

# Helping Patients and Physicians Reach Individualized Medical Decisions: Theory and Application to Prenatal Diagnostic Testing

Edi Karni, Moshe Leshno, and Sivan Rapaport

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- His financial and other concerns, such as its impact on his lifestyle and family.

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- **Normative** - The presumption is that the patient would like his decision to be governed by the principles (axioms) of expected utility theory, which we take as normatively compelling.
- **Non-paternalistic** - the recommended course of action maximizes the patient's expected utility, but is silent on what this utility should be. The patient is the ultimate arbiter of his own well-being.

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- $\lambda$  and  $v$  - "utility cost," (e.g., the pain or discomfort) associated with actions.

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- $r(\omega)$  is the solution to the equations

$$\pi(x, \omega) = \left[ x^{r(\omega)} + 1 - r(\omega) \right] \frac{\sigma_{\varepsilon}^2}{2}, \omega \in \Omega.$$

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- Combining these results we ascribe to the patient the utility functions

$$U(x, \omega) := b(\omega) \left[ -e^{\frac{-x r(\omega)}{r(\omega)}} \right] + d(\omega), \omega \in \Omega.$$

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- Patients' preferences are represented by expected utility functional

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- Both procedures performed by average physicians in a facility of one of the HMOs is fully covered.

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- Subjects were confronted with the hypothetical scenario according to which they won 1,000,000 NIS and, as a result, their wealth increase from  $x$  to  $y = x + 1,000,000$ .
- We fixed  $u(x, \omega_0) = 0$  and  $u(y, \omega_0) = 1$  and solved for

$$b(\omega_0) = \frac{1}{-e^{\frac{-x_1(\omega_0)r(\omega_0)}{r(\omega_0)}} + e^{\frac{-x_0(\omega_0)r(\omega_0)}{r(\omega_0)}}}, \quad d(\omega_0) = \frac{e^{\frac{-x_0(\omega_0)r(\omega_0)}{r(x_1, \omega_0)}}}{-e^{\frac{-x_1(\omega_0)r(\omega_0)}{r(\omega_0)}} + e^{\frac{-x_0(\omega_0)r(\omega_0)}{r(\omega_0)}}}$$

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- We obtain

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$$d(\omega_1) = \frac{1}{p_j(\omega_1)} \left[ b(\omega_0) \left( -e^{\frac{-y(\omega_0)r(\omega_0)}{r(\omega_0)}} \right) + d(\omega_0) \right] + b(\omega_1) e^{\frac{-x r(\omega_1)}{r(\omega_1)}}.$$

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- Non of the participants in either study were unreasonable according to (a) and only 9% of the respondents in the CVS study and 3% of the participants in the amniocentesis study were qualified as unreasonable according to (b).
- Thus, broadly speaking, the participants in the study seem able to give useful answers.

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- Among the women that display outcome-dependent risk attitude (30% in the CVS study and 24% in the amniocentesis study) 18% of the women in the CVS study exhibit higher degree of risk aversion in the state of continued pregnancy (that is,  $\pi(x, \omega_0) > \pi(x, \omega_1)$ ) and 12% exhibit higher degree of risk aversion in the state of fetus loss (that is,  $\pi(x, \omega_0) < \pi(x, \omega_1)$ ).



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- Further examination of the responses indicate the following general features
- Most women (70% in the CVS study and 76% in the amniocentesis study) display the same risk attitude in the two outcome (that is,  $\pi(x, \omega_0) = \pi(x, \omega_1)$ ). Thus, for the great majority, the risk attitudes are outcome-independent.
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# Case study I

- This patient's initial wealth is:  $x = 1,500,000$  *NIS*

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
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- This patient utility function is depicted in the below.





	Average Free	Average 570 <i>NIS</i>	Expert (In both cases)
$p_{CVS}(\omega_1) = 0.5\%$	3,186 <i>NIS</i>	3,671 <i>NIS</i>	<i>Average</i>
$p_{CVS}(\omega_1) = 0.25\%$	4,636 <i>NIS</i>	4,500 <i>NIS</i>	<i>Expert</i>
$p_{CVS}(\omega_1) = 0.1\%$	5,646 <i>NIS</i>	4,500 <i>NIS</i>	<i>Expert</i>

## Case study II

- This patient's initial wealth is:  $x = 3,000,000$  *NIS*

## Case study II


- This patient's initial wealth is:  $x = 3,000,000$  *NIS*
- He was asked to imagine winning 1 million *NIS*, so that  $y = 4,000,000$

## Case study II

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- This patient's initial wealth is:  $x = 3,000,000$  NIS
- He was asked to imagine winning  $I$  million NIS, so that  $y = 4,000,000$
- $r(\omega_0) = 0.27$ ,  $r(\omega_1) = 0.25$
- This patient utility function is depicted the below.



	Average Free	Average 570 <i>NIS</i>	Expert (In both cases)
$p_{CVS}(\omega_1) = 0.5\%$	750 <i>NIS</i>	1,316 <i>NIS</i>	<i>Average</i>
$p_{CVS}(\omega_1) = 0.25\%$	1,125 <i>NIS</i>	1,689 <i>NIS</i>	<i>Average</i>
$p_{CVS}(\omega_1) = 0.1\%$	1,350 <i>NIS</i>	1,913 <i>NIS</i>	<i>Average</i>