

**Knowledge Transfer in Total Institutions:
Trust and Influence in the U.S. Prison System**

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Abstract

This study contributes to the wider body of literature on organizational learning by broadening the definition of knowledge transfer to include interpersonal influence behaviors and by examining this process between employees and management in a low-trust environment. A study was undertaken in a sampling of guards in the U.S. prison system, which represents a “total institution.” Two research questions were posed: (1) What is the trust climate in prisons? (2) How is trust related to the use of low-coercion and high-coercion upward influence strategies? Results showed that the trust level was low and that upward influence among prison guards was more likely to be low coercion, using friendliness and reason, regardless of the security level or other differences of the ten organizations. Implications for this study point to the importance of formal and informal influence mechanisms across organizational structure. The trust climate is an important moderator in the knowledge transfer process.

This paper conceptualizes knowledge transfer as a directional process in organizations. That is, knowledge in organizations can be understood by the movement of knowledge across hierarchical structures (Kayes, 2006). Understanding the mechanisms and frequency by which information is exchanged and subsequently how meaning is attached to it is critical to studies of organizations.

The ways in which employees try to change the attitudes, beliefs, and actions of persons higher in the organizational hierarchy, also termed *upward influence*, is conceived as knowledge transfer between employees and management. Upward knowledge transfer and upward influence are similar terms for purposes of this study. This study does not stand alone in conceptualizing knowledge transfer as influence. Researchers have likened knowledge transfer to other categories of social influence such as ‘issue selling’ (e.g., Dutton & Ashford, 1993), social exchange (e.g., McClintock, Kramer, & Keil, 1984), and managing impressions (e.g., Rao, Schmidt, & Murray, 1994). To investigate knowledge transfer, a “total institution” was chosen. Correctional facilities provide fertile soil to study total institutions because they have strict hierarchies and informal and formal rules about the exchange of information among subordinates and bosses.

Although the organizational structure and rigidity of formal roles in total institutions might serve to aid the downward knowledge transfer process, microdynamics contained in the trust climate such as consistency and credibility can deter the upward knowledge transfer process. Research has indicated that it is imperative to understand how trust is built and maintained in organizations and to increase our awareness of the relationship between organizational trust and individual behavior. This understanding is

critical because the trust that people have in the organizations affects how they interact with others, the risks that they take, how they get their work done, and the ideas that they contribute (Galford & Drapeau, 2003).

Thus, this study examined the effects of trust climate (consistency, credibility) on the relationship between total institutional structure (social role distance, rigidity of roles) and upward influence (low coercion, high coercion) in the U.S. prison system. This study provides data on the types of strategies that correctional officers use to transmit knowledge up the formal hierarchy in prisons and the effects of the trust climate on these strategies. The paper starts by reviewing the concept of total institutions.

The Social Role of Total Institutions

Total institutions are not simply marginalized organizations, separate from mainstream organizational reality (Goffman, 1962). According to Goffman, total institutions serve to describe workplaces that have “barriers to social intercourse from the outside” and are subject to “rigid roles and role structures.” Activities in total institutions can be described as seeking rational objectives, are generally carried out in structured groups, and are designed to preserve social role distance and the formal structure of authority. Today, total institutions can be found in prisons, military bases, reserves for native peoples, abbeys, monasteries, missions, and boarding schools, as well as specific types of hospitals, nursing homes, and therapeutic communities such as alcohol and drug treatment centers. But the characteristics of total institutions proliferate beyond this list to include bureaucracies where social role distance, centralized authority, and rigidity of roles are commonplace. Goffman summarizes the use of his term *total*:

First, all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under the same authority. Second, each phase of the member's daily activity is carried out in the immediate company of a large batch of others, all of whom are treated alike and required to do the same things together. Third, all phases of the day's activities are tightly scheduled with one activity leading at a pre-arranged time into the next, the whole sequence of events being imposed from above by a system of explicit, formal rulings and a body of officials. Finally, the various enforced activities are brought together in a single rational plan purportedly designed to fulfill the official aims of the institution (p. 17).

Researchers have noted that in total institutions, institutional control does not in fact have to be total (e.g., Thomas, 1984) but can be extremely rigid and structured. This responds to assertions (e.g., Farrington, 1992) that modern prisons have a much looser structure than institutions that Goffman depicted and cannot be considered 'total' since the modern prison is not cut off from mainstream society. However, if one analyzes the intent of Goffman's typology, it is not a rigid classification schema based on an absolute set of normative qualifications, but rather a set of guidelines for thinking and responding to behavior in a special set of organizations. This study focuses on prisons in particular as having characteristics of total institutions.

