DEVELOPING ORGANIZATIONAL NARRATIONS - A NEW DIMENSION IN KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

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Abstract

In this paper we discuss the role organizational narrations can play in the field of knowledge management and develop a model on qualifying and evaluating narrations. As a necessary prerequisite we first clarify the epistemological nature of narrative knowledge opposed to discursive knowledge by referring to a distinction drawn by the French philosopher Lyotard. Narrative knowledge is characterized as a kind of verbal life-world knowledge that is non-reflexive in character by contrast to discursive knowledge which is based on sound reasons and therefore reflexive in nature. Building on this clarification we develop a three-step-model designed to qualify narrations and to develop narrative knowledge from narrations. The model suggests to examine the transferability of narrations within and across contexts (first and second step), and its validity and applicability in broader contexts (third step). Finally, the practical importance of developing narrations will be illustrated by examples from Shell International Exploration and Production.

Keywords: organizational knowledge, narrative knowledge, discursive knowledge, epistemology, knowledge management.

Developing Organizational Narrations

A New Dimension in Knowledge Management

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Introduction

Narrations are a ubiquitous feature of organizational life. Some authors even conceive of organizations as narrative entities ("story-telling systems" Boje 1991). The notion of narration refers to a wide range of interesting ideas and conceptions, such as storytelling and sense-making (Czarniawska 1997; Gabriel 2000), narrative discourse (Czarniawska 1995), narrative skills, and narrative rationality as opposed to argumentative rationality (Tsoukas and Hatch 2001, Weick and Browning 1986).

Recently, the narrative side of organizations has emerged as a prominent feature in the knowledge discourse and more practically in knowledge management (Patriotta 2003, Reinmann-Rothmeier and Vohle 2001). Interestingly enough, some authors go so far as to take narrations as the actual core of modern knowledge management (Snowden 2000). Narrations are assumed to fulfill multiple functions in organizations: they are supposed to distribute effectively uncodified knowledge and non-analytic problem-solving competences (Swap 2001, Pfeffer and Sutton 1999), to give "thick descriptions" of contexts thereby providing actors a much more adequate understanding of the complex nature of practical situations (Geertz 1993, Orr 1990, 1996), to build the basis for actionable knowing etc. Whatever the conceptions in detail, narrations are seen as building an important feature in future knowledge management. When push comes down to shove the problem solving power of narrations is considered as being even more important than that of codified knowledge in modern organizations (Nonaka et al. 2000, Tsoukas and Hatch 2001).

As a consequence knowledge management has to consider the specific nature of narrations and the part they can play in enhancing organizational knowledge and knowing. Narrations are a natural part of organizational life and its everyday communication (Boje 1995, Gabriel 1995, Czarniawska 1998). By their very nature they are not construed consciously, rather they evolve from events, extraordinary situations, successes and failures, etc. – and, most importantly, are told and re-told continually (Wilkins 1984). Organizations are seen as being pervaded by multiple streams of narrations told by organizational members, although to a different degree (Boje 1995). Some figure more prominently than others play as organizational storytellers.

As to the nature of stories one should be aware of the fact that stories cannot be conceived as well-defined entities stored in a special story warehouse. They are rather dynamic in character, and are unconsciously and consciously reshaped in the telling process. Stories are imprinted by the background of the storytellers, their cognitions, values, and emotions (Dyer 1983, Buskirk v. and McGrath 1992). Furthermore stories are basically interactive; they are actualized and adapted in the context of telling and listening. There is no storytelling without audience.

Due to their emergent nature organizational stories are not so easy to integrate into any conscious effort to manage knowledge. Any integration into knowledge management means a lot of extra efforts: Stories have to be identified, to be interpreted, to be accepted or disapproved, etc. From a knowledge management point of view narrations evoke a set of intriguing questions: Are all narrations useful? Are all stories true? How to identify false stories? Is the morale of narrations context-bound by its very nature? Do narrative lessons apply abroad (in other subsystems, other network organizations, other cultures)?, etc.

All these questions boil down to the same point that knowledge management cannot simply acknowledge the importance of narrations; rather, knowledge management has to reflect them and to learn how to process them effectively. This paper seeks to provide a framework for reflecting and processing organizational narrations, in particular for checking, validating and generalizing them.

