

 We will play 3 rounds of a game http://bit.ly/bMageq case sensitive!

"Keynesian Beauty Contest"

Keynesian Beauty Contest

- We played the Keynesian Beauty Contest
- Pick an integer between 0 and 100
 - Winner is the person closest to 2/3 of average number
- In Economics, this is known as a Simultaneous Move Game
 - As is Rock Paper Scissors
- The typical concept used to analyse these games is the Nash Equilibrium

- Idea comes from John Nash
 - Nobel Prize in 1994
 - A Beautiful Mind
- Mutual Best Responses
 - What's the best thing I can do, given what you are doing?
 - What's the best thing you can do, given what I'm doing?
 - If these coincide, we have a Nash Equilibrium

- Thinking in terms of best responses...
 - If everyone else guesses 100
 - 2/3 of 100 = 67
 - So 67 would be my best response
 - If guesses are below 100
 - My best response is below 67
 - So I should never guess above 67
- If I should never guess above 67, then neither should anyone else!

- So if I know nobody will guess above 67
 - My best response is always less than...
 - $-2/3 \times 67 = 45$
- Which is true for everybody!
- So if I know nobody will guess above 45
 - My best response is always less than...
 - 2/3 x 45 = 30
- And so on.....

 This procedure is known as iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies

- Following it gives a Nash Equilibrium

- The other way to find the Nash Equilibrium is to use *mutual best responses*
 - When is my best response x
 - Equal to 2/3 of everybody's best response

• = X

$$-x = 2/3 x$$

Implies x = 0

Keynesian Beauty Contest

- Experimentally, it seems like people use some kind of "iterated reasoning"
- But don't iterate all the way down to 0!
- Each time you iterate
 - You believe that your opponents are "1 level smarter"
 - And you best respond to that
- So what "level" of smart do you believe people to be?

- Consider a decision rule of the form
 - What is it best for me to do, if I assume everyone else is just picking a random number between 0 and 100?
 - This will give an average of 50
 - So I should pick (2/3) x 50 = 33
 - What do we get if, on average, people are this kind of "Level 1" player?
 - The **average** ends up being 33, and hence the **winning number** is 22
 - Close to what we got 33.9; 22.6!

- Then you see the results, and realise everyone else thought like you!
 - So you think one level deeper...
 - "Everyone else is a "Level 1" thinker, and will choose 33, so I'll choose 22!"
 - Seems sensible!
 - But again, everyone does the same, so 22 becomes the average
 - And so $22 \times 2/3 = 15$ is the winning number
 - We got 16.3 ; 10.6 in round 2

- Again, you see the results and the process repeats...
 - I'll think one level deeper in round 3
 - And choose 15
 - So does everyone else
 - And 15 is the mean so 2/3 x 15 = 10 wins

• We got 17.2 ; 11.5 in round 3

 This type of reasoning seems to fit the data better than playing NE in every period!

- This pattern of data has been repeated for students and CEO's alike
- You act rationally, *conditional* on your slightly misguided beliefs about everyone else
 - A NE person has taken the "I presume that they presume that I presume that they presume...." logic to infinity
 - Which almost seems less rational!

k-Level reasoning Nagel (AER, 1995)

- This process is called k-level reasoning
 - The person playing a random number is a Level 0 player (L0)
 - Using no level of reasoning about other people
- Most people start 1 level up from that!
 - They are Level 1 players
 - Who assume everyone else is L0
- And will then progress as more information is provided about everyone else

k-Level reasoning Nagel (AER, 1995)

- It seems unlikely that anyone would start as a L∞ player without knowing the "correct answer" to start
 - But that is the NE idea
- You can play this online now!
- http://twothirdsofaverage.creativitygames.net/
- Why is this a "Keynesian" Beauty Contest
 - Extend this idea to the Stock Market
 - Rational Speculation....