro-economic crises especially have the power to shatter the political order of states and even of world regions. German security experts and politicians take economic and financial assistance for the best measures to counteract such threats. Many respondents specified their expectations in a way that linked macro-economic instability to an overheating Asian economy in combination with a crisis on international capital markets. These threats are mainly attributed to non-state actors, exemplified by private finance companies.

The survey also addresses issues of ecological security, for instance environmental threats and potential natural disasters. Our findings for both topics are quite similar, referring to a high interdependency across various sectors (see Figures 6.10 and 6.11). Man-made environmental threats, in particular, need to be tackled in many different fields. Economic and financial assistance as well as diplomatic efforts are seen as the most important components of a preventive strategy, whereas more than 30 per cent of the experts interviewed asked for other measures. A considerable number of the respondents see these threats' locus of origin in Asia, especially in India and China, but also in the United States of America. Transnational business cooperations are expected to amplify the risk of man-made environmental threats (see Figures 6.10 and 6.11).

Yet, the survey's outcomes regarding threats of natural disasters and pandemics differ from the above-mentioned outcomes for man-made environmental threats. The results show a uniform distribution, with economic and financial assistance as focal point. About 13 per cent of the experts deem special operations an appropriate measure against this kind of threat. Some respondents mentioned the frenzy and confusion about the bird flu as pre-type of a pandemic threat. Therefore increased trans-border cooperation is advocated by many of the German security experts and politicians.

Also migratory pressures are perceived as a possible source of insecurity and threat for Germany. Once again, diplomatic efforts and, most notably, economic and financial assistance represent a significant proportion of the responses (almost 75 per cent) on how to tackle the problem. Police cooperation and intelligence sharing are also considered integral parts of political measures by 17 per cent of the German security experts interviewed. The respondents in unison identify poverty and conflicts in Africa as the main causes for migratory pressures (see Figures 6.12 and 6.13).

Asked about preferred measures against the threat of nuclear/radiological attacks, the respondents estimate the whole range of instruments to be equally important. First of all police cooperation and intelligence sharing are once again perceived to be the major policy instrument for minimising the risks of such threats, but also diplomacy is highly weighted, with an approval rate of 34 per cent. Moreover, hard-power measures pooled in the categories traditional military and special operations have a considerable weight. These outcomes reflect the present difficulties in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as the German security experts differ about how to deal effectively with this issue.

The survey also delved into the elite's assessment about the best policy instruments to face the most powerful threat of the present: terrorism. As mentioned above (Figure 6.1), the respondents perceive attacks on critical infrastructure as the main threat to Germany. 52 per cent take enhanced police-cooperation and intelligence-sharing to be the most important policy instruments, but diplomatic efforts (26 per cent) and economic and financial assistance (17 per cent) as well as special operations (17 per cent) are also advocated. The recently failed attacks on commuter trains in Dortmund and Koblenz underline the massive threat of terrorist assaults on critical infrastructure. The strong approval of enhanced police cooperation and intelligence sharing reflects the growing demand for more coordination between different agencies in the domestic security sector. At the moment Germany faces intensive public debates about the proper response to terrorism, with the main focus on possible limitations on civil rights through enhanced authorization of police forces and interagency cooperation (see Figures 6.14 and 6.15).

Asked about appropriate measures against terrorist attacks on state or society, the respondents once more mainly emphasise the importance of police cooperation and intelligence sharing. Diplomacy, economic assistance and special operations are also ranked considerably high. This illustrates the strong interdependence between external and internal security regarding the terrorist threat: without appropriate foreign policy measures and

political arrangements on an international level, more internal police cooperation cannot be successful, and vice versa.

### *c. Resource Allocation*

The survey also includes questions about the appropriateness of the resources allocated to minimise the above-mentioned threats. Figure 6.16 shows considerable dissatisfaction (47 per cent) with the budgetary resources and manpower devoted to security matters. A significant number of the German security experts and politicians surveyed perceive a strong misalignment in the use of available resources.

Asked about the appropriateness of the German defence budget, the respondents reveal mixed views. While 30 per cent are satisfied with the current defence spending, more than 21 per cent think the expenditures are too high. In combination with Figure 6.16, one could assume that the majority of the survey's participants propose a redistribution of the allocated resources (see Figure 6.17). No clear statement can be derived from the answers on the advisability of resource distribution within the defence budget. The replies are split into three almost equal shares: one third approve the current distribution, one third reject it and one third do not respond to the question, which could be a result of insufficient transparency concerning the allocation of resources (see Figure 6.18).

Views about the appropriateness of the quantity of public-sector personnel concerned with security-related issues are quite convergent. Most of the respondents assume that too much personnel is involved. Thus, a considerable part of the overall dissatisfaction with the distribution of budgetary resources (Figure 6.16) could result from a staffing level regarded as exaggeratedly high. Nearly 90 per cent state that too many staff are occupied with security-related issues (see Figure 6.19). More than 60 per cent of the respondents feel that budget spending on procurement is too high (see Figure 6.20).

In contrast to the above-mentioned questions about resource allocation, the issue of German security-related research and development is seen as a major shortcoming in budgetary spending. 75 per cent of the respondents argue for better funding of these measures. Hence, research and development is clearly seen as a very important part of budget planning. The survey's outcomes appear to reflect the ongoing transition of the German security sector. While overall funding is seen to be adequate, the internal distribution is perceived as unsatisfactory. The strong German commitment to the European Defence



Agency (EDA) underlines the awareness of the ongoing importance of research and development (see Figures 6.21 and 6.22).

The modernisation of the *Bundeswehr* has been a major German defence issue since the end of the Cold War. Asked about the funding of the army's modernisation, one third of the responders stated agreement with the current level of spending. Another 22 per cent call for more funds, while 13 per cent see too much money propelled into the upgrade of the *Bundeswehr*.

#### ***d. Transatlantic Relations***

A major part of the survey is dedicated to the state of transatlantic relations, with a view to revealing the effects triggered by stronger European integration in the realm of security and defence. Therefore, the respondents were asked to answer the question whether a stronger ESDP weakens NATO. All four answer categories were chosen equally here: Further European security and defence integration is not taken to be a zero-sum game regarding transatlantic relations (see Figure 6.23).

We found no unitary views regarding the effects of a weak NATO on the US commitment to European security (Figure 6.24). One third of the respondents see such a development as an eventuality, while only 13 per cent rule out such a causal relationship. More than 20 per cent acknowledge a clearly positive relation between NATO's strength and US commitment.

A major scale for evaluating transatlantic relations is the perceived importance of US commitment to European security. Figure 6.25 reiterates the mixed picture: 26 per cent of the respondents think that the US commitment is not very important. This could be taken as a signal towards enhanced European autonomy in terms of security and defence. However, 39 per cent in sum consider the US commitment essential, important or very important.

#### ***e. German policy patterns***

The last part of the survey is about the perceived policy style of Germany in security issues. Asked for the pattern that best describes German security policies, the respondents have a clear preference for multilateral engagement.

When asked for the government's orientation towards the definition of security, the answers also portray a clear picture. Nearly 70 per cent of the respondents consider the government's conception of security 'broad' or 'very broad' (Figures 6.16 and 6.27).

#### IV. CONCLUSIONS

Although the measures that are taken to ensure public safety are undeniably linked to the changes after September 11, in the case of Germany they are at the same time deeply rooted in about half a century of experience in the necessity of handling security-related issues on a national as well as on a global scale, including the use of a broad range of policy instruments. The German security debate in the 1990s had mainly been affected by the gradual reduction of border controls on the basis of the *Schengen* agreement, putting organised crime as a main issue on the security agenda. On the verge of the twenty-first century, however, terrorism as the primary threat appears in a de-individualised form and is perceived as rooted in the current global constellation. As a consequence, the necessity of understanding security as a concept as well as the adequate use of policy instruments in its favour needs to be comprehensive and depends heavily on the assessment of the current situation by opinion-leaders.

From our analysis, we conclude that first of all, the German security elite define security in a considerably broad sense. Therefore, any potential risk could be interpreted as a threat to national security. This position contradicts the classical German reluctance towards international engagement. Germany is still trying to find an adequate balance between its deeply-rooted exceptionalism (some would say anti-militarism) and the claims imposed by international partners to fulfil its responsibilities. Moreover, the country is still stuck in a large-scale reform of the security sector. This includes the budgetary redistribution of resources as well as the search for new patterns of reaction which conform to the historical German self-perception.


In consequence, soft-power, 'Friedenspolitik'-related instruments like financial aid, foreign aid and development initiatives, diplomacy and enhanced police cooperation count as the most adequate instruments for amending the security environment (see Figure 6.28).

Traditionally, Germany tends to act multilaterally, in most cases in coordination with the major EU partners and the US, and continues to see itself in the role of coordinating the equilibrium of the European political landscape. At the same time, German foreign and

security policy is losing much of its exceptionalism. Germany’s security elite, after all, appears to only have started to become aware of the country’s growing responsibility to match its appreciation of the new international threat scenery with readjusted assessments of appropriate choices of instruments as well as self-perception-based role-models.


**FIGURES**

**Figure 6.1: Five gravest threats present**




**Please choose from the list no more than 5 of the gravest threats facing your country today and rank order them.**

**Figure 6.2: Five gravest threats in 2010**




**Please choose from the list no more than 5 of the gravest threats facing your country in 2010 and rank order them.**

**Figure 6.3: Preferred measures: biological/chemical attacks**




**What are the three most appropriate policy instruments to meet the threat of biological/chemical attacks?**

**Figure 6.4: Preferred measures: conventional war**




**Figure 6.5: Preferred measures: criminalisation of economy**



**What are the most appropriate policy instruments to meet the threat of criminalisation of the economy?**


**Figure 6.6: Preferred measures: narcotics trafficking**



**What are the most appropriate policy instruments to meet the threat of narcotics trafficking?**




**Figure 6.7: Preferred measures: cyber attacks**




**What are the most appropriate policy instruments to meet the threat of cyber attacks?**

**Figure 6.8: Preferred measures: ethnic conflicts**




**What are the most appropriate policy instruments to meet the threat of ethnic conflicts?**

**Figure 6.9: Preferred measures: macroeconomic instability**




**What are the most appropriate policy instruments to meet the threat of macroeconomic instability?**

**Figure 6.10: Preferred measures: environmental threats**




**What are the most appropriate policy instruments to meet the threat of man-made environmental threats?**

**Figure 6.11: Natural disasters/pandemics**




**What are the most appropriate policy instruments to meet the threat of natural disasters and pandemics?**

**Figure 6.12: Preferred measures: migratory pressures**




**What are the most appropriate policy instruments to meet the threat of migratory pressures?**

**Figure 6.13: Preferred measures: nuclear attacks**



**What are the most appropriate policy instruments to meet the threat of nuclear/radiological attacks?**


**Figure 6.14: Preferred measures: terrorist attack on critical infrastructure**



**What are the most appropriate policy instruments to meet the threat of terrorist attacks against state or society?**




**Figure 6.15: Preferred measures: terrorist attack state or society**




**What are the most appropriate policy instruments to meet the threat of terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure?**


**Figure 6.16: Budgetary resources**




**Figure 6.17: Defence budget**




**Figure 6.18: Distribution within defence budget**




**Figure 6.19: Budgetary resources: personnel**




**Figure 6.20: Budgetary resources: procurement**



**Figure 6.21: Budgetary resources: R&D**




**Figure 6.22: Funding of military modernisation**







**Figure 6.23: ESDP and NATO**




**Figure 6.24: US commitment and weak NATO**




**Figure 6.25: Importance of US commitment**



**Figure 6.26: Patterns of state interaction**




**Figure 6.27: Security conception**



**Does your nation's government conceive of security narrowly (confined primarily to issues where 'hard' power is required) or broadly (where 'soft power' is necessary)?**

**Figure 6.28: Relative Importance of policy instruments**





Garnet Project JERP 5.3.2

May 2007

# National Threat Perception: Survey Results from Italy

Paolo Foradori & Paolo Rosa

Garnet Working Paper N° 18.7

## **ABSTRACT**

This paper presents the results of a survey on the Italian foreign policy elite's perception of security threats. The survey shows that the main Italian concerns regard the threats of terrorism and those connected to socio-economic phenomena, such as international migration, the criminalisation of the economy, macroeconomic instability and environmental pollution. The data confirms a certain disposition on Italy's part towards favouring instruments associated with forms of soft power rather than hard power in the management of threats. From the analysis emerges confirmation of the great importance that Italy attributes to transatlantic relations for the defence of its interests and the growing role carried out by the EU in this field. Thus both the tendency of Italy towards multilateral diplomacy, compared to bilateral or unilateral initiatives, is also corroborated by the data and a wider concept of security not merely perceived as narrowed down to the solely military dimension.

## **I. SURVEY INFORMATION**

This paper presents the results of a survey, carried out under the GARNET project, of the Italian foreign policy elite's perception of new threats. The aim of the research was not only to investigate the perception of the main security risks which Italy faces, but also to gather opinions on the responses to these problems, both in terms of instruments to be used and foreign policy models to be followed.

The online questionnaire was sent to a sample composed of 242 people: 60 security experts or academics, 142 members of the Italian parliament belonging to foreign policy and defence commissions and 40 civil servants. The questionnaire was administered in the period between June 2006 and April 2007. The number of replies received and questionnaires which were adequately completed was very low (nine cases were excluded from the analysis owing to the lack of complete responses). In all some 44 valid questionnaires were received, distributed as follows: 28 from security experts or academics, 11 from members of parliament and 5 from civil servants. Consequently, the sample is somewhat lacking and did not enable us to draw significant comparisons between elected politicians and officials responsible for the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, or between policy makers on the one hand, and academics and experts on the other; nor was it possible to distinguish between party affiliation or gender. Therefore it was necessary to present somewhat raw data on the general direction of the Italian foreign policy elite. In spite of these difficulties, some interesting data have emerged, comparable with similar surveys on Italian public opinion on matters of politics and security.



## II. ITALY'S THREAT PERCEPTIONS

The first question concerned the identification of the main threats posed to our country in 2006 and in the near future (2010). The interviewees were asked to indicate the main five threats in decreasing order (with number 1 the main danger and number 5 the least serious). The results are given in Figure 7.1.

Having analysed the data, it emerges that the main five threats for the Italian elite in 2006 are, in decreasing order: terrorist attacks against the state and society (29 responses), the criminalisation of the economy (27 responses), migratory pressures (26 responses), terrorist attacks against infrastructures (25 responses), problems posed by environmental pollution (20 responses). The dangers posed by drug trafficking (19 responses), macroeconomic problems, natural disasters and pandemics (18 responses each), which seem to rouse a certain amount of apprehension. Less worrying are the risks associated with conventional warfare, cyber attacks, nuclear or radiological warfare, and ethnic conflicts. The perception of threats for 2010 does not diverge much from this pattern. The negative evaluation of terrorist threats remains more or less the same. Terrorist attacks against political institutions, social or infrastructure targets occupy the first places (27 and 24 responses respectively), followed by migratory pressures (with 23 responses), a particularly sensitive issue in Italy due to the nature of its borders which are rather difficult to monitor, consisting almost entirely of thousands of miles of coastline. (This evaluation is accompanied by a certain – although not very significant – amount of fear of a possible re-emergence of ethnic conflict, which is currently totally absent). The criminalisation of the economy (21 responses) and the threats posed by environmental pollution (19 responses) then follow. There is a significant drop in the perception of dangers posed by drug trafficking (from 19 to 9 responses) and a slight fall in the perception of risks connected with macroeconomic instability (17 responses), perhaps due to a certain optimism in relation to the improvement of the Italian economy recorded at the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007. If we consider terrorist attacks as a single threat, in 2010 macroeconomic risks would be one of the top five overall threats.

The situation is partially confirmed if we go from analysis of the frequency of threats to their individual ranking (Figure 7.2). This was calculated by taking the average ranking of each threat (dividing the total of the ranking by the number of responses). The index value may vary between 1, for extreme threats, and 5 for less serious threats. For the year 2006, the highest ranking threat is that related to macroeconomic instability (1.8), which means that

despite having been indicated by fewer people compared to other threats, it was almost always put in first place in the scale of risks in terms of importance. Its ranking is also one of the highest for 2010 (2.5) together with criminalisation of the economy. At second place in 2006 are terrorist threats against society and infrastructures (2.6 and 2.5 respectively). For 2010 the perception of their danger remains substantially the same. Migratory pressures, whose importance in 2006 was not very high (3.3) show a certain deterioration in 2010, which demonstrates the perception of a negative trend. In line with the results of frequency is the ranking of criminalisation of the economy (2.6 and 2.5) and that relating to drug trafficking (2.5 and 2.6). Both threats are considered of immediate importance, comparable to that posed by terrorism. Conventional warfare also gets an average number of points in 2006, but appears to reduce in terms of the evaluation of its importance in 2010. The risks posed by biological and chemical attacks are more or less in the same position highlighting a degree of possible risk in 2006, although with a lower frequency compared to the main five threats as illustrated in Figure 7.1. The ranking of fears about human environmental pollution ranking appear somewhat reduced, not appearing amongst the main threats for 2006, whereas for 2010 expectations would seem to worsen.

### **III. ITALY'S POLICY INSTRUMENT PREFERENCES**

As we saw in the preceding paragraph, the main threats identified by the Italian elite in the period 2006-2010, whether in terms of frequency or ranking, are terrorist attacks, migratory pressures, the criminalisation of the economy, macroeconomic instability and the risk of environmental pollution. The Italian elite would appear to be less worried by conventional or nuclear military threats. Which main policy instruments are considered the most effective to tackle these threats? From an overview of the responses, the majority of the Italian elite would appear to prefer non-military solutions.<sup>62</sup>

It was foreseeable that after 11 September the risk of terrorist threats, which hitherto had not concerned Italy directly, increased dramatically according to the elite's perception. Those instruments indicated as most effective to tackle the threat of terrorism are, in order (Figure 7.3-7.4): cooperation between the police force and intelligence services, special operations, diplomacy, economic and financial assistance, and military operations. There does not seem to be much difference in preference according to the type of threat (against society and political institutions or against infrastructures), even if, in the case of attacks

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<sup>62</sup> Interviewees could indicate one or more policy instruments for each of the main threats identified.

against infrastructures, the preferences for military instruments appear to be slightly higher than those for economic instruments.

A keenly felt threat in Italy is that concerning migratory flows, which are very often perceived by the public as being linked with criminalisation of the economy and terrorist infiltration. In this case, we are dealing with a threat which, unlike the previous one, is considered as of increasing importance in the near future. As regards the replies (Figure 7.5), they are given in order: first diplomatic instruments then economic and financial assistance. A degree of importance is also given to instruments of policing. The first two instruments refer mainly to interventions in countries of origin aimed at discouraging the migratory phenomenon by countering factors which encourage emigration. Interventions by the forces of law and order are, on the other hand, mostly aimed at activities of monitoring and repression on Italian soil, even if there is an increasing tendency to move the borders out to sea by intercepting ships which carry clandestine migrants.

Similarly, the model of responses given concerning the risk of criminalisation of the economy, keenly felt in Italy, given the presence of strong criminal organizations (*mafia, camorra, ndrangheta*). Despite there having been past military operations to tackle this type of threat, especially in terms of territory monitoring, the vast majority of the sample indicate actions of cooperation between police and secret services and the use of economic instruments as the main ways of tackling the criminalisation of the economy (Figure 7.6).

Alongside the threat of criminalisation of the economy is that posed by drug trafficking (Figure 7.7), considered an important threat in 2006, but less critical in 2010. According to the sample responses, this threat should be tackled firstly with instruments of cooperation by the police force and intelligence services and, secondly, with the help of special operations. A less significant role is ascribed to economic instruments.

According to the Italian foreign policy elite, a further serious problem which urgently needs tackling is that of macroeconomic instability which, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, is perceived as a current fear. Obviously the main instruments indicated to face this type of risk are those of an economic kind (Figure 7.8). Strange, however, is the absence of diplomatic/international instruments from the list of responses, given the importance of the EU's power in negotiating greater or lesser favourable conditions within the field of economic and monetary union for the state of the Italian economy. In many cases the Italian governmental elite has tried to resolve its public funding problems by redefining its participation in EMU rather than by structural intervention.

Environmental threats have always been close to the Italian public's heart, as demonstrated by the presence of an active ecological movement, which, in spite of the lack of strong political representation, is reasonably well supported by the public at large. The great importance of tourism as an economic resource should be mentioned in relation to ecological questions. As regards instruments to tackle this kind of threat, first and foremost are those of an economical-financial and diplomatic nature (Figure 7.9). The latter make clear the great importance assumed by intergovernmental negotiations on the environment and by Italy's support of the main international standards concerning this theme. The responses also show a certain degree of indecisiveness, given that alongside economic instruments equal ranking is given to the generic 'other', which would appear to show an incapacity to understand what is a highly technical matter.

In order to complete the picture of the preferences of the Italian elite, it is interesting to show the type of response preferred in the event of conventional attacks, even though the latter, as we saw in the preceding paragraph, are very low ranking in terms of possible dangers which Italy may realistically have to face. It is interesting to note that, despite being faced with conventional attacks, the elite prefers instruments other than those of a military nature, thus apparently confirming a certain reluctance on Italy's part to use traditional military instruments, which are considered inferior to diplomatic instruments (Figure 7.10). This is probably due to both a culture of security (significantly influenced by Catholic values and the pacifist left-wing), which is hostile towards the use of military instruments, and a certain amount of scepticism about the level of training of the Armed Forces.<sup>63</sup>

The final aspect relating to the model of responses to the threats posed concerns the role of the EU. Italy has always been a pro-European country, in favour of the process of integration also in the sector of cooperation in foreign policy.<sup>64</sup> In the field of security Italy strongly supported the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), although it has always been careful that this should not be to the detriment of NATO and transatlantic relations. In all surveys both Italian public opinion and that of the elite show support for increased EU involvement in the shared management of international problems.<sup>65</sup> From the data of our survey emerges a picture which largely confirms this fact (Figure 7.11).

With reference to the main threats described above, the role of the EU is considered decisive in four out of five cases. As regards the criminalisation of the economy, the number

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<sup>63</sup> Foradori and Rosa (2007).

<sup>64</sup> Bonvicini (1983, 1996); Foradori and Rosa (2004, 2007).

<sup>65</sup> Rosa (2003).

of those who consider the EU's role as very or quite important is 22 and 13 responses respectively, against 9 who consider it of little importance. Even more noticeable is the pro-European stance regarding the management of macroeconomic instability: 29 respondents consider the EU very important, 9 quite important and only 6 consider it unimportant. This is perfectly in line with those writers who see in the 'external union', represented by the parameters of the Treaty of Maastricht, the instrument which has enabled Italian public accounts to be completely turned around. Similar is the model of responses to threats posed by environmental pollution – increasingly viewed as difficult to manage at national level – and migratory pressures. Concerning the latter, Italians ask the EU to assume responsibility, as they believe that the problem is not strictly Italian nor can it be resolved with exclusively national instruments. The Italian sample seems less convinced of the usefulness of the EU as regards the handling of terrorist threats against public institutions and society. On the risk posed by drug trafficking, the sample is divided between those who consider the role of the EU as very important (19 respondents), those who consider it quite important (14), and those who give little importance to the EU's role (11 responses).

#### **IV. ITALY'S MILITARY SPENDING**

A large part of the Italian elite is very critical towards military policy, maintaining that there is insufficient coherence between the security needs of the country and the financial and human resources assigned to questions of security. Eighty-one per cent (34 responses) of the sample consider that Italian resources are not in line with the threats they face (Figure 7.12). This scepticism derives both from the question of the defence budget, considered too small (Figure 7.13), and from the internal composition of defence policy, or rather from the way in which funds are distributed between personnel and technological modernisation (Figure 7.14 and 7.15).

As regards the extent of military expenses, in Italy these have always been something of an Achilles heel for national security policies. Since the formation of the Kingdom of Italy, the country's ambition of playing the part of a great power has run into the harsh reality of the difficulties of public funding.<sup>66</sup> During the Cold War, Italy played the part of a free-rider, taking advantage of the American security umbrella: in other words, favouring a strategy of external rather than internal balancing.<sup>67</sup> Alongside these structural limitations lie cultural

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<sup>66</sup> Chabod (1965).

<sup>67</sup> Waltz (1979).

factors, of both Catholic and Communist inspiration, which are contrary to the military instrument. For the entire post-war period, Italian military spending was very low (the percentage of the GDP – 1 per cent – was always close to the NATO minimum) and, within that 1 per cent, the amount set aside for investments was minimal. This has led to continual interventions of an exceptional nature to compensate for the main shortfalls, such as was the case with the provisional laws of the 1970s.

Since the end of the Cold War, with the multiplication of Italy's international commitments, a greater awareness of the country's limitations has come about in this sector and, consequently, of the need to adapt, both in terms of dimension and composition, the funds set aside for defence purposes. After these remarks, it is interesting to examine the type of answer given by our sample to questions regarding military spending in Italy. The vast majority of the sample, 61 per cent (27 responses), hold that Italy spends too little, and inefficiently, on its Armed Forces. About a third of the sample claim that military spending is adequate, and only a small percentage (7 per cent – 3 responses) believe that Italy spends too much (Figure 7.13).

Going beyond budgetary aspects, the Italian foreign policy elite consider the way in which military funds are spent to be flawed (Figure 7.14). Some 73 per cent of the sample (32 responses) consider the allocation of military resources to be out of line with security needs. The lack of coherence between perception of threats and defence budget choices was highlighted by the last budget. In the 2007 budget, launched by the centre-left government, there was an increase of 5 per cent in military spending compared to the last budget by Berlusconi's centre-right government. A large part of the increase is needed to finance the acquisition of particular weaponry systems (the aircraft carrier *Cavour*, ten frigates, 121 euro-fighter planes, 72 self-propelled howitzers)<sup>68</sup> which seem more suitable to countering conventional threats rather than threats to security by terrorist attacks or migratory pressures. It is a matter of choices dictated more by political-bureaucratic dynamics than by careful evaluation of security needs.

The reason why the defence budget is considered to be badly allocated can be seen in Figure 7.15. The main limitation consists in the excessive weight attached to manpower costs to the detriment of arms acquisition and technological development. In the defence budget for the fiscal year 2007, 72 per cent of funds are allocated to covering manpower costs.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> *La Repubblica*, 14 November 2006.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

## V. EU AND US

As regards its role in the defence sector, Italy has always played the role of faithful Atlantic partner, even if a low profile one, careful not to challenge the central role of the USA in European defence. Since the mid-1990s, Italy has been increasingly inclined towards positions in favour of greater European protagonism within NATO and for the development of an autonomous European defence capacity. This has not resolved the underlying problem of how to reconcile the creation of an autonomous European defence policy with Atlantic alliance. This dilemma has manifested itself repeatedly on various occasions: during the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union in 1991, in the European Councils of Cologne and Helsinki (June and December 1999) in which the ESDP was created, and during the Iraqi crisis. The Italian position has always been that of supporting the creation of the ESDP, but without compromising the central role of NATO in the structure of European security.

Italy's intermediate position as regards security means constantly having to minimise the risks of a possible challenge to the centrality of NATO and transatlantic relations resulting from the EU's increased involvement in this sector. As can be seen from the data shown in Figure 7.16, the majority of the sample (27 responses) believes that the creation of an integrated defence policy will not weaken NATO or will only do so minimally. Rather than an objective evaluation, this seems like a form of wishful thinking. In fact, it has been underlined by many how EU activism in the security sector has created more than a few problems on both sides of the Atlantic over recent years.<sup>70</sup>

This fact is connected to perceptions of the relationship between the weakening of NATO and the decoupling of the USA from European security. Here the data is less clear: about half of the sample (20 responses) hold that the weakening of NATO's position will bring about increasing isolation of the USA and a gradual disengagement in the defence of the Old Continent; 14 respondents believe this to be possible, whilst a minority (8 responses) are convinced that the weakening of NATO will not have a negative impact on transatlantic relations (Figure 7.17).

The Italian elite's fear of a possible American withdrawal is supported by the data relating to the importance attributed to the role of the United States in European security (Figure 7.18). Of the 44 respondents, 8 maintain that the role of the USA is essential, 12 very

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<sup>70</sup> Kupchan (2000).

important and 19 important: 39 responses overall out of 44 respondents. Only in five cases was American commitment to Europe considered unimportant.

Altogether, the data confirms the ambivalent attitude of Italy towards Europe and the United States, both considered essential for its own security. Furthermore, it confirms the tendency of Italy to undervalue potential elements of tension which may arise between the two sides of the Atlantic the moment the EU decides to commit itself to the creation of a common defence policy.