Epistemological Architecture of Knowledge and Narrations

The questions raised above cannot be addressed without having a clear understanding of what narrative knowledge exactly means, i.e. we cannot refrain from exploring its epistemological architecture. We suggest doing this by drawing on the philosophers Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jürgen Habermas and using their distinction between discursive and narrative knowledge and knowledge and Lebenswelt (life-world) respectively as a point of departure. It will turn out that we need the conception of discursive knowledge to make the specific nature of narrative knowledge visible. As a first step it is therefore necessary to outline briefly what discursive knowledge means.

According to Lyotard (1991), knowledge in the contemporary information society can be separated basically in two different forms: scientific and narrative knowledge. He starts by pointing out that scientific knowledge does not represent the whole range of a society's knowledge, it rather represents only a surplus to the so-called narrative knowledge (p. 76).

Following his argumentation, scientific knowledge must be seen as a specific language game which is constitutive for science and humanities only. The rules used within this language game are accepted within the scientific community; the differentiation between truth and untruth is at the core of the scientific language game. To put it differently, within this community assertions become accepted then and only then if they proved to be true. By implication, assertions, propositions, hypotheses, etc. have to be examined according to mutually agreed procedures designed to determine whether they can be accepted (validated) or not (falsified) (Popper 1959; Kamlah and Lorenzen 1967: 116). Assertions proven true in the defined sense are accepted as preliminary scientific knowledge and are separated from other propositions – at least as long as no other argument becomes known that can prove the contrary. Thus, only the use of an agreed examination procedure allows for a differentiation between scientific knowledge and other propositions. Assertions that have successfully passed the agreed examination procedure are marked as scientific knowledge. With that understanding of scientific knowledge Lytoard does not differ significantly from other common conceptions in the philosophy of science.

It should however be made clear that in this view discursive knowledge is not conceived as a category which applies exclusively to the scientific discourse, there are rather multiple language games (communities) in a society directed to generate different types of discursive knowledge, e.g. jurisdiction, stock exchange, taxation (Luhmann 1984; Lyotard 1988). The discourses differ in the criteria used to evaluate assertions. They all operate on their own logic (Burrell and Morgan 1979, Schreyögg and Geiger 2003). In spite of all these differentiations knowledge discourses have some basic characteristics in common, which distinguish them as being discursive:

1. The most fundamental characteristic across all kinds of discourse is the communicative nature of knowledge, i.e. any knowledge represents some kind of proposition or assertion. Knowledge cannot exist outside communication. Assertions can only be examined when they have become subject of a discourse. There is no qualification without differentiation; there is no differentiation without examination; there is no examination without communication.

2. However, the communicative dimension, while necessary, is not sufficient for qualifying an assertion as discursive knowledge. How can we differentiate, for example, useful and reliable recommendations from misleading ones? Again, we can refer to the essentials of any discursive praxis. Statements, assertions and so forth cannot be examined (discussed, reflected, etc.) and therefore cannot become knowledge unless they are given reasons in whatever form. Since any assertion puts forward a claim, explicitly or implicitly, the proponent must supply reasons that support the claim (Toulmin 1958: 11). Discourse demands reasons.

3. Reasons can be good or bad. Knowledge therefore needs not only reasons, but *good* reasons. Reasons are classified as good when they have successfully passed an examination procedure. The criteria in use stem from the discourse (community) in question (Toulmin 1958; Mittelstraß 1974; Lyotard 1988). The examination criteria for knowledge are always *discourse-dependent* (Toulmin 1958). There are no universal standards for justifying all kind of knowledge; instead, each discourse develops its own accepted standards.

These three basic criteria for discursive knowledge converge in one point: discursive knowledge is *reflexive* in character. In contrast, narrative knowledge refers to unconscious contexts. The stories tell something about success or failure, effective or failed solutions to problems, about good luck, justice, beauty, etc. Through listening to the stories, the audience is (apart from other functions) supposed to learn lessons. According to Lyotard (Lyotard 1991) narrations carry two different aspects simultaneously: on the one hand, special know-how, and on the other hand, the justification of the implicitly transported claims. In other words, narrations communicate a specific content and its evaluation at the same time (Koch 2003). It is important to realize this double character of narration, which is both descriptive and prescriptive. Such processes of acquiring norms, standards, assumptions and so forth, and simultaneously justifying them as true and fair are also well-known from the debate on organizational culture (Kluckhon and Strodtbeck 1961; Schein 1985). In a sense, culture is always affirmative.