Prisons as Total Institutions

Prisons in the U.S. fall under Goffman's guidelines, as they have highly formalized structures, rigid social norms, and a highly defined organizational climate reinforced by physical structures such as walls and intangible structures such as rules around social roles and segregation of offenders. Even in minimum-security work-release

facilities, highly formalized rules and rigid social norms determine the social order between inmates and staff and barriers to the outside world. Prisons do not need to be totally insulated from any outside influence; they simply need to be insular with barriers to the outside in order to fit Goffman's description.

Foucault (1974) focused on the importance of studying prisons to best understand issues of knowledge and power:

The prison must be the microcosm of the perfect society in which individuals are isolated in their moral existence, but in which they come together in a strict hierarchical framework, with no lateral relation, communication being possible only in a vertical direction (p. 238).

Although Foucault writes of the isolation of prisoners and their segmented knowledge networks, these same factors are applicable in studies of correctional officers in prisons. Correctional officers have rigidly defined communication or knowledge networks up the organizational hierarchy. Power in these terms is synonymous with knowledge (Foucault, 1974; French & Raven, 1959). Numerous researchers (e.g., Kipnis & Schmidt, 1988; Yukl, Falbe, & Youn, 1993; Chacko, 1990; McFarland, Ryan, & Kriska, 2002) have used the term *influence* as the behavioral manifestation of power. Where power is the capacity to influence others, influence is the actual behavioral attempt to sell ideas or change attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors. This is crucial in understanding upward knowledge transfer as a process of upward influence. If we take this notion of influence as power seriously, a more complete look at knowledge transfer and its relationship to the upward influence process is essential.

Upward Influence in Total Institutions

Importantly, total institutions have well-defined power dependencies between managers and subordinates based on their formal roles. Interpersonal power, in particular, is defined as “the capacity of one party (the agent) to influence another party (the target)” (Yukl, 2002, p. 142). This capacity, or interpersonal power, is measured through behaviors termed *influence strategies*. These influence strategies are described as ‘upward’ because the targets of influence, the wardens, are higher in positional power and organizational hierarchy than the influencers. That is, the correctional officers influence the wardens up the institution’s formal hierarchy. The strategies are measured based on level of coercion (e.g., Knippenberg & Steensma, 2003). Therefore, two variables of upward influence are low coercion and high coercion.

The specific upward influence strategies are reason, friendliness, bargaining, assertiveness, and coalition. Reason and friendliness comprise the low-coercion variable, and assertiveness, bargaining, and coalition comprise the high-coercion variable.

Low-Coercion Strategies

Reason or rational persuasion is defined by different theorists similarly (e.g., Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980; Klein, 1998; Krippendorf, 1995; Mowday, 1979; Yukl, Falbe, & Youn, 1993). Yukl and Tracey (1992) said that with *rational persuasion*, “the agent uses logical arguments and factual evidence to persuade the target that a proposal or request is viable and likely to result in the attainment of task objectives” (p. 526). Kipnis and Schmidt (1983) introduced *reason* as the use of logical arguments to encourage compliance by the target. Friendliness, also referred to as “ingratiation” (e.g., Yukl, 2002; Liden & Mitchell, 1988; Yukl, Guinan, & Sottolano, 1995; Kipnis &

Vanderveer, 1971; Mowday, 1979), means to cause someone to like you in order to sell your ideas or gain resources that strengthen the relationship between the influencer and the target (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1983).

High-Coercion Strategies

Bargaining is the actual or perceived promise of an exchange of resources (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1983). It is considered a high-coercion strategy because it is often achieved through pressure (e.g., McDonald, 2001). Assertiveness is making a direct request and also involves the capacity for pressure and threats. The third high-coercion strategy, coalition, occurs when the influencer aligns himself or herself with other employees to exert a unified group influence on the target (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1983).

Trust Climate in Total Institutions

Trust climate describes the atmosphere in organizations and is determined by the interactions of leaders with their followers (e.g., Litwin & Stringer, 1968; Deutsch, 1958; Crozier, 1964). Trust climate is important for understanding total institutions because of its relationship to organizational structure and its impact on knowledge in organizations (e.g., Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Foucault, 1974, 1977). For purposes of this study, climate is conceptualized as the trust in top leadership, or the *trust climate*. The trust climate determines the types of upward influence behaviors or the way that knowledge is integrated among employees and management in prisons and is depicted in Figure 1.