## **VI. ITALY'S PATTERNS OF INTERACTION AND SECURITY CONCEPTION**

Another aim of the survey was to investigate the type of relationship Italy has with other states – the type of diplomacy which it prefers – and its conception of security. As regards the first point, the survey confirms one constant factor in Italian international politics, that is, a strong preference on the country's part to implementing its foreign policy by means of multilateral instruments.<sup>71</sup> Thirty-four respondents out of 44 hold that the Italian model of foreign policy tends towards favouring multilateral procedures (Figure 7.19). Italy assigns a decisive role to international organizations, both of a universal kind (UN), and regional (NATO, EU), in the management of world politics and the promotion of Italian national interests.

As regards the second aspect, relating to the definition of security, our sample showed a clear preference (30 responses out of 44) for a wide concept of security, not purely and simply confined to the military dimension (Figure 7.20). This falls in line with previous data on threats, which tend to underestimate the classic military threats in terms of the evaluation of instruments, recalling notions of soft power rather than those of hard power.

## **VII. CONCLUSION**

From the limited data available it is possible to draw some interesting, if somewhat partial, conclusions on the perception of threats by the Italian elite. First and foremost, the risks the country currently faces, or could potentially face in the near future; classic threats such as conventional attacks or nuclear and radiological ones, do not appear to be significant according to the survey. The main concerns regard the threats of terrorism and those connected to socio-economic phenomena, such as international migration, the criminalisation of the economy, macroeconomic instability and environmental pollution.

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<sup>71</sup> Foradori and Rosa (2007).



The data confirm a certain disposition on Italy's part towards favouring instruments associated with forms of soft power rather than hard power in the management of threats. Significant, in this regard, is the fact that, faced with an albeit remote risk of a conventional war, the preferred instrument remains that of diplomacy rather than military action. To a certain extent, the view that Italy spends too little and unwisely for its Armed Forces would appear to contradict this data.


From the analysis emerges confirmation of the great importance that Italy attributes to transatlantic relations for the defence of its interests and the growing role carried out by the EU in this field. Thus both the tendency of Italy towards multilateral diplomacy, compared to bilateral or unilateral initiatives, is also corroborated by the data and a wider concept of security not merely perceived as narrowed down to the solely military dimension.

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**FIGURES**

**Figure 7.1. Top Five Threats (2006-2010)**



**Figure 7.2. Ranking gravest threats (2006-2010)**




Figure 7.3. Type of response to terrorist attack against state and society




Figure 7.4. Type of response to terrorist attack against infrastructures




Figure 7.5. Type of response to migratory pressure





Figure 7.6. Type of response to criminalisation of the economy





**Figure 7.7. Type of response to narcotic trafficking**




Figure 7.8. Type of response to macroeconomic instability




Figure 7.9. Type of response to man-made environmental threats





Figure 7.10. Type of response to conventional war



**Figure 7.11. EU relevance**




Figure 7.12 – Budgetary resources and manpower alignment




Figure 7.13. Size of defence budget




Figure 7.14. Budget Distribution Matches Security Needs






Figure 7.15. Budget Composition




Figure 7.16. ESDP and NATO




Figure 7.17 – NATO and US Retrenchment




Figure 7.18. US commitment to EU




Figure 7.19. Pattern of interaction: unilateral vs. multilateral





Figure 7.20. Security conception





Garnet Project JERP 5.3.2

May 2007

# National Threat Perception: Survey Results from Japan

Haruhiro Fukui

Garnet Working Paper N° 18.8

## **ABSTRACT**

The paper presents the results of a preliminary analysis of data on Japanese foreign and security policy elites' perceptions of threats facing their nation collected through questionnaire-based surveys conducted in the period 2006-2007. The sample included 20 members of parliament, representing all of the nation's five major political parties, two party officials currently not sitting in parliament, nine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and seven Ministry of Defence officials, five university professors, two scholars affiliated with think tanks, three television anchors, and one free-lance journalist, or a total of 49 individuals.

The preliminary analysis of their responses to the 14 questions asked finds the overwhelming majority of the respondents considering "Natural Disasters and Pandemics" one of the gravest threats that Japan faced in 2006 and 'Biological/Chemical Attack,' 'Conventional War,' 'Criminalization of the Economy,' 'Ethnic Conflict,' 'Migratory Pressures,' and 'Nuclear/Radiological Attack' not among such threats. Large majorities of them also rejected both 'Traditional Military' and 'Special Operations' as the most appropriate policy instruments to meet the gravest threats Japan faced. On most other questions, however, they disagreed among themselves. The two critical variables dividing them are found to be gender and, in the case of members of parliament, party affiliation.

## **I. INTRODUCTION: SURVEY INFORMATION**

This working paper presents the results of a preliminary analysis and interpretation of the data generated by a questionnaire-based survey of threat perceptions of Japanese Diet members and government officials conducted in person in Tokyo in May 2006 and those of academic and media experts by mail in November 2006 through February 2007.<sup>72</sup>

During the period 9-22 May 2006, I hand delivered packages (in most cases directly but via the individual's office staff in a few cases) containing copies of the Japanese version of the questionnaire prepared for the GARNET JERP 5.3.2. research project to 35 members of the Diet (hereafter referred to as MPs), 22 government officials (hereafter MGs for members of government), and two party officials (hereafter POs) currently not serving in either the Diet or a government ministry, or a total of 59 individuals. The wording of several questions was modified for Japanese respondents: In Question 4, 'the EU' in the English version was substituted with 'the ARF' (ASEAN Regional Forum) and 'Europe' by 'Asia'; in Question 10, 'ESDP' and 'NATO' were substituted with, respectively, 'an autonomous East

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<sup>72</sup> In revising an earlier draft of this paper, I benefited much from Dr. Han Dorussen's helpful comments and suggestions and would like to express my appreciation of his kind assistance.



Asian security regime' and 'the US-Japan mutual security regime'; in Question 11, 'NATO' and 'European security' were substituted with, respectively, 'the US-Japan mutual security regime' and 'Asian security'; and, in Question 12, 'European security' was substituted with 'Asian security'. In the last section of the questionnaire, where the respondents were asked to provide information about themselves, the Japanese MPs were asked to indicate whether they belonged to the House of Representatives (lower house; hereafter HR) or the House of Councillors (upper house; HC).

Along with the questionnaire, and on the advice of one of the several friends who helped arrange my visits with the targeted individuals,<sup>73</sup> a cover letter briefly explaining the project, my personal resume, and a stamped addressed envelope were also included in the package. In most cases, my visits included interviews lasting for about half an hour to, in one case, over two hours. 38 of the 59 individuals thus visited, or nearly two-thirds, subsequently returned completed questionnaire sheets.

In the survey of academics and journalists undertaken six months later, the questionnaire package contained the same contents as those used in the earlier survey. The survey packages were sent by airmail to 18 scholars randomly chosen from the 144 International Relations and Diplomatic Studies specialists listed at the end of the Japanese Political Science Association's 2006 members list and 31 print and electronic journalists selected on the basis of their reputation as foreign and/or security policy experts from the Who's Who appendix to the 2005 edition of the *Yomiuri Yearbook* (*Yomiuri Nenkan*, 2005). Of these 49 individuals, 11 returned completed questionnaires by the end of February, three sent regrets for not doing so for personal reasons, and four packages were returned unopened as undeliverable owing to the addressees' unknown whereabouts. Of the 11 who filled out and returned the questionnaire, five were university professors, two were scholars affiliated with think tanks, three were television newscasters, and one was a free-lance journalist. In the light of the very small number of the respondents in each category, they were lumped together and treated as 'EXPT' for experts for purposes of data processing and analysis.

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<sup>73</sup> I owe a special debt of gratitude to several friends: Tadatoshi Akiba, Mariko Mitsui, Takashi Miyazaki, Shoji Niihara, and Akio Watanabe, who had made initial contacts with most of the potential respondents on my behalf prior to my arrival in Tokyo. Given the widespread and well-known reluctance of Japanese politicians and officials to participate in surveys on politically sensitive topics, few of my visits would have materialized without these friends' prior personal interventions. I also owe much gratitude to Takako Kishima for letting me use her office as the temporary depository of all responses to the questionnaire in the May 2006 survey and for subsequently forwarding them to my address in California.

As Table 8.1 shows, the sample available for my analysis thus consists of 20 MPs (14 HR and 6 HC members), two Japan Communist Party (JCP) POs, 16 MGs (nine Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA], and seven Ministry of Defence [MOD] officials), and 11 experts. With respect to gender, thirteen MPs, both POs, all MGs, and seven experts were male, while seven MPs and four experts were female. The ages of the 42 respondents who gave theirs ranged rather evenly between 35 and 76, with the mean of 54.6.

As Table 8.2 shows, five of the MPs were members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), four the Clean Government Party (CGP), five the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), three the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and three the JCP. As Table 8.3 shows, 10, or half, of the 20 MPs were currently serving on parliamentary committees directly involved in security or foreign policy issues, five on those dealing with other types of issues, such as the government budget, labour and welfare policy, etc., and five did not mention any committee service. All of them, however, were known to have served at one time or another on security and/or foreign policy committees. Only three currently held any ministerial or executive, i.e., cabinet, position (Table 8.4).<sup>74</sup>

In using the survey data summarized above as a sample of Japan's influential, if not leading, security and foreign policy makers, practitioners, and experts, there are two obvious and important caveats that need to be mentioned at the beginning. First, it is a very small sample, and, second and just as important, it is, with the exception of the academics, a sample obtained, not by random or any other probabilistic method, but by one known as reputational or, often somewhat derisively, as snowballing or network sampling. As a result, the sample does not accurately represent the population in terms of such basic attributes as gender and party affiliation distributions. As illustrated by Figure 8.1, our sample of Diet members significantly under-represents males and over-represents females in the population. The degree of misrepresentation of the parliamentary parties in our sample is even greater (Figure 8.2). The LDP was significantly under-represented, while the SDP and the JCP were as significantly over-represented.

In this study, the independent variables refer here to the respondents' personal attributes identified on the basis of the information provided by most of them on the last page of the questionnaire. These attributes include: gender (whether male or female), occupation

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<sup>74</sup> This probably reflects, to some extent, the refusal of the LDP members serving in such positions to respond to questionnaires, including ours, under an informal, but apparently effective, gag order that was said to have been issued by the LDP leadership.

(whether MP, MG, or Experts), house membership (whether an MP is a member of HR or HC), committee service (whether an MP is serving on one dealing with security/foreign policy issues or other types of issues), party affiliation for the MPs, and ministerial affiliation (whether MOFA or MOD) for the MGs. The limitations of the survey sample — its small size and mismatch with the population combined with the categorical, as opposed to numerical, nature of all the variables used in the questionnaire — requires the use of the chi square ( $\chi^2$ ) statistic to establish the significance, or lack thereof, of the relationships between presumptive independent and dependent variables for the data set for each question.

## II. THREAT PERCEPTIONS

In discussing responses to Question 1, two procedural matters need to be explained at the outset. First, with a view to simplifying the statistical operation, each of the up to five gravest threats chosen and rank-ordered by each respondent was counted once each time it was included in or excluded from the set of several threats chosen by the respondent, regardless of its rank order, either as a positive (yes) or a negative (no) response. If, for example, ‘Biological/Chemical Attack’ was included in Respondent A’s and Respondent B’s set, the threat was counted as two positive responses, whereas, if it was included in A’s but not in B’s set, it was counted as one positive and one negative response. The total numbers of times each threat was included in or excluded from the total number of sets were then used as the scores for that threat. These scores thus may range between 0 and 49. An exception to this procedure was made for threats ranked first by the respondents, which were separately and independently counted and analysed. As Figure 8.3 shows, it turned out that ‘Natural Disasters and Pandemics’ far outnumbered every other threat, 25 of the 49 respondents named it as the gravest threat facing Japan today. Second, the distributions of the scores for the 14 types of threats, including ‘Other’, for 2006 and 2010 were found to be nearly identical, as Figure 8.4 shows. For this reason, the data for 2010 are ignored and the analysis restricted to the data for 2006 alone.

The 49 individuals comprising our sample were nearly unanimous that one of the threats listed in the question was a grave threat to Japan, while other categories of threat were totally discounted as constituting such a threat. Thirty-seven respondents (76%)<sup>75</sup> thus

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<sup>75</sup> Considering the small overall size of the sample and, especially, in individual cells — often less than 5 cases each — actual numbers are given in the text with the percentage share of total responses are in parentheses.

included 'Natural Disasters and Pandemics' in their sets of such threats, while 44 (90%) excluded from their sets 'Ethnic Conflict', 42 (86%) both 'Conventional War' and 'Nuclear/Radiological Attack', 39 (80%) 'Criminalization of the Economy', 38 (78%) 'Biological/Chemical Attack', and 34 (70%) 'Migratory Pressures'. These may be labelled consensus issues. On the other hand, their opinions were sharply divided on how grave several other threats were: 26 (53%) excluded but 21 (43%) included 'Cyber Attack' among the gravest threats facing today's Japan, while 26 (53%) included but 21 (43%) excluded 'Man-Made Environmental Instability', 25 (51%) excluded but 20 (41%) included 'Narcotics Trafficking', 25 (51%) excluded but 22 (45%) included 'Terrorist Attacks against Critical Infrastructure', and 28 (57%) excluded but 19 (39%) included 'Terrorist Attacks against State or Society' among their sets of such threats. These then should be regarded as divisive issues.

In searching for variables explaining the differences of opinion on the latter type of issues, those on 'Cyber Attack' were found to be significantly ( $p < 0.05$ ) related to gender, the majority of the male respondents counting but nearly all of the female respondents not counting it as one of the up to five gravest threats facing Japan (Table 8.5). Interestingly, the gender gap was reversed in the assessment of 'Man-Made Environmental Threats', which was equally significantly related ( $p < 0.05$ ) to gender and which was counted by nearly all the female respondents but not by the majority of the male respondents as one of such grave threats (Table 6). On another similarly divisive issue, 'Narcotics Trafficking', house affiliation among the MPs was found significantly ( $p < 0.02$ ) related to the division, the HR members overwhelmingly counting it as one of the gravest threats, while the HC members discounted it as such (Table 8.7).

Another variable that helps explain the differences in the assessment of some threats mentioned in this question was party affiliation. The LDP and the SDP MPs disagreed on whether 'Terrorist Attacks against State and Society' was one of the gravest threats facing Japan, the former saying 'Yes' and the latter 'No' (Table 8.8). The LDP and the JCP MPs disagreed as sharply on whether 'Cyber Attack' was such a grave threat facing Japan, three of the five LDP members answering 'Yes', while all of the five JCP members said 'No' (Table 8.9).

The last response option 'Other' was selected by many respondents, in most cases without a mention of any specific threat. Thirteen respondents who did mention one or more such threats referred to wide-ranging types of threats that they thought faced today's Japan. These included: deleterious effects of participation in military actions in support of US forces; international isolation resulting from participation in 'coalitions of the willing' formed

without a United Nations mandate; infiltration of Japan's main islands by foreign operatives; invasion of the nation's territorial waters and remote islands; the rise of a regional hegemon; Japan's own diplomatic failures; energy shortages; poverty and widening gaps between rich and poor in Japan and globally; the falling birth rate and greying of the Japanese population; arrival in Japan of huge numbers of refugees; and the growing burden of pension payments on the national economy.

### III. POLICY INSTRUMENTS

On Question 2, two instruments, namely police cooperation and economic and financial assistance, were by far the most preferred instruments, the former in dealing particularly with cyber attack, narcotics trafficking, and terrorist attacks both against critical infrastructure and state or society, the latter in dealing particularly with macroeconomic instability, man-made environmental threats, and natural disasters and pandemics (Figure 8.5). Diplomacy was a rather distant second to police cooperation and economic and financial assistance in dealing with either of those same threats. A reliance upon the traditional military instrument was chosen by very few respondents as an appropriate instrument for any of the threats as was a reliance upon special operations except, to a limited extent, for terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure and state or society.

Disregarding how many and which threats were identified by each respondent and summing the number of times each policy instrument was selected by all respondents, we find, first, that 'Traditional Military' and 'Special Operations' were both excluded by large majorities of our respondents and, second, that the responses on other instruments listed in the question were widely and thinly dispersed. For example, as Table 8.10 shows, the 'Diplomatic' was chosen once by nine respondents, twice by ten, thrice by six, four times by eight, five times by eight, and not at all by seven. In other words, this instrument was neither strongly endorsed nor categorically rejected by the majority or a clear plurality of the respondents, who were evidently concerned about different sets of threats facing Japan in 2006.

Upon closer examination, we find that gender was a statistically significant variable in the differences among the respondents in the assessment of the appropriateness as policy instruments of 'Diplomatic' ( $p < 0.01$ ) (Table 8.11), 'Economic and Financial Assistance' ( $p < 0.01$ ) (Table 8.12), and 'Police Cooperation and Intelligence Sharing' ( $p < 0.05$ ) (Table 8.13). A large majority of the male respondents selected 'Diplomatic' either not at all or only

once or twice, while even a larger majority of the female respondents selected it three, four or five times; ‘Economic and Financial Assistance’ was likewise chosen not at all or only once or twice by a very large majority of the male respondents, but three, four or five times by a substantial majority of the female respondents; and ‘Police Cooperation and Intelligence Sharing’ was chosen, conversely, not at all or only once or twice by a large majority of the female respondents, but three, four or five times by a majority of the male respondents. Interestingly, though somewhat puzzlingly, house membership divided the MPs on the issue of whether ‘Economic and Financial Assistance’ was an appropriate instrument; HC members selected it significantly ( $p < 0.03$ ) more frequently than did HR members (Table 8.14).

Further examination of the probable causal relationships between the respondents’ perceptions of the gravity of the various threats listed in Question 1, on the one hand, and their choices of policy instruments listed in Question 2, on the other, reveals that ‘Diplomatic’ was chosen significantly more ( $p < 0.02$ ) by those who counted ‘Other’ as one of the gravest threats facing Japan than by those who did not count it as such a threat, ‘Traditional Military’ significantly more ( $p < 0.03$ ) by those who counted ‘Conventional War’ than by those who did not count it as such a threat, and ‘Police Cooperation’ significantly more by those who counted ‘Cyber Attack’ ( $p < 0.02$ ) and ‘Terrorist Attacks against Critical Infrastructure’ ( $p < 0.01$ ) and significantly less by those who counted ‘Criminalization of the Economy’ ( $p < 0.05$ ) and ‘Man-Made Environmental Threats’ ( $p < 0.02$ ) than by those who did not count them as such threats (Tables 8.15 to 8.20, inclusive). As noted above, significantly more male respondents and LDP MPs counted ‘Cyber Attack’ as one of the gravest threats to Japan than did female respondents and JCP MPs, while significantly more female respondents counted ‘Man-Made Environmental Threats’ as a grave threat than did male respondents. This suggests that ‘Police Cooperation’ was accepted by male respondents as an appropriate policy instrument to deal with ‘Cyber Attack’ and rejected by female respondents to deal with ‘Man-Made Environmental Threats’.

The ‘Other’ option in this question elicited as diverse responses from 14 respondents as the same option in Question 1 elicited from 13 respondents. These included: education and training; increased international cooperation in the areas of science and technology and social welfare; increased cooperation in United Nations programs and projects; more effective control of financial flows to terrorist groups; the formation of a specialist organization against cyber attack; improved crisis management capability; improved capability to forecast natural disasters; improved public health services, preventive medicine and medical training;

expanded involvement of private businesses in security-related matters; and an expanded and more effective anti-war citizen movement.

#### **IV. THREAT ORIGINS**

In answering Question 3 about the origins of grave security threats facing Japan, the respondents attributed ‘Macroeconomic Instability’, ‘Man-Made Environmental Threats’, and ‘Other’ overwhelmingly to ‘State or Regions’, and ‘Cyber Attack’, ‘Terrorist Attacks against Critical Infrastructure’, and ‘Terrorist Attacks against State or Society’ overwhelmingly to ‘Non-State Actors’ (Figure 8.6). Not surprisingly, those who included the threat of ‘Cyber Attack’ and/or ‘Terrorist Attacks against Critical Infrastructure’ identified ‘Non-State Actors’ as the agents posing the gravest threat significantly more frequently than those who did not include those two types of threats in their responses to Question 1 (Tables 8.21 and 8.22). It was overwhelmingly male respondents that included either ‘Cyber Attack’ or ‘Terrorist Attacks’ in their responses to Question 1 and, as expected, gender proved to be a critical variable in dividing the respondents on this question, male respondents identifying ‘Non-State Actors’ significantly ( $p < 0.01$ ) more frequently than female respondents (Table 8.23).

#### **V. IMPORTANCE OF THE ASIAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF)**

There was considerable agreement among the respondents about the importance of the ARF in addressing the threats posed by ‘Migratory Pressures’ and ‘Narcotics Trafficking’, 33 (67%) and 38 (78%), respectively rating the importance of the organization as 3 points or higher on the 5-point scale. The responses to this question were otherwise widely scattered.

On whether the ARF is important in addressing the threat posed by ‘Man-Made Environmental Threats’ to Asian security, gender significantly ( $p < 0.05$ ) divided the respondents’ assessments of the organization, the majority of the female respondents, but only a very small minority of the male respondents, considering it as ‘Absolutely Essential’ (Table 8.24). In the assessment of the importance of the organization in meeting the threat of ‘Macroeconomic Instability’ to Asian security, on the other hand, partisanship turned out to be a statistically significant divisive variable; the DPJ and SDP MPs granted a significantly greater role to the organization than did the LDP MPs (Tables 8.25 and 8.26).

## VI. BUDGETARY RESOURCES AND MANPOWER

There was a virtual consensus among our respondents on some of the issues related to the allocations of budgetary resources and manpower that were mentioned in Questions 5 through 9. On Question 5, for example, 41 (84%) indicated ‘Misaligned’, while on Question 8, 43 (88%) disagreed that ‘Too little’ was spent on ‘Personnel’, 41 (84%) that expenditures on ‘Procurement’ were ‘Just about right’, and 38 (78%) believed that ‘Too much’ was spent on ‘R&D’.

On some other issues, however, opinions were divided by gender, occupation and/or, in the case of MPs, party affiliation into either a bipolar or tripolar confrontational positions. The female respondents tended significantly more to judge the allocation of the budgetary resources and manpower as ‘Too large’ than did the male respondents. On Question 6, a plurality of 23 respondents (47%) selected ‘Just about right’ but, as Table 8.27 shows, each of the two other options was also chosen by a smaller but significant number of respondents. These divisions were significantly, but in complex ways, related to gender ( $p < 0.03$ ), occupation ( $p < 0.01$ ), and, among MPs, party affiliation ( $p < 0.03$ ) (Tables 8.28, 8.29 and 8.30). Nearly half of the male and female respondents selected ‘Just about right’, but more than a third of the male respondents but none of the female respondents selected ‘Too little’. Moreover, only a small minority of the male respondents, but more than half of the female respondents selected ‘Too large’ (Table 8.28). They were also divided by occupation: the majorities of both the MPs and the experts selected ‘Just about right’ and more of them selected ‘Too large’ than ‘Too little’, while the majority of the MGs selected ‘Too little’, less than a third ‘Just about right’, and only one ‘Too large’ (Table 8.29). Among the MPs, moreover, all LDP members and the majorities of CGP and DPJ members selected ‘Just about right’, while all JCP and two of the three SDP members chose ‘Too large’ (Table 8.30)

On Question 7 about the appropriateness of the current distribution of budgetary resources, a large majority of 32 (65%) said ‘No’. But party affiliation significantly divided the respondents on this question, too: all LDP and CGP members answered ‘Yes’, while all DPJ and JCP members said ‘No’, as did two of the three SDP members (Table 8.31).

On Question 8, 43 (88%) disagreed that ‘Too little’ was spent on ‘Personnel’, 41 (84%) believed that expenditures on ‘Procurement’ were ‘Just about right’ and 38 (78%) believed that ‘Too much’ was spent on ‘R&D’. There was thus a virtual consensus on these issues among the respondents. Their views, however, were significantly divided on details: 22 (45%) and 17 (35%) agreed, but 25 (51%) and 31 (63%) disagreed, that ‘Too much’ was



spent on, respectively, 'Personnel' and 'Procurement', while 21 (43%) and 17 (35%) agreed, but 26 (53%) and 31 (63%) disagreed, that expenditures on those two categories, respectively, were 'Just about right'. They were similarly divided on whether 'Too little' was or was not spent on 'R&D' with 31 (63%) responding 'Yes' and 17 (35%) 'No'.

As on Question 7, party affiliation was the critical variable dividing them on this question: None of the LDP and CGP MPs selected 'Too much' for 'Procurement' or 'R&D' and all but one of them selected 'Just about right' for 'Procurement', while all SDP and JCP MPs selected 'Too much' for both 'Procurement' and 'R&D' and none of them selected 'Just about right' for 'Procurement' (Tables 8.32, 8.33, and 8.34). Not surprisingly, all but one LDP MPs, but none of the SDP and JCP MPs, selected 'Too little' for 'R&D' (Table 8.35). The DPJ MPs agreed with the LDP and CGP MPs that 'R&D' expenditures were excessive ('Too much'), but disagreed with them on whether 'Too much' was spent on 'Procurement' and on whether 'Too little' was spent on 'R&D'.

Responses to Question 9 about the allocation of funds to military modernization were divided roughly between the three alternative positions: 20 (41%) chose 'Just about right', 18 (37%) chose 'Too little', and 11 (22%) chose 'Too much'. The differences in the responses were significantly ( $p < 0.05$ ) related to the respondents' gender. An overwhelming majority of the male respondents selected either 'Just about right' or 'Too little', while the female respondents were nearly evenly divided between 'Too much' and 'Too little' (Table 8.36).

## **VII. THE EAST ASIAN SECURITY REGIME'S IMPACT ON THE US-JAPAN MUTUAL SECURITY REGIME AND US COMMITMENT TO ASIAN SECURITY**

The responses to Question 10 about the possible impact of an autonomous East Asian security regime on the U.S.-Japan mutual security regime present a somewhat weaker version of the tripolar pattern of opposition: 24 (49%) indicated 'Little', but 13 (27%) selected 'Some' and another 7 (14%) 'Very much' (Table 8.37). These differences, however, were not significantly related to or explicable in terms of any of the respondents' attributes used as presumptive independent variables.

The responses to Question 11, on the other hand, were divided along occupational lines at a significant level ( $p < 0.05$ ), most MPs and MOFA officials answering either 'Yes' or 'Maybe' and the experts and MOD officials divided equally between 'Yes' and 'No' to the question as to whether a weaker US-Japan mutual security regime would lead to a retrenchment of the American commitment to Asian security (Table 8.38).

Responses to Question 12 were similar to those to Question 8, with differences among the MPs significantly related to party affiliation (Table 8.39). All of the LDP, CGP, and DPJ MPs selected ‘Essential’, ‘Very important’ or ‘Important’, while none of the SDP or JCP selected either ‘Essential’ or ‘Very important’ and four of the five JCP MPs selected ‘Inessential’.

## **VIII. CONCEPTIONS OF THE JAPANESE PATTERN OF INTERACTION AND SECURITY**

The distribution of the responses to Question 13 on the Japanese pattern of inter-state interaction may be characterized as broadly consensual: 36 (77%) responses fell in the three centre positions between the 5<sup>th</sup> through the 7<sup>th</sup> points on the 10-point scale ranging from unilateral through bilateral to multilateral (Table 8.40).

Responses to Question 14 were scattered, as shown in Table 8.41. Interestingly, occupation, rather than either gender or party affiliation, proved to be the critical factor in dividing the respondents’ views of where the Japanese government’s position was on the 10-point scale of the narrow vs. broad conceptions of security. All of the MOD officials and the majorities of the HR members and the MOFA officials positioned it between ‘Medium’ and ‘Very Broad’, while the majorities of the HC members and the experts positioned it between ‘Narrow’ and ‘Medium’ (Table 8.42).

## **IX. CONCLUSION**

The foregoing preliminary analysis of our small, reputation-based sample of Japanese Diet members, MOFA and MOD officials, two JCP party officials, and Experts, all known for their professional interest in and knowledge about Japan’s security and foreign policy has produced some interesting and potentially useful information about their perceptions of and attitudes towards threats Japan faces today.<sup>76</sup>

In their responses to Question 1, the respondents were virtually unanimous that ‘Natural Disasters and Pandemics’ was by far the gravest threat facing Japan in 2006, but that several types of threat listed in the question were not identified as grave threats facing the

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<sup>76</sup> The findings about inter-party similarities and differences reported in this paper are consistent with and echo those found in the campaign manifestos published by the five parties at the time of the most recent HR general elections held in September 2005. Our findings are, however, far more specific and detailed than the parties’ official statements on security-related issues. Our survey and the analysis of the data generated by it and reported here are therefore useful, despite the small size of the sample used. For the full texts of the five parties’ campaign manifestos, see the *Mainichi Shimbun*, 12, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22, and 24 August 2005.

nation. These included: 'Biological/Chemical Attack', 'Conventional War', 'Criminalization of the Economy', 'Ethnic Conflict', 'Migratory Pressures', and 'Nuclear/Radiological Attack'. Large majorities also rejected both 'Traditional Military' and 'Special Operations' in Question 2 as the most appropriate policy instrument for Japan to adopt to meet the threats it faced but, in answering Question 4, considered the ARF important in addressing the security threat posed by 'Migratory Pressures' and 'Narcotics Trafficking'. Each of these cases may thus be regarded as a reflection of a broad consensus among members of Japan's foreign and security policy community.