Narrations are a "rich media", they embrace all kind of statements and expressions (mimic, gesture etc.). All these dimensions coexist within one story and are not separated (Lyotard, 1991: 68).

As already pointed out narrative knowledge is communicative in nature. Narrations follow a specific grammar, which is sometimes referred to as the *narrative mode* (Bruner 1986) or even as *narrative rationality* (Weick and Browning 1986; Tsoukas and Cummings 1997). In Lyotard's view, narrative knowledge – opposed to discursive knowledge - legitimates itself, it does not refer to any formal or explicit justification procedure (Lyotard, 1991: 74). This self-legitimation of narrative knowledge is achieved through implicit affirmation and retelling of the story: the story is accepted by passing it on, the message is simply taken for granted The criteria that legitimate narrative knowledge are part of the narration itself and therefore become more or less automatically accepted. Narrative knowledge does not explicitly raise the question of legitimation – it becomes accepted through its own implicit narrative practice. That is not to say that narrations have no evaluation criteria to fulfill, but these criteria are not the outcome of any explicitly agreed evaluation process. They are rather an implicit part of the practices of a community that is, apply tacitly.

This self-evaluative mode which characterizes methodologically the core of narrations is on a more general level representative the typical mode of the *Lebenswelt* (literally "life-world," the everyday context of life (Habermas 1989, Schütz and Luckmann 1989). Following Habermas, this narrative, non-reflexive mode of communication is used in an unproblematic way within the *life-world* (Habermas 1989). In his view as long as no problem (conflict, shortage etc.) emerges that cannot be solved on the basis of the standard procedures of the life-world, actors rely on the narrative mode of communication and take the narrative knowledge for granted.

Narrative Knowledge versus Tacit Knowing

Although narrative knowledge is an implicit part of organizational life, it must not be equated with tacit knowing. There are substantial methodological differences. Tacit knowing – at least in the conception of Polanyi – refers to all those aspects of individual proficiency which are practical in the real sense of the word, i.e. *non-verbal in nature* and *not explicable*. Thus Polanyi (1966: 4) stated, "We know more than we can tell." The individual is assumed to be unconscious of tacit knowledge which brings about an action in a way the actor cannot explain. He or she acts on the basis of something that he or she "knows" but cannot describe. Tacit knowledge is a special competence of a specific knower and is therefore an action-related category that cannot be separated from the knowing individual. It is an individual category. Tacit knowledge indicates a personal skill or capability, something individuals can rely on in everyday life without being aware of it, let alone understanding it. Tacit knowledge is a bodily competence; Polanyi therefore calls it "embodied knowledge," an

inseparable part of the actor's body (Franck 1992: 169). Ryle (1949) calls it "knowing how." As a logical consequence, tacit knowledge can only be actualized within actions and can never be removed in any way from an actor's context (Cook and Brown 1999: 387, Neuweg 1999).It is essentially part of the action.

Opposed to that, narrative knowledge is not embodied, it rather is verbal in nature, it can exist outside of action. Secondly narrative knowledge is not an individual category, it is interactive in nature. Without audience, there logically is no narrative knowledge. Recognizing these essential differences it is important to draw a clear distinction between narrative and tacit knowledge, otherwise separate categories are likely to get confused. And a final remark is due. Given its bodily, non-verbal nature, tacit knowledge cannot – as it is often assumed and recommended – be distributed in and between organizations by narrations. There is no way to convert tacit knowing into narrations (Schreyögg and Geiger 2003).

3-Step Model for Developing Narrations

The foregoing clarification revealed that narrations follow a non-reflexive mode and represent a self-legitimizing world. They are therefore in a way "raw". In order to open the narrative world for knowledge management they have to be re-worked and that means first of all, they have to become subject of reflection. To use narrations deliberately for managing purposes organizational narrations have to transcend the "naïve" level of storytelling, i.e. the life-world level. If we refrain from taking narrations for granted questions raised at the opening appear, questions on the truthfulness, rightness or reliability. And that basically means to look at narrations from a discursive point of view. Only by switching the level (or to put it differently: by introducing a second order observation) we can find a platform to reflect and to discuss narrations thereby finding answers on questions of validity, reliability etc. The narrative life-world level does not provide such platform, as pointed out above the methodological mode is a naïve one.