- Insert Figure 1 about here -

While the literature on trust at the individual level of analysis is seemingly the most abundant, the literature at the collective level (e.g., group, organization, and society) is still emerging (Gibb, 1964; Zand, 1972; Sashkin, 1990; Fukayama, 1995; Huff,

Couper, & Jones, 2002) and is particularly relevant to considerations of organizational knowledge transfer in total institutions. Gibb (1978) explained how organizations with autocratic structures will abound with suppression of emotions, hierarchal use of power and control, and the feeling of powerlessness by employees. It stands to reason that a baseline of trust in top leadership is needed in autocratic systems for knowledge transfer to occur. This trust in top leadership is described as the credibility and consistency of leadership and stems from research on leadership (e.g., Conger & Kanungo, 1988). *Credibility* introduces an element of believability (or follow-through on what leaders have promised); *consistency*, on the other hand, deals with the predictability of leaders' actions or behaviors over time.

Research Questions

This study provides a better overall picture of how knowledge is moved up the hierarchical structure in a total institution given the climate of trust. This study addresses two questions.

First, this research seeks to determine what the trust climate is in total institutions and if this differs based on various organizational factors such as level of security or private or public management of the organization.

Research question 1: What is the trust climate in prisons?

Second, the research seeks to uncover the specific types of upward influence strategies that correctional officers use with management. Research has linked the level of coercion (hard or soft strategies) with organizational climate; however, this research has not previously been conducted in a rigid bureaucracy or prisons. The second research

question addresses the types of influence strategies employed and the relationship between the coerciveness of the strategies and the climate of trust.

Research question 2: How is trust related to the use of low-coercion and high-coercion upward influence strategies?

The possible moderating effects of individual-level variables (e.g., age, years of education, years of work experience) and organizational level variables (e.g., security level of the prison and private or public management of the prison) are factored into the study.

Methods

This study utilizes a cross-sectional correlation design using two different validated self-report questionnaires.

Sample

The sample for this study came from all correctional officers in one region of the U.S. Department of Corrections (Table 1). The region, which had ten different organizations, was purposefully selected to ensure that differences in security level were represented. Data for both organizational-level measures were gathered randomly from the subjects: correctional officers in each of the ten institutions. Participation was voluntary.

- Insert Table 1 about here -

The sample on average was 39 years old with an average of 7 years of work experience in their organization. The sample was predominantly African American and was distributed almost evenly by gender (Table 2).

- Insert Table 2 about here -

Data Collection

All surveys were administered in person by the researcher in conjunction with a cover letter explaining the intent of the research and providing an informed consent form. The researcher distributed approximately 400 surveys. This number was selected to maximize the responses and ensure a large sample. A preliminary power analysis suggested that an acceptable and moderate power level would be achieved at $n=27$ for each institution. Thus, to maximize reliability and increase potential power, a desired sample of 40 was selected to take each of the two instruments in each of the ten institutions. The average response rate across all ten organizations was 38%.

Measures

The first instrument, the Management Behavior Climate Assessment (MBCA), measures organizational trust. The second instrument, the Profile of Organizational Influence Strategies (POIS), measures the use of upward influence strategies. Both survey instruments use Likert-type responses, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

Upward influence. The 50-item POIS instrument measures the use of six influence strategies that can be considered low coercion or high coercion. This instrument was selected because it has been extensively validated in previous studies. Additionally, the POIS was designed to measure influence strategies from the perspective of the influencer. In past research, reliability was high, with alpha coefficients of .70 to .90. In this study, the reliability measures were similar: friendliness ($\alpha=.83$), bargaining ($\alpha=.90$), reason ($\alpha=.87$), assertiveness ($\alpha=.89$), and coalition ($\alpha=.83$).

Trust climate. The MBCA is a 50-item instrument that measures trust climate as two dimensions, consistency and credibility. The consistency scales measure how senior executives act toward different people and what they tell different people. The credibility scales measure the alignment between executives' words and their past and future actions and outcomes. The consistency scale ($\alpha=.87$) and the credibility scale ($\alpha=.89$) on the MBCA showed strong reliability.