On most other questions, however, the respondents disagreed, often sharply in a confrontational manner. Where this occurred, the differences of opinion were found to be related, at the commonly accepted level of statistical significance used in chi square tests ( $p < 0.05$ ), mainly to two variables: gender and party affiliation. The former was the relevant variable explaining the division of opinion on Questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 9, while the latter was the relevant variable explaining the responses to Questions 2, 7, 8, and 12. On a couple of questions, however, house membership was significantly related to differences among the MPs rather than gender or party affiliation, particularly with respect to the importance of 'Narcotics Trafficking' as a security threat and to the appropriateness of 'Economic and Financial Assistance' as a policy instrument.

## APPENDIX 1: TABLES

**Table 8.1. Respondents' occupations and gender**

		Gender		Total
		<i>F</i>	<i>M</i>	
<b>Occupation</b>	<i>HR</i>	4	10	14
	<i>HC</i>	3	3	6
	<i>PO</i>	0	2	2
	<i>MOFA</i>	0	9	9
	<i>MOD</i>	0	7	7
	<i>EXPT</i>	4	7	11
<b>Total</b>		<b>11</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>49</b>

**Table 8.2. MPs' party affiliation**

		Number of Respondents	%
<b>Party affiliation</b>	<i>LDP</i>	5	25
	<i>CGP</i>	4	20
	<i>DPJ</i>	5	25
	<i>SDP</i>	3	15
	<i>JCP</i>	3	15
	<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>100</b>

**Table 8.3. MPs' Current committee assignments**

		Number of Respondents	%
<b>Diet Committee</b>	<i>Security-Related</i>	10	50
	<i>Non-Security-Related</i>	5	25
	<i>N/A</i>	5	25
	<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>100</b>

**Table 8.4. MPs' cabinet positions**

		Number of Respondents	%
<b>Hold any cabinet positions?</b>	<i>Yes</i>	3	15
	<i>No</i>	17	85
	<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>100</b>

**Table 8.5. 'Is 'Cyber Attack' one of up to five gravest threats facing Japan?'**

		Yes	No	NA	Total
<b>Gender</b>	<i>F</i>	1	9	1	11
	<i>M</i>	20	17	1	38
<b>Total</b>		<b>21</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>49</b>

$\chi^2 = 6.856$ ;  $df = 2$ ;  $p < 0.05$ .

**Table 8.6. 'Is "Man-Made Environmental Threats" one of up to five gravest threats facing Japan?'**

		Yes	No	NA	Total
<b>Gender</b>	<i>F</i>	9	1	1	11
	<i>M</i>	17	20	1	38
<b>Total</b>		<b>26</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>49</b>

$\chi^2 = 6.856$ ;  $df = 2$ ;  $p < 0.05$ .

**Table 8.7. 'Is "Narcotics Trafficking" one of up to five gravest threats facing Japan?'**

		Yes	No	Total
<b>House affiliation</b>	<i>HR</i>	12	2	14
	<i>HC</i>	2	4	6
<b>Total</b>		<b>14</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>20</b>

$\chi^2 = 5.488$ ;  $df = 1$ ;  $p < 0.02$ .

**Table 8.8. ‘Is “Terrorist Attacks against State or Society” one of up to five gravest threats facing Japan?’**

		Yes	No	Total
<b>Party affiliation</b>	<i>LDP</i>	4	1	5
	<i>SDP</i>	0	3	3
<b>Total</b>		<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>

$\chi^2 = 4.800$ ;  $df = 1$ ;  $P < 0.03$ .

**Table 8.9. ‘Is “Cyber Attack” one of up to five gravest threats facing Japan?’**

		Yes	No	Total
<b>Party affiliation</b>	<i>LDP</i>	3	2	5
	<i>JCP</i>	0	5	5
<b>Total</b>		<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>

$\chi^2 = 4.286$ ;  $df = 1$ ;  $P < 0.05$ .

**Table 8.10. ‘What are the three most appropriate policy instruments?’**

		Frequency	%	
		0	7	14.6
		1	9	18.8
<b>Number of times ‘Diplomatic’ was selected</b>	2	10	20.8	
	3	6	12.5	
	4	8	16.7	
	5	8	16.7	
	<b>Total</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>100.1</b>	

**Table 8.11. ‘What are the three most appropriate policy instruments?’**

		Number of times ‘Diplomatic’ was selected						Total
		0	1	2	3	4	5	
<b>Gender</b>	<i>F</i>	2	0	0	5	1	3	11
	<i>M</i>	5	9	10	1	7	5	37
<b>Total</b>		<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>48</b>

$\chi^2 = 19.628$ ;  $df = 5$ ;  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table 8.12. ‘What are the three most appropriate policy instruments?’**

		Number of times ‘Economic & Financial Assistance’ selected						Total
		0	1	2	3	4	5	
<b>Gender</b>	<i>F</i>	0	1	2	3	4	1	11
	<i>M</i>	9	15	8	4	1	0	37
	<b>Total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>48</b>

$\chi^2 = 19.402$ ;  $df = 5$ ;  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table 8.13. ‘What are the three most appropriate policy instruments?’**

		Number of times ‘Police Cooperation and Intelligence Sharing’ was selected						Total
		0	1	2	3	4	5	
<b>Gender</b>	<i>F</i>	4	1	2	2	1	1	11
	<i>M</i>	1	10	4	6	10	6	37
	<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>48</b>

$\chi^2 = 12.287$ ;  $df = 5$ ;  $p < 0.05$ .

**Table 8.14. ‘Is “Economic and Financial Assistance” an appropriate policy instrument?’**

		Number of times ‘Economic and Financial Assistance’ was selected						Total
		0	1	2	3	4	5	
<b>House membership</b>	<i>HR</i>	4	5	1	3	0	1	14
	<i>HC</i>	1	0	3	0	2	0	6
	<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>20</b>

$\chi^2 = 12.619$ ;  $df = 5$ ;  $P < 0.03$ .

**Table 8.15. ‘Is “Other” one of up to five gravest threats facing Japan?’**

		Number of times ‘Diplomatic’ was selected						Total
		0	1	2	3	4	5	
<b>Response to Q1</b>	<i>Yes</i>	0	0	2	2	2	6	12
	<i>No</i>	6	9	8	4	6	2	35
	<i>NA</i>	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>48</b>

$\chi^2 = 21.811$ ;  $df = 10$ ;  $P < 0.02$ .

**Table 8.16. ‘Is “Conventional War” one of up to five gravest threats facing Japan?’**

		<b>Number of times ‘Traditional Military’ was selected</b>					<b>Total</b>
		0	1	2	3	4	
<b>Response to Q1</b>	<i>Yes</i>	2	2	0	1	1	6
	<i>No</i>	33	6	2	0	0	41
	<i>NA</i>	1	0	0	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>		36	8	2	1	1	48

$\chi^2 = 17.247$ ;  $df = 8$ ;  $P < 0.03$ .

**Table 8.17. ‘Is “Cyber Attack” one of up to five gravest threats facing Japan?’**

		<b>Number of times ‘Police Cooperation’ was selected</b>					<b>Total</b>	
		0	1	2	3	4		5
<b>Response To Q1</b>	<i>Yes</i>	0	3	1	5	9	3	21
	<i>No</i>	4	8	5	3	2	4	26
	<i>NA</i>	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>		5	11	6	8	11	7	48

$\chi^2 = 22.073$ ;  $df = 0$ ;  $P < 0.02$ .

**Table 8.18. ‘Is “Terrorist Attacks against Critical Infrastructure” one of up to five gravest threats facing Japan?’**

		<b>Number of times ‘Police Cooperation’ was selected</b>					<b>Total</b>	
		0	1	2	3	4		5
<b>Response to Q1</b>	<i>Yes</i>	0	1	2	4	10	5	22
	<i>No</i>	4	10	4	4	1	2	25
	<i>NA</i>	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>		5	11	6	8	11	7	48

$\chi^2 = 19.074$ ;  $df = 10$ ;  $P < 0.01$ .



**Table 8.19. ‘Is “Criminalization of the Economy” one of up to five gravest threats facing Japan?’**

		Number of times ‘Police Cooperation’ was selected						Total
		0	1	2	3	4	5	
<b>Response to Q1</b>	<i>Yes</i>	0	3	1	4	8	3	19
	<i>No</i>	4	8	5	4	3	4	28
	<i>NA</i>	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>48</b>

$\chi^2 = 18.439$ ;  $df = 10$ ;  $P < 0.05$ .

**Table 8.20. ‘Is “Man-Made Environmental Threats” one of up to five gravest threats facing Japan?’**

		Number of times ‘Police Cooperation’ was selected						Total
		0	1	2	3	4	5	
<b>Response to Q1</b>	<i>Yes</i>	3	9	5	5	2	2	26
	<i>No</i>	1	2	1	3	9	5	21
	<i>NA</i>	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>		<b>5</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>48</b>

$\chi^2 = 22.940$ ;  $df = 10$ ;  $P < 0.02$ .

**Table 8.21. ‘Is “Cyber Attack” one of up to five gravest threats facing Japan?’**

		Number of times ‘Non-State Actors’ was selected						Total
		0	1	2	3	4	5	
<b>Response to Q1</b>	<i>Yes</i>	0	3	0	5	10	3	21
	<i>No</i>	5	7	8	3	1	2	26
	<i>NA</i>	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>		<b>6</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>48</b>

$\chi^2 = 29.323$ ;  $df = 10$ ;  $P < 0.01$ .

**Table 8.22. ‘Is “Terrorist Attacks against Critical Infrastructure” one of up to five gravest threats facing Japan?’**

		Number of times ‘Non-State Actors’ was selected						Total
		0	1	2	3	4	5	
<b>Response Q1</b>	<i>Yes</i>	0	2	2	5	9	4	22
	<i>No</i>	5	8	6	3	2	1	25
	<i>NA</i>	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
<b>Total</b>		<b>6</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>48</b>

$\chi^2 = 24.000$ ;  $df = 10$ ;  $P < 0.01$ .

**Table 8.23. ‘Non-State Actors’ as the origins of the most important security threats**

		Number of times ‘Non-State Actors’ was selected						Total
		0	1	2	3	4	5	
<b>Gender</b>	<i>F</i>	5	1	4	0	1	0	11
	<i>M</i>	1	9	4	8	10	5	37
<b>Total</b>		<b>6</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>48</b>

$\chi^2 = 21.720$ ;  $df = 5$ ;  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table 8.24. ‘How important is the ARF in addressing the “Man-Made Environmental Threats” facing Asia?’**

		Number of times ‘Absolutely Essential’ was selected						Total
		0	1	2	3	4	5	
<b>Gender</b>	<i>F</i>	1	1	0	1	1	6	10
	<i>M</i>	0	5	7	10	6	7	35
<b>Total</b>		<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>45</b>

$\chi^2 = 11.267$ ;  $df = 5$ ;  $p < 0.05$ .

**Table 8.25. ‘How important is the ARF to address the threat of “Macroeconomic Instability” facing Asia?’**

		ARF importance: 1= Not important at all; 5= Absolutely essential					Total
		1	2	3	4	5	
Party affiliation	<i>LDP</i>	2	0	0	3	0	5
	<i>DPJ</i>	0	2	1	0	2	5
<b>Total</b>		<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>10</b>

$\chi^2 = 10.000$ ;  $df = 4$ ;  $P < 0.05$ .

**Table 8.26. ‘How important is the ARF to address the threat of “Macroeconomic Instability” facing Asia?’**

		ARF importance: 1=Not important at all; 5=Absolutely essential				Total
		1	2	4	5	
Party affiliation	<i>LDP</i>	2	0	3	0	5
	<i>SDP</i>	0	1	0	2	3
<b>Total</b>		<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>8</b>

$\chi^2 = 8.000$ ;  $df = 3$ ;  $P < 0.05$ .

**Table 8.27. ‘Are national defence budgets of the appropriate size?’**

		Frequency	%
Response to Q6	<i>Too large</i>	12	24.5
	<i>Just about Right</i>	23	46.9
	<i>Too little</i>	14	28.6
	<b>Total</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table 8.28. ‘Are national defence budgets of the appropriate size?’**

		Too large	Just about right	Too little	Total
Gender	<i>F</i>	6	5	0	11
	<i>M</i>	6	18	14	38
<b>Total</b>		<b>12</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>49</b>

$\chi^2 = 9.291$ ;  $df = 2$ ;  $p < 0.03$ .

**Table 8.29. ‘Are national defence budgets of the appropriate size?’**

		<b>Too large</b>	<b>Just about right</b>	<b>Too little</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Occupation</b>	<i>MP</i>	6	12	2	20
	<i>MG</i>	1	5	10	16
	<i>EXPT</i>	3	6	2	11
<b>Total</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>47</b>

$\chi^2 = 13.067$ ;  $df = 4$ ;  $p < 0.03$ .

**Table 8.30. ‘Are national defence budgets of the appropriate size?’**

		<b>Too large</b>	<b>Just about right</b>	<b>Too little</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Party affiliation</b>	<i>LDP</i>	0	5	0	5
	<i>DPJ</i>	1	3	1	5
	<i>CGP</i>	0	3	1	4
	<i>SDP</i>	2	1	0	3
	<i>JCP</i>	5	0	0	5
<b>Total</b>		<b>8</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>22</b>

$\chi^2 = 18.119$ ;  $df = 84$ ;  $p < 0.03$ .

**Table 8.31. ‘Does the existing distribution of budgetary resources meet national security needs?’**

		<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Party affiliation</b>	<i>LDP</i>	5	0	5
	<i>DPJ</i>	0	5	5
	<i>CGP</i>	4	0	4
	<i>SDP</i>	1	2	3
	<i>JCP</i>	0	4	4
<b>Total</b>		<b>10</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>21</b>

$\chi^2 = 18.327$ ;  $df = 4$ ;  $P < 0.01$ .

**Table 8.32. ‘Is “too much” spent on “Procurement”?’**

		Yes	No	Total
	<i>LDP</i>	0	5	5
	<i>DPJ</i>	2	3	5
<b>Party affiliation</b>	<i>CGP</i>	0	4	4
	<i>SDP</i>	3	0	3
	<i>JCP</i>	5	0	5
	<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>22</b>

$\chi^2 = 17.160$ ;  $df = 4$ ;  $P < 0.01$ .

**Table 8.33. ‘Is “just about right” spent on “Procurement”?’**

		Yes	No	Total
	<i>LDP</i>	4	1	5
	<i>DPJ</i>	1	4	5
<b>Party affiliation</b>	<i>CGP</i>	3	1	4
	<i>SDP</i>	0	3	3
	<i>JCP</i>	0	5	5
	<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>22</b>

$\chi^2 = 11.845$ ;  $df = 4$ ;  $P < 0.02$ .

**Table 8.34. ‘Is “too much” spent on “R&D”?’**

		Yes	No	Total
	<i>LDP</i>	0	5	5
	<i>DPJ</i>	0	5	5
<b>Party affiliation</b>	<i>CGP</i>	0	4	4
	<i>SDP</i>	3	0	3
	<i>JCP</i>	5	0	5
	<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>22</b>

$\chi^2 = 22.000$ ;  $df = 4$ ;  $P < 0.01$

**Table 8.35. ‘Is “too little” spent on “R&D”?’**

		Yes	No	Total
<b>Party affiliation</b>	<i>LDP</i>	4	1	5
	<i>DPJ</i>	3	2	5
	<i>CGP</i>	2	2	4
	<i>SDP</i>	0	3	3
	<i>JCP</i>	0	5	5
<b>Total</b>		<b>9</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>22</b>

$\chi^2 = 9.590$ ;  $df = 4$ ;  $P < 0.05$ .

**Table 8.36. ‘Are sufficient funds being devoted to military modernization?’**

		Too much	Just about right	Too little	Total
<b>Gender</b>	<i>M</i>	6	19	13	38
	<i>F</i>	5	1	5	11
<b>Total</b>		<b>11</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>49</b>

$\chi^2 = 7.135$ ;  $df = 2$ ;  $P < 0.05$ .

**Table 8.37. ‘Could an autonomous East Asian Security Regime weaken the US-Japan Mutual Security Regime?’**

		Frequency	%
<b>Response to question</b>	<i>Little</i>	24	51.0
	<i>Some</i>	13	27.7
	<i>Very Much</i>	7	14.9
	<i>DK</i>	3	6.4
	<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table 8.38. ‘Will a weaker US-Japan mutual security regime lead to a retrenchment of the American commitment to the Asian security?’**

		<b>Yes</b>	<b>Maybe</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>DK</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Occupation</b>	<i>HR</i>	7	5	2	0	14
	<i>HC</i>	3	0	1	1	5
	<i>PO</i>	0	1	0	1	2
	<i>MOFA</i>	7	2	0	0	9
	<i>MOD</i>	3	1	3	0	7
	<i>EXPT</i>	4	3	4	0	11
<b>Total</b>		<b>24</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>48</b>

$\chi^2 = 26.019$ ;  $df = 152$ ;  $P < 0.05$ .

**Table 8.39. ‘Is the American commitment to Asian security...’**

		<b>Essential</b>	<b>Very important</b>	<b>Important</b>	<b>Not very important</b>	<b>Inessential</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Party affiliation</b>	<i>LDP</i>	3	2	0	0	0	5
	<i>DPJ</i>	2	1	2	0	0	5
	<i>CGP</i>	3	0	1	0	0	4
	<i>SDP</i>	0	0	2	0	1	3
	<i>JCP</i>	0	0	1	0	4	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>22</b>	

$\chi^2 = 23.690$ ;  $df = 12$ ;  $P < 0.03$ .

**Table 8.40. ‘What pattern of interstate interaction?’**

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>%</b>
	4	8.5
	5	14.9
	6	23.4
<b>Position on 10-point scale selected:</b>	7	38.3
<b>1 = unilateral always;</b>	8	8.5
<b>10 = multilateral always</b>	9	2.1
	10	4.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table 8.41. ‘Does the Japanese government conceive of security narrowly or broadly?’**

		Frequency	%
	<i>1</i>	1	2.1
	<i>2</i>	3	6.3
	<i>3</i>	6	12.5
	<i>4</i>	5	10.4
<b>Position on 10-point scale selected:</b>	<i>5</i>	5	10.4
<b>1 = very narrow;</b>	<i>6</i>	4	8.3
<b>10 = very broad</b>	<i>7</i>	6	12.5
	<i>8</i>	12	25.0
	<i>9</i>	3	6.3
	<i>10</i>	3	6.3
	<b>Total</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>100.1</b>

**Table 8.42. ‘Does the Japanese government conceive of security narrowly or broadly?’**


	Position on 10-point scale selected: 1=narrowest; 10=broadest										Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
<i>HR</i>	0	0	2	0	2	4	2	2	1	1	14
<i>HC</i>	0	0	2	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	6
<i>PO</i>	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
<i>MOFA</i>	0	0	1	2	0	0	2	2	1	0	8
<i>MOD</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	1	0	7
<i>EXPT</i>	1	1	1	3	1	0	1	1	0	2	11
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>48</b>

$\chi^2 = 81.029$ ;  $df = 45$ ;  $P < 0.01$ .



**APPENDIX 2: FIGURES**

**Figure 8.1. Male-Female Ratios Among Diet Members and Sample PMs**



**Figure 8.2. Party Affiliation of Diet and Sample Members**






Figure 8.3. The Single Most Important Threat Facing Japan in 2006



**Figure 8.4. Up to Five Gravest Threats Facing Japan in 2006 vs. 2010**



**Figure 8.5. What are the three most appropriate policy instruments?**





Figure 8.6. What is the origin of the five most important security threats?





Garnet Project JERP 5.3.2

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# National Threat Perception: Survey Results from Russia

Andrei Zagorski

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## ABSTRACT

The Russia-survey reveals a profound transformation of *threat perceptions* within the Russian security community. They no longer concentrate on external military threats but focus on new challenges, such as the criminalization of the economy, migratory pressures, narcotics trafficking, terrorist attacks, or ethnic conflict. The changing threat perceptions require a different set of *policy instruments*. In the contemporary security landscape, police cooperation and intelligence sharing, special operations, economic and diplomatic means are seen as more appropriate than traditional military instruments. The survey reveals multiple *sources of threats* to Russia. It represents an obvious tendency to attach many threatening developments to the West, the US policies, as well as to NATO. At the same time, China, South Asia and particularly Afghanistan, as well as the CIS region with a particular emphasis on Central Asia and South Caucasus occur as a prominent source of transnational security threats. The survey also reflects the growing appreciation of non-state actors as origin of specific threats, and of the home-grown security problems. One of the most striking findings of the survey is that almost every acute threat is seen by a large number of respondents as generated, *inter alia*, by the policies of the Russian government.

## I. INTRODUCTION: SURVEY INFORMATION

This paper presents the findings collected in a questionnaire-based survey conducted in the Russian Federation as part of the GARNET project. The survey was conducted from late May through mid July, 2006. Additional returns were collected from September through November 2006. The survey targeted, in the first instance, two groups of the Russian security community: members of the relevant Committees (Foreign Relations, Defence, Security, CIS) of the Parliament – the State Duma (Lower Chamber) and the Council of Federation (Upper Chamber), and security policy experts outside the government.

44 Russian non-governmental experts were invited to fill in the questionnaire. 28 fully and appropriately completed returns (66%) were included into the survey data. Two experts identified themselves as members of the ‘Yabloko’ a (pan-Russian democratic) party not



represented in the Parliament since December 2003. One identified himself as member of the Rodina (Motherland) party (represented in the State Duma).

49 questionnaires were circulated among Members of the relevant Committees of both Chambers of the Parliament. 26 of them (53%) were returned. 4 of them were either not fully or inappropriately completed. Thus the survey data includes 22 responses (45%) from Members of the Parliament. This includes returns from 16 Members of the State Duma and 6 of the Council of Federation. 14 individual interviews were conducted with Members of the Parliament in order to clarify and elaborate on their responses.

Most of the Parliamentarians' responses (11, or 50%) were received from members of the ruling Single Russia (SR) party which enjoys a two-thirds majority in the Parliament. 2 Members of Parliament identified themselves as members of the Rodina party, one as member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF). The group of independent Members of the State Duma is represented with two returns. 6 respondents identified themselves as not belonging to any political party. One identified himself as member of 'a liberal party' and one as belonging to the faction of the European Democrats in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Returns have been received from members of different Committees. The Foreign relations committees dominate with 14 responses (64%). Returns have been received from members of the Security (1 return) and CIS (2 returns) Committees of the State Duma, the Defence and Security as well as the CIS Committees of the Council of Federation (two from each).

Government officials were not a specific target of the survey. A total of 8 questionnaires were handed out to senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence and the Security Council. 4 returns were collected.

The total of 54 returns includes 4 responses from female respondents. The age groups are represented unevenly. Responses have been collected from 9 individuals under 41, 15 from individuals from 41 to 50, 22 from 51 to 60, and 7 from those over 60 years old. One respondent, while completing the online questionnaire fully and correctly, failed to indicate his age.

The survey can be regarded as relatively representative for the two target groups. Responses from the two Chambers of Parliament represent 20% of the members of their relevant Committees, and the distribution between the parties' representatives relatively reflects the majority picture. Nevertheless, one should be cautioned from the temptation to generalize the findings of this survey. Although dissemination of the questionnaire took into account the need for the survey to be as representative as possible, the responsiveness of the addressees was rather selective. Therefore, conclusions that appear to be supported by the survey would not necessarily fully correspond to the thinking of the wider security community of the Russian Federation. Having said this, we shall also note that the findings of this survey, in most parts, do not contradict but, rather, support the major trends identified by other, more representative, surveys conducted over the past years.

## **II. THREAT PERCEPTION**

The ranking of the perceived importance of different threats included on the questionnaire took into account three parameters: 1) frequency of threats identified; 2) frequency of threats ranked 1, and 3) mean rank of the threat (maximum 1, minimum 5). In a few cases threats identified slightly more often were placed lower because of their lower mean rank. This means the respondents gave those threats a lower priority on the range between 1 and 5. Table 10.1 summarises the aggregate threat assessment by the respondents for 2006 in descending order.

The five most challenging security threats in 2006, as perceived by the respondents, include, in descending order: the criminalization of the economy, migratory pressures, narcotics trafficking, the terrorist attacks against state or society and against critical infrastructure. Those threats are closely followed by the danger of an ethnic conflict. This outcome largely corresponds to two major trends in the Russian security discourse as it evolved since the 1990s. Firstly, it was gradually switching from the focus on traditional external military threats to a selection of new ones, including soft security challenges, such as illegal migration or narcotics trafficking and, from the late 1990s, terrorism. Secondly, the evolution of the Russian discourse was characterized by an increasing preoccupation with domestic security challenges as opposed to those emanating from outside the country.

Although both trends are reconfirmed by the threat assessment by Members of Parliament and experts, significant differences occur in ranking individual concepts, too. These differences with regard to the six threats perceived as most important in 2006, are revealed in Table 10.2.

Both groups would point to the same selection of six threats as most relevant for Russian security policy. But they would rank them in a different order. For the Members of Parliament, both kinds of the threat of terrorist attack (against state or society and against critical infrastructure) are high up on the list while the experts place them in its lower part. Experts give the highest priority to the domestically generated threat of the criminalization of the economy and attach greater importance to such threats as the challenges generated by migration (no. 2 on the list) and the danger of an ethnic conflict (no. 5). Experts also tend to believe that the danger of terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure is higher than that of terrorist attacks against state or society.

Members of Parliament give the highest priority to narcotics trafficking and place migratory pressures (no. 4) and especially the criminalization of the economy (no. 5) pretty

low on the list. They also tend to believe that the threat of terrorist attacks against state or society deserves greater attention than that of attacks against critical infrastructure.

In the course of the interviews, some experts complained that the dynamic element in the threat assessment (looking four years ahead from now) was lacking in the questionnaire. Some of them sought to introduce this dynamic element in their responses. Others, at the same time, were of the opinion that the four year outlook was too narrow to differentiate their threat assessment, as those threats had a much longer life cycle. Although many respondents have rather statically assessed the relevant security threats, Table 10.3 summarising the views on the five most important threats by 2010, reveals that the respective thinking of the Russian security community, indeed, is rather dynamic.

While the importance of the danger of the *criminalization of the economy* drops from the upper to the lower part of the list of five main threats, *migration and narcotics trafficking* (nos. 1 and 2) are seen as the most important challenges for the Russian security. The estimated importance of the danger of an *ethnic conflict* also grows (from no. 6 to no. 3). The man-made *environmental* threat is included in the list of five, while it was no. 7 for 2006. The expectation of *terrorist attacks* of any sort is no longer represented on the list of the five major security challenges for 2010 although it closely follows this list.

The forthcoming threats projection by Members of Parliament occurs more consistent with their current thinking. Narcotics trafficking remains high on their list (no. 1) while the dangers associated with the criminalization of the economy and the ethnic conflict – in its lower part (nos. 5 and 6). They tend to expect that the importance of the pressures generated by migration would increase (from no. 4 to 2) thus pushing the threat of the terrorist attacks against state or society somewhat lower down the list (from no. 2 to 3). The threat of terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure drops out from the top 5 and even 6 while the threat of a man-made environmental disaster joins that list (no 4).

The threats projection by experts reveals more changes. The pressures generated by migration remain at the top of the list (from no. 2 to no. 1) while the estimated danger of the criminalization of the economy drops in their assessment from no. 1 to no. 4 and, at the same time, is accompanied by the increasing expectation of macroeconomic destabilization in Russia. Experts polled envisage a significant rise in the danger of ethnic conflict to the security of Russia (from no. 5 to no. 2), and project an increase in the importance of man-made environmental threats (no. 3 for 2010). On the other hand, they expect that narcotics trafficking would pose a relatively low threat to Russia's security (from no. 3 to no. 5), and no sort of threat of terrorist attacks is included on the top list of security threats for 2010.

The questions included in the survey do not permit to conclude whether the projected falling or rising acuteness of some perceived threats (like the falling importance of terrorist threats or of that of the criminalization of the economy) is due to the expectation that those security threats are likely to be fixed in the near future. Respondents were asked not to rank the importance of the envisaged threats but, rather, to indicate what threats would they see as number 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5. Therefore, the ranking revealed in Tables 1, 2 and 3 does not represent the estimated magnitude of the respective issues on the Russian security policy agenda in 2006 and 2010. Rather, it represents the thinking of the respondents about what issues they are, or the Russian state should be more preoccupied with. Therefore, when the perceived importance of the criminalization of the economy falls and that of macroeconomic instability rises, the conclusion to make is not that that the respondents necessarily imply that the problem of the criminal economy would be progressively fixed in the coming four years. Rather, it implies that they believe that developments in Russia would increase the concerns related to an eventual macroeconomic destabilization and that, thus, they would have to think more often of the latter issue and less of the former one.