 This switching from a narrative to a discursive level does not simply occur, it has to be deliberately brought about; the life-world is a self- sustained world. The following model tries to systematize this level switching process which is seen as a basic prerequisite for bringing narrations into knowledge management. For these purposes (and only for these purposes!) we suggest a 3-step model that draws on the distinction between discursive and narrations. The idea of surfacing taken for granted narrations and reflecting them is at its core (thereby

adopting some of Habermas' proposals for making life-world elements reflexive; cf. Habermas 1989). The model is designed as a succession of steps to separate an organizational narration from its "naïve" life-world context ("first order observation" in terms of modern cybernetics) and to make it accessible from an evaluative point of view ("second order observation").

(1) *The first step* of our model aims at *reflecting a story* in its contextuality. As said above, organizational stories are generated and told in specific organizational communities and they refer to a specific historical situation. They are therefore closely embedded in their original context (Szulanski 2002; Brown and Duguid 2001; Hippel v. 1994). By implication the lesson incorporated in a story is strictly bound to the story's original context. The know-how carried along by a story applies to the story's context only. From a knowledge management point of view such limitation is disappointing, it might leave a great potential unexplored. Similar problems might emerge in that community and the question arises as to whether the generated problem solution carried along by the story may apply to those similar situations as well. The first step therefore is to put the story into perspective and to make generalizations to similar problem within the broader context of the community in question. This reflection may take different ways: Trial and error, analogical reasoning, etc. In order to routinize such reflection on the extension of the problem solutions carried along by stories, two aspects are of crucial importance: First, one has to ensure, that the once successful problem solutions are actually communicated via narrations, i.e. the organization has to provide platforms encouraging storytelling. Communities of practice (Brown and Duguid 1991; Wenger 1999) can be seen as such means to facilitate the storytelling process in organizations. They work as a specialist network and provide shared context and understanding. Secondly, once the problem solution is generalized to similar problems within a specific community, the reflection process needs feedback on the experiences and reached results to evaluate whether the transfer was successful or not. Knowledge management should therefore enable community members to explicate and share their experiences in communities of practice (referring to success of failure). The recipients of the story who tried it out in similar contexts should be given a platform to feed their experiences back, whether it worked or not. An adequate communication infrastructure therefore is a necessary prerequisite to keep this process going. And the more feedback (attached to the story) the better the orientation for the future use of the narrated problem-solution. This user-feedback process can be seen as a first experiential quality check of the stories' content.

(2) *The second step* of the model aims at further *de-contextualization and asks the question whether the story applies abroad.* Organizations are interested in learning whether the successfully proved narration (in the first step), applies to other contexts (subsystems, organizations, cultures) as well and can therefore be transferred abroad. In order to provide an answer on this question the narrations have to be made the subject of a second experiential evaluation procedure. Again, the question of making generalizations is on the agenda of this reflection process. The methods are the same. Trial and error, analogical reasoning, pattern recognition, etc. In order to enhance this process two aspects deserve special attention: First, knowledge management has to take care that an interchange between different, but work-related communities actually take place. The literature on communities of practice stresses already the importance of connecting and overlapping different communities of practice. In cases where such exchange dos not flow naturally it is suggested to create specialized roles such as translator or moderator, persons who are familiar with the context of both communities and able to act as broker between theses communities (Gherardi and Nicolini 2002: 434). Another possibility is to establish so called *boundary objects* as interfaces between communities. According to the community practices a broad range of objects can become *boundary objects:* models, maps, standardized methods, charts, computer simulations and so on (Carlile 2002: 451). Important for workability of boundary objects is that both communities are used working with them and use a familiar language when talking about them. With the help of these boundary objects narrations can be transferred from one community to another.

Such transfer is, however, only the first part of de-contextualization efforts. Secondly, a similar process as described in step one of the model has to take place to ensure, that the transferred problem-solution actually applies in the new context. The community itself has to check, if the new problem-solution is useful for them or not, and communicate the result of their assessment across the organization, so that other communities become accordingly informed. An intact communication infrastructure figures again most prominently here.