Data Analysis

Data were analyzed using correlations. Pearson's correlations, specifically, were used to determine a relationship between credibility and consistency and upward influence strategies. Additionally, Cronbach's alpha and factor analysis were used to determine reliability and validity for the population relative to the instruments used (Fraenkel & Wallen, 1996). The Cronbach's alpha results reported by the authors of the MBCA and the POIS were compared with the Cronbach's alpha results from this study. Significance was set at the .05 level.

Factor analysis is used in a series of post hoc tests. The data from the POIS were forced into two factors using the principal components' extraction method and rotated using a varimax rotation. This procedure identified two factors: high-coercion upward influence strategies and low-coercion upward influence strategies. This factor analysis replicates the work performed by McFarland, Ryan, and Kriska (2002). In their study, Kipnis and Schmidt's (1988) influence strategies were classified into two categories, hard low and high coercive strategies. The hard strategies were composed of items from the assertiveness, coalition, and bargaining scales. The soft strategies were composed of items from the friendliness and reason scales. After two clear categories of variables were

identified, these two categories were correlated with credibility and consistency using Pearson's correlations.

Results

Upward Influence Strategies

Table 3 shows the frequency of upward influence strategies used in each of the ten organizations. The low-coercion strategies, reason and friendliness, were used more frequently across all of the prisons than the high-coercion strategies, assertiveness, bargaining, and coalitions.

- Insert Table 3 about here -

No significant differences in types of strategies used were seen among the ten prisons (Table 4). In general, the same upward strategies were used in the different organizations.

- Insert Table 4 about here -

Trust Climate

Overall, the trust climate on both the credibility and consistency dimensions was very low compared with results of prior research. Table 5 shows the mean scores for credibility and the mean scores for consistency. ANOVAs were calculated to determine if the trust climate varied by security level or by privately managed vs publicly managed. There were no significant differences across organizations for trust climate and security level nor for trust climate and private or publicly managed.

- Insert Table 5 about here -

Trust climate showed a positive correlation compared with the use of low-coercion influence strategies. Low trust—and in particular low credibility—was related

to the use of nonthreatening upward influence. Bivariate correlations were calculated to determine whether any relationships existed between credibility and consistency and upward influence strategies. Results indicate significant correlations between low-coercion strategies and credibility ($r=.71, p=.02$) (Table 6).

- Insert Table 6 about here -

Demographic Effects

There were no significant difference between levels of coercion and levels of consistency and credibility among low- and high-security prisons and between privately managed and publicly managed prisons. The organizations in this sample consist of minimum-, medium-, moderate-, and maximum-security levels (Table 1). Organization 9 was the only privately managed facility.

Discussion

Findings on Research Question #1

Research question #1 asked about the trust climates in prisons. Trust climates are determined by the level of credibility and consistency displayed by top management. The data indicated that, overall, trust is very low across all of the prisons. Zand (1997) speculated that employees people who are in environments where they cannot trust others will distort information and hide their feelings. Thus, if an environment is low in trust, as the prisons in this study are, then employee behavior may be masked and distorted, further confounding the study of upward influence strategies.

The low overall trust scores in this study lead to the conclusion that another confounding variable may account for the lack of significant relationships between study variables. One possibility is *fear or distrust* present in the organization. When people are

in the stage of fear and distrust, punishment and blame are the means of interaction. If punishment is the primary means of interpersonal interactions, influence may be difficult to assess. Suffice it to say, measuring the relationship between organizational trust and the use of upward influence strategies may be possible only in an environment that is not so low in trust. That is, a baseline of trust is probably necessary so that fear and distrust do not confound the relationship between influence behavior and credibility and consistency.

Another possibility is the *difference in ethnicity* between correctional officers and top management. The correctional officer sample was severely skewed with respect to ethnicity. Eighty-four percent of the correctional officer sample was African American, while the wardens, the top managers in the organizations, were primarily Caucasian. Kipnis (1996) theorized that when management and employees differ on measures of diversity such as “culture, class, race, background, gender and work ideologies” (p. 48), managers may display increased control of employees. By the same token, as top managers distrust employees who are different from themselves, employees may also distrust top managers, and knowledge is distorted. Therefore, there may be a confounding relationship between ethnicity and influence and trust.

Findings on Research Question #2

Research question #2 asked how trust is related to the use of low coercion and high coercion upward influence strategies. First, it was determined that correctional officers are more inclined to use low-coercion influence strategies such as friendliness and reason than high-coercion strategies such as coalitions, bargaining, and assertiveness.