Judging the findings of the survey from that perspective, it can mainly be concluded that such issues as pressures generated by migration and, to a lesser extent, the challenge of narcotics trafficking are likely to attract the major attention of the Russian security community in the years to come. At the same time, this community expects that developments in and outside Russia would increasingly divert attention to environmental issues and eventual ethnic conflicts in the proximity of Russia – largely at the expense of the threat of the terrorist attacks, provided no major terrorist act is conducted in Russia in the coming four years.

The traditional external military threats, such as conventional war, nuclear/radiological or biological/chemical attack, find themselves low down the list along with the emerging new threat of a cyber attack. Traditional security policy preoccupations are no longer high on the agenda of either politicians or experts. As revealed in section 4 of this paper, the understanding of the traditional origins of those threats as emanating from other states' policies is also in the process of transformation (Table 10.4).

Several respondents made use of the space to add 'other' threats to the list offered to them. The survey does not provide any quantitative data to place them among the default concepts included into the questionnaire. However, the entries of different respondents on a few added threats have been identical, and the respondents entered in this category only those threats which they believed really matter (Table 10.5).

### **III. POLICY INSTRUMENTS**

The survey findings would support the basic assumption that changes in threat assessments would result in a different thinking of the policy instruments relevant to meet the acute threats. As shown in Table 10.6, the respondents do not see traditional military means as an adequate response to the predominantly non-traditional security challenges they perceive as

most important for the time being. At the same time, they attach an almost equal importance to such policy instruments as (in descending order) police cooperation and intelligence sharing, diplomacy, economic and financial assistance, special operations. At the same time, the relatively frequent selection by the respondents of the 'other' instruments category (over 10% of all responses) may well reflect the fact that those polled were not entirely satisfied with the suggested menu of policy instruments.

This general observation is compatible with the responses of both polled groups – Members of Parliament and experts. Both groups largely neglect the traditional military means as being less relevant to meet contemporary threats and challenges. Both see police cooperation and intelligence sharing as the most important alternative tool, although not entirely dominating the overall toolbox. There is a difference though in the evaluation of other policy instruments. Experts more often emphasize economic and financial instruments and diplomacy and, less often, special operations. Russian politicians follow the reverse order: they give a higher importance to special operations followed by diplomacy and economic and financial tools (Table 10.7).

There certainly is a significant differentiation in the perceptions of what might be an appropriate mix of policy instruments relevant to meet specific threats. Table 10.7 reveals such perceptions with regard to the top six identified challenges to Russian security which would support two kinds of strategy.

A combination of police cooperation, intelligence sharing and special operations clearly dominates the thinking with regard to combating the criminalization of the economy, narcotics trafficking, and the threat of terrorist attacks of all sorts. Diplomacy, economic and financial assistance supported by police cooperation and intelligence sharing are perceived as a more appropriate combination of tools to meet the challenges of pressures generated by migration, and the danger of ethnic conflicts.

However, here as well, there is a relatively high level of uncertainty in some of the responses collected, as the number of those who selected the ‘other’ category is rather high as regards such threats as the criminalization of the economy and the challenges generated by migration.

In order to complement the policy instruments included into the questionnaire, the survey participants have often specified their understanding of what ‘other’ means should be considered to increase the effectiveness of the relevant policies. Apart from a number of general terms, such as intensifying political dialogue and international cooperation, or apart from specifically focusing on the cooperation among the CIS states, they largely elaborate on the directions for the improvement of domestic policies to enable the Russian state to meet the relevant threats. As different respondents represent different political platforms, this list includes, *inter alia*, the following policy recommendations:

- democratization
- better governance
- promotion of self-government
- strengthening of civil society
- supporting the traditional Islam
- strengthening inter-cultural and inter-confessional ties
- promoting public morality
- improving the education sector, especially focusing on educational programs implemented outside public schools
- designing an effective policy addressing the problems of younger generations
- improving information policies
- improving the legislation
- increasing the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies and of special services



- implementing consistent anti-corruption measures
- changing the economic policy
- promoting the innovative development of the non-energy sectors of the economy
- strengthening the state regulation of the economy
- developing appropriate and effective demographic policy
- tightening of the border control to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Ukraine (as a means to compensate for eventual further NATO enlargement).

The general conclusion made on the basis of the survey indicating a significant shift in the Russian security community's thinking about the appropriate policy instruments to meet contemporary challenges is also supported by the data of budgetary appropriations. The Russian state budget breakdown provides for two separate lines of expenditures appropriated for the purposes of national defence and of national security. The latter includes in particular expenses for the General Prosecution Office and its branches, Ministry of the Interior, interior troops, Justice, penitentiary system, security agencies, border guards, combating narcotics trafficking, civil emergencies, fire security, migration policy, customs services.

Both budgets grew fast over the past seven years, although the security budget was growing visibly faster. While the share of the defense expenditure in the overall state budget of Russia declined from 19.7% in 1997 to 16.0% in 2007, the share of the security budget grew from 8.8% in 1997 to 12.2% in 2007. While the security expenses, in 1997, comprised about 45% of the defense appropriations, in 2007 it reached 76% of the latter (81% in 2006) (Figure 10.1).

In the context of this survey, specifically highlighted was the introduction, in 2004, of a separate budgetary line for expenses related to narcotics trafficking and, in 2005, of a separate line for migration policy and civil emergencies.

#### **IV. ORIGINS OF THREAT**

The questionnaire requested the respondents to distinguish between the states' policies and non-state actors (state or region versus non-state actors) as origins of specific threats. Many respondents restricted themselves to just choosing between the two options (or taking both of them) without specifying which states or regions, or what sort of non-state actors they particularly had in mind. However, many provided such a specification. Their responses encouraged us to introduce a third category – that of the explicitly domestic Russian origins of specific threats – after many survey participants referred explicitly to Russian policies, conditions or actors. Respective references are accounted for separately from the category of the non-state actors (Table 10.8).

While referring explicitly to other states or regions as the origin of specific threats, the respondents often used rather vague categories. Thus, for instance, attaching the origins of the narcotics trafficking to Afghanistan may mean Afghanistan as a state actor, or it may mean non-state actors operating in/from Afghanistan, or both. Therefore, in many instances, the attachment of specific origins of threat to particular states or regions in this survey shall be regarded as often relative. A more elaborate inquiry may well produce a much more differentiated outcome.

As revealed in Table 10.8, the respondents in general see the external non-state actors as an almost equally important origin of the threats included into the questionnaire. Another important finding from this table implies that the explicitly domestic origins of the security threats under consideration, though important (around  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the responses), are not seen as equally important as the external ones. There is also a slight but important difference between the perceptions of Members of Parliament and experts. Politicians tend to see the external states' policies a more important source of the origin of threats than the activities of external

non-state actors. The experts community, on the contrary, rather tends to give the priority to the latter threats origin.

This picture is more diverse when the data is broken down on the threat by threat basis (see Table 10.9). While the threat of terrorist attacks is overwhelmingly associated with the activities of non-state actors (outside Russia), the pressures generated by migration are perceived as emanating from specific states and regions. Narcotics trafficking and the danger of ethnic conflicts are almost equally associated with both, other states and regions as well as with the activities of non-state actors. It is only the danger of the criminalization of the economy which is seen as a predominantly domestic problem.

The views of Members of Parliament and those of experts tend to converge in many cases as regards the prioritization of the origin of threats to the security of Russia, but not in all of them. Members of the Parliament tend to emphasize more problems generated by domestic migration while experts look more at the external immigration sources. Experts, on the contrary, tend to emphasize the domestic origins of the threat of terrorist attacks against state or society as well as of eventual ethnic conflicts in Russia itself, while Members of Parliament more often emphasize the external origin of those threats.

While responding to the question, many respondents have specified what states or regions, (external) non-state or domestic actors they would associate with different threats. However, the resulting list of correlations does not provide a sufficient basis for a quantitative analysis and can only serve as an indicative explanation of the thinking of the Russian security community. It represents an obvious tendency to attach many threatening developments to the West, the US policies, as well as to NATO. At the same time, China, South Asia and particularly Afghanistan, as well as the CIS region with a particular emphasis on Central Asia and South Caucasus occur as a prominent source of transnational security

threats. The list in Table 10.10 clearly illustrates that those threats are perceived as geographically very diverse.

One of the most striking findings of the survey is that almost every acute threat is seen by a large number of respondents — 25 out of 54) as generated, *inter alia*, by the policies of Russia and of Russian state officials. This view is predominantly represented among experts, and is not common to the members of the ruling Single Russia party at all. This finding deserves further exploration. However, the survey data would justify a hypothesis that this finding reflects the existing split within the Russian elite, and a deepening estrangement between the group exercising power and the intellectual elite of the country.

## **V. IMPORTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Interviews conducted within the survey have revealed two basic approaches of the respondents to the question which may have impacted on the outcome. Some respondents linked their assessment to a general observation of how good (or poor) the EU capacity is to respond to individual threats and challenges. Others interpreted the question from the perspective of how helpful the EU could be in addressing threats with which Russia is confronted. While asking the question this way, many respondents tended to a lower assessment of the importance of the EU to Russia. Many see the EU as hardly helpful in addressing Russia's security needs and would rather rely either on Russia alone or, on cooperation with other nations in the region (particularly with the CIS states) from where many of the relevant threats originate. Therefore, if the question was asked in this straight way, the overall evaluation of the EU may have occurred somewhat different.

The survey indicates that neither Russian politicians nor experts highly appreciate the capacity of the EU to address the security threats included on the questionnaire. They have been asked to rate EU importance with regard to each of the 13 threats from 0 (not at all

important) to 5 (highly important). Figure 10.2 shows the average assessment of EU importance given by all respondents, Members of Parliament and experts. The maximum ranking of EU importance with regard to any specific threat would correspond to 5, with the level of 2.5 representing the medium line.

As a rule, Members of Parliament tend to a lower appreciation of the role the EU can play in meeting the respective threats. There are two exceptions, however. Members of Parliament, on average, tend to assess the capability of the European Union to meet the challenges of combating narcotics trafficking and of environmental hazards slightly higher than the experts. They also reveal a similar appreciation of the ability of the EU to address the challenges of a conventional war.

As revealed in Figure 10.2, the average assessment value for the whole group, in most cases, remains under or slightly above 2.5. In only two cases it reaches the rank of 3.5 – as regards the role of the EU in dealing with macroeconomic instability and man-made environmental threats.

## **VI. BUDGETARY RESOURCES AND MANPOWER**

The assessment of the budgetary allocations for the purposes of the security policy was, probably, the question with the most predictable responses. It is difficult, if not impossible, to find a Russian politician or expert in any field satisfied with the amount of budgetary appropriations, or with the way the appropriated resources are spent. The Russian security community is no exception. 74% of all respondents (91% of Members of Parliament and 57% of experts) insist that that the government's budgetary resources and manpower are misaligned with the threats facing the country. 99% of all respondents (95.5% among Members of Parliament and 100% of experts) are convinced that the defence budget does not meet the security needs. The overwhelming majority of the respondents see spending on

virtually every item as too low (see Table 10.11). Even these 26% of the respondents who are of the opinion that the resources allocated are more or less aligned with the security needs of the country insist that budgetary appropriations are far too low.

However, two aspects are important for the interpretation of the collected responses. Firstly, as outlined in the section 3.4 above, the Russian state budget has two major lines relevant for the policy areas covered by this survey: national defence and national security. The evolution of the security policy discourse, as reflected also in this survey, towards emphasizing non-traditional, non-military and largely domestically originated security threats suggests the need to reallocate resources appropriated for the security sector from defence towards other agencies dealing with new challenges. This is happening in Russia, as reflected in section 3.5 although defence spending maintains its dominant position. The questionnaire does not address the structure of resources allocation for wider security policy purposes but focuses on the size and structure of defence spending. By addressing defence expenditures as part of the overall security budget, more differentiated responses could have been obtained.

Secondly, the overwhelmingly gloomy responses given by the survey participants simply mean that they would like to see more resources being allocated for defence purposes while, at the same time, being spent more appropriately in structural terms. Had they been asked the question of whether budgetary allocations for education, science, health care or other purposes were sufficient and aligned with the needs in the respective areas, the response would predictably have been overwhelmingly negative, too. The responses given within the survey, therefore, merely represent the complaint of the respondents that the federal budget of the Russian Federation, in general, is not sizeable enough thus not affording significantly increased spending on defence or security in a wider sense. Had they been asked the question from a different perspective – the one of the affordable defence and security budgets within

the overall framework of the federal spending, the responses could have produced a much more complex picture.

## **VII. ESDP IMPACT ON NATO AND THE US COMMITMENT TO EUROPEAN SECURITY**

Most of the Russian survey participants are sceptical with regard to the eventual impact of further development of the ESDP on NATO and the US commitment to European security. They believe (Table 10.12) that a more autonomous ESDP would have little (40.7%) or some (44.4) weakening effect on NATO (32 and 30% among Members of Parliament and 53.6 and 25.7% among experts, respectively).

They neither believe that even a weaker NATO would lead to a retrenchment of the American commitment to the European security although the differentiation of responses to this question is higher than to the previous one (see Table 10.13). While roughly the same part of Members of Parliament (40.7%) and experts (40.9%) participating in the survey proceed on the basis that the US commitment to Europe is not going to weaken, more Members of Parliament (45.5%) admit that it may weaken (32% among experts). Still, the number of those who believe that weakening of NATO will lead to a retrenchment of the American commitment to the European security is relatively high – 13.6% among Members of Parliament and 21.4% among experts.

This differentiation in responses may indicate to some uncertainty in the assessment of the future of the American policy with regard to European security. This uncertainty is relevant since the relative majority – 44.4% of all respondents (41% of Members of Parliament and 50% of experts) maintain that the American commitment to Europe is at least important (Table 10.14). At the same time, while 41% of Members of Parliament consider the US commitment ‘not very important’, 21.4% of experts rank it essential.

## VIII. PATTERNS OF INTERSTATE INTERACTION

The overall development of the Russian foreign and security policy discourse and practices does not suggest a simple hypothesis of whether they are predominantly oriented towards a unilateral or multilateral policy. The vehement opposition to the concept of a unipolar world, the emphasis of the exclusive prerogative of the UN Security Council to decide over coercive enforcement measures, the emphasis on the prevalence of international law and, indeed, the recently more frequently used language of multilateralism – all this would suggest that Russian policy should be oriented towards a predominantly multilateral approach. This is reflected in the relatively high number of those polled who maintain that the Russian security policy is better explained through the concept of multilateralism (Figure 10.3).

On the other hand, the increasing emphasis on the principle of sovereignty, the promotion of the concept of a multipolar (as opposed to multilateral) world, the permanent intention to keep free hands in world politics, repeated reluctance to turn key international security issues to the UN Security Council – all these and many other examples would suggest that, while rhetorically emphasizing the principle of multilateralism, Russian foreign and security policy remains, at the core, largely oriented towards unilateral action and *ad hoc* coalitions. At least this would support the expectation that, in the end, Russian policy is neither purely multilateral, nor purely unilateral but rather a highly complex mix of both. This conclusion is largely supported by the wide differentiation of the responses of both Members of Parliament and experts, as well as the comparatively high number of those polled who establish that the Russian security policy tends to be more unilateral than multilateral.

Figure 10.3 reflects this split in the opinions of survey participants who were asked to select the most appropriate description of Russian policy on a scale where 0 would mean a purely unilateral approach, 9 – a purely multilateral one, and 5 – a balanced mix of both. The responses are distributed unevenly on that scale but it is clear that both the 0 and the 9



margins are much more poorly represented, while the relative majority of the responses is situated in between the balanced 5 and a the purely multilateral 9.

While interpreting this data, the particular meaning of the concept of multilateralism in the Russian policy discourse should be borne in mind. In practical policies, Moscow fully appreciates multilateral tools if they are helpful to pursue Russian interest and goals, or if they are helpful to prevent unilateral action by the US or any action against Russian interest. Multilateralism, however, has no value *per se* in the Russian politics and, in many instances, Moscow gives the preference to unilateral or bilateral action of its own. Thus multilateralism mainly applies in the Russian policy with regard to the frameworks which Russia is a leading part of, and to decisions taken in multilateral bodies which have been taken with the full participation of Moscow.

## **IX. BROAD VERSUS NARROW SECURITY CONCEPTION**

Most of the doctrinal documents of the Russian Federation apply a very broad concept of security ranging from the individual through international security. This concept underlies the Russian Law on Security and, respectively, the broad mandate of the Security Council. It is arguable, however, that this broad concept has never strongly affected the political practices while all security institutions were focusing on a narrow set of assignments instead of following a broader agenda.

The survey (see Figure 10.4) would rather support the assumption that the political practices of Russia are balanced instead of being based on either a genuinely broad, or a traditionally narrow approach. The survey participants were asked to locate their understanding of the security concept underlying Russian politics on a scale, on which 0 meant a narrow, 9 a broad, and 5 a balanced approach to security.

While the responses have been widely differentiated along the entire range of the scale, their relative but obvious majority concentrates in the middle of the scale (ranks 4 and 5). There is a clear difference, however, in the way Members of Parliament and experts perceive Russian policy in this regard. While the Members of Parliament tend to see the Russian conception of security as gravitating more towards a comprehensive approach (ranks 4, 5 and especially 7), experts assess the practice of the Russian security policy more modestly as balanced with some tendency towards the manifestation of a more traditional and narrow approach (ranks 3, 4 and 5).

## **X. CONCLUSIONS**

The survey data would support the following most important findings:

1. Threat perceptions within the Russian security community have undergone a profound transformation over the past years. They no longer concentrate on traditional external military threats but, rather, focus on an increasing number of new transnational soft threats.
2. Respectively, approaches to the relevance of individual policy instruments have also experienced a profound evolution. Depending on the nature of the individual threat, either police cooperation and intelligence sharing, or special operations, or economic and diplomatic means, or a mix of them are given a clear priority as compared to the traditional military instruments of security policy.
3. Although the perception of security threats as originated by other states is still strongly represented, it gradually gives way to the understanding of the growing importance of non-state actors, as well as of the partial predominance of the home-grown security problems over those that emanate from the outside world.

4. The Russian security community remains sceptical as regards the capability of the European Union to cope with the new security threats and, especially, to be helpful to Russia to cope with those threats it finds itself confronted with.
5. The Russian policy and security concept remain a more or less balanced mix of unilateral and multilateral approaches, as well as of a narrow and of a broader understanding of security.

## APPENDIX I: Tables

**Table 10.1. Threat Assessment 2006**

Threats	Frequency identified	Rank 1	Rank 2	Rank 3	Rank 4	Rank 5	Mean rank
<i>Criminalization of the economy</i>	38	17	5	5	6	5	2.4
<i>Migratory pressures</i>	37	7	8	5	9	8	3.1
<i>Narcotics trafficking</i>	38	2	7	9	8	12	3.6
<i>Terrorist attacks against state or society</i>	30	7	5	6	9	3	2.9
<i>Terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure</i>	27	7	10	2	1	7	2.7
<i>Ethnic conflict</i>	28	4	4	14	4	2	2.9
<i>Man-made environmental threats</i>	20	3	4	3	4	6	3.3
<i>Macroeconomic Instability</i>	17	1	7	2	3	4	3.1
<i>Natural disaster and pandemics</i>	10	2	2	2	2	2	3.0
<i>Cyber Attack</i>	5	1	1	1	0	2	3.2
<i>Nuclear/Radiological Attack</i>	4	1	1	1	0	1	2.8
<i>Biological and chemical attack</i>	3	1	0	1	1	0	2.7
<i>Conventional War</i>	4	0	0	1	0	3	4.5

**Table 10.2. Threat Assessment by Members of Parliament and Experts, 2006**

All respondents	MPs	Experts
Criminalization of the economy	Narcotics Trafficking	Criminalization of the economy
Migratory pressures	Terrorist attacks against state or society	Migratory pressures
Narcotics Trafficking	Terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure	Narcotics trafficking
Terrorist attacks against state or society	Migratory pressures	Terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure
Terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure	Criminalization of the economy	Ethnic conflict
Ethnic conflict	Ethnic conflict	Terrorist attacks against state or society

**Table 10.3 Threat Assessment by Members of Parliament and Experts, 2010**

All respondents	MPs	Experts
Migratory pressures	Narcotics Trafficking	Migratory pressures
Narcotics Trafficking	Migratory pressures	Ethnic conflict
Ethnic conflict	Terrorist attacks against state or society	Man-made environmental threats
Man-made environmental threats	Man-made environmental threats	Criminalization of the economy
Criminalization of the economy	Criminalization of the economy	Narcotics Trafficking
Terrorist attacks against state or society	Ethnic conflict	Macroeconomic Instability

**Table 10.4. Frequency of Threats Identified**

Respondents	Biological/ chemical attack		Conventional war		Cyber attack		Nuclear/ radiological attack	
	2006	2010	2006	2010	2006	2010	2006	2010
All respondents (54)	3	8	4	7	5	8	4	6
MPs (22)	1	2	2	3	2	4	2	2
Experts (28)	2	5	1	3	3	3	2	3

**Table 10.5. ‘Other’ Threats Entered by Respondents**

Threats	Frequency identified	Rank 2006	Rank 2010
<i>Corrupt state*</i>	3	2	2 – 3
<i>Unipolar World</i>	2	4	1
<i>NATO</i>	1	4	4
<i>Technogeneous disasters</i>	1	1	1
<i>Bad economic policy</i>	1	1	1
<i>Political destabilization due to ineffective Government</i>	1	1	–
<i>Bad domestic elites</i>	1	2	3
<i>Raw materials dominated economy</i>	1	3	3
<i>Demographic decline, degradation, de-intellectualization</i>	1	5	5

- As different from criminalization of the economy. It means not a state capture but, rather, capture by state

**Table 10.6. Frequency of policy instruments identified**

Policy instruments	Total		MPs		Experts	
	Number	%	number	%	Number	%
<i>Diplomatic</i>	114	20.6	43	18.2	61	21.8
<i>Economic and financial assistance</i>	112	20.3	47	19.9	57	20.3
<i>Police cooperation and intelligence sharing</i>	134	24.2	56	23.7	71	25.4
<i>Traditional military</i>	30	5.4	13	5.5	14	5.0
<i>Special operations</i>	105	19.0	50	21.2	46	16.4
<i>Other</i>	58	10.5	27	11.5	31	11.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>553</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>236</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>280</b>	<b>100</b>

**Table 10.7. Differentiation of Threats Based on the Frequency of Policy Instruments Identified**

Policy instruments for each category of threat	Total		MPs		Experts	
	Number	%	number	%	Number	%
<b>Criminalization of the economy</b>						
<i>Diplomatic</i>	7	10.8	2	9.5	5	12.2
<i>Economic and financial assistance</i>	10	15.4	2	9.5	8	19.5
<i>Police cooperation and intelligence sharing</i>	19	29.2	8	38.1	11	26.8
<i>Traditional military</i>	2	3.1	0	0.0	2	4.9
<i>Special operations</i>	13	20.0	5	23.8	6	14.6
<i>Other</i>	14	21.5	4	19.1	9	22.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Migratory pressure</b>						
<i>Diplomatic</i>	26	31.3	12	33.3	12	29.3
<i>Economic and financial assistance</i>	22	26.5	12	33.3	10	24.3
<i>Police cooperation and intelligence sharing</i>	18	21.7	6	16.7	9	22.0
<i>Traditional military</i>	1	1.2	0	0	1	2.4
<i>Special operations</i>	7	8.4	4	11.1	2	4.9
<i>Other</i>	9	10.9	2	5.6	7	17.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Narcotics Trafficking</b>						
<i>Diplomatic</i>	14	15.9	4	11.1	9	19.2
<i>Economic and financial assistance</i>	12	13.6	6	16.7	5	10.6
<i>Police cooperation and intelligence sharing</i>	32	36.4	12	33.3	18	38.3
<i>Traditional military</i>	1	1.1	0	0	1	2.1
<i>Special operations</i>	25	28.4	11	30.6	13	27.7
<i>Other</i>	4	4.6	3	8.3	1	2.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>100</b>

<b>Terrorist attacks against state or society</b>						
<i>Diplomatic</i>	13	19.2	5	15.5	8	22.8
<i>Economic and financial assistance</i>	6	8.8	2	6.3	5	14.3
<i>Police cooperation and intelligence sharing</i>	24	35.3	11	34.4	12	34.3
<i>Traditional military</i>	7	10.3	3	9.4	4	11.4
<i>Special operations</i>	16	23.5	10	31.3	5	14.3
<i>Other</i>	2	2.9	1	3.1	1	2.9
<b>Total</b>	68	100	32	100	35	100
<b>Terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure</b>						
<i>Diplomatic</i>	10	14.5	2	6.7	8	20.5
<i>Economic and financial assistance</i>	7	10.1	2	6.7	5	12.8
<i>Police cooperation and intelligence sharing</i>	21	30.5	10	33.3	11	28.2
<i>Traditional military</i>	7	10.1	4	13.3	3	7.7
<i>Special operations</i>	22	31.9	10	33.3	12	30.8
<i>Other</i>	2	2.9	2	6.7	0	0
<b>Total</b>	69	100	30	100	39	100
<b>Ethnic conflict</b>						
<i>Diplomatic</i>	18	27.3	6	22.2	10	31.2
<i>Economic and financial assistance</i>	18	27.3	9	33.4	8	25.0
<i>Police cooperation and intelligence sharing</i>	12	18.2	4	14.8	6	18.8
<i>Traditional military</i>	3	4.5	1	3.7	2	6.3
<i>Special operations</i>	12	18.2	5	18.5	5	15.6
<i>Other</i>	3	4.5	2	7.4	1	3.1
<b>Total</b>	66	100	27	100	32	100

**Table 10.8. Origins of threat**

Policy instruments	Total		MPs		Experts	
	Number	%	number	%	Number	%
<i>State/region</i>	130	38.1	54	41.2	64	34.6
<i>Non-state actors</i>	126	37.0	45	34.4	72	38.9
<i>Explicitly domestic</i>	85	24.9	32	24.4	49	26.5
<i>Total</i>	341	100	131	100	185	100

**Table 10.9. Origins of the top six threats**

Origin of Threat for Each Category of Threat	Total		MPs		Experts	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
<b>Criminalization of the economy</b>						
<i>State/region</i>	5	9.3	1	4.5	5	17.9
<i>Non-state actors</i>	10	18.5	3	13.6	7	25.0
<i>Explicitly domestic</i>	25	46.3	8	36.4	15	53.6
<b>Migratory pressures</b>						
<i>State/region</i>	29	53.7	12	54.5	14	50.0
<i>Non-state actors</i>	12	22.2	1	4.5	9	32.1
<i>Explicitly domestic</i>	6	11.1	3	13.6	3	10.7
<b>Narcotics trafficking</b>						
<i>State/region</i>	29	53.7	11	50.0	15	53.6
<i>Non-state actors</i>	23	42.6	7	31.8	15	53.6
<i>Explicitly domestic</i>	5	9.3	1	4.5	4	14.3
<b>Terrorist attacks against state or society</b>						
<i>State/region</i>	6	11.1	3	13.6	3	10.7
<i>Non-state actors</i>	26	48.1	13	59.1	13	46.4
<i>Explicitly domestic</i>	6	11.1	2	9.1	4	17.9
<b>Terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure</b>						
<i>State/region</i>	9	16.7	4	18.2	5	17.9
<i>Non-state actors</i>	25	46.3	10	45.5	12	42.9
<i>Explicitly domestic</i>	7	13.0	3	13.6	4	14.3
<b>Ethnic conflict</b>						
<i>State/region</i>	15	27.8	5	22.7	8	28.6
<i>Non-state actors</i>	13	24.1	6	27.3	5	17.9
<i>Explicitly domestic</i>	10	18.5	3	18.2	6	21.4