(3) *The third step* focuses directly on the stories' content and aims at evaluating their "lessons"*.* The first two steps took the validity of the content for granted. The question was whether or not the lesson is likely to work in different contexts in both within and outside the community. The final third step challenges the content as such and asks roughly spoken the question whether the story is true or false. To put it differently, the narrations that have successfully passed steps one and two have in a third step to be made subject to an explicit discursive evaluation procedure. At this stage different, once successful and therefore

narrated problem solutions that are on their way to get distributed in communities in and around the organization have to be challenged. Knowledge management has to take care of assessing the validity of these narrated problem solutions in order to find out whether they are "true" or "false" solutions, whether they enhance performance or not, whether they should be distributed across the whole organization or not.

As stated above, narratives are contextual entities but they may contain "…knowledge of regularities, or scientific principles, or general values…" (Tsoukas and Cummings 1997: 667), which might be distilled from the narration and then transformed into a more generalized advise, or as Calori puts it, the analysis of narratives might: "….reveal their lay ontology and serve to construct a higher-order theory" (2002: 131). As already pointed out, narrative knowledge by its very nature lacks a coherent structure and it therefore does not allow for any generalization without a foregoing reflection. With respect to this self-legitimizing nature of narrations, they follow a non-reflexive mode and therefore their validity cannot be analyzed and discussed within this non-reflexive, narrative mode. To do this the narrative context has to be transformed and the narrations be made subject to a discursive mode, where the claims inherent in every narration can be made accessible and reflected in a way, that the claims have to be supported by reasons and the reasons can be evaluated according to discourse-specific criteria.

Seen this way, narrative and discursive knowledge are not completely separated worlds, but instead it is possible to transfer previously only implicitly accepted claims (narrative mode) into the world of discursive reasoning (Habermas 1984:17). As a consequence instead of complete separation there is a ongoing interchange between the narrative life-world and the reflexive world of discourses: implicit validity claims can be surfaced and made subject of a discursive assessment. This discursive assessment allows to elicit the essence of stories' content and to check its validity in terms of arguments provided supplementarily.

In case the once narrated problem solution bears up the discursive assessment, a general lesson or best-practice can be distilled from the narration which might replace previously used but inferior practices. If the propositions pass the discursive reflection successfully, knowledge management can mark them (as "best practice" or something comparable) in order to provide orientation for members of the organization.

This discursive evaluation procedure pointed out above can be also be interpreted as a learning process (Habermas 1984: 18) which amounts in some cases to a special form of double-loop learning (Argyris and Schön 1978). Through a discursive assessment, narrated implicit assumptions, once taken for granted, get surfaced and reflected. More often than not this reflexive practice might induce a change of these background assumptions in terms of double-loop learning.

The crucial point here is that this third step opens the door for assessing the quality of narrative knowledge and for overcoming the taken for granted mentality, which predominates the current knowledge management debate. This prevalent attitude of keeping away from assessing issues is all the more surprising since the broadly acclaimed resourced-based-view stresses the importance of organizational knowledge for corporate success if it can be qualified as a "strategic resource" (Barney 1991, 1997). Recently published empirical studies also emphasize the importance of evaluating knowledge claims in order to generate high-quality knowledge (Lee and Cole 2003: 638). For Lee and Cole a key driver in the Linux software development process has been the constant criticism of draft versions by peers: "In the Linux development community we observe a peer review process as a structured approach to generating criticism of existing versions, evaluating those criticisms, and eliminating 'error', while retaining those solutions that cannot be falsified" (Lee and Cole 2003: 639). This process of criticizing and evaluating matches nicely what we have conceptualized above as third step in our three step-model of developing narrations. In the light of our framework, the Linux knowledge creation process can be seen as a way of transforming narrative knowledge into discursive, consented knowledge through peer-review processes set up by the Linux development team.

Figure 1 is designed to summarize all three steps of our proposed three-step-model.

Figure 1: The 3-step model

Implications for Knowledge Management

This qualifying process along the suggestions of the 3-step model is likely to contribute to the improvement of knowledge management. Certainly not all narrations are supposed to pass these steps and in many cases passing step 1 or 2 is sufficient. In cases, however, where clarification is needed the model may well apply. Whatever the number, the basic issue behind, namely the quality of the knowledge resource, is likely to become a distinguishing feature of knowledge management anyway. We are therefore confident that qualification of organizational narrations is likely to become an important new dimension in knowledge management, one that is concerned with the knowledge content and its quality, not only with managing the context of knowledge, as suggested in most common approaches to knowledge management. A necessary precondition for this new dimension is a sound conception of knowledge that draws a distinction between narrative and discursive knowledge thereby providing a platform for evaluating the quality of emergent narrations in organizations.

