

TOWARD A FEMINIST ETHICS OF NONVIOLENCE

Adriana Cavarero, with Judith Butler, Bonnie
Honig, and Other Voices

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Cavarero, Kant, and the Arcs of Friendship

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My underlying concern in this étude is the extent to which Adriana Cavarero's relational ontology can provide us with a suitable opening for the important task of reimagining the grounding principles of political and ethical theory in ways that help us reconcile the ideals of free choice and individualism with the recognition that all humans are vulnerable, and that the individual's choices are subject to manipulation. This is an urgent question, since we find ourselves living at a time when power inequalities and states of dependency are increasing rather than diminishing. The so-called tech giants (including Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Amazon, Apple) play on our weaknesses as they manipulate our needs, our friendships, and our desires, and there is increasing evidence that these technologies are themselves being exploited in order to distort the operation of democratic systems of government. There is a pressing need for a political and ethical framework that can adequately address issues relating to power imbalances, along with bodily and psychological frailties. I will, however, approach this topic in a sideways fashion: through a consideration of Cavarero's criticisms of Immanuel Kant in her recent book *Inclinations: A Critique of Rectitude*.¹

There we discover that Cavarero is highly critical of Kant for privileging a self that positions itself as solitary, as upright and always under the control of the head and of reason, and for developing an "autarchic and egoistic model" that makes "verticality" key to the "postural geometry of Kantian ethics."² As such, Cavarero places Kant in opposition to her own relational ontology and her own alternative ethics and politics, which emphasize interpersonal relationships, vulnerability, and modes

of inclination and subjectivity linked to maternity. Cavarero's argument against Kant is important to that of the book overall, as well as to her philosophical position more generally, as Judith Butler also shows in her chapter, "Leaning Out."³ We see this in Chapter 2 of *Inclinations*, entitled "Kant and the Newborn," and in comments on Kant scattered throughout that book, as well as in a related essay, "Rectitude: Reflections on Postural Ontology" (2013), which focuses almost entirely on Kant.⁴

Inclinations opens with the observation that it was when writing about what is missing from Kant's philosophy that Walter Benjamin came up with the idea that moral philosophy would be radically transformed if we gave inclination (*Neigung*) a positive moral value.⁵ For Kant, famously, moral worth is tied to obedience to the moral law and, more especially, to duty (*Pflicht*); by contrast, inclination is either morally neutral or morally harmful. Cavarero regards Kant's low esteem for inclination as symptomatic of a more general failing in our culture and develops Benjamin's hint about inclination—and about Kant—as she seeks to expose the bias toward the upright and the perpendicular that dominates Western thought. In *Inclinations*, it is the maternal that takes center stage, and Cavarero shows how Kant, along with many other writers, fails to register the ontological and ethical imbalances that result from the fact that a human fetus is dependent for its growth on a mother, and that infancy is also a state of dependence on an adult—and usually female—carer. Neglecting ontological dependencies and power inequalities, philosophers and political theorists overprivilege fully autonomous, and ideally equal and adult selves. Cavarero provides a pithy critique of such a cultural bias, and seeks to counterbalance it by stressing the visual, metaphoric, and philosophical importance of being off-balance, with one self inclining toward another. As such, Cavarero is seeking to provide an alternative imaginary not only to an ontological schematism that has a dominant and solitary "I," but also to any ethics or politics that is erected on such a basis.

Much of her critique of Kant is well-founded, but Cavarero neglects Kant's privilege of friendship and his account of "unsocial sociability" (*ungesellige Geselligkeit*) as integral to human civilization. In what follows I will look at this gap. I will be critical, but the criticisms are offered in a spirit that does, I hope, reflect my longstanding friendship with Adriana Cavarero. Indeed, the criticisms are not meant to detract from the power of this, her most challenging, original, and important book—at least as far as I am concerned. My criticisms will be detailed insofar as they relate to Kant; but at stake is a broader issue, in that it seems to me that Cavarero's ontology, with its emphasis on asymmetrical relationality, needs a fur-

ther swerve so as to include arcs of dependence that are appropriate to friendship between individuals, states, and other social groupings.