**Table 10.10. Origin of threat: perceived correlations**

Origin of Threat by State or Region	Total	MPs	Experts	Threats
<i>Asia</i>	1	1	0	Migratory pressures
<i>East Asia</i>	2	0	2	Man-made environmental threats; migratory pressures
<i>China</i>	11	3	7	Man-made environmental threats; migratory pressures
<i>Afghanistan</i>	12	7	4	Narcotics trafficking
<i>Middle East</i>	9	4	5	Ethnic conflict; terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure; terrorist attacks against state or society
<i>Pakistan</i>	2	1	1	Narcotics trafficking
<i>Saudi Arabia</i>	1	0	1	Terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure
<i>South Asia</i>	1	0	1	Man-made environmental threats
<i>South East Asia</i>	1	0	1	Man-made environmental threats
<i>Muslim States</i>	1	0	1	Biological and chemical attack
<i>CIS</i>	14	2	12	Conventional war; ethnic conflict; man-made environmental threats
<i>Central Asia</i>	15	7	8	Migratory pressures; narcotics trafficking
<i>South Caucasus</i>	14	5	9	Migratory pressures; narcotics trafficking
<i>Georgia</i>	5	2	3	Ethnic conflict; conventional war; Criminalization of the economy
<i>Azerbaijan</i>	1	0	1	Criminalization of the economy
<i>Kazakhstan</i>	1	1	0	Man-made environmental threats
<i>Moldova</i>	1	1	0	Conventional war
<i>Tajikistan</i>	1	1	0	Narcotics trafficking
<i>Turkmenistan</i>	1	0	1	Narcotics trafficking
<i>The West</i>	1	0	1	Narcotics trafficking
<i>US</i>	5	3	1	Conventional war; cyber attack; Macroeconomic instability; other
<i>NATO</i>	2	1	0	Conventional war; other
<i>Latvia</i>	1	0	1	Criminalization of the economy
<i>Africa</i>	3	0	2	Ethnic conflict; migratory pressures Migratory pressures; Narcotics trafficking
<b>Non-State Actors</b>				
<i>Religious (Islamic extremists)</i>	15	87	7	Ethnic conflict; migratory pressures; narcotics trafficking; terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure; Terrorist attacks against state or society
<i>Terrorist groups</i>	12	4	8	Biological and chemical attack; terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure; terrorist attacks against state or society
<i>Organized crime</i>	11	2	9	Criminalization of the economy; narcotics trafficking; Terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure
<i>Narco-mafia</i>	10	3	7	Narcotics trafficking

<i>Local clans</i>	4	0	4	Ethnic conflict; Narcotics trafficking
<i>Illegal military formations</i>	3	1	2	Ethnic conflict; Terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure; Terrorist attacks against state or society
<i>Radical ethnic groups</i>	3	0	3	Ethnic conflict
<i>Extremists</i>	2	1	1	Narcotics trafficking; Terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure
<i>Nationalists</i>	3	0	3	Migratory pressures
<i>Separatists</i>	1	0	1	Terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure
<b><i>Explicitly domestic</i></b>				
<i>Russia's policies and officials</i>	25	3	22	Criminalization of the economy; ethnic conflict; Macroeconomic instability; man-made environmental threats; migratory pressures; narcotics trafficking; Terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure; other
<i>Russian criminal communities, corruption</i>	5	3	2	Criminalization of the economy
<i>North Caucasus</i>	5	3	2	Ethnic conflict; migratory pressures
<i>Chechen groups</i>	5	2	3	Terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure; Terrorist attacks against state or society
<i>Russian businesses</i>	4	1	3	Criminalization of the economy; Man-made environmental threats
<i>Weak legislation, lack of state control</i>	1	0	1	Man-made environmental threats
<i>Lobbyists of Western interests</i>	1	1	0	Criminalization of the economy
<i>Nationalists</i>	1	0	1	Ethnic conflict

**Table 10.11. Defence appropriation sufficiency (in %)**

	Defence budget			Personnel			Procurement			R&D			Military modernization		
	<i>All</i>	<i>MP</i>	<i>Exp</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>MP</i>	<i>Exp</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>MP</i>	<i>Exp</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>MP</i>	<i>Exp</i>	<i>All</i>	<i>MP</i>	<i>Exp</i>
<i>Too large</i>	18.5	4.5	32.1	24.1	22.7	28.6	11.1	0.0	21.4	5.6	4.5	7.1	1.9	0.0	3.6
<i>Just about right</i>	20.4	18.2	25.0	3.7	4.5	3.6	20.4	13.6	28.6	5.6	4.5	7.1	9.3	4.5	14.3
<i>Too low</i>	61.1	77.3	42.9	72.1	72.8	67.8	68.5	86.4	50.0	88.9	91.0	85.7	88.9	95.5	82.1

**Table 10.12. Could a more autonomous ESDP weaken NATO further? (in %)**

	All respondents	MPs	Experts
<i>Not at all</i>	5.6	4.5	7.1
<i>Little</i>	40.7	31.9	53.6
<i>Some</i>	44.4	50.0	35.7
<i>Very much</i>	7.4	13.6	0.0
<i>Don't know</i>	1.9	0.0	3.6

**Table 10.13 Will a weaker NATO lead to a retrenchment of the American commitment to `European security? (%)**


	All respondents	MPs	Experts
Yes	16.7	13.6	21.4
Maybe	38.9	45.5	32.1
No	40.7	40.9	42.9
Don't know	3.7	0.0	3.6

**Table 10.14. The American commitment to European security is:**

	All respondents	MPs	Experts
<i>Essential</i>	14.8	4.5	21.4
<i>Very important</i>	16.7	13.7	17.9
<i>Important</i>	44.4	40.9	50.0
<i>Not very important</i>	24.1	40.9	10.7
<i>Inessential</i>	0.0	0.0	0.0

## APPENDIX II: Figures

**Figure 10.1.** National Defence and Security Budgetary Appropriations, 1997 – 2007 (as % of the total state budget appropriations)



Source: Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. Available at: <http://www.minfin.ru>.

**Figure 10.2.** Importance of the EU (average value)






Figure 10.3. Unilateral versus Multilateral Security Policy (%)



**Figure 10.4.** Narrow or Broad Security Definition (%)





Garnet Project JERP 5.3.2

May 2007

# National Threat Perception: Survey Results from the United Kingdom

Elke Krahmenn

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## ABSTRACT

Following an analysis of UK government security policy published in early 2007, this second part of the GARNET project 'Global and Regional Security Governance: Security Threats and Institutional Response' compares the threat perception and policy assessments of three British security policy elites: MPs, civil servants and experts. Based on 89 responses to a questionnaire-based survey, this report reinforces the earlier findings that UK threat perception and security policy preferences have changed significantly since the end of the Cold War and 9/11. The British security elites agree with the government that non-traditional threats such as terrorism, environmental degradation and economic instability have replaced the threat of war as the primary security concerns to the UK today and in the near future. However, the elites were also critical of British government policy. In particular, the elites blamed the UK and its Western allies for aggravating these threats through their military and neoliberal economic policies and questioned the military spending policies of the government.

## I. INTRODUCTION: SURVEY INFORMATION

*Survey Aims and Groups:* This paper presents the findings of a GARNET project survey of threat perception and security policy assessments among the British security policy elites. The questionnaire-based anonymous survey was conducted between May and December 2006. The aim of the survey was to compare the views of three elite groups: (1) Members of both Houses of Parliament, (2) security experts from British universities, think tanks and major newspapers, and (3) civil servants from the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In addition, the survey sought to establish to what degree the opinions of these security policy elites matched the changing security priorities of the British government as analysed in a previous GARNET report in 2005.<sup>77</sup>

In total 300 Members of both Houses of Parliament (in the following both will be referred to as 'MPs') were invited to participate in the survey by filling in the questionnaire. Of these, a small number were also asked whether they would agree to be interviewed in person. Specifically targeted were MPs with a particular expertise or interest in security matters, including the members of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees and the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Global Security and Non-Proliferation. Due to the low response rate among the target group of 88 MPs, an additional

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<sup>77</sup> Elke Krahmman (2007) 'United Kingdom: Punching above its weight', in Emil Kirchner and James Sperling (eds) *Global Security Governance* (London: Routledge), pp. 93-112.

random sample of 212 MPs was invited to complete the questionnaire. Nevertheless, only 14 questionnaires were returned and one MP agreed to an interview. Among the respondents were 13 members of the House of Commons and two members of the House of Lords. Five respondents belonged to Labour Party, five to the Conservative Party, three to the Liberal Democrat Party, one was an independent member and one did not specify his or her party affiliation (see Table 11.1 ).

In addition, 30 top-ranking civil servants in the central offices of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) were invited to take part in the survey. However, both groups declined to participate because of a Whitehall policy which does not permit officers to complete “questionnaires which might allow inference to be drawn about opinions of senior government policy staff”.<sup>78</sup> Instead, a snowball sampling approach was adopted among the lower ranking civil servants of both ministries and their regional branches which generated 32 responses, two from within the FCO and 30 from within the MoD.

Finally, 80 security experts from British universities, think tanks and major newspapers were asked to participate in the survey. Again, due to the low response rate, this sample was later enlarged by sending out an invitation to take part in the survey to all British members of an international academic mailing list numbering in total 404 members. In total, both approaches resulted in 42 completed responses, including 38 from academics, three from think tanks and one from a major British newspaper.

*Respondent Group Composition:* Before turning to an analysis of the survey results, it is important to examine the composition of the British security policy making elite and any selective biases in the three respondent groups in order to assess the validity of any conclusions that might be drawn from the data. The most striking feature of the respondent groups was the low proportion of women (see Table 11.2). Only two MPs (13 per cent), nine civil servants (28 per cent) and ten experts (24 per cent) were female. The low number of women among MPs with a security remit was to some degree a reflection of the small number of women in the British Parliament (20 per cent). Moreover, it should be noted that a much lower proportion is engaged in UK security issues. It is disconcerting that only one in 14 members (7 per cent) of the House of Commons Defence Committee and two in 14 members (14 per cent) of the Foreign Affairs Committee were female in 2006. While it seems easy to blame the political system in the UK for the under-representation of women in the

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<sup>78</sup> Foreign Office email, received 24 November 2006.

security policy decision-making process, women were also underrepresented in both the target and respondent groups within the civil service and security experts. On the whole, the small number of female respondents was thus representative of the British security policy elites.

In terms of age, the total respondent group was characterized by a relatively even distribution (see Table 11.3). Individually, civil servants tended to be of a younger age because top-ranking positions had declined to participate in the survey, whereas MPs tended to be above 40 years of age because of the electoral process. Among the experts all age groups were nearly equally represented.

Unfortunately, the party-political composition of the MP respondent group did not reflect party size in the House of Commons. In particular the Labour party was very much underrepresented, whereas the Liberal Democrats and Independent MPs were overrepresented. The MP group, therefore, is somewhat more representative of the opposition than the government view on British security policy (see Table 11.4).

Overall, the survey can be regarded as representative of the gender and age composition of each of the three elite groups. It might be taken as an advantage that the respondents of the MP group were more likely to be affiliated with the opposition than the government parties because the previous GARNET report already examined UK government policy. Thus, while the original aim of the survey was to assess the threat perception and security policy beliefs among leading governmental and non-governmental decision-makers, the results presented in the following reflect the views of the broader security policy elites beyond the current government. The conclusions of this report should thus be understood as merely a very particular and partial reflection of the security elite discourse in the UK. Finally, although significant efforts were made to increase the response rates, the total sample of 89 respondents can only give a very limited and inaccurate representation of this discourse. Any conclusions drawn from the following data should therefore be treated with the appropriate caution.

## **II. UK THREAT PERCEPTION**

The first and most important question asked in the survey regarded the personal assessment of the top five security threats facing the UK in 2006 and 2010.<sup>79</sup> Specifically, the survey participants were required to choose from a predefined list of 13 traditional and non-

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<sup>79</sup> For all questions please see Introduction chapter: Questionnaire.

traditional security threats as well as self-specified alternatives “no more than 5 of the gravest threats facing the UK today and in 2010 and rank order them (1 the most grave, 5 the least).” The ranking of each survey group was measured in terms of three parameters: (1) the frequency of threats ranked No. 1, (2) the frequency of threats ranked among the top five and (3) the mean rank of each threat. Each parameter gives a different indication of how threats were regarded.

*Security Threats in 2006:* The threat most frequently ranked as the No.1 security threat to the UK in 2006 was that of terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure or state and society (Table 11.5). Although there was some disagreement among the three groups as to what was the most likely target of a terrorist attack, all three groups ranked one or the other as clearly the gravest concern to British security. Among the three survey groups, man-made environmental threats were mentioned as second or third security priority for the UK, with MPs even considering environmental problems more often the most important security threat than terrorist attacks against critical infrastructure. Only civil servants also considered macroeconomic instability as a top security threat, but there was strong agreement on this issue and economic security was mentioned as often as the No.1 threat as terrorist attacks.

The ranking of the five most important security challenges in 2006 confirms the overwhelming concern regarding terrorist attacks against the UK (see Table 11.6). All three elite groups consistently ranked terrorist attacks among the top five security threats. Moreover, in the aggregate data, critical infrastructure and state and society were considered equally likely targets. Beyond terrorism, manmade environmental problems were regarded as one of the most pressing security concerns. This was closely followed by natural disasters and pandemics. As with terrorism, all three elite groups agreed on the importance of manmade and natural environmental issues. There was less agreement on the threats of narcotics trafficking, macroeconomic instability and biological and chemical attacks which were ranked fifth by MPs, civil servants and experts respectively, but only considered average concerns by the other two groups. Among the self-specified “other” threats, only energy security and the lack of leadership/failure to innovate were mentioned twice.

The mean ranking was calculated by dividing the weighted ranking by the frequency mentioned (see Table 11.7). As a consequence, some threats received high mean rankings because they were mentioned infrequently, but as top threats. Nevertheless, this measure helps to analyse the variation among the three groups. In particular, it demonstrates that whereas there was a widespread consensus on the ranking of terrorist attacks and manmade environmental threats as the most important concerns, other threats gained importance in the

average weighting of different groups. In particular, MPs considered biological and chemical attacks highly likely, followed by concerns about narcotics trafficking. Civil servants also ranked narcotics trafficking as a serious threat, but in their assessment macroeconomic instability was even more dangerous than terrorism. Experts, on the other hand, emphasized the criminalization of the economy and macroeconomic instability.

*Security Threats in 2010:* For the year 2010, all three groups expected little change in the No.1 security threat facing the UK (see Table 11.8). Terrorist attacks against state and society and against critical infrastructure remained the primary concerns, followed by manmade environmental problems and, for civil servants, macroeconomic instability. Nevertheless, there was a small increase in the importance of environmental threats in comparison with terrorism across all three elite groups. MPs even ranked manmade environmental problems more frequently as the top security concern than terrorist attacks against the UK.

The top five ranked security threats for 2010 confirm the, albeit minor, increase in the importance of environmental problems, including both manmade and natural disasters and pandemics, in the perception of all three survey groups (see Table 11.9). Unlike civil servants and experts, however, many MPs believed that narcotics trafficking and migratory pressures will become two of the top five threats to British security. There was no change in the threats mentioned as “other”. In the mean ranking, the threat from migratory pressures is also ranked highly by civil servants (see Table 11.10). Whereas civil servants and experts agree that the criminalization of the economy remains a considerable threat in the near future.

*Conclusions:* Several conclusions can be drawn from the survey data regarding the threat perception of the three British security elites.

First, there was widespread agreement between the British security elite and the government that terrorism is the top security threat facing the UK today and in the near future. Given the experiences of terrorist attacks against British public transport on 7 July 2005 and the prevention of the planned suicide bombings on flights departing Heathrow in the summer of 2006, this assessment is little surprising. Other threats, such as chemical and biological were ranked highly because of their relation to terrorism (see the section on UK Threat Origins below).

Second, while the *2003 Defence White Paper* only listed environmental problems fourth after terrorism, WMD proliferation and regional instability, the British elites perceived environmental problems not only as the second most important set of security issues facing the UK, but also as of increasing relevance. All three survey

groups attributed manmade environmental threats greater importance than natural pandemics or disasters, although the latter was also regarded as a growing threat.

Third, economic problems such as macroeconomic instability, criminalization of the economy and in some respects migratory pressures were considered the third most important set of threats by the survey groups, whereas military threats such as conventional war, ethnic conflict and nuclear or radiological attacks regarded as unlikely to affect UK national security across the three elite groups.

Finally, as the only interviewee pointed out, the UK is already living with the three most important sets of threats identified in the survey: terrorism, environmental degradation and economic insecurity. The imperative of security policy has thus changed from prevention and deterrence to threat “management.” The following question, therefore, turned to the policy instruments regarded as most suited for UK security policy.

### **III. UK POLICY INSTRUMENTS**

The second question asked respondents to check “the three most appropriate policy instruments to meet the five security threats identified above for the year 2006”. The list of possible instruments included: (1) diplomatic means, (2) economic and financial assistance, (3) Police and intelligence cooperation, (4) traditional military means, (5) special operations and (6) other. Respondents were allowed to tick more than one policy instrument for each threat. Since the questionnaire asked respondents to match policy instruments to their top five threats only, there was an obvious bias in the responses in favour of the threats considered the most important, i.e. terrorist attacks. Accordingly, the relevance of particular instruments expressed in the following data should primarily be read in relation to particular threats and only secondarily as indications of general utility for British security management.

*Preferred Policy Instruments:* As Table 11.11 shows, there was a considerable variation in the assessment of the utility of certain policy instruments depending on the nature of the threat. Police and intelligence cooperation was identified as the most suitable response to terrorist, WMD and cyber attacks as well as to narcotics trafficking, but it was considered largely irrelevant with regard to conventional war, ethnic conflict or environmental threats. In most cases the preferences for certain policy instruments were fairly commonsensical such as the selection of economic and financial assistance to target macroeconomic instability.

Nevertheless, the survey data contained a number of interesting results. Notably, diplomatic instruments were more frequently selected than military means to deal with

conventional war. Similarly, respondents thought that ethnic conflict would better be resolved by economic and financial assistance and diplomatic means than by military operations. Also with regard to terrorism, the respondents tended to prefer non-military over military instruments. Police and intelligence cooperation was selected nearly twice as often as special operations, and diplomatic means and economic and financial help were both considered more important than traditional military interventions in dealing with the threat of terrorist attacks.

As with regard to the security threats facing the UK, the three elite groups largely agreed on the overall relevance of the different types of instruments for the management of the top five security threats (Figure 11.1). Civil servants were somewhat more likely to favour diplomatic and economic instruments due to their higher concern about macroeconomic instability, while MPs put greater emphasis on police cooperation and special operations because of their ranking of narcotics trafficking among the top five threats to the UK. Experts more often specified other policy instruments as the most suitable than the two other groups. All groups concurred that military instruments were least suitable for addressing current security threats to the UK.

#### **IV. UK THREAT ORIGINS**

To gain a greater understanding of the threat perceptions and the selection of particular policy instruments among the three elite groups, question 3 asked respondents to specify the origin(s) of the five most important security threats they had identified and to differentiate between their state and non-state origins. Since there were no pre-defined answers, it was difficult to aggregate the data. In Table 11.12, therefore, specific states or actors such as “the UK” are listed separately from generic terms such as “the West” which subsume them. Moreover, because of the diversity of answers, it was not possible to compare responses among the three elite groups.

*State and Non-state Origins of the Top Five Threats:* The survey showed that elite perception of the origins of the main security threats facing the UK, closely matches those of the British government as outlined in the *2003 Defence White Paper* (See Table 11.12). Geographically, the Middle East remained a key concern for British policy makers and the security elites with regard to threats such as WMD and terrorism. Additionally, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran were listed because of their involvement in the “war on terror”. Respondents attributed manmade environmental threats to the policies of both developed and developing nations, although Western industrialised countries and in particular the United

States were blamed in particular. Economic insecurity and criminalization were primarily associated with Russia, Eastern Europe and the Balkans, although macroeconomic instability was overwhelmingly linked to the policies of the United States and the European Union. Migratory pressures were perceived to originate equally within Africa and Eastern Europe. Cyber attacks were suspected to be carried out most likely by China, Russia, North Korea and India. Conventional wars were primarily associated with the current “war on terror” involving Iraq, Afghanistan and the US, although the possibility of a war with Iran was mentioned.

In terms of non-state origins, terrorist groups were mentioned most frequently and across a range of threats, including terrorist, WMD and cyber attacks as well as conventional war (due to respondents associating contemporary wars with the ‘war on terror’). Most respondents had a broad view of the potential type of terrorist groups ranging from the domestic to the global, and from religious to economic motivations. But Islamic fundamentalists were most often identified as a specific origin of terrorism and WMD attacks. Respondents typically linked environmental threats to states and regions rather than non-state actors. However, multinational corporations were a single type of actor who was not only mentioned as an important source of manmade environmental threats and natural disasters and pandemics, but also economic problems such as macroeconomic instability, criminalisation of the economy and cyber attacks. Five respondents even suggested that multinational corporations played a role in the rise of the terrorist threat to the UK. Global financial and trade institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and their neoliberal policies were held responsible for economic insecurity.

*Conclusions:* To a large degree, the state and non-state origins of insecurity identified in the survey supported the changed assessments of the current British government after the end of the Cold War and 9/11. While certain regions and states such as the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Russia and China retained their importance for UK national security, non-state actors were considered a clear danger across a wide range of non-traditional security threats.<sup>80</sup>

Unlike the British government, however, the respondents were more likely to attribute blame to the UK and its close allies for the rise of the three most important threats: terrorism, environmental degradation and macroeconomic instability. British government policies were

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<sup>80</sup> Compare Table 5.2 in Krahmman, ‘United Kingdom: punching above its weight’ in Emil Kirchner and James Sperling (eds) *Global Security Governance* (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 98.



repeatedly held responsible for alienating certain religious or economically disadvantaged groups at home and abroad thereby facilitating terrorism, transnational crime and ethnic conflict. Moreover, most survey participants believed that the neoliberal policies of the “West”, international institutions and multinational corporations were the main causes for economic insecurity and environmental problems.

## **V. UK MILITARY SPENDING**

In addition to their threat perception, the survey sought to examine whether the three British security elite groups agreed with the military spending policies of the UK government. Specifically, this section asked four questions: (1) Are the government’s budgetary resources and manpower aligned with the threats facing the UK, (2) are UK defence budgets of the appropriate size to meet the security threats the UK faces today, (3) does the existing distribution of budgetary resources within the defence budget meet UK security needs and (4) are sufficient funds being devoted to military modernisation? Of particular interest was to what degree MPs, civil servants and experts approved of British government policy.

*Assessment of Military Spending:* The survey results illustrated that the British security elites were very critical of UK military spending policies. In total 76 per cent of respondents across all three groups agreed that current budgetary resources and manpower were not sufficiently aligned with the threats facing the UK today (see Table 11.13).

However, Table 11.14 indicates that this was not merely a problem of budget size. For instance, 44 per cent of civil servants believed that the defence budget was of appropriate size, although 75 per cent had been unhappy with the alignment. Moreover, the survey results showed significant disagreement over the budget size among the three groups. While 80 per cent of the MPs thought the budget was too small, only 50 per cent of the civil servants and 43 per cent of the experts believed the same. Conversely, almost one third of the experts argued that the size of the defence budget was in fact too large, whereas very few MPs and civil servants shared this view.

As question 7 demonstrated, the greatest criticism was of the existing distribution of the defence budget (see Figure 11.2). All three groups agreed that the current allocation of defence spending was misguided. When asked to specify their criticism, it became apparent that all three respondent groups agreed that, in particular, personnel was currently underfinanced (see Figure 11.3; Table 11.15). But there was no consensus on procurement and research and development (R&D) spending.

In fact, the responses on procurement were the most diverse within and between the three groups. Nearly two thirds of MPs favoured more procurement spending, but one third thought it should be reduced. Among civil servants 40 per cent were satisfied with the current level of the procurement budget, but 32 per cent thought it should be larger and 28 per cent smaller. Finally, 46 per cent of experts believed that procurement spending was too high, compared with 39 per cent who argued it was too little.

Regarding R&D, MPs and experts overwhelmingly agreed that the government should increase spending, while civil servants believed that the current level was just about right. Only a very small minority of the three groups favoured less investment in research and development.

On the question of whether the UK government devotes sufficient funds to military modernisation there was again considerable disagreement among the three elites with 73 per cent of the MPs supporting additional spending, but only 50 per cent of the experts and 28 per cent of the civil servants.

*Conclusions:* On the whole, the survey indicated widespread disagreement with the UK government's military spending policies. All three groups would in their majority not only set different budget levels, but also different priorities.

There was a strong consensus among and within all three elite groups that insufficient funds were being spent on military personnel. However, on the other issues, the three groups diverged. A large majority of MPs favoured higher military spending across all categories, including personnel, procurement, R&D and military modernisation. Conversely, the views of civil servants and experts were more varied. In general, the majority civil servants tended to be satisfied with existing spending on R&D and modernisation, but only marginally so with procurement. Experts supported increased budgets for R&D and modernisation, but advocated a reduction on procurement.

## **VI. UK PATTERN OF INTERACTION AND SECURITY COOPERATION**

In addition to UK national security policies, the survey was also interested in the elites' perception of British collaboration with other states and organisations in security matters and the government's definition of security. The first was analysed by asking respondents whether British interstate interaction patterns would best be described as unilateral or multilateral on a scale from one ("solely unilateral") to ten ("always multilateral"). The second was investigated through the question, "Does your nation's government conceive of security narrowly (confined primarily to issues where 'hard' power is required) or broadly

(where ‘soft power’ is necessary)?” with answers on a scale from one (“narrow”) to ten (“very broad”).

*UK Interstate Collaboration:* On the issue of British international collaboration in security, there was some agreement among the three elite groups that the UK’s policies were best characterised as somewhere above the middle of the scale between five and eight with a total mean of 6.3 (see Table 11.16). Very few respondents argued that the UK was always acting multilaterally, but even fewer thought that the UK tended towards unilateral action. In the inter-group comparison, the assessment by MPs was the most varied and 27 per cent believed that British policies were more unilateral than bilateral. Civil servants assigned British policies the highest mean score of 6.8 in terms of multilaterality, whereas experts and MPs only gave the UK a mean score of 5.9 and 5.8 respectively.

*UK Security Conception:* On the question of whether the UK government conceived of security in narrow, i.e. traditional military, terms or broad, i.e. soft power, terms the survey results were mixed (see Table 11.17). Although again most respondents assigned the UK a middle score, the answers were more spread out across the scale. Most MPs (53 per cent) ranked the British security conception between six and eight, i.e. broad, but 20 per cent thought it was rather narrow. Among the civil servants there was a strong consensus that the British security conception was neither very broad nor narrow, but right in the middle. By comparison, experts tended to think that the government’s conception was narrower than the other groups. The mean score placed MPs and civil servants together with 6.2, while the experts gave the UK only a score of 5.2.

*Conclusions:* In the context of the other survey findings, the elites’ assessment of UK international interaction patterns and security conception suggests a critique of current government policies. While most respondents had identified police and intelligence cooperation as one of the most important security policy instruments in combating top UK security threats such as terrorism and the criminalisation of the economy, the British government only received a slightly above average score of 6.3 in terms of multilateral collaboration. Similarly, non-traditional threats, namely terrorism, environmental problems, macroeconomic instability, clearly topped the elite ranking of security threats to the UK, but the British government’s security conception was defined as rather conventional with neither a particularly narrow nor a very broad approach.

## VII. EU AND NATO

The final set of questions moved beyond UK national security to investigate the opinions of the British security policy elites on the roles and relations of the European Union (EU), NATO and the United States (US) in security and defence matters. The first question asked respondents to rank the importance of the EU with regard to the 13 predefined security threats and “other” on a scale from zero (“not important at all”) to five (“absolutely essential”). The second question, inquired whether a more autonomous ESDP would weaken NATO further. The third question asked if a weaker NATO would lead to a retrenchment of US commitment to European security, and the fourth question asked respondents to assess the importance of the US commitment.

*EU Importance in Security Matters:* According to the survey results, the British security policy elites attributed the EU some importance in most of the security threats facing the UK today (see Table 11.18). Although the EU ranked lowest with regard to terrorist and WMD attacks, it was considered quite important in dealing with the other threats identified by the respondents as most critical to UK national security: macroeconomic instability and manmade environmental problems. The EU also received higher scores on migration issues and narcotics trafficking which had been selected by MPs as among the top five security threats to the UK today and in the near future. In comparison, MPs thought the EU less important than civil servants, and experts ranked the EU highest among the three groups.

It should be noted that a significant number of experts (24 per cent) gave the EU no ranking for migratory pressures because they disagreed with the questionnaire’s definition of migration as a “security threat”. The “securitisation” of migration and other concerns has been widely criticised in academic circles because it is believed to increase threat perception in an inappropriate manner and to encourage the use of “hard” power to deal with non-military issues.<sup>81</sup>

*ESDP Impact on NATO:* The British security elite was divided over the question of whether a more autonomous ESDP will weaken NATO further (see Table 11.19). On the one hand, 30 per cent thought that the development of an independent European defence capability will have “some” impact on NATO. On the other hand, 35 per cent argued that

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<sup>81</sup> Jef Hysmans, ‘The European Union and the Securitization of Migration’, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38:5 (2000), pp. 751-77; Ayse Ceyhan and Anastassia Tsoukala, ‘The Securitization of Migration in Western Societies: Ambivalent Discourses and Policies’, *Alternatives*, 27:1 (2002), pp. 21-39; and Stefan Elbe, ‘Should HIV/AIDS Be Securitized? The Ethical Dilemmas of Linking HIV/AIDS and Security’, *International Studies Quarterly*, 50:1 (2006), pp. 119-44.

there was no relationship at all between the two organizations. Among the three groups, civil servants were the least concerned that ESPD would lead to the potential weakening of NATO. MPs were evenly split on the issue. The majority of experts believed that some impact was likely.