Furthermore, there were no significant differences in strategies used across the prisons even when controlling for security level.

There is a possible theoretical explanation for why low-coercion upward influence was significantly positively associated with organizational trust even after controlling for possible confounding effects from demographic variables. This possibility is *bureaucracy*. This positive relationship indicates that using low-coercion strategies such as reason increases as top management is perceived as being credible and consistent. Using logic and data in organizations is supported, specifically, in bureaucratic organizations according to Weber (1946). Organizations that have strict hierarchies, such as correctional facilities, have informal and formal rules about the exchange of information among subordinates and bosses. As the perception that management is credible and consistent increases, as managers ought to be in functional bureaucracies, the use of logic among employees increases. That is, as the climate indicates that the managers act as they should act in a bureaucracy (e.g., they are being fair, consistent, believable, credible), the employees act as they should act in a bureaucracy. Employees' upward influence attempts are rational and based on informal and formal rules.

Low-coercion influence strategies were significantly associated with credibility even after controlling for possible confounding effects from demographic variables. There is an explanation for this finding based on the work by Kouzes and Posner (1993) on leadership. Kouzes and Posner (1993) explain that credible leaders develop credible employees. As management is perceived as being credible, employees use soft upward influence strategies. Employees who foster credibility would be more inclined to use soft upward influence strategies with management. Low-coercion strategies are less

threatening. They consist of reason and friendliness, whereas high-coercion upward influence strategies are more threatening and include Assertiveness and Bargaining.

Implications for Organizational Learning

This research has one primary implication for organizational learning. It shows the limits of knowledge transfer in total institutions. In this study, influence and strategies were sorted into two categories: low coercion and high coercion. In prisons, knowledge moving upward from employees to managers is transferred primarily through low-coercion strategies. High-coercion strategies are infrequently used. If officers infrequently use mechanisms such as coalitions to sell their ideas, gain resources, and move knowledge up the organization, the organizations potentially lose their ability to learn through 'informal' mechanisms. As a result, learning from experience and tacit knowledge transfer in particular might be limited.

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Figure 1. Knowledge transfer as upward influence determined by total institutional structure and trust climate.




Table 1

Description of Study Sample

Org.	Men or women	Security level*	State/private	Prisoners (N)	Officers (N)	Participating/invited
1	Both; separate centers	Medium	State	663	240	26/40 (65%)
2	Men	Maximum	State	467	95	13/40 (33%)
3	Men	Moderate	State	3,000	570	17/40 (43%)
4	Men and women	Medium (substance abuse institution)	State	900	147	21/40 (53%)
5	Men	Medium	State	740	185	40/40 (100%)
6	Men	Low	State	530	85	12/40 (30%)
7	Men	Low	State	490	107	20/40 (50%)
8	Men	Low	State	1,140	214	11/40 (28%)
9	Men	Medium	Private	1,200	207	26/40 (65%)
10	Men	Medium	State	1,536	150	15/40 (38%)

*The security levels are defined as follows:

Low (level 2): For initial assignment only. To be eligible for this level, the inmate must have no history of escape attempts within the past 5 years. Those with single life sentences must have reached their parole eligibility date.

Medium (level 3): Inmates with single, multiple, and life-plus sentences who have served 20 consecutive years on sentence.

Moderate (level 4): Inmates with long-term; single, multiple, and life-plus sentences.

Maximum (level 5): Inmates on death row, as well as those with long-term; single, multiple, and life-plus sentences.

Inmates cannot be transferred to a less-secure facility unless they have shown no disruptive behavior for at least the previous 24 months.

Table 2

Demographic Statistics of the Correctional Officer Respondents for All Prisons

Factor		Value
Institutional security level	Maximum	5%
	Moderate	8%
	Medium	65%
	Low	22%
Age	Mean	39 years
Gender	Male	53%
	Female	47%
Years worked	Mean	7 years
Ethnicity	African American	85%
	Caucasian	14%
	Other	1%