And here I need to start by saying that Cavarero is not entirely fair to Kant. Relationality does, for example, play a larger role in his philosophy than she allows. She suggests, for example, that Kant is a solipsist, relying on Hannah Arendt's *Book of Thoughts* to establish this claim.⁶ But this is rather misleading, insofar as solipsism is usually defined as the view or theory that the self is all that can be known to exist. Kant's position, by contrast, as it emerges in the *Critique of Pure Reason*—and, more especially, in the "Refutation of Idealism" of the second (1787) edition—is that we cannot have direct inner knowledge of the self, and that we are only able to say "I" insofar as we are able to locate an object in space and time to which we stand in a *relationship* of negation. Cavarero's reading of Kant elides the positions of Descartes and Kant; but, for Kant, Descartes is an idealist, and precisely the type of idealist that he sets out to "refute."⁷

Cavarero and Arendt are on stronger ground when together they suggest that Kant's moral philosophy goes astray insofar as it neglects other human beings with whom we share the space-time world. But even here there is a degree of exaggeration. Cavarero quotes Arendt as claiming that "it is most surprising that in *The Critique of Practical Reason*, and in his other moral writings, Kant hardly can speak of *other people* [*Mitmenschen*]. It is really just about the Self and Reason functioning in isolation."⁸ But the I and reason are never isolated in Kant, at least on the level of the space-time world, which is, Kant insists, the only world that it is possible to *know*. Cavarero reads Kant as adopting a "two-world" ontology that reaches back to Plato.⁹ Kant is, however, even more critical of Plato and Platonism than he is of Descartes.¹⁰ He does not claim that we can have *knowledge* of the world of the noumenal in which freedom, God, and the soul exist as ontological entities; but only that in our moral dealings with others—and also in terms of the relation that the self has with itself—we have to act *as if* that were the case. Ascribing moral responsibility in the empirical (phenomenal) world does, Kant argues, require treating the "I" *as if* it were autonomous and also a unity, and *as if* it were responsible for its own freely chosen actions. As such, Kant does not fit straightforwardly into the "two-world" view of human reality that Cavarero describes in terms of an "immobile and ecstatic verticalization" that is entirely hostile to inclination and the "curled-up posture" of those who are trapped within Plato's cave of sensory illusion.¹¹

There is a caricature of Kant as an isolated individual who did not much like other people—especially children. And, to some extent, Cavarero recycles this view. But we now know this to be a historical mistake. Kant's

closest friend was Joseph Green, an English merchant, originally from Hull, also unmarried, but three years younger than Kant. Green lived his life in accordance with strict rules and maxims, timetabling his day-to-day activities with scrupulous attention to detail—so much so that it has been argued that he provided the model for the main character, Orbil, in Theodor Gottlieb von Hippel's satirical play *The Man of the Clock or the Orderly Man* (1765).¹² Kant is also often mocked for leading a similarly routinized life; but this was not a feature of his daily life as a young man, and it was Green who persuaded Kant to change his ways.

The two men spent so much time together, and were so close, as to lead one German scholar to suggest that it was potentially *schwul*—a slang term for homosexual or “queer.”¹³ Earlier in this volume, we saw Judith Butler playing with a similar idea, although her mischievous comments are made on the basis of narrative and philosophical and physical instabilities, rather than through awareness of Kant's male friendships and their associated routines.¹⁴ The two friends ate together, went on trips together, discussed books and politics together, and were also said to take an afternoon doze together—also with other male friends—side by side, in easy chairs.¹⁵ Kant was said to have read every sentence of the *Critique of Pure Reason* to Green and discussed each sentence with him.¹⁶ After Green died in 1786, Kant went into a kind of mourning and stopped going out to eat in the evenings. He did, however, keep up his relationship with Robert Motherby, another of the Hull merchants and the business partner of Green. Kant was a frequent guest for Sunday lunch, and was treated as a family member as he played with the nine surviving children and helped with the education of the older boys.¹⁷ Thus, if we follow Kant into the labyrinths of his moral philosophy and look more closely at his private life, we end up not with an isolated self and reason, but with an intimate circle of friends who care for each other, mostly in male friendship circles, but also within the domestic and family sphere.