*NATO's Impact on US Commitment:* Conversely, the relationship between NATO and the US was clearer in the minds of the respondents. The British security policy elites overwhelmingly concluded that a weaker NATO will or may lead to a retrenchment of US commitment to European security (see Figure 11.4). Moreover, there was little disagreement across the three groups.

*US Commitment to Europe:* Yet, the question whether the American commitment to European security was important divided the British security elite. Among MPs there was no agreement at all as to how important US security commitments were for Europe with a nearly equal number of MPs believing that the US was essential, very important, important or not very important. The responses of security experts also varied significantly across the answers, although there was a small majority who thought the American commitment was important. Interestingly, a strong majority among the civil servants considered the US not very important for European security (see Table 11.20).

*Conclusions:* Broadly, the opinions of the British security policy elites on the respective roles of the EU, NATO and the US in European security confirmed the views of the British government which regards the EU only as the third most important organisation for UK security after NATO and the United Nations.<sup>82</sup> While on average the EU was attributed some importance in addressing most contemporary security threats facing the UK, none of the three groups believed that the EU was very important or even essential for British national security. Although the elites were divided on the question whether ESDP would contribute to undermining NATO, there was a clear consensus that a weaker NATO was likely to lead to a retrenchment of the US commitment to Europe. Whether the British elite believed that the US commitment was important was unclear. Across the three groups, 65 per cent believed that it was essential to important, but 31 per cent thought that the American contribution to European security was not very important.

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<sup>82</sup> Krahnmann, 'United Kingdom: Punching above its weight', in Emil Kirchner and James Sperling (eds) *Global Security Governance* (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 101.

## VII. CONCLUSIONS

From the limited data provided by the survey, several general conclusions can be drawn regarding the threat perceptions and policy assessment of the British security elite.

1. The British security elite confirmed the fundamental transformation which has taken place in UK threat perception after the end of the Cold War and 9/11. Non-military threats such as terrorism have taken the place of traditional military security concerns. However, the British security elite went beyond the UK government's assessment in placing environmental problems and economic instability in their importance above WMD proliferation and regional conflicts.
2. Given the priority assigned to non-traditional threats, the British security elite strongly favoured non-military policy instruments such as police cooperation, diplomacy and economic and financial assistance. Even with regard to terrorism, special operations and traditional military means were ranked below police cooperation and diplomatic instruments respectively.
3. In terms of the origins of the threats facing the UK today, the British security policy elite agreed with the UK government's assessment that regions such as the Middle East and Eastern Europe retain their relevance, while international non-state actors become increasingly important. However, the elite also attributed considerable blame to the UK and its allies for facilitating terrorism, environmental degradation and underdevelopment through their neoliberal policies.
4. The British security elite also criticised the military spending policies of the UK government. The military budget was not only believed to be insufficient to meet current security demands, but also misaligned. In particular, personnel spending was ranked as too low.
5. The interaction pattern of the UK and the government's definition of security were perceived as neither unilateral nor explicitly multilateral, and neither narrow nor broad by the survey groups, although the elites themselves favoured multilateral cooperation and 'soft' power instruments in the fight against terrorism and other threats.
6. Nevertheless, the British security elite remained sceptical of the EU as a main contributor to UK national security. Although the EU was considered somewhat important in dealing with economic and environmental issues, the overall ranking was not very high.

7. Concerning the US, Britain's closest ally, there appeared to be a shift in perception within the British security elite. While two thirds of the respondents believed that the American commitment to European security was important, one third thought that it was not very important (any more).

## APPENDIX I: Tables

**Table 11.1. Respondents**

	Number of Respondents (Affiliation)
<i>MPs</i>	15 (Labour: 5, Conservative: 5, LibDem: 3, Indep.:1, NA:1)
<i>Civil servants</i>	32 (MoD: 30, FCO:2)
<i>Experts</i>	42 (Universities: 38; Think Tanks: 3, Newspapers:1)
<i>Total</i>	89

**Table 11.2. Gender % (n)**

	Female	Male	NA (%)
<i>MPs</i>	13% (2)	73% (11)	13% (2)
<i>Civil servants</i>	28% (9)	72% (23)	0% (0)
<i>Experts</i>	24% (10)	76% (32)	0% (0)
<i>Total</i>	23% (20)	74% (66)	2 % (2)

**Table 11.3. Age**

Age	20s	30s	40s	50s	60+	NA
<i>Total</i>	18	15	12	16	11	7

**Table 11.4. MPs' Party Affiliation**

Party	Labour	Conservative	LibDem	Independent	NA
<i>Survey</i>	33% (5)	33% (5)	20% (3)	7% (1)	7% (1)
<i>Commons</i>	54% (352)	30% (196)	10% (64)	0.3% (2)	



**Table 11.5. No.1 Threat in 2006**

<b>Threats 2006 – No.1 in % (n)</b>	<b>MPs (15)</b>	<b>Civil servants (31)</b>	<b>Experts (41)</b>	<b>Total (87)</b>
<i>Biological/Chemical attack</i>	7% (1)	0% (0)	2% (1)	2% (2)
<i>Conventional War</i>	0% (0)	0% (0)	2% (1)	1% (1)
<i>Criminalization of Economy</i>	0% (0)	3% (1)	5% (2)	3% (3)
<i>Cyber Attack</i>	0% (0)	0% (0)	0% (0)	0% (0)
<i>Ethnic Conflict</i>	7% (1)	0% (0)	2% (1)	2% (2)
<i>Macroeconomic Instability</i>	0% (0)	32% (10)	5% (2)	14% (12)
<i>Manmade Environmental Threats</i>	20% (3)	16% (5)	10% (4)	14% (12)
<i>Migratory Pressures</i>	0% (0)	0% (0)	2% (1)	1% (1)
<i>Narcotics Trafficking</i>	0% (0)	3% (1)	0% (0)	1% (1)
<i>Natural Disasters/Pandemics</i>	7% (1)	0% (0)	0% (0)	1% (1)
<i>Nuclear/Radiological Attack</i>	0% (0)	0% (0)	0% (0)	0% (0)
<i>Terrorist Attacks: Critical Infrastructure</i>	13% (2)	32% (10)	20% (8)	23% (20)
<i>Terrorist Attacks: State or Society</i>	40% (6)	10% (3)	41% (17)	30% (26)
<i>Other</i>	7% (1)	3% (1)	7% (3)	6% (5)

**Table 11.6. Top Five Threats in 2006**

<b>Threats 2006 - Top 5 in % (n)</b>	<b>MPs (15)</b>	<b>Civil servants (32)</b>	<b>Experts (42)</b>	<b>Total (89)</b>
<i>Biological/Chemical attack</i>	13% (2)	6% (2)	45% (19)	26% (23)
<i>Conventional War</i>	0% (0)	6% (2)	7% (3)	6% (5)
<i>Criminalisation of Economy</i>	7% (1)	22% (7)	24% (10)	20% (18)
<i>Cyber Attack</i>	0% (0)	22% (7)	24% (10)	19% (17)
<i>Ethnic Conflict</i>	27% (4)	16% (5)	24% (10)	21% (19)
<i>Macroeconomic Instability</i>	20% (3)	63% (20)	26% (11)	38% (34)
<i>Manmade Environmental Threats</i>	53% (8)	75% (24)	62% (26)	65% (58)
<i>Migratory Pressures</i>	20% (3)	19% (6)	29% (12)	24% (21)
<i>Narcotics Trafficking</i>	47% (7)	16% (5)	29% (12)	27% (24)
<i>Natural Disasters/Pandemics</i>	53% (8)	75% (24)	60% (25)	64% (57)
<i>Nuclear/Radiological Attack</i>	13% (2)	6% (2)	26% (11)	17% (15)
<i>Terrorist Attacks: Critical Infrastructure</i>	87% (13)	81% (26)	74% (31)	79% (70)
<i>Terrorist Attacks: State or Society</i>	73% (11)	84% (27)	76% (32)	79% (70)
<i>Other</i>	40% (6)	3% (1)	17% (7)	16% (14)

**Table 11.7. Mean Threat Ranking in 2006**

<b>Threats 2006 (mean rank)</b>	<b>MPs</b>	<b>Civil servants</b>	<b>Experts</b>	<b>Total</b>
<i>Biological/Chemical attack</i>	2.5	5	3.63	3.65
<i>Conventional War</i>	-	3	3.33	3.2
<i>Criminalization of Economy</i>	5	3.14	2.8	3.06
<i>Cyber Attack</i>	-	4.71	4.3	4.47
<i>Ethnic Conflict</i>	3.25	3.2	3.4	3.32
<i>Macroeconomic Instability</i>	3.67	2.1	2.81	2.47
<i>Manmade Environmental Threats</i>	3.13	3.08	3.15	3.12
<i>Migratory Pressures</i>	4.33	3.33	3.42	3.52
<i>Narcotics Trafficking</i>	2.86	2.6	3.83	3.29
<i>Natural Disasters/Pandemics</i>	3.38	3.71	3.56	3.6
<i>Nuclear/Radiological Attack</i>	3.5	4	4.18	4.07
<i>Terrorist Attacks: Critical Infrastructure</i>	2.38	2.27	2.19	2.26
<i>Terrorist Attacks: State or Society</i>	1.64	2.96	1.84	2.24

**Table 11.8. No.1 Threat in 2010**

<b>Threats 2010 – No.1 in % (n)</b>	<b>MPs (14)</b>	<b>Civil servants (31)</b>	<b>Experts (40)</b>	<b>Total (85)</b>
<i>Biological/Chemical attack</i>	7% (1)	0% (0)	3% (1)	2% (2)
<i>Conventional War</i>	0% (0)	0% (0)	0% (0)	0% (0)
<i>Criminalization of Economy</i>	0% (0)	3% (1)	5% (2)	4% (3)
<i>Cyber Attack</i>	0% (0)	6% (2)	0% (0)	2% (2)
<i>Ethnic Conflict</i>	7% (1)	0% (0)	3% (1)	2% (2)
<i>Macroeconomic Instability</i>	0% (0)	32% (10)	3% (1)	13% (11)
<i>Manmade Environmental Threats</i>	29% (4)	16% (5)	18% (7)	19% (16)
<i>Migratory Pressures</i>	0% (0)	3% (1)	8% (3)	5% (4)
<i>Narcotics Trafficking</i>	0% (0)	3% (1)	0% (0)	1% (1)
<i>Natural Disasters/Pandemics</i>	0% (0)	0% (0)	8% (3)	4% (3)
<i>Nuclear/Radiological Attack</i>	0% (0)	0% (0)	8% (3)	4% (3)
<i>Terrorist Attacks: Critical Infrastructure</i>	21% (3)	23% (7)	10% (4)	17% (14)
<i>Terrorist Attacks: State or Society</i>	21% (3)	10% (3)	30% (12)	21% (18)
<i>Other</i>	14% (2)	3% (1)	8% (3)	7% (6)

**Table 11.9. Top Five Threats in 2010**

<b>Threats 2010 – Top 5 ranked % (n)</b>	<b>MPs (15)</b>	<b>Civil servants (32)</b>	<b>Experts (42)</b>	<b>Total (89)</b>
<i>Biological/Chemical attack</i>	20% (3)	6% (2)	45% (19)	27% (24)
<i>Conventional War</i>	0% (0)	0% (0)	5% (2)	2% (2)
<i>Criminalization of Economy</i>	7% (1)	19% (6)	21% (9)	18% (16)
<i>Cyber Attack</i>	13% (2)	31% (10)	29% (12)	27% (24)
<i>Ethnic Conflict</i>	33% (5)	9% (3)	21% (9)	19% (17)
<i>Macroeconomic Instability</i>	27% (4)	66% (21)	29% (12)	42% (37)
<i>Manmade Environmental Threats</i>	53% (8)	78% (25)	67% (28)	69% (61)
<i>Migratory Pressures</i>	47% (7)	16% (5)	26% (11)	26% (23)
<i>Narcotics Trafficking</i>	60% (9)	16% (5)	24% (10)	27% (24)
<i>Natural Disasters/Pandemics</i>	33% (5)	75% (24)	60% (25)	61% (54)
<i>Nuclear/Radiological Attack</i>	20% (3)	6% (2)	26% (11)	18% (16)
<i>Terrorist Attacks: Critical Infrastructure</i>	67% (10)	81% (26)	69% (29)	73% (65)
<i>Terrorist Attacks: State or Society</i>	60% (9)	84% (27)	76% (32)	76% (68)
<i>Other</i>	27% (4)	3% (1)	17% (7)	13% (12)

**Table 11.10. Mean Threat Ranking in 2010**

<b>Threats 2010 (mean rank)</b>	<b>MPs</b>	<b>Civil servants</b>	<b>Experts</b>	<b>Total</b>
<i>Biological/Chemical attack</i>	3.33	4.5	3.53	3.58
<i>Conventional War</i>	-	-	4.5	4.5
<i>Criminalisation of Economy</i>	5	2.83	2.89	3
<i>Cyber Attack</i>	4	3.6	4.33	4
<i>Ethnic Conflict</i>	3.2	3.33	3.22	3.24
<i>Macroeconomic Instability</i>	4.25	2	2.92	2.54
<i>Manmade Environmental Threats</i>	2.63	3	2.43	2.69
<i>Migratory Pressures</i>	2.86	2.6	3.09	2.91
<i>Narcotics Trafficking</i>	3.44	2.6	4	3.5
<i>Natural Disasters/Pandemics</i>	3.6	3.42	2.96	3.22
<i>Nuclear/Radiological Attack</i>	3	5	2.82	3.13
<i>Terrorist Attacks: Critical Infrastructure</i>	2.3	2.81	2.83	2.74
<i>Terrorist Attacks: State or Society</i>	2	3.3	2.44	2.72

**Table 11.11. Policy Instruments (total mentioned)**

<b>Threats</b>	<b>Diplomatic</b>	<b>Economic/ Financial</b>	<b>Police/ Intel. coop</b>	<b>Military</b>	<b>Special Ops</b>	<b>Other</b>
<i>Biological/Chemical attack</i>	13	19	19	5	14	3
<i>Conventional War</i>	5	1	1	2	1	1
<i>Criminalization of Economy</i>	5	7	16	0	8	1
<i>Cyber Attack</i>	5	2	17	0	10	4
<i>Ethnic Conflict</i>	9	11	7	1	2	2
<i>Macroeconomic Instability</i>	22	29	8	0	2	7
<i>Manmade Environmental Threats</i>	48	51	6	1	3	14
<i>Migratory Pressures</i>	14	17	10	0	2	1
<i>Narcotics Trafficking</i>	10	14	24	1	12	5
<i>Natural Disasters/Pandemics</i>	35	46	17	6	6	16
<i>Nuclear/Radiological Attack</i>	10	4	14	6	8	3
<i>Terrorist Attacks: Critical Infrastructure</i>	32	24	67	18	40	9
<i>Terrorist Attacks: State or Society</i>	40	27	64	15	39	11

**Table 11.12. Threat Origins (total mentioned)**

<b>Threats</b>	<b>State/Regional origins</b>	<b>Non-state origins</b>
<i>Biological/ Chemical Attack</i>	Middle East (4); West (2); Europe (1); global (1); Asia (1); states with despotic leaders (1); NSA (1)	Terrorist groups (9); Al Qaeda (4); Islamic extremists (1); fundamentalist groups (1); alienated groups (1); domestic terrorist groups (1)
<i>Conventional War</i>	Iraq (1); Iran (1); Afghanistan (1); USA (1)	Al Qaeda (1); Palestinian groups (1); nationalism (1)
<i>Criminalisation of Economy</i>	UK (3); Russia (3); Eastern Europe (2); EU (1); USA (1); Balkans (1); China (1); systemic (1); human nature (1)	Corrupt businesses/corporations (5); organized crime (4); international criminal networks (3); armaments companies (2); terrorists (1); Russian mafia (1); mafia (1); police (1)
<i>Cyber Attack</i>	China (7); Global (3); Russia (3); North Korea (2); India (2); Iran (1); UK (1); USA (1); Europe (1); NSA (1); Israel (1)	(Multinational) corporations (5); organized crime (2); terrorists (1); hackers (1)
<i>Ethnic Conflict</i>	Africa (1); UK (1); economically impoverished regions (1); Indian subcontinent (1);	(Religious) fundamentalists (3); tribal affiliation (1); alienated groups (1); ethnic groups (1); UK cultural segregation (1)
<i>Macroeconomic Instability</i>	USA (13); Europe (8); UK (6); West (5); China (4); systemic (3); Asia (2); India (1); Russia (1)	WTO (9); (multinational) corporations (5); international financial institutions (4); Washington consensus (1); global trade bodies (1); IMF (1); World Bank (1); organized crime groups (1)

<i>Manmade Environmental Threats</i>	USA (19); global (15); EU (10); China (9); UK (6); India (6); Russia (5); West (4); Asia (3); developing world (3); developed world (3); advanced industrial states (2); emerging industrial states (1); over-industrialisation (1); oil dependency (1); systemic (1); human nature (1)	(Multinational) corporations (9); general public (apathy) (3); petrochemical and related industries (2); house builders (1); water companies (1); acts of God (1); global warming (1); man-made (1); across the board (1)
<i>Migratory Pressures</i>	(North/Horn of) Africa (6); new EU members/Eastern Europe (6); Europe (3); 2 <sup>nd</sup> and 3 <sup>rd</sup> world (2); Near/Middle East (1); China (1); Iran (1); Asia (1)	Criminal networks/groups (2); media bandwagon (1)
<i>Narcotics Trafficking</i>	Afghanistan (7); South/Latin America (6); Balkans (3); Columbia (3); UK (2); Narcotics states (1); Europe (1); Eastern Europe (1); global (1); Central Eurasia (1); failed states (1); Asia (1)	International/local criminal networks (9); drug cartels (2); domestic demand in the West (1); guerrilla (1); various (1)
<i>Natural Disasters/Pandemics</i>	Global (15); USA (9); Europe (8); (South East/ East) Asia (7); China (6); Russia (4); India (4); West (4); UK (3); advanced industrial states (1); emerging industrial states (1); bird-flu countries (1); nature (1); developed world (1); state failure (1); Africa (1); systemic (1)	(Multinational) corporations (6); migration (2); humanity/mankind (2); global warming (2); industrialisation (1); nature (1); trade (1); tourism (1); Acts of God (1); poverty (1); changes in microbiology (1); terrorists (1)
<i>Nuclear/Radiological Attack</i>	Middle East (3); Israel (2); former USSR (1); Islamic world (1); pariah states (1); global (1); USA (1); UK (1); China (1); North Korea (1); NSA (1)	Al Qaeda network (2); Islamic extremists (1); domestic actors (1); terrorists (1)
<i>Terrorist Attacks: Critical Infrastructure</i>	Middle East (12); UK (8); West (4); Pakistan (2); Afghanistan (2); Asia (2); Africa (1); USA (1); failed states (1); global (2); Far East (1); Iran (1); Indonesia (1); Lebanon (1); NSA (1)	Al Qaeda network (24); terrorist groups in UK and abroad (16); (multinational) corporations (5); religious fundamentalism/extremism (4); alienation/alientated groups (3); Jihadists/radical Islamists (2); international networks (2); Hamas (1); Hezbollah (1); foreign policy (1)
<i>Terrorist Attacks: State or Society</i>	Middle East (12); UK (10); West (3); global (3); Pakistan (2); Asia (2); Africa (2); Israel (1); Islamic world (1); Afghanistan (1); Far East (1); Western Europe (1); Iran (1); systemic (1);	Al Qaeda network (23); terrorist groups in UK and abroad (18); religious fundamentalists (3); Jihadists/radical/militant Islamists (4); alienated/disaffected groups (2); Israeli groups (2); (multinational) corporations (2); international networks (2); victims of Western policies (2); UK Muslim groups (1); extremist groups (1); Middle Eastern networks (1); Al Muhadjeruf (1); Hamas (1); foreign policy (1)

**Table 11.13. Alignment of Resources % (n)**

	MPs	Civil servants	Experts	Total
<i>Misaligned</i>	73% (11)	75% (24)	79% (33)	76% (68)
<i>Aligned</i>	27% (4)	25% (8)	21% (9)	24% (21)

**Table 11.14. Size of Defence Budget % (n)**

	MPs	Civil servants	Experts	Total
<i>Too large</i>	13% (2)	6% (2)	29% (12)	18% (16)
<i>Just about right</i>	7% (1)	44% (14)	26% (11)	29% (26)
<i>Too little</i>	80% (12)	50% (16)	43% (18)	52% (46)
<i>NA</i>	0% (0)	0% (0)	2% (1)	1% (1)

**Table 11.15. Spending on Personnel, Procurement, R&D, and Military Modernisation**

	MPs	Civil servants	Experts	Total
<b>Personnel</b>				
<i>Too much</i>	0% (0)	4% (1)	12% (4)	7% (5)
<i>Just about right</i>	0% (0)	4% (1)	18% (6)	10% (7)
<i>Too little</i>	85% (11)	92% (23)	70% (23)	80% (57)
<i>NA</i>	15% (2)	0% (0)	0% (0)	3% (2)
<b>Procurement</b>				
<i>Too much</i>	29% (4)	28% (7)	46% (15)	36% (26)
<i>Just about right</i>	7% (1)	40% (10)	15% (5)	22% (16)
<i>Too little</i>	57% (8)	32% (8)	39% (13)	41% (29)
<i>NA</i>	7% (1)	0% (0)	0% (0)	1% (1)
<b>R&amp;D</b>				
<i>Too much</i>	0% (0)	12% (3)	9% (3)	8% (6)
<i>Just about right</i>	14% (2)	52% (13)	24% (8)	32% (23)
<i>Too little</i>	79% (11)	36% (9)	67% (23)	59% (42)
<i>NA</i>	7% (1)	0% (0)	0% (0)	1% (1)
<b>Military Modernisation</b>				
<i>Too much</i>	13% (2)	13% (4)	21% (9)	17% (15)
<i>Just about right</i>	7% (1)	59% (19)	29% (12)	36% (32)
<i>Too little</i>	73% (11)	28% (9)	50% (21)	46% (41)
<i>NA</i>	7% (1)	0% (0)	0% (0)	1% (1)

**Table 11.16. Interstate Interaction % (n)**

	<b>MPs</b>	<b>Civil servants</b>	<b>Experts</b>	<b>Total</b>
<i>1 = solely unilateral</i>	0% (0)	0% (0)	0% (0)	0% (0)
2	7% (1)	0% (0)	0% (0)	1% (1)
3	13% (2)	0% (0)	7% (3)	6% (5)
4	7% (1)	0% (0)	5% (2)	3% (3)
5	13% (2)	13% (4)	12% (5)	12% (11)
6	7% (1)	34% (11)	36% (15)	31% (27)
7	33% (5)	22% (7)	33% (14)	29% (26)
8	20% (3)	28% (9)	5% (2)	16% (14)
9	0% (0)	3% (1)	2% (1)	2% (2)
<i>10 = always multilateral</i>	0% (0)	0% (0)	0% (0)	0% (0)
<i>Mean ranking</i>	5.8	6.8	5.9	6.3

**Table 11.17. Security Conception % (n)**

	<b>MPs</b>	<b>Civil servants</b>	<b>Experts</b>	<b>Total</b>
<i>1 = narrow</i>	0% (0)	0% (0)	2% (1)	1% (1)
2	0% (0)	0% (0)	2% (1)	1% (1)
3	7% (1)	0% (0)	16% (7)	9% (8)
4	13% (2)	6% (2)	21% (9)	14% (13)
5	7% (1)	28% (9)	21% (9)	22% (19)
6	27% (4)	22% (7)	5% (2)	14% (13)
7	13% (2)	35% (11)	21% (9)	25% (22)
8	13% (2)	3% (1)	0% (0)	3% (3)
9	0% (0)	6% (2)	9% (4)	7% (6)
<i>10 = very broad</i>	7% (1)	0% (0)	2% (1)	2% (2)
<i>NA</i>	13% (2)	0% (0)	0% (0)	2% (2)
<i>Mean ranking</i>	6.2	6.2	5.2	5.6

**Table 11.18. EU Importance (mean on a scale from 0-5)**

<b>Threats</b>	<b>MPs</b>	<b>Civil servants</b>	<b>Experts</b>	<b>Total</b>
<i>Biological/Chemical attack</i>	2.14	1.87	2.59	2.2
<i>Conventional War</i>	2.07	1.94	2.93	2.31
<i>Criminalization of Economy</i>	2.86	3.47	3.55	3.29
<i>Cyber Attack</i>	2.21	2.16	3.05	2.47
<i>Ethnic Conflict</i>	2.36	3.69	3.36	3.14
<i>Macroeconomic Instability</i>	3.57	3.47	3.86	3.63
<i>Manmade Environmental Threats</i>	3.29	3.56	3.69	3.51
<i>Migratory Pressures</i>	3.5	3.81	3.63	3.65
<i>Narcotics Trafficking</i>	3.33	3.19	3.6	3.37
<i>Natural Disasters/Pandemics</i>	2.5	3.25	3.3	3.02
<i>Nuclear/Radiological Attack</i>	1.64	1.1	2.78	1.84
<i>Terrorist Attacks: Critical Infrastructure</i>	2.14	2.37	2.73	2.41
<i>Terrorist Attacks: State or Society</i>	2.07	2.56	2.95	2.39
<i>Other</i>	2	4	3.21	3.07
<i>Mean</i>	2.55	2.89	3.23	

**Table 11.19. ESDP Weakens NATO % (n)**

	<b>MPs</b>	<b>Civil servants</b>	<b>Experts</b>	<b>Total</b>
<i>Not at all</i>	27% (4)	43% (14)	31% (13)	35% (31)
<i>Little</i>	13% (2)	19% (6)	17% (7)	17% (15)
<i>Some</i>	27% (4)	22% (7)	38% (16)	30% (27)
<i>Very much</i>	13% (2)	13% (4)	7% (3)	10% (9)
<i>Don't know</i>	13% (2)	3% (1)	7% (3)	7% (6)
<i>NA</i>	7% (1)	0% (0)	0% (0)	1% (1)

**Table 11.20. US Commitment Is...**

	<b>MPs</b>	<b>Civil servants</b>	<b>Experts</b>	<b>Total</b>
<i>Essential</i>	27% (4)	6% (2)	17% (7)	15% (13)
<i>Very important</i>	27% (4)	6% (2)	21% (9)	17% (15)
<i>Important</i>	27% (4)	28% (9)	38% (16)	33% (29)
<i>Not very important</i>	20% (3)	57% (18)	17% (7)	31% (28)
<i>Inessential</i>	0% (0)	3% (1)	7% (3)	4% (4)



APPENDIX II: Figures

Figure 11.1.




Figure 11.2.




Figure 11.3.





Figure 11.4.





Garnet Project JERP 5.3.2

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# National Threat Perception: Survey Results from the United States

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Garnet Working Paper N° 18.11

## ABSTRACT

This elite survey in conjunction with an earlier review and analysis of the threat perceptions held by members of the post-Cold War administrations and those Senators on those committees responsible for security policy, broadly interpreted, suggests that the American security culture is undergoing a rapid change. We find that while the post-war security culture provides a good guide to understanding the instruments, origins and nature of the *direct* threats to national security, the same security culture does not provide much guidance for understanding or responding to the *indirect* threats to American security. If this survey explains anything, it sheds light a possible reason why the United States has had trouble adjusting to a radically changed external environment: where the threats are novel, there is no frame of reference for defining who poses the threat. Moreover, the willingness to rely upon police cooperation and intelligence sharing to meet many of the contemporary threats facing the United States may either reflect a change in an essential component of the American security culture; or it may simply reflect the dissatisfaction that usually accompanies foreign policy failure.

## I. INTRODUCTION

*The American Security Environment and Culture:*<sup>83</sup> The core elements of the American ‘security culture’ may be defined along four dimensions: the world view of the external environment, national identity, instrumental preferences, and interaction preferences. The world view of the external environment captures the underlying causal beliefs about the international system, the state’s position in the system, and the definition and classification of the pertinent security actors. National identity establishes the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and thereby defines the targets and origins of threat as well as the nature of the responses to them. The third element of security culture identifies the range of preferred instruments that a state avails itself to meet the external challenges to its territorial integrity or way of life. Finally, interaction preferences capture the variety of formal and informal international institutions in which a state may participate in order to achieve its security goals, particularly the preference for multilateral as opposed to bilateral or unilateral action.<sup>84</sup>

The American security culture encourages the confluence of security and defence. Kantian optimism about the possibility of perpetual peace and prosperity is wedded to a Hobbesian pessimism about human nature and the dynamics of the international system. For

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<sup>83</sup> This and the following section are based on Sperling (2007).