Table 3

Summary Statistics of Upward Influence by Organization

Org.	Mean ± standard deviation (variance)				
	Reason	Friendliness	Bargaining	Assertiveness	Coalition
1 (n=26)	2.57 ± 1.00 (1.00)	2.46 ± .86 (.74)	1.83 ± .87 (.75)	1.84 ± .75 (.57)	2.53 ± 1.05 (1.11)
2 (n=13)	3.00 ± .80 (.64)	2.56 ± .80 (.65)	1.80 ± .74 (.55)	1.71 ± .61 (.38)	2.65 ± 1.10 (1.22)
3 (n=17)	3.05 ± 1.09 (1.19)	2.67 ± .79 (.62)	2.00 ± .73 (.53)	2.32 ± .89 (.79)	2.38 ± 1.19 (1.42)
4 (n=21)	2.57 ± .97 (.95)	2.19 ± .87 (.77)	1.72 ± .71 (.51)	1.65 ± .71 (.51)	2.50 ± 1.25 (1.57)
5 (n=40)	2.96 ± .97 (.94)	2.68 ± .78 (.62)	2.03 ± .92 (.84)	2.04 ± .69 (.48)	2.77 ± 1.21 (1.47)
6 (n=12)	2.93 ± .77 (.60)	3.03 ± .48 (.23)	2.18 ± .78 (.61)	2.02 ± .52 (.27)	2.12 ± .74 (.55)
7 (n=20)	3.07 ± 1.03 (1.08)	2.80 ± .64 (.42)	2.12 ± .90 (.82)	2.04 ± .84 (.71)	2.82 ± 1.09 (1.19)
8 (n=11)	2.94 ± 1.17 (1.37)	2.62 ± .73 (.54)	1.96 ± .82 (.68)	1.83 ± .91 (.83)	2.45 ± 1.10 (1.22)
9 (n=26)	2.60 ± 1.15 (1.34)	2.81 ± .84 (.71)	2.27 ± 1.11 (1.24)	2.15 ± .98 (.96)	2.42 ± 1.19 (1.43)
10 (n=15)	2.82 ± .94 (.90)	2.99 ± .89 (.79)	2.35 ± .97 (.95)	2.47 ± .84 (.71)	2.56 ± .90 (.81)
Total (n=201)	2.83 ± 1.00 (1.01)	2.66 ± .81 (.65)	2.02 ± .89 (.79)	2.01 ± .80 (.65)	2.56 ± 1.11 (1.24)

Table 4

Differences in Upward Influence Strategies Across Organizations

Strategy	Groups	Sum of Squares	df	Mean square	F	p
Reason	Between groups	7.97	9	.88	.86	.55
	Within groups	195.02	191	1.02		
	Total	203.00	200			
Friendliness	Between groups	10.18	9	1.13	1.78	.07
	Within groups	121.35	191	.63		
	Total	131.54	200			
Bargaining	Between groups	7.27	9	.80	1.01	.42
	Within groups	151.47	191	.79		
	Total	158.75	200			
Assertiveness	Between groups	10.30	9	1.14	1.82	.06
	Within groups	119.66	191	.62		
	Total	129.97	200			
Coalition	Between groups	6.87	9	.76	.60	.79
	Within groups	242.60	191	1.27	1.78	
	Total	249.47	200			

** $p \leq .05$

Table 5

Summary Statistics for Trust Climate by Organization

Org.	Scale	Mean	Std. deviation	Variance
1 (n=26)	Consistency	2.86	.49	.24
	Credibility	2.61	.48	.23
2 (n=10)	Consistency	2.80	.78	.61
	Credibility	2.64	.80	.64
3 (n=21)	Consistency	3.12	.55	.30
	Credibility	3.15	.47	.22
4 (n=38)	Consistency	2.59	.55	.30
	Credibility	2.34	.47	.22
5 (n=46)	Consistency	3.01	.65	.42
	Credibility	2.88	.64	.40
6 (n=15)	Consistency	3.08	.47	.22
	Credibility	2.84	.52	.26
7 (n=31)	Consistency	3.07	.75	.56
	Credibility	2.93	.76	.58
8 (n=15)	Consistency	2.82	.54	.29
	Credibility	2.76	.75	.57
9 (n=41)	Consistency	2.62	.69	.47
	Credibility	2.48	.70	.49
10 (n=25)	Consistency	2.79	.62	.38
	Credibility	2.63	.61	.37

Table 6

Pearson's Correlations Between High-Coercion and Low-Coercion Upward Influence

Strategies and Credibility and Consistency

Strategies		Credibility	Consistency
High coercion	Pearson correlation	.39	.37
	Significance (two-tailed)	.25	.29
	N	10	10
Low coercion	Pearson correlation	.71	.60
	Significance (two-tailed)	.02**	.06
	N	10	10

** $p \leq .05$.