In testimony to Kant's close friendships, I was excited to stumble across the image of an engraved glass goblet, inscribed with the date August 30, 1763, together with a motto (in English) and the names of Kant and six of his friends, including Green, Motherby, and Charles Staniforth (brother-in-law to Green, and also closely linked to the shipping merchants of Kingston-upon-Hull). (See Fig. 1a.)¹⁸ The motto reads, “Secrecy in love and sincerity in Friendship / all Happy together notwithstanding what happen [sic] in the World.” (See Fig. 1b, which contains the complete transcription of the inscription on the glass.)¹⁹

The discovery was made on the website of the “Friends of Kant and Königsberg” [*Freunde Kants und Königsbergs*], an organization that ar-



FIGURE 1A. *Kant Glass Friendship Goblet* (1763), © 2013 Freunde Kants und Königsbergs e. V. Source Image by Viktor Haupt, supplied by Freunde Kants und Königsbergs e. V.

ranges an annual trip to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad—formerly Königsberg—to honor Kant on his birthday, in the city where he spent his whole life. Since the existence of this goblet is absent from recent scholarly biographies of Kant, I have investigated its pedigree, and looked further into its history. Correspondence with the Motherby family assured me of its legitimacy, a conclusion very recently confirmed by Simon Wain-Hobson, a connoisseur of Georgian glass, whose attention had also been drawn to the image on the website, and who had also been in correspondence with the family and the owner of the glass. Wain-Hobson has no doubt that the goblet itself, with its “triple series opaque twist stem,” was made in Britain, and that the “diamond point inscription of dubious quality” would most likely have been executed in Königsberg. As he indicates,

*Secrecy in love and sincerity
in Friendship*

*Emanuel Kant M. A.
Anthony Schorn
Joseph Green
Robert Motherby.*

all Happy together notwithstanding what happend in the World

=
*August of 30th
1763*

*Joseph P... [?]
John Chappoll
Charles Staniforth*

FIGURE 1B. *Kant Glass Inscription* © 2013 Freunde Kants und Königsbergs e. V.

the stem of the glass has been broken and “repaired using a soldered tin collar”; in addition, “a gold plaid ribbon” of unknown significance and date was knotted around the stem.²⁰

My historical research also revealed that August 1763 was the time of a global banking crash that economists have compared to that of September 1998.²¹ Triggered by the ending of the Seven Years War—and the signing of the Treaty of Paris that initiated the series of international realignments that triggered the American War of Independence in 1775—financial ruin faced many merchant banking companies, across Europe and beyond. The firm of Motherby and Green survived the banking crash in good shape, as did that of Charles Staniforth—so much so that his son, John Staniforth the younger, would later become the M.P. for Hull and then also the Director of the Bank of England.²² Kant clearly benefitted from having a competent firm of merchant bankers looking after his finances at this time of economic catastrophe. Not all the signatories were so fortunate, however. Thus, for example, it seems likely that the name “Anthony Schorn” refers to Anton Schorn, son of Michael Schorn—a fabulously wealthy wine and shipping-merchant (and collector of “luxury” goods)—who traded out of Braunsberg (present-day Braniewo in northeast Poland), sourcing wines from right across France, and trading also in salt, limes, sugar, coffee, yarns, and huge quantities of window glass. In July 1765 Michael Schorn’s enterprise suddenly and unexpectedly collapsed, “like a house of cards,” its owner having been forced into bankruptcy by the Königsberg shipping firms with whom he had long-standing and trusted trading relationships. This catastrophe did, in its turn, lead to the financial ruin of Anton Schorn’s own business.²³ Given this outcome, not quite two years after the drinking party, it’s important

not to sentimentalize the reasons each of the friends allowed his name to be scratched with a diamond onto the surface of the drinking glass. The goblet does, nevertheless, emblemize an ideal of friendship across national borders and the mutual dependence of one adult self on another in a time of crisis, shifting national borders, and political and economic instability.