<sup>84</sup> These variables are variations on those presented by Banchoff (1999) and Duffield (1998).

any number of plausible reasons — cultural, theological or sociological — Americans require a palpable existential threat to conduct a purposeful security policy; there appear to be no permanent interests independent of the threat posed by a malevolent ‘other’. This world view largely explains the often parochial definition of interest and unwillingness to treat differences of interest as just that, a difference of interest rather than as evidence of an ally’s (or adversary’s) moral or ethical failing. Likewise, placing the United States in mortal combat with a well-defined enemy limits the electorate’s tolerance of an American foreign policy presented in shades of grey rather than in black and white. Finally, the American preference for multilateralism has been episodic and generally valued instrumentally rather than substantively. The preference for multilateral, bilateral or unilateral responses to international crises or challenges varies from administration to administration, although multilateralism enjoys less support within the Bush administration than in any other postdating America’s entry into World War II (see Table 11.1).

The circumstances of the post-1989 world initiated a change in the security requirements of the United States. The question that naturally arises is whether the national security culture has simply reflected the changed external environment or whether the security culture has defined how that security environment is understood. Moreover, the abrupt changes initiated with the end of the Cold War and the events of 11 September 2001 also provide an insight into those aspects of national security cultures that are relatively fixed and those that are relatively malleable. Arguably, American security policy came full circle between 1945 and 1989: just as in the immediate post-war period those ‘present at the creation’ understood the importance of providing the prerequisites of a stable international system, including international institutions and law to manage conflicts, the Clinton administration strategy of democratic engagement conceptually separated security and defence, a development that reflected the challenges of the post-1989 international system. The collective trauma experienced on and after 11 September in conjunction with the positive predisposition within the Bush administration to rely on force collapsed security and defence into virtually indistinguishable categories just as occurred with the foreign policy hysteria of the early Cold War world that reflected a deep-seeded fear of communism.

## **II. PERCEIVED SECURITY THREATS: THE OFFICIAL VIEW**

The post-Cold War international system has produced a remarkable degree of continuity in American security and defence policies, particularly with respect to the definition and origin

of threat. Changes have occurred, however, in administration perceptions of the primary agents of threat, the perceived utility of force in meeting those threats, and the pattern of interaction with allies and adversaries alike. With the end of the Cold War, the Bush administration announced that the United States needed to move beyond containment. Yet the administration remained committed to preventing ‘any hostile power or group of powers from dominating the Eurasian land mass’ (White House 1990: 1). American interests were conceived within an intellectual framework that retained a traditional geo-strategic understanding of security while acknowledging the interdependence of national security and economic power. Even under the aegis of fostering democracy and the market economy, the security strategy emphasized the desire to ‘maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek regional dominance’ (White House 1990: 2-3). As the Bush administration focused on the requirements of facilitating the transition to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the American security strategy increasingly appreciated the importance of the non-military instruments of statecraft. This appreciation was linked to the idea that market-oriented democracies were more likely to share the values and interests of the United States.

The Clinton administration, which downgraded further the reliance on military force to meet the security threats facing the United States, predicated its strategy of engagement and enlargement upon the assumption that the future security of the Euro-Atlantic region depended upon the successful transitions to democracy and the market economy in the CEE states as well as the republics of the FSU, particularly the Russian Federation. This strategy modified the Bush administration’s strategy of engagement and leadership. The change was more than cosmetic, but it obscured as much as it revealed. The Clinton administration went much further than the Bush administration in demonstrating a greater willingness to employ the non-military instruments of diplomacy to achieve American security objectives. It also recognized that the security threats facing the United States had changed qualitatively; security threats were no longer solely military in nature and were increasingly transnational phenomena, particularly terrorism and organized crime. These new threats were expected to dominate the future security agenda.

The Bush administration’s final *National Security Strategy* (1993) identified four major threats to the United States: nuclear proliferation stemming from unsecured nuclear materials in the FSU, particularly in Ukraine and Kazakhstan; a generic concern with terrorism; the nexus between narcotics and transnational organized crime; and an undefined challenge to American military--strategic dominance (see Table 11.1). The Clinton



administration published two national security strategies, the first in 1995 and the second in 1999. Both identified a relatively stable number of traditional security threats: the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran, Iraq, North Korea and other rogue states; the proliferation of nuclear weapons owing to the continuing problem of securing nuclear materials and sites in the Russian Federation; missile technology proliferation, particularly its acquisition by Iran and North Korea; and terrorism, including specific references to al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. By 1999, the Clinton administration turned its attention to a number of security threats often best addressed with the ‘soft’ elements of power: cyber-vandalism and information warfare; the proliferation of dangerous technologies; environmental and health threats (irreparable damage to regional ecosystems or epidemics); and the flow of narcotics into the United States.

President George W. Bush issued his first *National Security Strategy (NSS)* in 2002 and updated it in 2006 (White House 2002; 2006). His administration has focused upon Islamic terrorist groups and their acquisition of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) devices, and upon the acquisition of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by the three states constituting the ‘Axis of Evil’ — Iran, Iraq and North Korea.<sup>85</sup> While many of these concerns were held in common with the previous Clinton administration, the 2002 *NSS* was clearly preoccupied with the threat posed by ‘radical Islam’, which eventually mutated into a Sunni jihadist or extremist movement (Tenet 2003; Loy 2005). In the 2006 iteration of the *NSS*, the administration employed inflammatory rhetoric describing the ‘War on Terror’ as a fight ‘against terrorists and against their murderous ideology’ and claimed that al-Qaeda sought ‘a totalitarian empire that denies all political and religious freedom’ (White House 2006: 1, 9). The administration also adopted and then modified the Cold War syllogism, substituting terrorism for communism: democracy was ‘the opposite of terrorist tyranny’ and that terrorism presents a threat to democracy everywhere (White House 2006: 11). Unsurprisingly, the foreign policy corollary equates the presence of tyranny or repression anywhere in the world as a direct threat to the United States. A second change emerged in the strategic objectives of the United States between 1995 and 1999. In 1995, the Clinton administration echoed the previous Bush administration’s concern about preventing another hegemon from emerging on the European continent (White House 1995: 25; cf. Hamilton 1997: 91). At century’s end, it nonetheless adopted two assumptions of a ‘civilian power’: first, that peace in Europe was contingent upon continent-wide political and economic

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<sup>85</sup> In retrospect, a more appropriate moniker might have been the tricycle of evil given the absence of a meaningful threat from either Iraq or North Korea.

stability; second, direct and indirect security threats were diffused throughout the international system and were best addressed in multilateral fora (White House 1999: 29).

The Clinton administration's *NSS* identified three categories of interest that justified the calibrated use of American armed force: vital interests, important interests, and humanitarian interests. Vital interests were defined generally as the defence of American territorial integrity, national survival, and defence of allies. Important interests were defined as interests that do not affect national survival, but 'affect importantly our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live.' Humanitarian interests only called for the use of American armed forces where military capabilities are necessary to alleviate human suffering and when 'the risk to American troops is minimal' (White House 1995: 12). This threat hierarchy, however, is specific to American security interests and does not appear to be readily generalizable for America's allies in Europe or Asia. European and Asian security officials and experts are unlikely to be persuaded that either Somalia, Rwanda or, especially, Haiti meet even the slack criteria of an important threat justifying the deployment of force; Europeans are likely to consider the civil conflicts in Kosovo and Bosnia as having transgressed the boundary demarcating a vital interest from an important one — an assessment not shared by either Asians or Americans (Carter and Perry 1999; Carter 1999-2000). The American approach to security remains narrowly national in the definition of interest and threat, was largely state-centric prior to 11 September, and only slowly appreciated the security implications of malevolent non-state actors, a failing no doubt corrected in the recent past.

Correspondingly, the Department of Defense (DoD) has produced a fairly tightly defined set of security threats, most of which either threaten US combat forces (biological and chemical warfare particularly) or target the acquisition of nuclear weapons by rogue states and proliferation more generally. The war against terror had become *the* preoccupation of the DoD prior to the invasion and occupation of Iraq, although combating terrorism has now become virtually indistinguishable from concerns with containing the civil war in Iraq and rogue regimes, particularly North Korea, Iran and Syria. Notably, China has emerged as America's most likely, if not certain, competitor for geo-strategic dominance in Central Asia and the Asia Pacific. While views of China's ambitions do vary widely within the current administration, the DoD has long been wary of Chinese military power and its ability to degrade the dominance the United States currently enjoys in Asia (DoD 2005a).

The 2002 *National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS)* identified a biological, chemical, nuclear or radiological attack on the homeland as the major threat facing the United

States (Office of Homeland Security 2002: vii; cf. Fingar 2005). America's vulnerability to CBRN terrorism was ascribed to the liabilities facing any open society, long and difficult-to-control borders, unsecured key infrastructures, and an extraordinarily large number of soft, valuable targets (Office of Homeland Security 2002: 7-10). Yet, the preoccupation with homeland security preceded both 11 September and the Bush administration. Presidential Decision Directive-63 (PDD-63), issued in 1998, had already recognized the problem of protecting critical infrastructures in the United States and led to the creation of the National Infrastructure Protection Center housed in the FBI. The primary menaces to the American infrastructure were identified as an attack on information networks by vandals, organized crime and terrorists, as a form of foreign espionage, or as a component of an adversary's strategic attack. Cyberspace presented a double-edged threat to the United States: first, information warfare could erase the battlefield advantages of net-centric warfare which was key to the modernization of the American forces; second, the government and public rely upon cyberspace for every aspect of daily life and that dependence left society and the state vulnerable to threats ranging from cyber-vandalism to cyber-terrorism (Freeh 1998; Vatis 2000: 5; cf. Goslin 2000; Department of Justice 2003; Federal Bureau of Investigation 2004). The concern with protecting cyberspace only accelerated after 11 September. The Bush administration also understood that protecting cyberspace was particularly problematic owing to the absence of defensible boundaries and the relatively low barrier to carrying out a successful attack (White House 2003b: 6-7).

The Clinton administration also implemented a Key Asset Program targeting potential attacks on critical infrastructures. The catalogue of critical infrastructures identified in 1998 included government and private sector telecommunications and information systems, critical sectors of the economy highly dependent upon information technologies (banking and finance), energy distribution networks, and transportation systems (Vatis 1999: 1). The Bush administration's national strategy for the protection of critical infrastructures responded to the dramatic demonstration on 11 September that the United States was not only vulnerable to terrorist attacks, but that the American (and global) financial system could have come unglued had the terrorists targeted the New York Stock Exchange or the New York Federal Reserve. In the USA Patriot Act, the Bush administration not only expanded the number of categories constituting critical infrastructures, but added to the list national monuments and icons, both considered 'symbolically equated with traditional values and institutions or US political and economic power' (White House 2003a: viii). The American government's 'official' perception of threat can thus be summarised as shown in Table 11.2.

This working paper presents the results of an elite survey conducted during the summer and fall of 2006. The purpose of the elite survey was to identify the level of correspondence between the attentive security elite and the United States government (a task made easier by the existence of a Republican President unquestioningly supported by Republican majorities in the US House of Representatives and US Senate between 2000 and January 2007). The elite survey produces two strong findings: first, there is a disjunction between the implied security culture of the attentive foreign policy elite outside government and the security culture of the foreign policy elite within government; second, the security preoccupations, instruments of choice, and interaction preferences of that elite correspond closely to those preoccupations and preferences ascribed to elites with a ‘civilian’ security orientation. These two findings raise an important question: Are there two contending security cultures in the United States that represent a partisan divide or is the conceptual utility of security culture limited during a period of disequilibrium and uncertainty in the external environment?

### **III. PERCEIVED SECURITY THREATS: ELITE VIEWS**

*Methodology.* The survey of nongovernmental American security elites was administered in June and a survey of Senate legislative assistants was unsuccessfully attempted in the period spanning October and December 2006. As the goal of our survey was to identify people with specialized knowledge, the sampling strategy was purposive in overall design. For the first round initiated in June 2006, we established three separate lists of nongovernmental security experts drawn from five major foreign policy think tanks (the American Enterprise Institute, Council on Foreign Affairs, the Brookings Institution, the Henry Stimson Center, and the Institute for International Economics), associate and full professors at major research institutions with specialised schools of foreign affairs or international relations (Columbia University, Georgetown University, the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, INSS, SAIS, the Johns Hopkins University, Stanford, University of California (San Diego), the University of Virginia, and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University) as well as select faculty at two service academies (the Naval Academy and West Point), members of the Foreign Policy Association, and Stennis Congressional Fellows.<sup>86</sup> The study population of the first two groups consisted of 356 individuals: 98 from the think tanks and 258 from the universities. In June 2006, these

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<sup>86</sup> Special thanks are owed to Robert Nolan who kindly agreed to distribute the questionnaire electronically to the FPA membership.

individuals received an electronic request to complete the attached online (and anonymous) questionnaire. This request yielded 18 responses from individuals located in think tanks (an 18% response rate) and 32 responses from academics (a 12% response rate). Compared to other elite surveys, the response rate for the security expert survey was very low.<sup>87</sup>

A second round of the survey was administered between October and December 2006. The study population in this case was restricted to two legislative assistants for each member of the US Senate sitting on security-related standing committees (Intelligence, Foreign Affairs, and Defense). This strategy yielded a total of 80 individuals. The survey was sent to each individual on three occasions. The response rate was zero — a disappointing but not unexpected result. An effort was made to conduct telephone interviews, but the response rate was limited to the legislative assistants for the two senators from the State of Ohio, who considered it a constituency obligation. Consequently, this working paper, unlike the others in the series, lacks a component reflecting the foreign policy views of either the Congress or members of the administration.

Several factors may account for the low participation rates, particularly the sensitive nature of information about security perceptions, the timing of the survey (prior to the 2006 mid-term elections and the likely turn-over in personnel thereafter), and the overall decline in survey participation rates that has been observed since the early 1990s.<sup>88</sup>

#### **IV. SECURITY THREAT PERCEPTIONS**

The American security elites were asked to rank order five of the gravest threats facing the country in 2006 and 2010, with ‘1’ indicating the most grave and ‘5’ the least. When respondents ranked the same issue area in both 2006 and 2010, they exhibited consistency in their threat perceptions. There was a substantial amount of elite consensus within the three occupation sub-groupings of the attentive foreign policy elite. They generally held similar views about the gravest security threats facing the United States (Table 11.3). The top five

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<sup>87</sup> A November 2005 online survey of American opinion leaders about the state of the world and the US global role yielded response rates of 60 per cent for academic and think tank leaders, and 52 per cent for state and local government politicians. Telephone response rates were 40 and 48 per cent for the academic and state/local opinion leader sub-samples, respectively (Pew Research 2005). Since we do not know whether non-respondents differ from the respondents in a way that is relevant to the study, there is the possibility of non-response error (Dillman 2000: 11; Babbie 2001: 256). One puzzling result of the survey, however, was the respondents’ unwillingness to identify their age, gender or political affiliation, which made it impossible to test a hypothesis about demographic characteristics and security orientation.

<sup>88</sup> Another explanation contributing to the zero response rate might be the institutional bias of the legislative assistants. Unlike an individual representing the Pew Research Center, the Chicago Council of Foreign Affairs or one of the major research institutions, an individual from a relatively obscure Midwestern university is less likely to pique the curiosity or be extended the courtesy of a response. A more cynical explanation is the unwillingness of these individuals to defend a foreign policy that was clearly indefensible by late 2006.

security threats, in descending order of gravity, were terrorism against state and society (2.28), terrorism against critical infrastructure (2.42), macroeconomic instability (2.72), biological or chemical attack (2.91), and man-made environmental threats (3.04). The rank-ordering in terms of number of mentions varies slightly: natural disasters and pandemics ranks first (70 mentions) and is followed by terrorism against critical infrastructure (65 mentions), terrorism against state and society (64 mentions), biological and chemical threats (56 mentions), and a virtual tie between man-made environmental threats (47) and nuclear or radiological attacks (45). Thus, while fewer identified macroeconomic stability as a threat to American security, those who did view it as a threat viewed as a very grave one as compared to natural disasters and pandemics or nuclear and radiological attacks. One plausible inference from this divergence lies in the distinction between the consequences of the threat (which lies upon a continuum of graveness) and the probability of threat (which lies on a continuum marked by a certainty of occurrence ranging between 0 and 1). Arguably, these 7 security concerns should be considered the most critical facing the United States today.

Statistically significant inter-group differences in threat perceptions were detected for just one issue in 2006 and no issues in 2010. This absence of dissensus is shown by the strong magnitude of the Pearson-r correlations, which measure how variables or rank orders are related (Table 11.3). Somewhat surprisingly, there was a significant inter-group difference with respect to the gravity of the threat posed by macroeconomic instability to US security. Academics and members of the FPA ranked the assessed the macroeconomic threat as much graver than did individuals drawn from think tanks; a pattern that carried over less markedly into the assessment of macroeconomic instability in 2010.

Generally, the results from this survey suggest that American security elites not only remain preoccupied with security threats that pose a *direct* threats to life, property and society, but are less concerned with the *indirect* threats to life, property and society posed by many of the threats on ‘new’ security agenda. These elites do differ from the current administration, however, with respect to the favoured policy instruments and the preference for multilateralism.

## **V. POLICY INSTRUMENTS**

The preferred policy instruments for direct and indirect threats to American security reflect a ‘civilian’ orientation: a reliance upon military force to meet the security threats facing the United States is the least favoured of the six categories of policy instrument. The respondents identified police cooperation and intelligence sharing, 278 times (27% of the total),

diplomacy 216 times (21% of the total), economic and financial assistance 182 times (18% of the total), special operations 159 times (16% of the total), ‘other’ 117 times (11% of the total) and conventional military force 69 times (7% of the total). Police cooperation and intelligence sharing was the first instrument of choice for meeting the threats posed by biological or chemical attacks, the criminalization of economies, cyber-attack, narcotics trafficking, nuclear or radiological attacks, and terrorism against critical infrastructure and against state or society. Diplomacy was the preferred instrument to cope with conventional war, ethnic conflict, and the environment. Economic and financial assistance was viewed as most effective to meet the threats posed by migratory flows and natural disasters or pandemics. Finally, the respondents identified ‘other’ as the chief instrument for meeting the threat of macroeconomic instability. The second best instruments for each security threat were identified economic and financial assistance (criminalization of economies, ethnic conflict, macroeconomic instability, and man-made environmental threats), special operations (terrorism against critical infrastructure and against state or society, biological or chemical attack, and narcotics trafficking), diplomacy (migratory pressures, nuclear or radiological attacks, and narcotics trafficking), ‘other’ (pandemics or natural disasters and cyber attacks), and conventional military force (conventional war) (see Tables 11.4 and 11.5).<sup>89</sup>

Overall, only three statistically significant differences between the occupational groups were detected with respect to the appropriate instrument for meeting a security threat. First, think tank respondents expressed a greater willingness to rely upon traditional military force to meet the challenge of biological or chemical attacks than did their academic and FPA/Stennis counterparts.<sup>90</sup> Second, they also placed greater reliance upon military force to meet the challenge posed by terrorist attacks on state and society than did the other two occupational groups. Third, FPA/Stennis respondents viewed special operations as a useful instrument for meeting the threat posed by man-made environmental threats, while the others did not.<sup>91</sup>

## **VI. ORIGINS OF SECURITY THREATS**

The identification of states, regions, and non-state actors as the primary agents of threat in the contemporary international system varied with the nature of the general category of threat. Those threats which have traditionally relied upon the use of force generated specific states

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<sup>89</sup> For a breakdown of the rank-ordering of the preferred policy instruments for each category of threat, see Tables A11.1a-d in the appendix.

<sup>90</sup> See Table A11.1a located in the appendix.

<sup>91</sup> See Table A11.1d located in the appendix.

and regions as the primary sources of threat to the United States, while those threats classified as constituting the elements of the ‘new’ security agenda identify regions and non-state actors as the most likely origins of threat. Among the most prominent states and regions are Iran (biological and chemical attacks, conventional war, nuclear or radiological attacks, both categories of terrorist attack), North Korea (biological and chemical attacks, conventional war, and nuclear or radiological attacks), China (conventional war, cyber-attack, macroeconomic instability, and natural disasters or pandemics, and both categories of terrorist threat), and the United States (biological and chemical attacks, conventional war, criminalization of the economy, cyber-attack, macroeconomic instability and both categories of terrorist attack) (See Tables 11.6a and 11.6b).

The traditional elements of the security agenda entailing the use of force provided a common set of regions from which threats to American security originate. The Middle East was identified as the chief origin of threat for all five threats (the responsible biological or chemical attack, conventional war, nuclear or radiological attack, both categories of terrorist attack). Latin and South America were identified as the chief sources of threat for the eight threats classified as typical of the ‘new’ security agenda. Those identifying Latin and South America outnumbered those identifying the Middle East or the global system as the chief origin of threat (See Tables 11.6a-b).

Think tank respondents were less likely than the others to identify the same regions as the origin of specific threats (nuclear or radiological attacks and both categories of terrorist threat). Members of the three occupational groups tended to agree about the regional origins of security threats. Statistically significant inter-group differences were found in just three instances (see Tables 11.7a-b).

The most enlightening differences that emerge in the survey are the assessments of non-state actors as agents of threat. Non-state actors emerge as a prominent source of concern that no doubt helps explain the reliance upon the non-coercive instruments of diplomacy and the preference for the ‘civilian’ instruments of police cooperation and intelligence sharing or financial and economic assistance. With respect to those security threats where the use of force is at issue, the three major non-state actors identified by the respondents were generic terrorists (biological or chemical attack, nuclear or radiological attack, and both categories of terrorist attack); the other two agents frequently identified were Islamic terrorists and Al Qaeda for four of the five categories of threat found in Table 11.6a. The primary non-state agents identified as the origins of those threats associated with the ‘new’ security agenda included organised criminal groups (criminalisation of the economy and narcotics



trafficking), hackers (cyber-attack), economic agents (environmental threats), and natural phenomena (natural disasters or pandemics) (see Table 11.6b). Taken together, the results from the survey suggest that the security elites have a firm mental picture of the most important agents of threat in those security areas where the use of force is at issue. Likewise, the evidence would support the conclusion that the contemporary security elite have a less sure grasp of the origin or identification of those actors threatening American security over a broad spectrum of threats. This divergence between the two categories of security threat is consistent with the seeming inability of the foreign policy elite to craft policy options that would meet effectively these security challenges.

## **VII. IMPORTANCE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Table 11.8 presents data on elite perceptions of the European Union's (EU) importance in addressing the security threats currently facing the United States. On a 0-5 scale, where 0 = not important at all and 5 = absolutely essential, they collectively judged the EU to be of relatively high importance, with the mean responses ranging from a low of 3.23 (conventional war) to a high of 3.85 (man-made environmental threat). The EU was seen as an important partner for the United States in meeting ten threats (the mean was over 3.5); in only three instances was the EU viewed as of moderate importance (conventional war, nuclear and radiological attacks, and cyber-attacks). Although each category of threat drew a wide range of responses on the 0-5 scale, the standard deviations were not large, suggesting there is an elite consensus that EU involvement is of great importance, although it is not an essential partner in the vast majority of cases. It is considered an essential partner in the cases of man-made environmental threats, macroeconomic stability, and the criminalization of the economy. The relatively higher scores attributed to the EU in these three categories no doubt reflects the importance of the Euro in the international monetary and financial system, the EU states as an important partners for overcoming the threat posed by climate change, and the growing transnational network of European and North American criminal organisations.

Academics assessed the role of the EU most sceptically. In five categories of threat (biological or chemical attack, cyber-attack, macroeconomic instability, and both categories of terrorism), a statistically significant difference emerged within the three occupation groups; in each case, academics took the most sceptical view of the EU as a viable partner for the United States. Moreover, academics consistently assigned the lowest scores to the EU as compared to the other two categories of respondent. This assessment would no doubt come as a surprise to academic specialists who have carefully tracked the emergence of the EU as a

security actor across a wide spectrum of policy issues. Given the academic scepticism of the EU, it is puzzling that those with diplomatic or political experience (the FPA members or Stennis Fellows) or those engaged in government supported or policy relevant research (those in think tanks) assign a higher value to the EU as a security partner. These results (while remaining fully aware of the sample's limitations) suggest that international relations specialists may want to reconsider their opinion of the EU as a strategic actor.

### **VIII. ESDP, NATO AND THE US**

The assessed utility of the EU as a security actor can also be inferred from the results of the questions posed about the relationship between the EU security and defence policy (ESDP), NATO, and the strength of American commitment to European security. Three questions were posed: Would a more autonomous ESDP weaken NATO? Would a weaker NATO lead to a retrenchment of the US commitment to European security? How important is the American commitment to European security? The answers to these questions, paradoxically, demonstrate the growing importance of the EU as a security actor and the incompatibility between American leadership and European autonomy.

A near majority (45.9%) claimed that a more autonomous ESDP would weaken NATO some or very much. Just under than 29% were undecided, while almost 26% did not believe it would have much affect at all on NATO (see Table 11.8). A simple majority of think tank and FPA/Stennis respondents believed that a stronger ESDP would affect NATO negatively, while academics were much more sanguine about its impact on NATO. Academics and the FPA members/Stennis fellows were similarly unsure about the outcome (approximately one-third), but the latter group of respondents were also quite certain that the consequence would not be negligible.

The geopolitical consequences of a stronger ESDP on the American security commitment exhibited a greater degree of uncertainty: slightly over 40% of the respondents answered 'maybe' to the question, while only 23% believed that a stronger ESDP would lead to the retrenchment of the US commitment to European security (see Table 11.8). One difficulty in drawing any firm conclusion about the consequences of a stronger ESDP on the American commitment is the prior understanding of that commitment held by each respondent: if the American commitment is considered a function of the American national interest rather than a mixture of interest and community, then the ESDP is unlikely to have a marked effect on American intentions; if the respondent were an ideological Atlanticist, there would be a similar lack of concern. Either rationale could explain why 28% of the respondents see no change in the intensity of the American commitment. It would also

suggest that those operating within think tanks, particularly, are more likely to see the US commitment as a bargain between Europe and America: American protection in exchange for American leadership and European followership. An autonomous ESDP would represent a renegotiation of that bargain which in turn would lead to a lower American commitment — a position held by half of that occupation group.

The perceived durability of the American commitment to Europe despite the evolution of the ESDP can also be explained by the importance ascribed to the American commitment to European security. A clear majority (85%) hold that the American security commitment to Europe is important, and 55% believe that that commitment is either essential or very important. Only 15% believe that the American commitment is inessential or not very important (see Table 11.9). The range of opinion within the three occupation groups did not differ significantly: the range of respondents assessing the US security commitment as essential or very important ranged from 75% to 50%, as important ranged from 25% to 37%, and inessential or not very important ranged from 0% to 20%. What is remarkable, however, is the implication of these results for the expected future relationship between the EU and the US: the strong belief that the American commitment to Europe is essential is tied to the equally strong belief that a weakened NATO (which is in part a function of a more autonomous ESDP) will reduce the security of the transatlantic area. These findings provide some basis for drawing the following conclusion: this position on the complex relationship between the US, NATO and Europe is similar to that found in the Congress and successive American administrations: a stronger Europe is only in the American (and European) interest so long as Europe remains the political and diplomatic subordinate of the United States.

## **IX. NATIONAL DEFENCE BUDGETS**

American elites were asked to comment on the size and distribution of budgetary and manpower resources devoted to meeting security and national defence needs. These responses inevitably focussed on the narrow question of traditional military defence rather than Federal expenditures in meeting the entire spectrum of threats that resist a military solution.

*Perceptions of the size and distribution of national defence budgets.* As shown in Table 11.10, almost 87% of the respondents felt that the distribution of budgetary and manpower resources were misaligned with the threats facing the United States, with think tank respondents expressing the greatest amount of dissatisfaction (92%), although the others were close behind (86% each). Dissatisfaction with the size and distribution of national

defence budgets was also evident (Table 11.11). A clear majority of respondents (53%) indicated the defence budget is too large. While 73% of the academics held that position, only 42% of those working in think tanks did so. Similarly, only 9% of academics agreed that the defence budget was too small, while 25% of those working in think tanks did so. These elites also agreed overwhelmingly (88%) that the distribution of the defence budget between procurement, personnel, and equipment did not meet US defence requirements. Less than 10% of academic and think tank respondents were satisfied with the defence budget, while 17% of the FPA members/Stennis fellows were satisfied that the defence budget met US defence needs. These assessments of the defence budget, particularly the dissatisfaction with its absolute size, permits the inference that the attentive foreign policy elite agree that the resources currently devoted to military defence should be reallocated to those agencies responsible for meeting the broad spectrum of threats that face the United States but resist a military solution.