This new dimension of qualifying narrations carries along new challenging tasks for knowledge management. Apart from meantime well-known suggestions devoted to create a flourishing narrative context ("ba") and making a storytelling friendly culture happen (Krogh 1998), knowledge management has to *institutionalize mechanisms of reflection* at all three levels of the proposed model. At the first level, all community members are invited to participate in the experiential evaluation process: therefore, an atmosphere that fosters criticism has to be established. No-sayers are appreciated, groupthink has to be challenged

actively (Janis 1982). Also, a communication system is needed which takes care of locally dispersed communities (virtual communities) providing opportunity to participate in the crucial feedback processes. Without doubt, the information- and communication technology is likely to play a pivotal role here. Some companies already operate successfully with intranet communication platforms which automatically ask for user feedback when getting narrative advice. Later on they circulate electronically the received feedback together with the original narration thereby approximating a continuously improving knowledge system (Gibbert et al. 2002). It seems to very important to institutionalize this feedback process formally to guarantee that all narrated messages are reliably provided with feedback information.

The second level of our model putting the range of the narrative knowledge on the agenda also has far reaching infrastructural implications. What is needed to fulfill this task is an architecture of overlapping, linked communities. Interfaces between them have to be established so that a constant interchange can occur. The assessment procedure of the narrations as such has principally the same requirements as on the first level.

At the third level, the organization of the *review process come to the fore. Some firms pioneered with review committees* which have been institutionalized to assess the quality of the narrated problem solutions. Such committees consist of acknowledged experts of the field in question who meet on regular basis. Experts are expected to discuss the surfaced narrated problem-solution along consented criteria and decide whether or not they are likely to work. To get this subject more concrete five examples of such evaluation criteria are quoted below. The examples are taken from a case study at Shell International Exploration and Production. At Shell the experts used these criteria to evaluate new practices/narrations surfaced in the communities of practice in the field of exploring and producing hydrocarbons. The issues discussed within the three observed technical communities with altogether 15.000 members cover mainly engineering themes on off-shore deep sea drilling techniques. The peer-review committee agreed on the following five criteria, their weighting differed from case to case:

- Health, Safety and Environment: Here, safety risks for the staff and the impact of a solution for the environment were given major importance.

- Cost estimation: They were a very general, but very important criteria. What are long- and short term costs when applying the solution, how is the proportion of fixed and variable costs?

- Quality/Risk: This category refers to the performance potential of a practice. Questions on the reliability, durability and transferability were taken into consideration here.

- Alignment with other processes: This issue highlights the interdependence with other processes which can be positive or negative. Salient questions were: Does the reported solution fit with already existing related processes or not? Is the narrated solution really new or are there already existing equal processes? Are the costs of integrating the narrated solution into already existing processes too high? Does the narrated solution falsify an already existing solution so that this has to be changed?

- Implementation time: How urgent is the narrated solution for improving our practices? Can we speed up the process? etc.

Obviously different practices require different criteria, the ones used by the group at Shell cannot be considered having universal validity. The basic lesson to be learned is that first of all review-committees have to find an agreed canon of criteria considered to be important in their field to evaluate narrated practices. Once these criteria are set up, the committee should meet regularly to discuss the narrated practices. The results of the evaluation should be made available for all community members. Subsequently, certain narrated practices might become mandatory for the solution of specific problems, or could replace previously used, but not comparably effective ones. On the other side, less effective narrative practices may be deleted.

Certainly these are only first suggestions on how such a qualification of narrations might be translated into effective practices. These design issues have to be explored further into much more detail. But the basic direction clearly emerges: Knowledge management has to tackle the quality issue of organizational narrations generated in organizations. A necessary and indispensable prerequisite for this endeavor is a clear conceptualization of the epistemological nature of knowledge and narrations; an issue which has too long been ignored in the debate on organizational knowledge management (Schreyögg 2001, Alvesson and Kärreman 2001, Grandori and Kogut 2002). Ignoring this issue is likely to threaten organizational processes. Any meaningful knowledge management should address the question of evaluating narrations, the advice to appreciate all kinds of practices, ideas, feelings etc. irrespective of its validity seems to be too risky an advice.

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