The glass and its historical background show very clearly how we can be led astray if we treat Kant as a solitary individual, cut off from friendships and disconnected from those around him. We have seen Cavarero agreeing with Arendt when she claims that Kant hardly speaks of other humans anywhere in his writings on morality. But although it’s true that other humans have a quite subsidiary role in Kant’s *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), in his later *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797) other human beings are certainly spoken about—not only in volume 1, which focuses on justice and “the doctrine of right,” but also in volume 2, which focuses on what it is to be a virtuous individual. This volume starts with “a Human Being’s Duties to Himself” (as Arendt and Cavarero might lead us to expect); but it then moves on to the topic of our “Ethical Duties to Others” [*ethischen Pflichten gegen Andere*]²⁴—an extended, but also condensed, section of Kant’s ethics that Arendt seems not to have known.²⁴ These duties are, first, our duties to other humans simply insofar as they are human beings; second, our duties to those humans whom we should love [*Liebespflicht*]; and, third, our duties pertaining to those humans we should respect [*der Pflicht der Achtung für Andere*].²⁵ Kant treats friendship under this third heading—that of respect for others—while nevertheless adding an extra chapter on the intimate link between love and respect in friendship.

Here, Kant focuses on the distinction between modes of friendship that have the capacity to fizzle out when circumstances change and “moral friendship,” which consists in “the complete confidence of two persons in revealing their secret judgments and feelings to each other, as far as such disclosures are consistent with mutual respect.”²⁶ Underlying Kant’s disquisition on friendship in these pages is his insistence that a “human being is a being meant for society (though he is also an unsociable one).” On the one hand, his social drive means that “he feels strongly the need to *reveal* himself to others (even with no ulterior purpose).” On the other hand, “hemmed in and cautioned by fear of the misuse that others may make of his disclosing his thoughts, he finds himself constrained to *lock up* in himself a good part of his judgments (especially those about other people). He would like to discuss with someone what he thinks about his associates, the government, religion and so forth, but he cannot risk it.”²⁷

Here Kant is describing a kind of dialectic of friendship. On the one hand, there is loneliness that is a kind of "prison"; but an individual can escape from being "shut up" inside himself by finding a close friend who shares the individual's "general outlook on things." With such a friend, "secrets" will be shared, and the friend then has an obligation never to divulge what he or she has been told.²⁸ This means, Kant argues, that it is important not to place the friend in the position of knowing things about one's self that would present the friend with a moral quandary or undermine the two friends' feelings of mutual respect for each other.²⁹ It's a duty to others, as well as to oneself, "not to isolate oneself," Kant insists, as he constructs an imaginary "circle," with the self with its moral principles at the center. This "all-inclusive circle" should include "those who, in their disposition, are citizens of the world" and who share a "disposition of reciprocity—agreeableness, tolerance, mutual love and respect."³⁰ As a corollary to this duty, Kant also insists that we should exclude from this social and moral circle those who reveal a "vicious" character, and the section ends with a barb against anyone who "is rich enough to bribe parasites with the pleasures of luxury."³¹