The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the emphasis placed on net centric warfare and highly mobile forces during Donald Rumsfeld's tenure at the Defence Department renewed pressures on the Europeans to modernize their forces to keep pace with the United States modernization efforts. Modernisation was and is viewed as a mechanism for enabling the United States (and its allies) to project force across the globe at a lower cost in terms of blood and treasure; it represents an American effort to substitute capital for labour in the conduct of war (Sperling 2004). Despite the vast sums spent on modernization in the last decade, a significant portion of the respondents (35%) believed that too little was being spent on modernization, while only 16% believed that too much was being spent. This finding obscures an intra-elite debate, however. Almost 46% of academics believe that too much is being spent on modernization, while only 17% of those working in think tanks agree.

When probed further about their opinions about spending on personnel, procurement, and research and development within national defence budgets, 55% believed that too much was being spent on procurement (the key component of modernization). Surprisingly and perhaps inconsistently in the case of think tank respondents, all three groups believed that too much was spend on procurement. No academic indicated that too little was dedicated to this category of expenditure, while FPA/Stennis and think tank respondents were in general agreement (24% and 25%, respectively). A majority also held that too little was spent on personnel (ranging between 61% and 30% within occupational groups), while only a minority (20%) felt that too much was being devoted to personnel. An inter-group consensus exists in the area of R&D: 47% believed that too little was being spent, 26% believed that just the

right amount was being spent, and 26% believed that too much was spent on R&D (see Table 11.12). What can we conclude from these responses? The emphasis on R&D reflects the American desire to substitute capital for labour in the waging of war and a continuing fascination with the technology of war, particularly the promise of smart weapons and the need to find technological solutions to the challenges of asymmetrical warfare. The dissatisfaction with procurement budgets undoubtedly reflects two concerns: a general desire to wait until the next generation of weapons systems are developed (which would explain the shift of resources from procurement to R&D), the belief that the current pattern of procurement does not meet the needs of the United States military, particularly those of its expeditionary forces, and that the men and women under arms are not receiving the training or protection necessary to fulfil their assigned missions.

## **X. CONCEPTIONS OF INTERSTATE ACTIONS AND SECURITY APPROACHES**

The final two questions of the survey addressed two academic and policy debates: the first revolves around the effectiveness and relevance of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power in meeting American security policy objectives; the second addresses the strategic decision of choosing between unilateral, bilateral and multilateral responses. In a previous study, the evolution of American foreign policy since 1989 demonstrated that the first Bush and both Clinton administrations preferred multilateral solutions to security threats facing the Atlantic world in common and viewed unilateral or bilateral solutions as second best, while the administrations of George W. Bush exhibited a preference for unilateral action when possible and tactical multilateralism (‘coalitions of the willing’) only when necessary (Sperling 2007). The survey respondents generally view the United States as a state that prefers unilateral to multilateral action: the mean survey response was 3.69 (see Table 11.13). The standard deviations are not large, which suggests consensus within and between the elite groups. Arguably, this assessment is largely consistent with the trajectory of US defence and foreign policy in the new century.

Consistent with the tendency towards unilateral action is the shared perception that the United States has practised a security policy that has relied heavily upon the ‘hard’ instruments of security policy (mean response of 3.5), a finding that may help explain the relative dissatisfaction with the size and distribution of the defence budget as well as the utility ascribed by the respondents to the ‘soft’ instruments of power in Tables 11.4 and 11.5. The greatest divergences once again emerge in the assessments of think tank and academic respondents, although that difference is not statistically significant.

## XI. CONCLUSIONS

The results of this survey in conjunction with an earlier review and analysis of the threat perceptions held by members of the post-Cold War administrations and those Senators on those committees responsible for security policy, broadly interpreted, suggest that the American security culture is undergoing a rapid change. This process of change brings us back to the first questions raised earlier in this working paper: Do the two contending security cultures in the United States merely represent a partisan divide or is the conceptual utility of security culture limited during a period of disequilibrium and uncertainty in the external environment? There is no evidence that there is a partisan divide within the United States on the origins, means, and goals of security policy, although that conclusion must be severely qualified: the unwillingness of the respondents to self-identify their partisan allegiance makes it impossible to conduct a statistical test. Yet, there is a high degree of conformity among the three groups of respondents. The evidence does support the proposition that in a period of rapid and uncertain change in the external environment, the saliency of the pre-existing (in this case post-war) security culture to the external security challenges may rapidly decline in saliency, both conceptually and as a guide to policy-making. While the post-war security culture provides a good guide to understanding the instruments, origins and nature of the *direct* threats to national security, that same security culture does not provide much guidance for understanding or responding to the *indirect* threats to American security. Thus, the post-Cold War experience demonstrates that the American national security culture that emerged in the post-war period provides an imperfect, if not faulty, guide to understanding the trajectory of American security policy or the perception of threat by the attentive foreign policy elite.

A second and related question asks whether a changing national security culture simply reflects the changed external environment or whether the security culture has defined how that security environment is understood. Both questions touch upon the conceptual utility of security culture. Does it play a causal role by constructing the conceptual lens through which the security environment is understood and security threats are defined? Is its impact on the definition of threat contingent upon the (in)stability of the external environment or is it particular to a partisan divide. An unwillingness to abandon the central tenets of the American national security culture — the reflex to rely upon unilateral or bilateral policies in matters of national security, the pessimistic view of the external environment and the need to identify an existential threat, and the reliance upon traditional military power — explains the flawed and fatal foreign policy of the current Bush

administration. If this survey explains anything, it sheds light a possible reason why the United States has had trouble adjusting to a radically changed external environment: where the threats are novel, there is no frame of reference for defining who poses the threat. Moreover, the willingness to rely upon police cooperation and intelligence sharing to meet many of the threats may either reflect a change in an essential component of the American security culture; or it may simply reflect the dissatisfaction that usually accompanies foreign policy failure.

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## TABLES

**Table 11.1. US national security culture**

<i>World view of external environment</i>	Paradox of Kantian optimism combined with Hobbesian expectations. See world as hostile and threatening. Threats are always existential: first communism, now 'radical Islam'. Or threat posed by a great power with interests inimical to the United States (Soviet Union prior to 1989 and China since then on a sporadic basis). US requires a hostile 'other' to frame its understanding of the external world.
<i>National identity</i>	National and parochial. Largely free from cosmopolitanism.
<i>Instrumental preferences</i>	US administrations have relied on military as well as civilian instruments. There is an embedded assumption that military instruments are the most efficacious and appropriate. Arguably, the most recent administration has fully remilitarized American foreign policy.
<i>Interaction preferences</i>	Interaction pattern dependent upon the threat faced. Has been a greater willingness to avoid institutionalised multilateral frameworks and operate either unilaterally or in ad hoc coalitions of the willing which allow the US greatest freedom of action.

**Table 11.2 : Summary characteristics of US security orientation**

	Post-Cold War	Post-11 September 2001
<i>Type of threat</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) failure of transitions to democracy and the market</li> <li>b) spread of nuclear weapons, materials, and human capital</li> <li>c) rise of peer competitors</li> <li>d) integrity of international law and international institutions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) international terrorism, particularly that posed by radical Islamists</li> <li>b) The rise of China as a peer competitor</li> <li>c) Axis of Evil: reflects preoccupation with nuclear proliferation programmes that pose (in)direct threats to US interests</li> </ul>
<i>Agency of threat</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) primarily states, both established, new and failing</li> <li>b) rogue states</li> <li>c) secondary threat by non-state actors, particularly terrorist groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) rogue states that supported terrorism to further national ends</li> <li>b) terrorist networks symbolised by al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.</li> <li>c) States remain critical actor in terms of strategic threat</li> </ul>
<i>Target of threat</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) stability of the American supported international system</li> <li>b) state viability and concurrent disorder</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) terrorist threat to American way of life, its economic and social institutions</li> <li>b) threat to broader US foreign policy goals in Middle East (Israeli security or a secure supply of oil)</li> <li>c) American hegemony</li> </ul>
<i>Geographical source of threat</i>	<p>Threats were generally linked to specific geographic areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) failed transitions in eastern and south eastern Europe and FSU</li> <li>b) loss of control over nuclear weapons and material primarily Russia, but concern at end of decade with Pakistan, India, North Korea and Iraq</li> <li>c) China in Pacific.</li> </ul>	<p>The geographical source of threat contracted to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Middle East, particularly Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran</li> <li>b) North Korea and China</li> <li>c) Pakistan and India</li> </ul> <p>More generally, US security policy has several regional foci that are embedded in a global frame of reference.</p>
<i>Severity of threat</i>	<p>No single threat was viewed as an existential threat to the United States. Rather, threat posed to US order and potentially to allies across the globe.</p>	<p>The threat posed by terrorism and rogue states seen as an immediate and existential threat to US; the threat posed by potential peer competitors is a longer term concern.</p>
<i>Types of response</i>	<p>Primarily one of democratic engagement; the use of civilian instruments, but willingness to employ military instrument as last resort. Multilateralism when possible, unilateral or bilateral if necessary.</p>	<p>The response to these threats has been largely militarised. Even where diplomatic efforts are made, the shadow of preventive war makes US policy coercive rather than persuasive. Unilateralism when possible, multilateralism when necessary.</p>
<i>Tractability</i>	<p>Most of the threats were considered susceptible to negotiation, although amelioration of most threats viewed as amenable to military solution.</p>	<p>Threats posed by terrorism and non-state actors are seen as relatively intractable and long-term. Threats posed by state actors are seen as resolvable either by negotiation or force.</p>

**Table 11.3. Mean perceptions of security threats in 2006 and 2010**

	<b>Think Tank (n=18)</b>	<b>Academics (n=32)</b>	<b>FPA, Stennis (n=63)</b>	<b>Overall (n=113)</b>	<b>Pearson Correlation 2006/2010</b>
<i>Biological/chemical</i>	3.18 (11)	2.69 (13)	2.91 (32)	2.91 (56)	.63 (51)***
	3.09 (11)	2.69 (13)	2.89 (27)	2.88 (51)	
<i>Conventional war</i>	2.75 (4)	3.86 (7)	3.00 (8)	3.26 (19)	.92 (18)***
	3.25 (4)	4.00 (8)	3.14 (7)	3.53 (19)	
<i>Criminalisation of economy</i>	3.00 (2)	4.00 (3)	3.18 (11)	3.31 (16)	.92 (15)***
	3.00 (2)	4.00 (3)	3.09 (11)	3.25 (16)	
<i>Cyber attack</i>	3.75 (4)	3.56 (9)	3.05 (20)	3.27 (33)	.61 (30)***
	3.33 (6)	3.25 (8)	3.48 (21)	3.40 (35)	
<i>Ethnic conflict</i>	4.50 (2)	3.57 (7)	3.44 (9)	3.61 (18)	.90 (16)***
	5.00 (2)	3.00 (6)	3.30 (10)	3.39 (18)	
<i>Macroeconomic instability</i>	<b>4.20 (5)</b>	<b>2.23 (13)</b>	<b>2.67 (21)</b>	2.72 (39)	.61 (32)***
	3.75 (4)	2.92 (13)	2.31 (16)	2.73 (33)	
<i>Manmade environmental</i>	3.17 (6)	3.24 (17)	2.88 (24)	3.04 (47)	.82 (46)***
	2.17 (6)	3.16 (19)	3.06 (34)	3.00 (59)	
<i>Migratory pressures</i>	4.00 (2)	3.83 (6)	3.00 (13)	3.33 (21)	.83 (20)***
	4.33 (3)	3.67 (6)	3.00 (13)	3.36 (22)	
<i>Narcotics trafficking</i>	5.00 (3)	3.40 (5)	3.27 (15)	3.52 (23)	.92 (22)***
	5.00 (2)	3.40 (5)	3.07 (15)	3.32 (22)	
<i>Natural disasters/pandemics</i>	3.27 (11)	3.00 (20)	3.51 (39)	3.33 (70)	.69 (63)***
	3.18 (11)	2.89 (19)	3.09 (34)	3.05 (64)	
<i>Nuclear/radiological</i>	3.70 (10)	2.67 (12)	3.26 (23)	3.20 (45)	.79 (41)***
	3.60 (10)	2.29 (14)	2.87 (23)	2.85 (47)	
<i>Terrorism: critical infrastructure</i>	2.86 (14)	2.53 (17)	2.18 (34)	2.42 (65)	.67 (58)***
	3.00 (13)	2.83 (18)	2.50 (28)	2.71 (59)	
<i>Terrorism: state or society</i>	2.00 (12)	2.26 (19)	2.39 (33)	2.28 (64)	.74 (58)***
	2.17 (12)	2.67 (18)	2.71 (28)	2.59 (58)	

Notes: 2006 and 2010 means in first and second rows of each cell, respectively. Figures in bold indicate F-scores for inter-group differences are statistically significant at  $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*  $p < .05$

**Table 11.4. Policy instruments for direct threats**

<b>Policy Instrument →</b>	<b>Diplomatic</b>	<b>Economic and financial assistance</b>	<b>Police cooperation and intelligence sharing</b>	<b>Traditional military</b>	<b>Special operations</b>	<b>Other</b>
<b>Threat ↓</b>						
<i>Biological/chemical</i>	23	10	<b>46</b>	9	29	6
<i>Conventional war</i>	<b>15</b>	6	3	12	4	0
<i>Nuclear/ radiological</i>	27	7	<b>36</b>	9	24	1
<i>Terrorism: critical infrastructure</i>	23	11	<b>58</b>	13	35	4
<i>Terrorism: state/society</i>	25	11	<b>53</b>	12	33	3
<i>Total</i>	113	45	<b>196</b>	55	125	14
<i>As percentage of total (548)</i>	21%	8%	36%	10%	23%	3%

**Table 11.5. Policy instruments for indirect threats**

<b>Policy Instrument →</b> <b>Threat ↓</b>	<b>Diplomatic</b>	<b>Economic and financial assistance</b>	<b>Police cooperation and intelligence sharing</b>	<b>Traditional military</b>	<b>Special operations</b>	<b>Other</b>
<i>Criminalization of economies</i>	2	7	<b>13</b>	0	2	3
<i>Cyberattack</i>	6	3	<b>25</b>	0	7	9
<i>Ethnic conflict</i>	<b>13</b>	12	2	4	3	2
<i>Macroeconomic instability</i>	15	20	3	0	0	<b>30</b>
<i>Environmental</i>	<b>30</b>	25	3	0	0	22
<i>Migratory flows</i>	13	<b>18</b>	7	1	2	5
<i>Narcotics trafficking</i>	8	6	<b>18</b>	2	8	2
<i>Natural disasters/pandemics</i>	16	<b>46</b>	11	7	12	30
<b>TOTAL</b>	103	<b>137</b>	82	14	34	103
<i>As percentage of total (473)</i>	22%	29%	17%	3%	7%	22%

**Table 11.6a. Origins of threat: use of force**

	<b>State</b>	<b>Regions</b>	<b>Non-State</b>
<i>Biological/ chemical attack</i>	Iran (4) North Korea (3) US (3) Weak states (1)	Middle East (18) Asia (1) Central Asia (1) South Asia (1) Europe (1)	Terrorists (15) Islamic Terrorists (14) Al Qaeda (10) Domestic (1)
<i>Conventional war</i>	Iran (2) China (2) US (2) North Korea (1) Russia (1)	Middle East (4) Africa (1) Asia (1)	
<i>Nuclear/radiological attack</i>	North Korea (10) Iran (6) FSU (3) Russia (3) Pakistan (2) India (1) Iraq (1)	Middle East (7) Arab World (1) South Asia (1) Southeast Asia (1)	Islamic extremists (10) Terrorists (7) Al Qaeda (5) Euro-based Islamists (2)
<i>Terrorist attack: critical infrastructure</i>	Iran (4) China (1) Palestine (1) Syria (1) US (1)	Middle East (15) Asia (3) Central Asia (1) Global (1) North Africa (1) South Asia (1)	Islamic extremists (18) Terrorists (17) Al Qaeda (14) Euro-based Islamists (1) Hezbollah (1) Taliban (1)
<i>Terrorist attack: state/society</i>	Iran (3) US (3) China (1) Palestinian Authority (1)	Middle East (8) Global (2) North Africa (1) South Asia (1)	Terrorists (19) Islamic extremists (16) Al Qaeda (12) Euro-based Islamists (1) Hezbollah (1)

**Table 11.6b. Origins of threat: ‘new’ security agenda**

	<b>State</b>	<b>Regions</b>	<b>Non-State</b>
<i>Criminalization of the economy</i>	FSU (3) Russia (3) US (2) EU (1)	Africa (1) Asia (1) Middle East (1) South America (1)	Organized criminal groups (14) FARC (1) Russian mafia (1) Taliban (1) US administration (1)
<i>Cyber-attack</i>	China (4) Russia (2) US (1) FSU (1)	Middle East (3) Asia (2) Global (2) Europe (1)	Hackers (6) Terrorists (3) Al Qaeda (2) Anarchists (1) Criminals (1) Islamists (1)
<i>Ethnic conflict</i>	US (2) Burma (1) Russia (1) Sri Lanka (1)	Middle East (4) Africa (2) Balkans (2) Caucasus (1)	African rebels (1) Marginalized groups (1) Radical groups (1) Warlords (1)
<i>Macroeconomic instability</i>	US (14) China (3) Italy (1) Russia (1) Venezuela (1)	Global (4) East Asia (1) Latin America (1)	US consumers/elite (2) Financial centers (1) Hedgefunds (1) Market (1)
<i>Environment</i>	US (25) China (13) OECD (4) India (6) Russia (4) EU (2)	Global (4) Emerging economies (1) Middle East (1) South Asia (1)	Assorted actors in market [e.g., MNC's, OPEC, globalization process] (18)
<i>Migratory flows</i>	Mexico (4) Failed States (3)	Latin America (4) Africa (2) Middle East (1)	Nonspecific (4)
<i>Narcotics trafficking</i>	Afghanistan (8) Bolivia (1) Burma (1) Columbia (1) Peru (1) Russia (1) Thailand (1) Turkey (1) US (1)	Latin/South America (10) Southeast Asia (2) OECD domestic (1)	Drug cartels (4) Organized crime (4) Inner-city gangs (1)
<i>Natural disasters/pandemics</i>	US (9) China (5) India (1) Indonesia (1)	Global (11) Asia (9) Africa (3) Caribbean (1)	Natural phenomena (11) Bird flu/disease (5) Climate change (4) Globalization (4)



**Table 11.7a. States and/or regions as origins of security threats  
(column per cent)**

	<b>Think Tank (n=18)</b>	<b>Academic (n=32)</b>	<b>FPA, Stennis (n=63)</b>	<b>Overall (n=113)</b>
<i>Biological/chemical attack</i>	38.9 (7)	21.9 (7)	28.6 (18)	28.3 (32)
<i>Conventional war</i>	16.7 (3)	12.5 (4)	7.9(5)	10.6 (12)
<i>Criminalisation of economy</i>	5.6 (1)	3.1 (1)	7.9 (5)	6.2 (7)
<i>Cyber attack</i>	22.2 (4)	6.3 (2)	20.6 (13)	16.8 (19)
<i>Ethnic conflict</i>	11.1 (2)	12.5 (4)	11.1 (7)	11.5 (13)
<i>Macroeconomic instability</i>	27.8 (5)	31.3 (10)	20.6 (13)	24.8 (28)
<i>Manmade environmental</i>	33.3 (6)	34.4 (11)	30.2 (19)	31.9 (36)
<i>Migratory pressures</i>	11.1 (2)	6.3 (2)	17.5 (11)	13.3 (15)
<i>Narcotics trafficking</i>	16.7 (3)	6.3 (2)	14.3 (9)	12.4 (14)
<i>Natural disaster/pandemics</i>	33.3 (6)	34.4 (11)	39.7 (25)	37.2 (42)
<i>Nuclear/radiological attacks</i>	33.3 (6)	25 (8)	27 (17)	27.4 (31)
<i>Terrorism: critical infrastructure</i>	38.9 (7)	25 (8)	30.2 (19)	30.1 (34)
<i>Terrorism: state or society</i>	27.8 (5)	31.3 (10)	25.4 (16)	27.4 (31)

**Table 11.7b. Per cent naming non-state actors as origins of security threats**

	<b>Think Tank (n=18)</b>	<b>Academics (n=32)</b>	<b>FPA, Stennis (n=63)</b>	<b>Overall (n=113)</b>
<i>Biological/chemical attack</i>	50.0 (9)	34.4 (11)	33.3 (21)	36.3 (41)
<i>Conventional war<sup>a</sup></i>	5.6 (1)	3.1 (1)	0 (0)	1.8 (2)
<i>Criminalisation of economy</i>	11.1 (2)	0 (0)	11.1 (7)	8.0 (9)
<i>Cyber attack</i>	16.7 (3)	21.9 (7)	7.9 (5)	13.3 (15)
<i>Ethnic conflict</i>	5.6 (1)	12.5 (4)	6.3 (4)	8.0 (9)
<i>Macroeconomic instability</i>	5.6 (1)	6.3 (2)	9.5 (6)	8.0 (9)
<i>Manmade environmental</i>	11.1 (2)	15.6 (5)	15.9 (10)	15.0 (17)
<i>Migratory pressures</i>	0 (0)	12.5 (4)	6.3 (4)	7.1 (8)
<i>Narcotics trafficking</i>	11.1 (2)	0 (0)	12.7 (8)	8.8 (10)
<i>Natural disaster/pandemics</i>	22.2 (4)	9.4 (3)	20.6 (13)	17.7 (20)
<i>Nuclear/radiological Attacks**</i>	<b>50.0 (9)</b>	<b>21.9 (7)</b>	<b>12.7 (8)</b>	21.2 (24)
<i>Terrorism: critical infrastructure**</i>	<b>72.2 (13)</b>	<b>40.6 (13)</b>	<b>31.7 (20)</b>	40.7 (46)
<i>Terrorism: state or society*</i>	<b>61.1 (11)</b>	<b>43.8 (14)</b>	<b>30.2 (19)</b>	38.9 (44)

<sup>a</sup> insufficient number of cases for chi square significance test analysis; \*\*p < .01, \*p < .05.

**Table 11.8. Mean importance of the European Union**

	Think Tank	Academics	FPA, Stennis	Overall
<i>Biological/chemical attack*</i>	<b>3.58 (1.38)</b>	<b>2.91 (1.19)</b>	<b>3.90 (1.26)</b>	3.55 (1.31)
<i>Conventional war</i>	3.25 (1.42)	2.86 (1.52)	3.43 (1.43)	3.23 (1.46)
<i>Criminalisation of economy</i>	3.33 (1.30)	3.27 (1.20)	3.95 (1.23)	3.64 (1.26)
<i>Cyber attack*</i>	<b>3.58 (1.17)</b>	<b>2.86 (1.21)</b>	<b>3.65 (1.01)</b>	3.41 (1.17)
<i>Ethnic conflict</i>	3.58 (1.38)	3.50 (.96)	3.50 (1.40)	3.51 (1.27)
<i>Macroeconomic instability*</i>	<b>3.75 (1.29)</b>	<b>3.23 (1.41)</b>	<b>4.06 (1.03)</b>	3.75 (1.23)
<i>Manmade environmental</i>	4.00 (1.05)	3.33 (1.46)	4.08 (1.00)	3.85 (1.19)
<i>Migratory pressures</i>	3.50 (1.31)	3.50 (1.37)	3.80 (1.18)	3.66 (1.25)
<i>Narcotics trafficking</i>	3.58 (1.08)	2.45 (.96)	3.55 (1.26)	3.53 (1.14)
<i>Natural disaster/pandemics</i>	3.33 (1.30)	3.18 (1.22)	3.73 (1.15)	3.50 (1.21)
<i>Nuclear/radiological attacks</i>	3.50 (1.51)	2.95 (1.33)	3.78 (1.31)	3.49 (1.38)
<i>Terrorism: critical infrastructure**</i>	<b>3.42 (1.44)</b>	<b>3.09 (1.07)</b>	<b>4.03 (1.10)</b>	3.65 (1.21)
<i>Terrorism: state or society**</i>	<b>3.42 (1.44)</b>	<b>2.91 (1.07)</b>	<b>3.97 (1.21)</b>	3.55 (1.29)
<i>Base n (can vary by question)</i>	12	21-22	37-40	71-74

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses; F-scores significant at \*\*p < .01; \*p < .05.

**Table 11.9. Perceptions of ESDP and US Commitment to European security (column percent)**

	Think Tank	Academic	FPA, Stennis	Overall
<i>More autonomous ESDP weaken NATO?</i>				
Little/ not at all	33.3 (4)	36.4 (8)	17.5 (7)	25.7 (19)
Some/very much	50.0 (6)	31.8 (7)	52.5 (21)	45.9 (34)
Don't know	16.7 (2)	31.8 (7)	30.0 (12)	28.4 (21)
Cramer's V=.17, insignificant				
<i>Weaker NATO lead to retrenchment of US commitment to European security?</i>				
Yes	50.0 (6)	22.7 (5)	15.0 (6)	23.0 (17)
Maybe	41.7 (5)	27.3 (6)	47.5 (19)	40.5 (30)
No	8.3 (1)	36.4 (8)	30.0 (12)	28.4 (21)
Don't know	0 (0)	13.6 (3)	7.5 (3)	8.1 (6)
Cramer's V=.26, insignificant				
<i>American commitment to European security...</i>				
Essential/very important	75 (9)	50.0 (11)	52.5 (21)	55.4 (41)
Important	25 (3)	36.4 (8)	27.5 (11)	29.7 (22)
Inessential/not very important	0 (0)	13.6 (3)	20.0 (8)	14.9 (11)
Cramer's V=.16, insignificant				

**Table 11.10. Distribution of budgetary and manpower resources (column percent)**

	<b>Think Tank (n=12)</b>	<b>Academics (n=22)</b>	<b>FPA, Stennis (n=42)</b>	<b>Overall (n=76)</b>
<i>Aligned</i>	8.3 (1)	13.6 (3)	14.3 (6)	13.2 (10)
<i>Misaligned</i>	91.7 (11)	86.4 (19)	85.7 (36)	86.8 (66)

Note: Cramer's V=.06, insignificant

**Table 11.11. Evaluations of National Defence Budget and Military Modernisation (column percent)**

	Think Tank	Academics	FPA, Stennis	Overall
<i>Size of budget</i>				
Too large	41.7 (5)	72.7 (16)	46.3 (19)	53.3 (40)
Just about right	33.3 (4)	18.2 (4)	36.6 (15)	30.7 (23)
Too little	25.0 (3)	9.1 (2)	17.1 (7)	16 (12)
Cramer's	V=.18,			
insig.				
<i>Distribution of defence budget meets needs?</i>				
Yes	0 (0)	9.1 (2)	17.1 (17)	12 (9)
No	100 (12)	90.9 (20)	82.9 (34)	88 (66)
Cramer's	V=.19,			
insig.				
<i>Sufficient funds to military modernisation?</i>				
Too much	16.7 (2)	45.5 (10)	35.0(14)	16.2 (12)
Just about right	58.3 (7)	45.5 (10)	47.5 (19)	48.6 (36)
Too little	25.0 (3)	9.1 (2)	17.5 (7)	35.1 (26)
Cramer's	V=.15,			
insignificant				

**Table 11.12. Satisfaction with distribution of defence budget spending (column percent)**

	Think Tank	Academics	FPA, Stennis	Overall
<i>Personnel</i>				
Too much	25.0 (3)	25 (5)	15.2 (5)	20.0 (13)
Just about right	16.7 (2)	45 (9)	24.2 (8)	29.2 (19)
Too little	58.3 (7)	30 (6)	60.6 (20)	50.8 (33)
Cramer's V=.21, insig.				
<i>Procurement</i>				
Too much	41.7 (5)	75 (15)	48.5 (16)	55.4 (36)
Just about right	33.3 (4)	25 (5)	27.3 (9)	27.7 (18)
Too little	25.5 (3)	0 (0)	24.2 (8)	16.9 (11)
Cramer's V=.24, insig.				
<i>Research and Development</i>				
Too much	33.3 (4)	30 (6)	21.2 (7)	26.2 (17)
Just about right	16.7 (2)	20 (4)	33.3 (11)	26.2 (17)
Too little	50.0 (6)	50 (10)	45.5 (15)	47.7 (31)
Cramer's V=.13, insig.				

**Table 11.13. Mean evaluations of the United States' interstate interactions and security conceptions**

	Think Tank	Academics	FPA, Stennis	Overall
<i>Interstate Interaction</i>				
Mean (s.d)	4.83 (2.08)	3.59 (2.06)	3.40 (2.28)	3.69 (2.22)
Minimum/Maximum	1/8	1/7	1/9	1/9
n=	12	22	40	74
F-score=2.00, insignificant				
<i>Security conceptions</i>				
Mean (s.d.)	4.83 (2.37)	3.10 (1.66)	3.33 (2.26)	3.50 (2.17)
Minimum/Maximum	1/8	1/6	1/9	1/9
n=	12	22	40	74
F-score=2.93, insignificant				

Notes: standard deviation (s.d.) in parentheses.