The motto on that friendship goblet of 1763—"Secrecy in love and sincerity in Friendship"—would seem thus to prefigure Kant's much later account of moral friendship, which keeps the tension between "the need to reveal" oneself and secrecy in play. The phrase "secrecy in love" was probably taken from Samuel Butler's *Hudibras* (1663–78), a mock-heroic satirical poem that had been translated from English into German and that Kant refers to elsewhere.³² In it, Butler's anti-hero and a Dame debate whether oaths respecting the secrecy of love should be respected, given that love itself is a "treason" that wrenches the lover away from sociality, especially since oaths about love often serve as a cover for disputes about money.³³ *Hudibras* took aim at the Protestant sects that emerged during the English civil war. It was subsequently much used by rebels against the English crown and others contesting civil authority.³⁴ As such, it seems as if the German philosopher and his English merchant friends were not only vowing secrecy in love, but probably also about money, as well as about political and religious allegiances that might mitigate against their friendships. Kant was a strong opponent of the British monarchy—a view probably not shared by his English friends—which he accused of conducting a war without consulting the British people.³⁵ Kant and his friends also needed to be careful not to offend the Prussian state, which exercised political censorship over what could be written and said. The motto on the engraved glass goblet positions friendship as a remedy for political

and financial uncertainties: "all Happy together notwithstanding what happend in the World."

Elsewhere in this volume we have seen Bonnie Honig look to sorority as a means of extending Cavarero's argument about the importance of inclination.³⁶ Sisterhood does, however, suggest a *biological or natural* relationship that does not start in "unsociality," and, as such, Honig's argument leads in a different direction—and one that does not foreground the fragilities and hazards of friendship that I am concerned to emphasize here. Unlike sisterhood, friendship has to start *from scratch*; friends need to *work across time* to negotiate disparities in power, personal situation, inclinations, and beliefs. As Clare Woodford also points out, friendship does not entail shared inclinations or consensus, although Kant's account of "moral friendship" does privilege those modes of friendship in which inclinations are shared.³⁷ Importantly also, friendships can be abusive—and often do involve modes of bullying and of seduction.

At a global level, there are the bullying relationships that exist between global superpowers and their client states. At a more individual level, there are issues relating to sexual abuse, or the abuse involved in turning a young and vulnerable human being into a potential terrorist, willing to kill and maim civilians for the "greater good" of a religious or political cause. In these dangerous times of political populism, of Brexit, Trumpism, and of manipulation of "friends" via social media, it is worth looking again at Kant's account of human and civic relationality to see how the arcs of *friendship* between civil societies and also between persons can be developed in ways that involve a reimagination of autonomy, but without subjection or abuse. The development of cosmopolitanism—and also its occasional setbacks—depends on this dialectic between the one and the many. This is not to say that we should accept Kant's account of the dialectics of friendship without questioning the assumptions on which it is based. But it is to add into Cavarero's argument in *Inclinations* the point that she makes in *Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood*, where we encounter a self "that belongs to the world, in the relational and contextual form of self exposure to others," and where friendship is also given an important role in allowing the "I" to discover itself and reveal itself to itself.³⁸

In a recent essay entitled, "All of Us Are Vulnerable, But Some Are More Vulnerable than Others," Alyson Cole has explored some of the political and ethical problems that stem from overemphasizing dependence and vulnerability as part of the human condition.³⁹ If all of us are vulnerable, how can we adequately theorize those who are most vulnerable?

And—to extend Cole’s analysis—if all of us are vulnerable, how do we go about defending the minds of those who are most vulnerable from those political fanatics or those with political power who would seek to take over their choices and their inclinations by turning them into terrorists or cogs in some political machine? Of course, there are weaknesses in the Kantian position that posits autonomy, freedom from constraint, and equality as ideals for moral behavior. But there are also problems with a position that emphasizes vulnerability and asymmetrical relationships of dependency as the basis for a new ethical and political ideal.

In this étude I have offered a limited defense of Kant (whose ideas of sexual, racial, and ethnic differences I have strongly criticized elsewhere),⁴⁰ as a way of pointing to other models of relationality that could serve as a counter to the overidealized account of autonomy and of equality so often associated with Kant’s philosophical system. I strongly believe that we need a new type of political and ethical framework that can adequately address issues of trust and mistrust, along with the pervasiveness of bullying and other abuses of power. However, if we are to confront the particular political dangers of our time, it seems to me that the mother-child relationship is a perilous starting point, and that we should also look back at Kant’s dialectics of friendship, together with Cavarero’s emphasis on friendship in her earlier book, to discover how the arcs of relationality can best be developed with the goals of democratic freedoms and cosmopolitanism in view.

Notes

1. Adriana Cavarero, *Inclinations: A Critique of Rectitude*, trans. Amanda Minervini and Adam Sitze (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2016); first published in Italian (2014).
2. *Ibid.*, 129, 33, 121.
3. Judith Butler, “Leaning Out, Caught in the Fall: Interdependency and Ethics in Cavarero,” in this volume.
4. Cavarero, *Inclinations*, 25–33. Cavarero, “Rectitude: Reflections on Postural Ontology,” *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 27, no. 3 (2013): 220–35.
5. Cavarero, *Inclinations*, 1, 177n1; Walter Benjamin, “Zur Kantischen Ethik,” *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974–99), 6:55, <https://archive.org/stream/GesammelteSchriftenBd.6/BenjaminGs6#page/n5>.
6. Cavarero, *Inclinations*, 31, 181n22, citing Hannah Arendt, *Denktagebuch: 1950 bis 1972*, ed. Ursula Ludz and Ingeborg Nordmann (Munich: Piper, 2002), 818.
7. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 326–29 [B274–79]; 121n.–22n. [Bxxxix–xli]; and see also 425–31 [A367–80]. The 1781 page numbers are marked “A”; the 1787 page numbers are marked “B.” See Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*,

- ed. der Deutschen [formerly Königlich Preussischen] Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter Verlag, 1902–), vol. 3 (B edition) and vol. 4 (A edition). Further references to this Akademie edition will be prefaced Ak., followed by the volume and page numbers.
8. Cavarero *Inclinations*, 31, quoting Arendt, *Denktagebuch*, 818.
 9. Cavarero, *Inclinations*, 27.
 10. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 140 [A5/B8–B9]; 395–98 [A312–19/B368–76]. See also Kant, “On a Recently Prominent Tone of Superiority in Philosophy,” in *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*, ed. Henry Allison and Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 431–45 [Ak. 8:389–406].
 11. Cavarero, *Inclinations*, 54, and see 33.
 12. Theodor Gottlieb von Hippel, *Der Mann nach der Uhr oder der ordentliche Mann*, ed. Erich Jenisch, 4th ed. (Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1928), <http://www.zeno.org/nid/20005071739>. And see Manfred Kuehn, *Kant: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 154–57.
 13. Hans-Peter Gensichen, “Wie schwul war Kant?,” *Forum für Politik, Gesellschaft und Kultur* 234 (March 2004): 43–47, http://www.forum.lu/pdf/artikel/5189_234_Gensichen.pdf.
 14. Butler, “Leaning Out.”
 15. Alfons Hoffmann, ed., *Ein Lebensbild nach Darstellungen der Zeitgenossen Jachmann, Borowski, Wasianski* (Halle an der Saale: Hugo Peter, 1902), 57, <https://archive.org/details/immanuelkanteinloohoff>. And see Kuehn, *Kant*, 273.
 16. Kuehn, *Kant*, 240–41.
 17. Marianne Motherby, “Kant and the Motherby Family,” trans. Terence Coe, *Freunde Kants und Königsbergs*, 2020, www.freunde-kants.com/kant-and-the-motherby-family.
 18. Figure 1a. The goblet remains in the Motherby family, and I am indebted to Marianne Motherby, as well as to its current owner, the photographer Viktor H. Haupt, and Freunde Kants und Königsbergs e. V., for permission to reproduce it here. See also Motherby, “Kant.”
 19. Inscription can be viewed online at <http://www.kant-online.ru/en/?p=191>; © 2013 Freunde Kants und Königsbergs e. V. Motherby, “Kant” includes a “corrected” version of the inscription, but Marianne Motherby has been unable to determine which version is correct, and I have chosen to remain with the original deciphered text.
 20. Simon Wain-Hobson, “To See a World in a Glass Engraving,” *Glass Matters: Journal of the Glass Society* (forthcoming). I have corresponded with Wain-Hobson, and his essay incorporates some of my conclusions. It does, however, include additional detailed information about this 21.6 cm-tall glass and the names inscribed on it. In particular, he identifies John Chappoll as John Chappell (1739–76), the son of the master of a ship that traded between Hull and Königsberg, and who always took to sea with him books of poetry by Milton and Edward Young.
 21. Isabel Schnabel and Hyun Song Shin, “Liquidity and Contagion: The Crisis of 1763,” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 2, no. 6 (Dec. 2004): 929–68.
 22. See *The History of Parliament: The House of Commons, 1790–1820*, ed. R. G. Thorne, online ed., accessed September 25, 2018, <https://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1790-1820/member/staniforth-john>. This records that Joseph Green’s brother, Philip Green, was a shipowner based in Hull, as was also John Staniforth (d. 1798), the brother of Charles Staniforth, a merchant

trader with offices in London. Charles's son, John Staniforth (1771–1830), became M.P. for Hull in 1804 and Director of the Bank of England in 1807.

23. Franz Buchholz, "Braunsberg im Wandel der Jahrhunderte: Festschrift zum 650jährigen Stadtjubiläum am 23. und 24. Juni 1934," <http://www.braunsberg-ostpreussen.de/buchholz-ges.htm>.

24. Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals* [1797], in *Practical Philosophy*, trans. ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 602–3 [Ak. 6:491–93].

25. *Ibid.*, 603 [Ak. 6:493].

26. *Ibid.*, 586 [Ak. 6:470–71]. Kant also outlined some modes of instrumental friendship in his *Lectures on Ethics*, as recorded in the notebooks of his students between 1774 and 1777. See Lara Denis, "From Friendship to Marriage: Revising Kant," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 63, no. 1 (July 2001): 3; and Lara Denis and Oliver Sensen, eds., *Kant's Lectures on Ethics: A Critical Guide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

27. *Ibid.*, 586 [Ak. 6:471–72].

28. *Ibid.*, 587 [Ak. 6:472].

29. *Ibid.*, 585 [Ak. 6:469–70].

30. *Ibid.*, 588 [Ak. 6:473].

31. *Ibid.*, 588 [Ak. 6:474].

32. Kant, *Lectures on Anthropology*, ed. Allan W. Wood and Robert B. Loudon, trans. Robert R. Clewis and G. Felicitas Munzel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 391–92 [Ak. 25:1268–69]. See also Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics* (1766), in *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770*, ed. David Walford and Ralf Meerbote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 336 [Ak. 2:348].

33. Samuel Butler, *Hudibras: Poem*, new ed. (London: Suttaby, Evance, Fox, and Crosby, 1812), 1:248, Part 2, Canto 1, lines 415–45, <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/005641486>.

34. Bruce Ingham Granger, *Political Satire in the American Revolution, 1763–1783* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1960), 12–15.

35. Kant, *The Conflict of the Faculties* (1798), trans. Mary J. Gregor, in *Religion and Rational Theology*, ed. Allan W. Wood and George Di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 305–6, 306 n. [Ak 7:90].

36. Bonnie Honig, "How to Do Things with Inclination," in this volume. I am less interested than Honig (or also Cavarero in her "Coda" to this volume) in "doing things" with inclination. This links to my criticism of Carol Gilligan and her "feminine" ethics of care in Christine Battersby, *The Phenomenal Woman: Feminist Metaphysics and the Patterns of Identity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 206–8.

37. Clare Woodford, "Queer Madonnas," in this volume.

38. Cavarero, *Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood*, trans. Paul A. Kottman (London and New York: Routledge, 2000).

39. Alyson Cole, "All of Us Are Vulnerable, But Some Are More Vulnerable Than Others: The Political Ambiguity of Vulnerability Studies; An Ambivalent Critique," *Critical Horizons* 17, no. 2 (2016): 260–77, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14409917.2016.1153896>.

40. See especially Christine Battersby, *The Sublime, Terror and Human Difference* (London and New York: Routledge 2007), 45–99.